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The crisis that shook the realm of three South Caucasian former Soviet republics in 
the 1980s and early 1990s left many scholars and experts astounded.  The conflicts 
escalated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost simultaneously.  
This study aims to analyse the discourse of ethnic disputes as they have contributed 
to mobilisation.   
 The title is adapted from Sigmund Freud’s concept of ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’ (1929).  Freud argues that ethnicity was too minor an issue to justify 
bloodshed. His point is that ethnic differences do not constitute a valid reason for 
war and atrocities; it is, rather, a veil for prejudices and a camouflage for other 
factors.  Hence, the study considers that ethnic differences were securitized, i.e. 
depicted as threats by certain political or military actors.  
 By examining the discursive dimension of the crisis, this thesis suggests that 
the meanings allocated to the nation and ethnic affiliations were instrumental in 
escalating the crisis.  The study adopts the securitization framework and finds that 
political narratives have influenced the interpretation of ethnicity and enmity across 






1. Chapter One  
 
Introduction, Context and Aim 
1.1.General Introduction  
 
The thesis focuses on the three conflicts that were the result of contested borders 
between the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia between the centre 
and two autonomous units: South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  It will address the events 
of the late 1980s up until the early 1990s, a time of transformations and the 
establishment of state independence that shaped policies and polities across the 
region.  The fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union paved the way to the 
independence of the individual units of the USSR, changing both the political and the 
societal landscapes.  The end of the bi-polar world order forced new states to switch 
from a hierarchical order to an anarchical society, a profoundly new challenge that 
was marked by wars and conflicts across the area.  The territorial claims had occupied 
the agenda in relations between the republican governments and their autonomous 
entities.  Political or ethnical disputes in republics other than those of Armenia, 
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Azerbaijan, and Georgia were not as violent as in the South Caucasus (e.g. the issue 
over Crimea’s status between Russia and Ukraine).   
 The decisions and approaches of policymakers in Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia — the former republics of the USSR — prompt this project to examine the 
conflicts in the South Caucasus.  This thesis will focus on three conflicts in one region: 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia — war-torn and disputed areas of 
the South Caucasus.  The main idea of this research is to analyse and re-classify the 
rise of separatism in three de-facto states.  How did the national movements shape 
the ideas and demands of autonomous entities as they mobilised the public along 
the ethnic lines?  This research aims to understand the content of disputes that took 
the lives of tens of thousands of innocent citizens.  General opinion about the war 
and conflict in the former Soviet Union tends towards primordial or great power 
game assumptions, an outlook mostly shared by the post-Soviet scholars, while the 
Western academia is more likely to explore the social constructivist dimensions of 
the conflicts (see Suny).  This project aims to give voice to the constructivist approach 
and emphasize the discourses and verbal communications hidden behind the 
sequence of the events outlined above.  
 The argument is based on the assessment that securitization served as a last 
resort for the national movements and their allies to acquire legitimacy and embark 
on coercive and military actions.  The collapse of the USSR revealed the shortcomings 
of a corrupt system, which failed to bring progressive social forces into politics.  
During major political shifts it is essential to acquire and develop “political 
consciousness”, which will itself lead to greater participation in the political system 
and acknowledgment of its demands; thus the political shift serves as a litmus test of 
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a system’s adjustability (Huntington, 2006: 143).  However, the break-up of the state 
represented a huge political about-turn within the strict Soviet hierarchical order.  It 
was impossible to assure the continuity of the political process.  Political groups in 
the USSR failed to adapt and were unreceptive to the new system (Huntington, 2006: 
143).  Hence it was impossible to sustain the normal process of interactions.  As 
Samuel Huntington notes, power has a dual function — it can both expand and 
contract, and must be “concentrated and dispersed” (2006: 143).  In other words, 
power is not a unilateral action, but a form of a reciprocal relationship.  Yet power 
was neither contracted nor dispersed in the three states of the South Caucasus.  
Subsequently, the failure to communicate post-regime requirements caused the 
crisis that took place in the South Caucasus after the breakup of the USSR.  The 
groups claiming power in Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan structured their narrative along 
ethnic lines and forgot about the need to “contract” and “disperse” power.  They 
thought that only the monopolisation of power and space was enough to govern 
effectively.  The governments of all three countries disregarded and underestimated 
the significance of communication.  Their policies fostered exclusiveness and rigidity 
(the inability to change).  Nationalists in the republics were delusional about their 
own potential as well as their relative importance.  For example, most nationalists in 
Tbilisi in 1989 thought that a nationwide strike could persuade Gorbachev to listen 
to their demands (Bogert, 1989).  In 1989, Newsweek reported from southern 
Georgia that national minorities did not feel safe, as an Azeri resident of Bolnisi talked 
about Georgian and Azerbaijani gangs roaming and shooting at night; in the 
meantime, the opposition (or nationalists) were unable to deliver a reassuring 
message (Bogert, 1989).  Willingness to listen to alternative arguments was absent, 
as nobody was ready to reconsider the positions and question their own reasoning 
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behind the rationale.  This project will explore and analyse how the cultural and 
territorial claims of autonomous entities were dealt with in terms of language and 
subsequent actions.            
 As suggested from the title, the interpretation of the crises offered by this 
thesis is that an ethnic difference is not itself a cause of war and atrocities; it is, 
rather, a focal point for prejudices and a camouflage for other factors.  But before it 
becomes an instrument, differences are “produced” (Derrida, 1982: 14).  The 
difference is given a degree or a level of distinction.  To a certain extent, this contrast 
is emphasized and imposed on a social level.  All those people, in Abkhazia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and South Ossetia had previously co-existed despite the political and 
geographic boundaries drawn by the Soviet Union authorities.  The Kremlin 
employed the practice of social/geographic engineering, that is, relocating people 
from one place to another or granting small chunks of cross-border provinces to 
neighbouring republics.  Paula Garb describes how people in the North Caucasus and 
Abkhazia complained about artificial boundaries: “borders were drawn to separate 
us from each other.  We almost forgot that we were related” (1998: 190).  Garb notes 
that people understand that differences were imposed by the Soviet regime (in the 
North Caucasus in particular), but argues that the absence of “Pan-Caucasian” 
identity and alliance combined with wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya exacerbated 
nationalism further (1998: 199).  Indeed, the ethnopolitical borders raised many 
issues that emphasized peoples’ ethnic background (see chapter 4).  Another 
example of social engineering was the relocation of Georgian families from the Racha 
region to Abkhazia after the World War II.  This relocation and the ethnic structure 
of the area later became a significant source of dilemma between governments in 
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Tbilisi and Sokhumi as the ethnic texture of Abkhazia became a cornerstone of 
disputes.   Earlier, in the nineteenth century, the Tsarist Russian government had 
deported thousands of residents of Abkhazia to Turkey, thus inflicting a long-lasting 
national trauma (on the Muhajirs).  Besides, the Armenian province of Nagorno-
Karabakh was put under the administration of Azerbaijan in the 1920s, and the 
Georgian province of Saingilo was also given to Azerbaijan.  It is notable that the 
Communists did amend the geographical boundaries of the region, establishing a 
common state, i.e. the USSR.  At the same time, ethnic Azerbaijanis mainly inhabited 
the Georgian area of Marneuli.  South Ossetia (Samachablo2) was mainly populated 
by Ossetians (North Caucasian people).  Also, there was a significant Armenian 
population in the Southern Georgian province of Akhalkalaki.  Subsequently, after 
the independence of the three countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), conflicts 
erupted in three spots: Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Meanwhile, 
neither Saingilo, nor Marneuli or Akhalkalaki experienced large-scale divisions.   
 One might ask what these three conflicts have in common apart from being 
geographical neighbours.  The answer could lie in the structure and content of the 
narratives that helped to emphasize ethnic differences.  Political entrepreneurs in all 
three republics followed very similar lines and exploited divisions built up during the 
years of the Communist regime.  Statistical analysis shows that “cultural factors” 
were assigned importance across the twenty eight post-Communist countries after 
the collapse of the USSR (Horowitz, 2003: 26).  This research project assumes that 
those cultural factors were constructed and shaped by national movements.  
Speaking of history, ethnicity and difference allowed the political entrepreneurs to 
 2	An	old	name	of	the	province,	originating	from	the	Princes	Machabeli,	who	ruled	the	area.			
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employ similar stories of greatness and victimhood.  Such practices have 
unequivocally helped to resurrect enmities that were first provoked by the Bolshevik 
rule and by policies employed in 1920s.  Hence, to be able to understand the 
rationale of wars in the 1980s, one should examine the verbal material used to build 
a narrative of nationalism and ethnic superiority.  One has to bear in mind how such 
ideas overtook other more rational ones, and brought the countries considered in 
this study to the brink of catastrophe.  In other words, this project concerns the 
discourse of ethnic politics during the last years of the Soviet Union and how the 
political actors crafted the “othering” narrative.   Focusing on the three former Soviet 
republics, one can recount narratives of division that exacerbated the enmity in those 
states.  Looking into the commonalities across the Caucasian republics might offer a 
blueprint for studying the discourses of difference.       
       
1.1.1. Context of the research  
 
I grew up in Tbilisi in the late 1980s and 1990s and witnessed first-hand the impact 
of nationalist discourses on communities. Georgian society, which had five years 
earlier had applauded Tengiz Abuladze’s Repentance and Eldar Shengelaia’s Blue 
Mountains, was absorbed by narrow-minded ethnic nationalism, becoming an 
example of “incompetent authoritarianism” (Jones, 2013: 51).3 The reason behind 
the transformation of the public opinion in favour of nationalists was hidden and 
ignored by most of public and intelligentsia.  Therefore, I found it fascinating to 
 3	Both	films	were	famous	for	their	anti-Soviet	and	anti-establishment	outlook,	Abuladze	was	awarded	a	Special	Jury	Prize	at	Cannes	Film	Festival	in	1987.	CANBY,	V.	1987.	Pialat	Film	Gets	Top	Prize	At	Cannes.	New	York	Times,	20	May.	
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examine the discourse of divisions and define the line that separated ‘us’ from ‘them’ 
and how it happened that part of us had turned into the others almost overnight.     
 This research project was motivated by my observations and experience 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, when political polarization and ultra-
nationalism swept away moderate opinions in Georgia (see Jones, 2013: 52-54).  
Living in this age of extremes had prompted questions in me about the polarization 
of a society and why radicalism had become acceptable.  After spending almost a 
decade within British academia, I have identified a gap in academic literature 
concerning the region.  Being both an insider and at the same time an outsider is an 
advantage that helps me to examine the series of events that precipitated the crises 
I am studying.  The political narratives that were intrinsic parts of the conflicts and 
their escalation have previously been underestimated.  It was after my MA graduate 
studies that I realised the significance of the discursive paradigm, which was largely 
an under-researched area in the South Caucasus.  With an outsider’s lens, it is easier 
to notice those dramatic shifts that the hostile and radical discourse had caused in 
building post-Soviet relations between the member-republics of the 
“internationalist” country.  It is the primary aim of this research to underline the 
words and performatives (see chapter 3) that changed the perception of “the other”.  
I trace the pretext of the armed conflict in political narratives featuring the glorious 
past, ethnic belonging and supremacy.  As Michael Billig argues to have a national 
identity is the ability to own the ways of talking about nationhood (1995: 8).  In a 
certain way, polarization was a matter of convenience and a classificatory device that 
one day became a “substitute of thinking”; differences became essentialised and 
were turned into facts (Herzfield, 1997: 165).  As Miroslav Hroch explains, the 
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national movements were made up of a “new range of activists” who agitated on 
behalf of their compatriots to share the project of creating a nation-state (phase B); 
most of the movements succeeded, forming a mass movement (phase C) which then 
forced the emergence of the full social structure of the nation, thus creating political 
differences (1994: 5).  Again as Billig observes,  nationalism is banal in everyday life, 
but if the established routines break down, nationalism can become ‘hot’, i.e. 
politically charged and driven emotionally (1995: 43-44).      
Therefore, building on observations and empirical data, this study intends to: 
• Apply securitization theory to the context of three de-facto states; explore 
and study the implicit meanings of rules and practices that predated the 
turmoil. 
• Examine the interactions between the former Soviet Republics (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Georgia) and de-facto entities (they had autonomous status at 
the time of conflict), and analyse how securitization was achieved, explain the 
socially-produced meaning that influenced regional security alignments, and 
to stress that geopolitical location was not a supreme guiding factor; nor were 
the ethnic differences of the highest priority, but the scope and interpretation 
of many distinct variables have co-acted and produced the crises. 
This study will examine the depth and breadth of securitising tools and their 
role in triggering the bloodshed.  For the purposes of this research, ‘securitising tools’ 
mean words and utterances, speeches and symbols, as well as historical narratives 
used to incite the conflicts (see Balzacq, 2011b).  Bearing in mind the wars over 
territories and status in the South Caucasus in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is 
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legitimate to pose this question concerning the role and function of differences, 
security and otherness in the escalation of the situation.    This research project will 
propose to understand the discourses of those years as practices and categories that 
became central to the escalation of conflicts and the maintenance of nationalism 
through the ‘othering’ of certain groups of population.  Predominantly it is an 
attempt to explain the “metaconflict” over the nature of the conflict — to show the 
social struggle over the interpretation and definition of the actual violence (Brubaker, 
2002: 174).    
One might ask why Adjara is not included in the study, as it is a tiny 
autonomous region situated directly on the former Soviet–Turkish border.  This 
thesis does not argue that autonomous status per se was the reason for the conflict 
in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but rather the securitization of 
the narratives predisposed it.  Adjara did not qualify for this particular study, because 
the divisive discourse did not refer to Adjarans.  Although a large number of the 
population was Muslim, these were ethnic Georgians and therefore their 
‘Georgianess’ trumped religious difference.  This study focuses on 
instrumentalization of ethnicity, which did not take place in Adjara in 1980s.  Besides 
Adjarans speak Georgian language, and Abkhaz or Ossetians have their own 
languages (Hamilton, 2014: 120-121).  There was no negative ethnic stereotype with 
regard to Adjarans, hence there was no conflict over ethnic/national symbols as was 
the case in Nagorno-Karabakh for example.  These were the “eliminatory variables” 
that exclude Adjara from the study (Goertz, 2006: 187).  In short, it is instructive to 
consider the selectivity of the differentiation process in the Soviet Union.  As Mathijs 
Pelkmans argues, the Soviet authorities had “restructured” Adjaran autonomy and 
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its meaning: because the Adjaran Autonomous SSR was not a pre-planned entity in 
the Soviet Union, it was a result of the compromise between the Turkish Republic 
and the USSR in 1921, which initially implied that full autonomy should be given to 
Adjara based on its “religious difference” (Pelkmans, 2006: 7).  Yet it was 
unacceptable, in the atheist USSR, to define a unit by a religious criterion — thus 
Adjara started to “disappear” from Soviet statistics gradually through the 1930s 
(Pelkmans, 2006: 7).  As Pelkmans notes, the Georgian Soviet Encyclopaedia, offers a 
very simple definition of Adjaran autonomy compared to that of Abkhazia (2006: 5-
7).  Adjara was an economically flourishing region and its population was described 
as predominantly Georgian, being positioned “as a politically indivisible part” of 
Georgia (Pelkmans, 2006: 5).  The very same encyclopaedia offered a quite different 
text about Abkhazian autonomy however, assigning importance to those “titular 
categories” that were instrumental for emphasizing the autonomous status 
(Pelkmans, 2006: 7).  In other words, the Adjaran ASSR was treated differently, 
despite its lack of enthusiasm about joining Georgia in 1918 (Hamilton, 2014: 114).  
Pelkmans argues that “discursive” and “political shifts” had shaped and defined the 
consequences of post-socialist religious dynamics (2006: 96).  As the focus of this 
study is securitization, Adjara, despite its autonomous status, will not be addressed.  
The conditions of securitization were not met in the Adjaran case, as when Abkhaz 
and Ossetians were merely ‘guests’ of Georgia, Adjarans were ethnic Georgians 
practicing Islam.  Adjara will not be used as a dependent variable because the 
criterion of case selection for this study is the discourse of securitization.      
 
1.1.2. Political actors and intelligentsia  
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Another vital aspect for this study is the definition of intelligentsia and political 
actors.  As it has been mentioned this study focuses on their speech acts, as they 
were active participants of social transformation.  It is important to explain who these 
people were and why their language was significant during the collapse of the USSR.  
As it is further explained in forthcoming empirical chapters, the political 
entrepreneurs or actors were the members or activists of the national movements in 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan: i.e. people who distrusted the Communist regime 
and, during the Glasnost and Perestroika, became outspoken critics of the system.  
They consolidated nationalist sentiments among the public and became a force that 
demanded concessions from the Kremlin and later full independence.  It must be 
noted that their political narrative had put an imprint on the relations between the 
republics and their smaller units: autonomies. Hence, these people merit closer 
examination and might aid in uncovering the reasons for conflicts.   
 Another group which is also addressed in this thesis are intellectuals, some of 
whom, later on, joined the independence movements and proved instrumental in 
supporting national self-determination in 1980s.  One must bear in mind that some 
of the nationalist leaders were intellectuals and rebels at the same time.  The 
empirical chapters provide more detailed description of this trend.  Yet, before going 
into the details one must draw attention to the content that was attached to Soviet 
intelligentsia. 
 Notably, those intellectuals who had suffered intimidation and epistemic 
violence — and were successful representatives of the intelligentsia — somehow 
adjusted to the Perestroika, but others adhered to nationalist rhetoric.  They became 
consumed by nationalistic ideas as they spoke of history and patriotism.  They were 
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liberated from the shackles of the Soviet power in which they were used to be an 
“expression of the interests of the working class” (Sakwa, 1990: 72).  Yet here one 
can question how they used Gorbachev’s trust when he urged the writers’ congress 
to support his vision and help him to “influence the people” (Sakwa, 1990: 72) and 
make a success out of the Perestroika. 
 Richard Sakwa notes that Gorbachev’s elevation of the intelligentsia indicated 
the change from conformity towards diversity of ideas (1990: 73).  However, after 
the purges of the Stalin-era it was not easy to be sure that these influences would 
have been positive, and the intelligentsia could produce a meaningful impact that 
Gorbachev wished to see.  Besides, in times of Brezhnev the USSR went through 
“intellectual stagnation” as there was no role permitted for critical and creative 
people in society (Sakwa, 1990: 73).  Moreover, Stalin ensured he destroyed the 
finest minds and mostly vacated the space for “superfluous people”, leaving no room 
for people with distinct aptitudes in the country (1990: 73).        
 Gorbachev’s initiative to open up the country and vacate the space for free-
thinking people did not go down smoothly.  Despite his efforts to communicate with 
the members of the intelligentsia they began to split into different groups of 
“reformists” (Gorbachevites), “radicals” and “conservatives” (Sakwa, 1990: 75).  
Gorbachev perhaps wished to see them as moderate agents of change, ones who 
were able to abstain from radical demands and, at the same time, not argue that the 
Perestroika was leading the country toward destruction (Sakwa, 1990: 74).  Yet, the 
intelligentsia were facing up to what they perceived to be “ethnisized bureaucracy” 
and an underdeveloped institutional framework for political participation, which was 
able to reconcile the ethnic concerns animated by Glasnost (Snyder, 2000: 225).     
26 
 In other words, intellectuals became another source of dilemma for 
Gorbachev and his reformist ideas.  If there was progress in Moscow the situation 
was different in the South Caucasus.  As Sakwa observes, the intelligentsia in the 
South Caucasus and the Baltic states took a different stance on Glasnost and 
Perestroika when they shifted attention to the nationalist sentiments (1990: 77).  
More precisely, the leading intellectuals in the Caucasus began to copy Baltic 
“popular fronts” movements, which meant facilitating national movements and 
supporting the organization of political parties (Snyder, 2000: 225).  This thesis brings 
attention to the decisions of the intellectuals in the three republics, which varied 
significantly depending on local settings and political constellations (2000: 226).  It 
should be noted that intellectuals re-interpreted Glasnost and used it to boost 
nationalist sentiments.  As mentioned earlier, these were the individuals who 
suffered censorship and were victims of unfair repression.  The voices of intellectuals 
had influenced the audiences on all sides of the argument, and, as Czeslaw Milosz 
notes, the dialectician emerges as victor in the battle of arguments, as he uses 
affective language and listeners are defenceless even if they raise questions (1981: 
14).  Therefore, individuals who were bred by the repressive regime were now 
commissioned with a mission to transform that very system.  Despite the efforts 
made by intellectuals many of them pursued different agendas that increased the 
divide and perhaps Glasnost made them even more visible.     
 Sakwa argues that Glasnost had one big achievement: the reconstruction of 
free-thinking (Sakwa, 1990: 81).  Yet, returning to the point raised by Milosz, one can 
understand why the part of intelligentsia was instrumental in supporting nationalist 
sentiments.   Perhaps one has to bear in mind that tyranny begins not with tyrants, 
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but rather its source is the language of tyranny, which derives from philosophy (Lilla, 
2001: 178).  In other words, intellectuals do have a say in the outcome of political 
discourse. Their words and ideas did shape the understanding of Perestroika, and, 
hence, their comments and articles influenced the discourse of Soviet change.    
 
1.1.3. Aim and objectives  
 
 
The broad aim of this study is to analyse the discursive paradigm of the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus.  It will demonstrate the problem through the securitization 
framework, and emphasize how the protagonists and political actors shaped and 
directed the discourse.  Securitization theory is a toolkit that reflects the political 
reality of the time.  Just as a photo is a reflection that depends on the amount of light 
and speed transmitted through the camera, the social world is displayed through a 
scientific lens reflecting the interaction of structure and agency.  Photographers draw 
the world with light, whereas social scientists opt for their own trajectory of 
observation, and the size of their lens.  A photographer always adjusts the light and 
speed of the camera, making an objective picture a product of adjustment.  This study 
will prioritise a qualitative methodology based on empirical data, on words uttered 
and decisions made.  Delving below the divisions and the discourse of conflicts allows 
the reader to reconsider the content and style of slogans that governed communities.         
For the purpose of the study this research project will focus on speeches, 
articles, open letters and declarations that surrounded the crises in 1980s.  It will 
analyse ideas and viewpoints of political leaders and members of the intelligentsia 
who were instrumental in forming the discourse of the post-Soviet Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.  The data examined in the study depicts the narratives of 
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people in or close to power who were the main enunciators and affected the context 
of the conflicts.  It does not focus on particular sources or media, rather the data 
includes different outlets or video footage that represent the discourse of 
nationalists.  Decisions are thought to be “choices consciously and intentionally made 
by individuals between alternatives”(Lukes, 1974: 21); thus they are analysed from 
the sources that show the sequence of those decisions.  The need to represent the 
views of the leaders largely dictated the selection of news sources and media.   
 This research aims to illustrate how the distinction was carefully inculcated 
as a tool of mobilisation and alienation.  These case studies (Nagorno-Karabakh, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia) are selected to show patterns of alienation.  Agency 
plays a more significant role than hitherto acknowledged in the literature (Adjara did 
not explode because Islam was not securitized to the same level as nationality).  
Contrary to many observers who prefer to focus on the standoff of great powers or 
adhere to the primordial arguments (Posen, 1993, Nuriyev, 2007, Rondeli, 2000), this 
thesis will scrutinize the role of agency which acted and spoke in the name of people.  
When pointing to agency, it means shifting focus to the nationalists and their 
supporters who vied for political influence in the post-Soviet republics.  In thinking 
about the evidence and what needs to be observed the major task is to reveal and 
then conceptualise the texts, speeches and behaviour of political agents of the period 
under analysis.  The variations in the discourse and its direction toward hostility 
constituted a major part of the problem with the autonomous entities within the 
Georgian SSR.  The central issue revolved around the handling of the crisis through 
actions i.e. words and utterances, or to be more specific “performatives” (see 
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Chapter 3 Austin, 1975).  One can see how a theoretical model of securitization 
expands the understanding by retracting significance of others (Wæver, 2011: 474).       
 This thesis aims to demonstrate how the discourse affected both political and 
social aspects of disintegration and the way in which nationalism and history became 
the dogmas that refashioned people’s perception of one another within the region.  
It aims to explore how discourses exercise power in a society as they “institutionalize 
and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting” (Jager and Maier, 2009: 35).  The 
data used for this research study comprises speeches, newspaper articles, certain TV 
reports4 and official documents dating back to the years of political turmoil — late 
1980s and early 1990s.  The study will examine the decisions of the Communist 
authorities as well as nationalist leaders who sought to come to power in 1980s.  It 
is the human dimension of the conflicts that will prompt further re-evaluation of the 
events.  Such an approach is the ultimate way to make causal inferences that can 
complete our picture of unfolding violence.  By reconsidering observations and 
variables, one can alter existing judgments that have produced negative 
ramifications across the region.    
 This thesis will borrow Juha Vuori’s assertion that understanding 
securitization in diverse political and social orders and contexts is vital for studies of 
this phenomenon (2008: 94).  He insists that securitization theory should be applied 
to the study of all types of political orders (2008: 66).  At the same time, Vuori is 
concerned about the conceptual purity of a theory when applied to other types of 
political systems (2008: 66).  Vuori indicates that security serves political goals in 
“various contexts” and that scientists should examine as many cases as possible 
 4	Many	of	them	are	available	on	YouTube	
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(2008: 68).  Indeed, some cases might require a light theoretical “stretching” or 
extension, because of certain political or cultural peculiarities.  By diversifying the 
theoretical scope, it will attempt to improve the degree of understanding of the 
hidden phenomena underlying the controversy.  By offering a distinct viewpoint the 
project could empower and strengthen area studies on the Caucasus and inspire 
future projects.  Doubtless, by better understanding the tenets that underline 
nationalism and conflict we might make the scholarly community more confident 
about the measures that could contain nationalism (Hechter, 2000: 18).   
    
1.2. Research design 
 
These three cases were selected for observation as they provide ample examples of 
hostile discourses that prevailed the social and political space in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia during the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  They show how enmity 
was constructed and inculcated into communities in the late 1980s.     
 This research project focuses on the ‘how’ question.  It will address the role 
of discourse and trace a correlation between spoken words and their political 
consequences.  This study embarks on an analysis of speech and narratives that 
proved influential in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet political space in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.  The design incorporates the conceptual basis of the 
research (securitization), methods of data collection and analysis that will help to 
answer the research question. That question is: how did political discourse turn 
ethnic difference into an instrument of securitization in the South Caucasus during 
the late Soviet and the transitional period? 
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My hypothesis is that the securitization of ethnic differences, as well as of 
language about historical narratives, was a significant factor of the conflicts in 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia during the period under question.  
Political conflicts were influenced by specific narratives, for example ethnic 
difference, that require thorough examination.  To a greater rather than lesser 
extent, speeches and utterances help to measure policies of escalation; tone, 
inflexion, content and the meaning of words, actions, and in-actions, all paved the 
way to armed combat.   
This thesis is a piece of qualitative research focused on narratives that 
assigned form and meaning to words like ‘justice’, ‘nation’ or ‘state’.  These are some 
of the key narratives identified during the research project.  It will study the data and 
draw conclusions about the role of the discourse in escalating political conflict.  It will 
examine the process of ‘othering’ through speech and public media across the 
region.   
This thesis makes two original contributions to the field.  It provides empirical 
evidence about the relationship between speech acts and political conflict, which 
supports the theoretical models proposed by John Austin, Michel Foucault and 
Thierry Balzacq among others.  Secondly, it offers new insights into the historical 
evolution of the conflict in the South Caucasus.  There are three geographical areas 
of conflict, which will be addressed in the empirical chapters – Nagorno-Karabakh, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The research traces the impact of factors (political 
discourses and narratives) that had specific consequences which escalated conflicts.    
 Each case study features a conflict over the status between the centre and 
periphery of the former Soviet Republics.  It addresses the narrative concerning 
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nationalism and history and the attitude of political actors (representatives of the 
intelligentsia) toward adversaries.  The empirical part is mostly a retrospective 
analysis of the cases  (Vaus, 2001: 227).  These case studies represent a blueprint of 
how political actors and their words construct or emphasize differences between 
communities, and how the use of adjectives in political and societal contexts create 
the world anew. They illustrate how nationalist leaders leveraged the environment 
to create a dominant narrative about ethnic belonging and seized the space of 
deliberation.   
By addressing these cases, this study will produce an explanatory framework 
that will elucidate the most extreme causes of confrontation in the context of the 
South Caucasus.  Anti-Communist movements were important shapers of the 
political environment and they had a crucial role in forming the post-Soviet facets of 
the region.  The discourse of history, nationalism and ethnic hatred will reveal how 
political entrepreneurs exploited emotions among the populace as they triggered 
violence.           
 Furthermore, such a methodology will assist us in altering the geopolitical and 
structure-based analysis of the problem.   This approach will help to reconstruct the 
agent-structure nexus that influenced social reality in the period.   
 These case studies will build an analytical model of the abuse of ethnic 
differences.  It is instrumental for this research to show the tools influencing 
narratives and symbols that were used to coerce the public into following the 
nationalist agenda.  In part, the conflicts were about the dehumanisation (in 
Schmittian terms) of adversaries; for example, Armenians defined Azerbaijanis as 
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‘Turks’5 — i.e. it was legitimate to annihilate them.  Georgian nationalists declared 
that Georgia must be a unitary state, and refused to acknowledge the rights of the 
autonomous units.  The speeches and statements analysed in the coming chapters 
will explain how the national movements, and nationalists, acted to implement their 
agendas.  It is an invitation to understand how organizations and political actors play 
with categories such as ethnicity or nationalism, and how they affect processes and 
relations and define consequences and institutions (Brubaker, 2002: 183).   
  This study is about revisiting the definitions of problems.  Dora Yanow 
differentiates between the approach of “right answers” and an “inquiry”; in the first 
instance, right answers imply that the perception of the matter under consideration 
is accurate, whereas an inquiry deals with the investigation of the definition assigned 
to the problem (1996: 15).  Therefore, if one distances oneself from the existing 
definitions and revisits the adjectives of division, then it will be possible to reassess 
existing views and evaluations.  There is a question here about the content of the 
conflict:  was the enmity embedded deeply within society or did politicians impose 
and exploit it?  Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in-between.  It is very difficult to 
believe in either-or answers, as social discontent involves many actors and factors 
simultaneously.  Any conflict involves people, their perception and values or lands 
that are to be “defended”.  There are always some principles or traditions that ‘need’ 
protection.  Zygmunt Bauman argues that “the Holocaust was born and executed in 
our modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and the peak of 
human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem of that society, 
civilization and culture” (in Booth, 2007: 120).  In other words, the escalation of the 
 5	Referring	to	the	1915	Genocide	
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violent conflict must be seen as a problem of a society, which was unable to 
overcome the differences.  This project intends to argue that a society has to re-think 
its own deeds because a social discourse imbues the ideas that produce certain 
consequences.  Subsequently, the argument that geopolitical alignments and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union were the main causes of the armed confrontation can 
be challenged.  As this research will not argue that those conflicts were totally 
independent from the influence from Moscow; however, it is important to elucidate 
on the discourses of division and how and why they resonated across the 
communities.  This research does not aim to define a common denominator, but 
rather to argue that there are complexities behind the confrontation that need to be 
acknowledged.  It is based on a pluralistic view of the region; in other words, one has 
to bear in mind that there were multiple paradigms that defined the territorial 
disputes.   
This research is broken down into two main empirical chapters about the conflicts in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  These chapters explain the patterns 
of mobilisation along ethnic lines in Armenia and Azerbaijan and in Georgia.  These 
case studies provide a roadmap to the political abuse of ethnos vis-a-vis demos.  The 
close examination of the statements and speeches of political actors that formed a 
particular pro-nationalist direction of outgoing Communist authorities will add 
explanatory power to regional studies.      
 
1.2.4. Reliability and validity 
 
It will be vital to consider the validity of the findings of this research by considering 
them altogether.  One must contemplate the nature and density of the information 
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at hand, and if there are plausible explanations that determine the issues (Weiss, 
1994: 181).  Every research project is the sum of the analytical approaches utilized 
for establishing causal inference, which consist of both strengths and drawbacks.  
Therefore, the case-focused materials enlarge the experience and help an 
investigator to come up with an original inference (Weiss, 1994: 182).   
 Robert Weiss argues that an investigator’s preconceptions give shape to the 
initial organization of the material, but that at the same time the material modifies 
the way of the investigator’s thinking (1994: 169) — meaning that the study is a 
subject of cognitive bias.  Selection of speeches is “necessary” because any utterance 
can have several meanings, thus an investigator responds to the “obligation to 
choose” as he/she selects the cases (Pocock, 1972: 29).  Hence, the sources of validity 
are qualitative methods, competence and the knowledge a researcher has (Patton, 
2015: 22).   
 To increase the trustworthiness of results, Joseph Maxwell suggests specific 
strategical solutions might be useful for minimizing validity threats within the context 
of a particular study (2013: 124). Hence this study opts for the following strategies: 
credibility, generalizability, reliability and confirmability (Bryman, 2004: 273).   
Confirmability: bearing in mind that it is not possible to achieve absolute objectivity 
in qualitative study — which is constructivist by its nature — one must decrease the 
personal influence and biases during the whole course of examination.  I am reflexive 
and conscious of personal influences as well as of my own observations.  Certain 
limits of the study are explained below.  Furthermore, during the process of collecting 
data, sources were verified so as to safeguard credibility.   
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Generalizability: the current study is not intended to be generalized and extended 
to all territorial disputes shaped by ethnic difference, though one could expect that 
the results and conclusions might contribute to understandings of similar cases.  It 
will instead make a contribution by putting securitization into the context of ethnic 
identity and historical narratives.  One might also expect readers to judge how the 
findings may be applicable to the analysis of populist discourse, too.   
Credibility: the data selected for this project focuses on the ideas and speeches of 
political leaders and members of the nationalist movement in 1980s and early 1990s 
(see appendix).  These data encompass ideas and narratives that presided over the 
political conflict that later on escalated into an armed confrontation.  It is essential 
to emphasize the importance of the print media within that timeframe, as TV stations 
were completely under the control of the Communist Party establishment (see Benn, 
1989: 17), and members of the national movement had a very limited access to the 
state-controlled outlets.  Yet the speeches were published in Literaturuli Saqartvelo, 
a weekly newspaper of the Writer’s Union of Georgia which had a turnover of 
twenty-two thousand copies according to the 1981 data (Redaqcia, 1983: 259).  
Besides this, many writers in their own right (e.g. Guram Panjikidze, Akaki Bakradze) 
added their voices to the nationalistic narrative.   
 Due to the language barrier, the publications used here in the analysis of the 
Karabakh conflict are in Russian6 or English. However, they still exemplify the content 
of the narratives that dominated Armenia and Azerbaijan as they gradually went to 
war over the autonomous entity.  This study refers to the memoirs of prominent 
 6	Actually,	the	confrontation	between	two	republics	was	mostly	held	in	Russian	as	it	was	the	lingua	franca	of	the	USSR		
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Soviet politicians, including Mikhail Gorbachev, his aide Anatoly Chernayev and 
notable scholar and Nobel Prize winner Andrey Sakharov.  
 Additionally, this study examines government decrees and reports, which 
strengthen the reliability of my sources.   
Reliability: reliability is a relative concept in qualitative research.  Both the 
researcher and participants influence procedures and their interpretation. Besides, 
“the interview is a social situation and inherently involves a relationship between the 
interviewer and the informant”  (Briggs & Mishler in Maxwell, 1992: 295).  However, 
the sources used in the researched have been verified and I have avoided using any 
ambiguous information that was impossible to triangulate.  
 
1.2.5. Selection of sources 
 
The events addressed in this study took place in 1980s, hence the data used in the 
empirical sections include the newspapers, magazines and TV programmes of the 
time (see appendix).  The thesis does not focus on particular newspapers, it looks for 
the thoughts and discourses of individual political actors who influenced societies at 
the time.  The information about the politicians of the time is based on my contextual 
knowledge and preliminary research conducted to find their speeches or letters or 
other materials that include their communication and opinion, video footage for 
example.  Due to the sensitivity of the topic in the South Caucasus, I have chosen 
sources according to their trustworthiness, meaning that I opted for relatively 
unbiased reports provided by the Western media.  Despite the fact that the events 
took place about thirty years ago, it must be noted that any researcher faces the 
challenge of identifying balanced and trustworthy material (see section 1.2.7).  As a 
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way to avoid biases I chose to read wide range of information and verify their validity.  
One must note that there are several websites which provide some primary data on 
the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh.  For reasons of assurance, 
triangulation is used and the material from such websites has been verified and 
corroborated from other articles, video footage or memoirs.  For example, when 
writing about Khojali tragedy, I did a word search in the Nexis database to find 
Western media sources because the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides attempted to 
either cover up or misreport the tragedy.  The main idea of the empirical sections is 
to introduce the operationalization of the historical contexts that played a major role 
in the escalation of conflicts.  I have spoken to historians and experts in regional 
studies when doing the preliminary research, and followed their advice while 
selecting the literature used in this study.  Yet one must always bear in mind the 
challenges faced by Soviet historians caused by censorship (see chapter 4), which 
affects the interpretation and role of history in the former USSR.    
 The source of a speech by Zviad Gamsakhurdia has been verified through the 
video recording of the event that is available on YouTube.  YouTube is used by 
different publishers and stakeholders to spread the old footage and make it available 
for the wider audiences.  This online multimedia database provides access to the 
Soviet era programmes that otherwise would not be freely available because they 
are stored in the archives of the TV channels, which need special permission to obtain 
the access.  YouTube is a convenient source, because it allows the reader to access 
the material without significant restrictions or a paywall.  Video recordings that are 
used from YouTube were uploaded by people who were formerly part of the national 
movement or the government of the time or are from the YouTube channels of the 
39 
broadcasting companies; additionally, the interview with Akaki Bakradze is from the 
YouTube account of his son7.  I have watched many of Soviet news programmes that 
are also available on YouTube, which have helped me to verify the events that took 
place.  The list of programmes includes the national news programme “Vremya” (I 
watched most of the programmes aired from 1988 to the mid-1990), “Vzglyad” – a 
Friday late-night show that was aimed to guide the Soviet citizens about benefits of 
Perestroika and Glasnost (see appendix), “Namedni” – a short history of the USSR 
produced by the prominent journalist Leonid Parfenov (see appendix).  During the 
course of the research I read the following newspapers: “Literaturuli Saqartvelo”, 
“Pravda”, “Izvestia”, “Bakinskii Rabochii”, “Edinenie”, “Abkhazia”, the Soviet 
magazine “Ogonek” among others.  The study contains many European and 
American publications including The Washington Post, The New York Times, The 
Independent, The Times and The Newsweek.  Also, I have used the articles published 
in the Soviet digest of the Voice of America.  The selection criteria were guided by 
following the speeches and interviews or comments of the political actors who were 
the main influencers of the events.  In other words, the newspapers were selected 
because they contained an interview or a comment of a person who was actively 
involved in the Caucasian conflicts.  I have obtained approximately ten issues of 
Russian-language Abkhaz newspapers from Professor George Hewitt and used them 
to present the Abkhaz reading of the problem in the empirical chapter featuring 
Georgian conflicts (see appendix).  During the process of selecting key political actors, 
I tried to be as inclusive as possible.  Yet there were only a few outspoken political 
 7	Overall,	as	a	person	who	lived	and	remembers	the	events,	it	has	been	much	easier	to	find	the	original	material,	as	my	general	knowledge	and	memory	allows	me	to	identify	the	sources.			
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leaders who influenced the discursive space back in 1980s.  Hence, I approached the 
people who were in the position of power or are scholars and experts specializing on 
conflicts and their consequences.               
 There are two collections of primary sources used in the empirical chapters.  
The Karabagh File, as it is explained later, is the publication by the Zorian Institute, 
which collected almost all primary materials about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
(for details see appendix).  Another source is the volume on regional conflicts in 
Georgia Regionaluri Konpliqtebi Saqartveloshi collected and published by the 
Georgian researcher Tamaz Diasamidze, who conducted the study at the Centre for 
Study of Regionalism in Tbilisi, Georgia (for details see appendix).  These publications 
contain the newspaper articles, interviews and statutory acts that determined the 
escalation of the conflicts.  Most of them are copies of the original documents or 
articles.  Yet they express opinion of particular people, which is acknowledged in the 
limitations of the study.  One must bear in mind that the newspapers of the time 
offered both news and views featuring the events.  The current study emphasizes the 
importance of views expressed by the political actors, therefore most of the articles 




The material used for this study include interviews with experts and politicians who 
participated in the events twenty-five or so years ago.  It was challenging to select 
the participants, as many of them are no longer alive or else sometimes refuse to 
talk.  It was impossible to obtain interviews from Azerbaijani experts, but there were 
a few Armenians who spoke without tape — simply sharing their opinion about the 
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conflict.  In the case of Georgia, the selection was mainly concentrated on people 
who participated in the events or worked for the government in 1980-90s.  The list 
of interviewees is provided in the appendix.  They were given the consent forms, 
which were designed in accordance with the guidelines of the Ethics Office of the 
King’s College, London.  I clearly explained to every interviewee their rights, and the 
purpose of the interview.     
 The main question I asked was how the respondent [assuming their role in 
events] assesses the discourses of the time.  After their answers, I adjusted the 
subsequent questions.  I followed the use of keywords in respondents’ answers, but 
did not intend to scrutinize every “meaning unit” (Weiss, 1994: 155); rather, I focused 
on trends that were linked to the categories under question and on what further 
questions their answers raised.  During the interviews I was looking to identify key 
themes and words, for example, the use of the words, “erovnuli” (national), “chven”-
“isini” (us-them), “Ruseti” (Russia), were noted as they indicate a particular meaning 
in the context of the study.  It is common to blame Russia for wars and talk about 
Abkhaz and Ossetians as “them” (outgroup).  It emerged that the idea of “nation” 
has a symbolic power and the interviewees used it to strengthen the argument.     
 When summarising the material, I chose to apply “local integration” (Weiss, 
1994: 159); i.e. what most respondents say about the asked question and the overall 
role of narratives in the escalation of conflicts.  One must take into consideration that 
the questions were asked after two and half decades.  Some of the respondents 
admit the importance of political discourse, but back in 1980s and 1990s they 
articulated hostile narratives and incited ethnic hatred.  One could extract a 
minitheory (Weiss, 1994: 159) from the interviews: that, after decades of 
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observation, the political actors have now changed their perception as they think 
about the legacy of the conflicts.     
 One must also note that interviews for this research helped to support 
collected data.  They confirm the importance of the discourse that is evident in 
newspapers and speeches of the time.       
 
 
1.2.7. Limitations of the study 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to offer a distinct analysis of events — an alternative 
perspective that allows reassessment of the causes of the hostilities.  As no man can 
arrive at the “complete and final truth” (Booth, 2007: 189) about any subject let 
alone the instigation of an armed conflict, it will exercise an approach that might 
depict those speech acts and decisions to be prejudices of the time.  Going back to 
Derrida’s point, it is not about choice but links and liaisons between form and 
meaning.    
Whilst collecting data, there were certain difficulties.  During the research, I 
conducted ten interviews and two off the record conversations in Tbilisi and London.  
Yet I was unable to interview anyone from Azerbaijan.  Azerbaijani officials and 
representatives of the organizations who deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue 
seem to be very cautious and refuse to make any comments, let alone formal 
interviews.  I had a chance to speak to a prominent Armenian political expert, yet our 
conversation was held under the Chatham House rules in London.  The language 
barrier was another impediment, though most of the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
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sources are available in Russian as well.  There is another restriction on empirical 
data regarding the pogroms in Baku.  Azerbaijani sources are extremely scarce and 
serve as limits to understanding the picture in full.  The most prominent reaction to 
the pogroms, which is at the same time the official Azerbaijani position about the 
Sumgait massacres, is a piece by late scholar Ziya Bunyadov entitled “Pochemu 
Sumgait” [Why Sumgait?] (Bunyadov, 2010) 8 . Bunyadov accused Armenians of 
staging the pogroms in order to be able to blame the Azerbaijani side.       
 It is surely impossible to understand fully and explain international relations 
and particularly the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the South Caucasus.  The 
interpretation of understanding is another issue.  That is, every individual has his/her 
original vision and interpretation of the story or an event.  It is doubtful that the 
analysis and interpretation of the ideas, all the way down during the process of 
escalation and in the aftermath, will depict a truthful account of the events.  Rather, 
it will be a part of the whole, of the plethora of actions or inactions, which together 
made the war possible and inevitable at that time.  Additionally, this thesis cannot 
reassure the reader that the stories and versions of the events told by interviewees 
will all be sincere.  By combining social science theories and the empirical data this 
thesis will try to analyse the language of controversies.  It must be judged on the 
importance of the trajectories of divisions that it emphasizes and brings to the 




1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The first chapter is an introduction and a research design, which presents the aim of 
the study and offers a short overview of the work that follows.  It outlines the 
research questions taken up by this thesis and offers a hypothesis, and also explains 
why the topic was selected in the first place, and how I intend to argue my case.    
The second chapter is a literature review, which will address the existing 
approaches to the problem.  It touches upon the main writings that concern the 
conflicts and the region, as well as works more broadly about security and 
nationalism.  In the third chapter the theoretical and methodological points will be 
outlined.  The fourth chapter will add explanatory power to the methodological 
section, as it examines Soviet ethnonationalism and the challenges that it caused 
during the Perestroika and Glasnost.  Evaluation of these trends and policies will 
allow for the definition of the politics of securitization used towards the groups and 
the autonomous republics/oblasts.  For this research, I will refer to Hidemi 
Suganami’s arguments about history and its neglect in IR, and bring “critical 
reflections on the nature and functions” of historical narratives towards analysis in 
IR (2008: 356).  In fact, all of these patterns, taken together, have created and helped 
us to follow the politics of securitization across societies and the region per se.  Much 
of the enmity in the South Caucasus was constructed through the us and them 
dichotomy, making catastrophe an inevitability.  I will explore the basis of this 
othering and the power of symbols in constructing securitization.  The elites referred 
to symbolic power, and to a certain extent attempted to persuade the public to 
accept their offer based on ethnic violence.  The fourth chapter therefore addresses 
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how history was viewed in the USSR and why the dominant narratives examined in 
my empirical chapters were instrumental in triggering conflicts.       
 The fifth and sixth chapters will address the actual analysis of conflicts, one 
about the Nagorno-Karabakh situation and another about South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  It will include a study and analysis of governmental decrees, newspaper 
reports, and the political speeches of leaders as well as members of the intelligentsia 
— including writers, actors, film directors and others.  There were many prominent 
Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis who regularly made nationalistic and 
patriotic statements, remarks and declarations.  Few of them dared to contradict the 
mainstream views about freedom and national revival.  This project will analyse 
archival materials, and available (unclassified) government meeting minutes, to 
reveal the discourse between the state officials and the remarks and statements 
made for the public.  This will help us to disclose the actual process of securitization.  
And, finally, I present interviews with politicians and political entrepreneurs who 
were involved in the escalation.             
 The seventh chapter will make an overall evaluation of the issue: how the 
agent-constructed processes have become a hindrance for nations, their 
development and economic prosperity.  The nationalistic prejudices and historic 
dogmas were mainly created through speech acts and political decisions: e.g. 
abolition of autonomy (in South Ossetia).  The speech acts served to marginalise the 
masses, elaborated on historical narratives and involved rhetoric, which ultimately 
had harrowing results.  That section will analyse language as a complex, rule-
governed behaviour (Searle, 1969: 12), one that has transformed into an irrevocable 
tool of enmity and vengeance for the securitising of ethnic and political differences.  
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John Searle points out that linguistic communication is the result of a theory of 
language and a theory of action, where the language is very much part of a theory of 
action inasmuch as speaking is a “rule-governed” behaviour, constructed through 
units of linguistic communication — i.e., the production of a sentence under 
particular conditions as speech acts (1969: 16-17).  Assuming that there are analytical 
connections between the views of speech acts, meaning implied by speakers — the 
meaning of a particular sentence, a speaker’s intention, the understanding of the 
audience and general rules that govern the linguistic elements — speech acts are 
powerful tools for the construction of social environments (Searle, 1969: 21).     
 Those three conflicts are very much the “world of our making” (Onuf, 1989), 
and resisting dialogue and compromise to a certain extent is a part of the gamble of 
ruling elites.  Donald Horowitz (1985: xi) claimed that ethnicity has “fought and bled 
and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness”, but whether it was the 
ethnicity alone, or a paradigm supported by agenda-setters to vindicate ambitions 
and aspirations is a partly unanswered question. The argument will rest upon the 
hypothesis that wars aiming to eliminate potential competitors for power and 
influence were not merely the results of great power or geopolitical games.  This 
work is an attempt to emphasize the role of agency and the use and abuse of 















This section of the thesis will analyse the existing overviews and general evaluations 
of the conflicts and divisions.  This section introduces literature about nationalism 
and identity, ethnic conflict and its political paradigms, as well as about these three 
cases in the South Caucasus.  It offers a critique of the existing studies that search for 
the answers or analyse the hostilities.  Which issue is the most important for 
Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia?  What are the trajectories that define their vision 
and perception of conflict, of understanding the enmity?   
 As Laurence Broers argues, these three de facto states appeared in the 
literature involving historical aspects and have never been the subject of a full 360-
degree enquiry (Broers, 2013: 59-64). Hence, this chapter looks for the academic 
thought that defines the scholarly opinion about the region and its protracted 
conflicts.  Notably, these sections will reveal how academic scholarship tends to be 
split between the Soviet or post-Soviet scholarship, which mostly focuses on the 
ethnic or geopolitical aspects, and the Western approach that looks for 
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instrumentalist reasons behind the violence.  One could see how the Soviet (and 
post-Soviet) academia tend to look for a scapegoat when addressing the trajectories 
of conflicts.    
 Bearing this in mind, this research project will elaborate on conflict and 
security paradigms.  This section will offer a synopsis of some studies dedicated to 
the topic.  It will be divided into three major parts.  The first part will consider views 
about conflict and ethnicity; the next will bring in the regional dimensions; and 
finally, the third will offer a summary of the gaps in the scholarly literature that need 
addressing.   
 
2.1.Selecting them  
 
“All my life I considered myself as a Yugoslav, not a Muslim. Now I am a Muslim 
because that has been forced upon me” (in Nye, 2007: 158).  This quote conveys a 
question regarding the origins and reasons of ethnic wars.  There are categories and 
interpretations which are forced upon societies and communities by warmongering 
political actors.  This was the case in the Balkan crisis and the scenario was similar in 
the South Caucasus.  People were told that they were distinct from, and, in some 
cases, better than, their fellow neighbours.    
 Clashing identities and out-group hostilities were products of discourse in 
which “a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor in Lebow, 2008: 477).  It is evident that 
images produced during the debates had demeaned the identity of the “other”.  Yet 
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this thesis will question the principle that “othering” was the essential norm of post-
Soviet nation-building, because, as Gordon Allport argues, “concentric loyalties need 
not clash” and devotion to a certain circle does not imply hostility to another (1979: 
44).  He argues that usually clashing loyalties are of identical scope, and attitudes 
that are partial to the in-group do not require antagonistic attitudes toward other 
groups; he refers to the Jewish ‘menace’ created by Hitler, which in the end was 
designed to cement the Nazi leadership (Allport, 1979: 41 and 46).  In other words, 
one political group alienates a part of society while having special interests in mind.     
 As Henry Hale argues, ethnicity is relational and it is vital to understand why 
people tend to interpret events and situations with reference to ethnic divides (2008: 
8).  When addressing solutions, Hale argues that ethnicity should not be treated as a 
“motive” but instead removed to allow for and change the predisposition of analysis 
(Hale, 2008: 8).  In revealing the context of nationalism, one should consider that 
discourse is about directing attention to certain aspects of a phenomena; in other 
words, one can amend the colour of an object by blocking its contours from view 
(Wittgenstein, 2009: no: 33).  By simply emphasizing one trajectory of the dilemma 
it does not mean that the conflict has only one face.  It is always a multifaceted, 
multidimensional enterprise, spoken and fought by a wide variety of different 
political actors.  
 Eventually, a state-sponsored nationalism is largely directed against outside 
groups, which in turn leaves out the smaller groups whose cultures are ignored in 
nationalization project (Hale, 2008: 23).  This tendency of exclusiveness forces the 
local groups to form their ethnic consciousness against the dominant culture (Hale, 
2008: 23).  Presumably, this was one of the challenges of the Soviet ethno-
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nationalism, as it left out too many smaller communities and undermined their 
identity.     
 For the former units of the USSR, membership in a nation was significant, as 
it came to appear as an indicator of a certain degree of security in turbulent times 
and at the same time a means of communication.  As Karl Deutsch argues, 
membership of a nation allows people to communicate effectively and hold the 
nation together from “within” (in Hechter, 2000: 12).  But, instead of communication, 
Tbilisi  (for example) launched the “legal undoing” of Soviet legitimacy by revising all 
treaties between Georgia and the USSR after 1921, including those which regulated 
the status of Ossetian and Abkhaz autonomies, and thus damaging the rights of 
minorities (Cheterian, 2008: 174). 
 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff define ethnic conflict as an undertaking where 
at least one party “is organised around the ethnic identity of its members” (2010: 5).  
They argue that it is not a dispute that is ethnic, but that its parties interpret the 
causes “along actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide” (2010: 5).  
This thesis will emphasize the significance of words that were used to construct an 
ethnic divide and select ‘others’ for political purposes.  It has to be realised that the 
conflicts in Georgia and between Azerbaijan and Armenia structured along ethnic 
lines were neither products of ethnic hatred nor of geopolitical shifts.  There were 
other variables and circumstances that contributed to the escalation in those years.  
The political actors assigned political status to ethnic differences, which helped them 
to gain legitimacy.  In this case, ethnic identities arose from man’s “lust for power” 
which transformed “churches into political organizations… revolutions into 
dictatorships … love for country into imperialism” (Morgenthau in Waltz, 1959: 124).  
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In other words, the meanings of ethnic belonging were extremely politicized and 
helped the political parties to change the meaning of words like ‘nation’ or ‘justice’, 
making them instruments of escalation of the conflicts.   
 The fact that different areas with diverse populations had such different fates 
naturally raises the question: why were these areas not affected?  Why did 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh clash with Azerbaijanis, whilst Armenians in 
Akhalkalaki did not?  Or why were Ossetians who lived in South Ossetia designated 
as enemies by Georgia at a time when there were fewer ethnic Ossetians there than 
in other parts of Georgia.  Maybe because it was a selective othering due to the fact 
that the wars were mostly local, without any spill-over effect.  To be more specific, 
Georgians and Abkhazians fought in Abkhazia, but elsewhere remained friends.  
Armenians and Azerbaijanis clashed over Nagorno-Karabakh, but they lived and 
continue to live peacefully in Georgia.  Ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis are 
neighbours in many parts of the Georgian capital, but they never argue over ethnic 
or religious difference.  The same people were both us and them in different 
circumstances and geographical locations. Accordingly, ethnicity is not a difference 
that is responsible for war, but rather it was a tool used to legitimise certain 
securitising acts of fellow politicians or political entrepreneurs.  Diversity has always 
been the strength of these nations and deeply embedded in their cultures.  Even the 
Communists used to boast of Georgia’s care of ethnic minorities, as there were eight 
languages taught at schools and the media had seven-language programmes 
(Forsyth, 2013: 675).  The roots of the problem and the present isolation do not 
simply lie in ethnic differences, but rather they are the products of distorted legends 
about diversity and multiculturalism.  
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Despite many theories and presumptions tested in the study and analysis of 
these conflicts, scholars still miss the answers to many remaining questions.  
Governments9, experts and scholars (Cornell, 2001, Nuriyev, 2007, Rondeli, 2000) set 
out different conspiracy theories or accuse the strategic geopolitical location of the 
region between the two continents and two seas, or continue to blame history by 
looking for ancient hatreds between groups of people (Posen, 1993).  To be more 
specific, the local scholarship tends to prioritize the primordial explanation (e.g. 
Nuriyev or Bunyadov) while the Western academics address the social constructivist 
aspects of the issue (e.g. Suny).  The strategies and approaches employed so far by 
researchers and scholars, as well as by politicians, underestimate the role of agency 
in the conflicts.  They highlight individualism and structuralism but overlook the 
structurationist approach (Wendt, 1987: 339).  In other words, studies often 
disregard the fact that agents and structures are “theoretically interdependent and 
mutually implicating entities” (Wendt, 1987: 338).  These problems remain under-
researched and spawn biased and subjective judgements regarding causes and 
consequences, because the study of structures lacks the other half of the problem 
under scrutiny.  The world of our making is mutually constituted, or, as Alexander 
Wendt puts it, “mutually implicated” (1987: 338) by the interaction of structure and 
agency.   
 The main shortcoming in studies of the South Caucasus is the understatement 
of agency and its role in making and shaping the conflicts.  It is significant to focus on 
this gap, particularly on the processes of securitization.  The structural problems, 
 9	The	National	Security	Concepts	of	all	three	republics	consider	the	conflicting	areas	as	primary	threats	and	outline	the	possible	methods	of	solutions.	
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including geopolitical location and great power dictum, were misused in the 
discourses and actions of political actors.  Without addressing this gap in knowledge, 
the peace-making efforts and policies based on the conclusions so far achieved fail 
to produce tangible results.  Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia complain about 
territorial problems, the de-facto states remain outside the space of international 
engagement, and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) continue to suffer.  The 
condition of frozen peace or an enduring stalemate is a reason to elaborate on 
explanations other than great power games, old ethnic hatreds or a strategic 
location, and instead to explore the specifics of these dilemmas.    
 While rethinking the conflicts and their consequences, it is essential to realise 
that modern security could be understood as a process of 
securitization/insecuritization of borders, identities and of the conception of orders; 
thus, securitization becomes a capacity to manage (or even create) insecurity (Bigo, 
2000: 173-74).  Security is more a “device” or a “technique of government” (author: 
or perhaps inability to govern), and understanding and analysing these techniques 
and the individuals who use them will help to explain securitization (Bigo, 2000: 176).  
Re-evaluation of anatomy of the South Caucasian conflicts will broaden scholarship 
on the instrumentalisation of differences.  Research on the practices of actions, that 
is, analysis of securitization/(in)securitization and the framework of the social power 
balance that empowers these practices, is essential (Bigo, 2000: 177).  Otherwise, 
the scholarly community faces an inversion, that “what is done determines the doing, 
when in fact the opposite is true” (Bigo, 2000: 177).  Because, as Paul Veyne puts it, 
“what is done is explained by what the doing was at any point in history.  Things, 
objects, are simply the correlate of practices” (in Bigo, 2000: 177).  This work is 
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concerned by the practices that constituted that ‘doing’, and which determined the 
face of security and political alignments across the South Caucasus area.            
 The reality built by discourses across the South Caucasus needs 
reconsideration.  The context and meaning given to populist texts and political 
manifestos continue to influence policies and polities.  The words and utterances, 
and articulations allocated to the texts and history in general, have shaped the 
politics of identity and nation-building.  However, identity is not fixed by nature, but 
rather is constituted in relation to difference (Campbell, 1992: 8).  This thesis is about 
how the ‘others’ were constructed and marginalised in an attempt to form an 
identity or to gain the power — or perhaps both.  Identity can be interpreted as “a 
ground or basis for social or political action”, a joint phenomenon denoting some 
degree of sameness among a group, “a core aspect of individual or collective 
‘selfhood’”, which is a product of social or political action, or of multiple and 
competing discourses (Lebow, 2008: 474).  Since the question is to what extent the 
wars over the areas under discussion had a discursive context.  The hostile 
environment was produced by words alone, but these same words could have 
created windows of opportunity for settlement of disputes.   
To sum up, this research will present the issues that supported the escalation 
of conflict and conceptualise the relationship between structure and agency, central 
governments and local authorities, political and national identities, construction and 
securitization of enemies and relations shaped along antagonism.  Bearing in mind 
that there is no given or fixed risk or threat in the social world, danger is not an 
objective condition and it does not exist independently of those who might consider 
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it as a threat (Campbell, 1992: 1).  For David Campbell, there is no risk per se in reality 
–- but rather, anything can be transformed or analysed as a risk.       
        
2.2.Mapping friends and threats 
 
The South Caucasus is a patchwork of many ethnic and religious groups.  Diversity 
and multiplicity in the region have been more a strength rather than a weakness for 
millennia.  The many faces and facets of the region produced a rich social and cultural 
neighbourhood.  The plurality of cultures made the region an important trade bridge 
between the East and the West.  Buoyant commerce and the exchange of goods 
shaped the fabric and texture of social and political life for centuries.  As Ronald Suny 
highlights, the region was diverse and Armenians were mostly urban and occupied 
economic and technical positions representing certain sub-elites in Georgia and 
particularly in Azerbaijan (2003: 496).  There were many victories and failures, 
territorial claims between the principalities, and finally the Soviet ideological imprint 
changed the socio-political landscape of the region.  The Bolshevik legacy made the 
process of adjustment from hierarchical order to anarchical society a painful 
experience. 
 For the purpose of the current research, ‘region’ is a “geographically clustered 
subsystem of states” that has a sufficiently distinctive internal structure and can be 
differentiated from a wider international system (Buzan, 2012: 22).  The regional 
approach is a level of analysis which lies between the state and the international, and 
has become an important aspect of the modern international system (Buzan, 2012: 
26), gradually acquiring more significance in a leaderless world.  Buzan argues that 
regions will remain an essential factor in forming and shaping political 
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transformations for decades to come (Buzan, 2012: 26).  The growing and enhanced 
role of regions in an evolving and changing international society is one of the reasons 
for a regional approach to the South Caucasus problem. 
 Despite its geographic and political proximity, the region of the South 
Caucasus is subject to debate.  Some scholars describe it as a “negative” region; that 
is, a space where the region exists but lacks internal interaction (Coppetiers in 
German, 2012: 24).  Tracy German addresses the causes, including the lack of 
Caucasian identity and the absence of shared affinities (2012: 17).  The term ‘South 
Caucasus’ developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union to substitute the use, in 
the Tsarist period, of the name of the province Transcaucasia.  Ghia Nodia assesses 
the change as a significant distancing from the Soviet era clichés (in German, 2012: 
23).  Ismailov and Papava have offered a detailed definition for the geographical area, 
dividing Caucasus into three sections: the Central Caucasus — Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia; the Northern Caucasus — the border regions of the Russian Federation; 
and the Southern Caucasus, which consists of three Central Caucasus states 
alongside eastern areas of Turkey and northwest Iran (German, 2012: 23).  However, 
putting aside the broader approaches to geographical indicators, the South Caucasus 
in this study refers to the three states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, including 
their de-facto republics of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia.    
 Conflict is a struggle with the aim of achieving particular objectives and 
simultaneously to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals (Coser in Horowitz, 2000: 95), 
although Donald Horowitz notes that the nature and extent of goals and methods 
are open to investigation (2000: 95).  This has been the standard prevailing view of 
confrontation between individuals and/or their groups.  Georg Simmel explains the 
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sociological aspects of a conflict and argues that it is an ordinary form of relations 
that sociology studies within the complexity of life (1964: 20).  Simmel thinks that 
even the moral philosophers could not move too far away from the old Roman maxim 
homo homini lupus (Simmel et al., 1964: 28).  Yet is this evaluation always true, and 
does it help to explain and answer all those complex puzzles that surround a political 
dispute?  
 Ethnic conflict is a relatively new notion for the international community.  The 
problem gained increased significance after the collapse of Communism when 
violence erupted in Eastern Europe (Gilley, 2004: 1156).  It is defined as either a 
political or a social conflict involving different groups, which possess a certain marker 
of ethnic identity (Gilley, 2004: 1155).  That distinct identity could have some 
consequences for economic, social or political development (Gilley, 2004: 1155) is, 
however, open to debate -– i.e., whether the possession of a different ethnicity or 
language makes confrontation inevitable.  Are ethnic conflicts “ethnic hatreds” or a 
myth misleading society (Bowen, 1996: 3)?  Ernest Gellner has ruled out ethnicity as 
a single force behind war: he calls it a tool of “political legitimacy” (2006: 1) that could 
be revived using values to achieve political goals.   
 Primordialists consider ethnicity to be a “fixed characteristic” of 
communities, which cannot be changed by individuals, thus tensions between the 
groups are “natural” and conflict is embedded in ethnicity (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 
5, Levy, 2001: 16).   The main criticism of primordial views is directed at the belief in 
“fixed” identities and a failure to address transformations “over time and place” 
(Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 5).  This notion lacks explanation for new and changed 
identities as well as why there are other ethnic groups who do not fight, but live in 
58 
peaceful coexistence (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 5, Levy, 2001: 16).  Apart from the 
argument that not all different groups fight, it is also significant to bear in mind that 
identities that are depicted as ‘fixed’ are very much products of interactions and the 
communication of groups.  Thus, identities are prone to change from time to time.  
Some scholars argue that ancient rivalries were suppressed in the former USSR and 
Yugoslavia, and that the collapse of institutions had caused conflicts among the units.  
But not all units fought, and the intensity of violence varied across the cases.   
 Clifford Geertz defines a primordial attachment as a ‘given’ of social 
existence.  Givens are kinships and affiliations by blood, speech, custom, dialect or 
other social practices.  Geertz allocates them a certain degree of  power, though the 
empowering role of such affinities varies across societies (Geertz, 1963: 109).  
Meanwhile, Geertz points to pathological inclinations that might follow from 
allocating political supremacy to ‘givens’ in modern societies (1963: 110).  
Encouragement of primordial rather than civil political communities brings about 
destruction and disorder.  A weak tradition of civil political development coupled 
with the poor structure of a welfare government transform primordial attachments 
into tools for the demarcation of political units (Geertz, 1963: 110).  Using 
primordialism as a “rock solid” foundation for analysis is misguided and underpins 
“biased observation” regarding the threats of ethnic difference (Laitin, 2007: 26).  
This research is focused on the methods of transformation and tools of demarcation 
of ethnicities across the South Caucasus.  My argument emphasizes the excess 
importance attached to those ‘givens’ by certain political actors and groups.      
 Meanwhile, instrumentalist scholars define ethnicity as a political tool utilised 
by individuals or groups to meet material or other ends (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 5, 
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Levy, 2001: 16, Gellner, 2006).  For instrumentalists, ethnicity does not have any 
independent value outside the political realm.  Historical myths and narratives are 
used to glorify one’s own people and demonise others, and help to mobilise the 
masses and armies in the name of a particular cause (Levy, 2001: 16).  Constructivists 
point to the social origins and nature of ethnicity that is constructed from social 
interactions (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 6).  
 To summarize, the fact that the ethnic conflict is a contemporary occurrence, 
one can lean toward the instrumentalist evaluation; as the primordial givens are put 
into context by individual actors while they communicate with wider audiences.  
Hence, investigation of the connection between the speech act and securitization 
helps to unravel the context of enmity.   
 
2.3.Nationalism and ethnicity 
 
For the purpose of this study, it will also be necessary to offer a working definition of 
the concept of nationalism.  All ideological or religious “isms” have a political 
connotation and possess capacity to amend political agendas.  Yet nationalism must 
rank among the most contentious principles, entailing security, language, culture and 
identity.  Michael Hechter defines nationalism as a mix of political activities that “aim 
to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with those of the state” where a 
nation is a culturally different collective that strives to achieve self-governance 
(2000: 7).  Predominantly, nationalism resorts to the belief that individual members 
of the nation are wealthier with self-determination than without (Hechter, 2000: 30).      
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Nationalism is constructed from borrowed “imagery and verbiage” from the 
“organic option”, notes Gellner, but rests on the social reality of an atomized society 
(1995: 2).  Nationalists like to claim that “nations constitute the building blocks of 
humanity” (Hurrell, 2007: 123).  Andrew Hurrell argues that nationalism is purely 
connected to the emergence of industrial society (as Gellner) (2007: 123).  He defines 
political nationalism as the most “persistent and pervasive” ideology of the modern 
state system, which has been “intimately implicated in the exercise of immense 
political power” (Hurrell, 2007: 122).  Hurrell argues that national self-determination 
acquired politically and morally powerful “justification” to pursue the system of 
nation-states, and there is no other doctrine that might challenge the trend (2007: 
122).  Hence, nationalism is a political doctrine that justifies actions or inactions of 
political leaders.  The current study considers that despite the symbolic overtones 
assigned to nationalism in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, it was a toolkit for 
mobilization of public against particular communities.   
 Ernest Renan famously stated that a nation is an act of solidarity, it ascertains 
the past, but is reiterated in the present, so that the nation’s existence is “a daily 
plebiscite” (1990).  This was not the case in the Soviet Union, as the system was 
absolutist and did not involve daily participation of people.  The very existence of a 
society (Gesellschaft) was rejected and as Manuel Castells explains, the enduring 
statism and its consequences for the space of the former USSR was predisposed by 
the destruction of civil society “after decades of systematic negation of its existence” 
(2000: 67).  Therefore, communities across its units lacked the experience of 
“plebiscite”; instead they were ruled by economic five-year plans.   
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In Anthony Giddens’s interpretation nationalism is a primarily psychological 
occurrence that implies affiliations of certain individuals to a set of symbols and 
beliefs that form and shape their political order; whereas a nation exists  collectively 
within a demarcated territory (1985: 116).  As Giddens argues, nationalism is a 
product of the eighteenth century and a nation is a “pre-eminent power container” 
(1985: 119-120).  In other words, nations and nationalism are social constructs that 
make and operate a political order.    
 In offering his definition of a nation-state, Giddens insists that it is a set of 
institutional forms of governance that maintain an administrative monopoly over a 
territory and its rule is sanctioned by law and control of the means of both internal 
and external violence (1985: 121).  Political leaders tend to produce social biases, 
when they address the targets of their political discourse: they are specifically 
tailoring the discourse for mass audiences.  The claims about ‘nation’, ‘people’ and 
‘history’ are very effective tools of mobilisation.  
  Walter Bagehot once said that the nation is a phenomenon that “we 
understand as long as we are not asked”, but one is unable to explain it in brief and 
coherent terms (in Bauer, 1996: 39).  Certainly, politicians struggle to interpret the 
meaning and subject of a nation but mostly stumble when facing the question.  The 
central problem with nationalists is that they exuberantly investigate and invent 
divisions and differences between communities and then exploit them, whereas 
societies who know that the vehicle for advancement are their commonalities are 
often disenfranchised by aggression and narratives of national mobilisation.  The 
power of words and discourses of ethnic superiority can create a moral crisis that 
drives communities to war and conflict.  Nationalists play a game of domination 
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founded on myths, lies and bigotry that breaks a society and ousts certain groups 
from humanity.  The preponderant narrative deprives many of dignity and directs 
them against the few.  Eventually such nation-building endeavours end up in the 
collapse of humanism as it happened in the South Caucasus.  Elaborating on the 
argument, one must always remember the power of dominant narrative and 
consequences of its abuse.  Nations can be founded on myths and history, but they 
can also destroy communities and societies that nations are supposed to protect.              
 Another element of confusion about nationalism arises from its treatment of 
national identity as “a system of absolute values”, which transforms the relativism of 
“ethnic shifters” into “eternal verities” that removes the relativism from the moral 
terminology of identity (Herzfield, 1997: 42).  An “ethnic shifter” in this context 
means that there is a particular focus on certain values or images (e.g. Abkhaz 
ethnicity) in the discourse (Galaty, 1982: 5).  Its meaning mostly depends on the 
relationship between the social group and the essential social identity of the 
‘speaker’ (or another group involved in the discourse) - the ethnic shifters apply 
principles of discrimination, making ‘outsiders’ look inferior (Herzfield, 1997: 83).  To 
be more precise, adherence to “absolute values” emphasizes extremes and causes 
states to appear as eternal edifices.  In other words, the “political morality of 
nationalism” attempts to transform ethnic identity into a national character or a 
“fixed designator”, as these form a convenient technical vocabulary of a fixed 
political order (Herzfield, 1997: 42-43).  The meaning of ethnic identity thus became 
a fixed symbol of discrimination against targeted groups in the South Caucasus.  
Having identified the meaning of ethnic shifters and their application in the creation 
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of a new political morality one has to address the dilemmas originating from the 
interpretation of history.     
 Distorted and reconstructed history has always been a part of the problem, 
as highlighted by many scholars, as it tends to serve the purposes of nationalists.  
Margot Light emphasizes the fact that the Russian identity that was too closely tied 
to the empire.  This solid link between the state and empire made it hard for Russians 
to digest the independence of its former colonies (Light, 1995: 40).  Partially, revised 
history was to  blame, as in the Caucasus Russia had been a symbol of opportunities 
and development, a beacon of advanced culture rather than an aggressor (Light, 
1995: 42).  Light’s point is relevant, though the use or maybe abuse of historic 
narratives needs more attention and scrutiny.  The meaning assigned to history as 
well as its communication will help to shed light on the issue.             
 In his book, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus, 
Ohannes Geukjian (2012) analyses ethnic differences and territorial claims, and looks 
for historical causes of disputes in Soviet nationalisation policy.  Following Geukjian 
this thesis recognises the role of Soviet indoctrination, nevertheless, it is concerned 
that while so many representatives of the intelligentsia and nationalist leaders 
acknowledged perverted stories and falsified truth, why and how did they then go 
on to deploy such stories and falsehoods with the aim of securitising and ultimately 
mobilising their populations?  The arguments that are aimed to protect nationalists 
— as heroes who defend a native land — in fact make securitization theory more 
plausible in this case.  Social engineering was the official policy of the Soviet 
government.  They (nationalists) all knew this fact.  If nationalists were so conscious 
of the needs of the ‘people’ then why did they go on deliberately to misinterpret and 
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misrepresent so many ideas and facts?  The following paragraph will address the 
viewpoints on nationalism as a process.     
 Mark Beissinger (2002) examines nationalism and the ethnic diversity of the 
USSR: for him nationalism is a “recursive and emulative process” where the successes 
of prior acts (mobilisation) create an inertia, which brings more people to the streets 
(2002: 141).  Beissinger addresses the crisis of belonging that had riven the Soviet 
Union from the very beginning of its existence.  The question about belonging to the 
state had both an ambiguous and inconsistent answer (Beissinger, 2002: 50).  It might 
be considered that this ambiguity was the cause of the internal spread of 
nationalism.  Beissinger gives the example of how the Baltic republics shared 
knowledge and expertise with fellow colleagues from Moldavia, Armenia or Georgia, 
thus creating “transnational phenomena” of revolutions (2002: 85).  Nevertheless, 
one could argue that not all lessons were learnt.  The nationalists, as in most cases, 
were hardliners across the South Caucasus.  At a certain point they were captivated 
by emotions, leaving no room for rationality.  It was hard to digest so much 
information about the world and life outside the Iron Curtain and to accommodate 
them into nationalist rhetoric (in fact, they were convinced that everybody was 
nationalist).  The discourses were so far from reality that communities were at war 
with own identities.  Beissinger provides quantitative research about the trajectory 
of conflict and the process of development, finding that political liberalisation 
produced the greatest impact on mobilisation, because it supported the organising 
capacities of nationalist elites (2002: 140).  Evidence is given in the form of data, 
showing the number of people who went to demonstrations.  However, the very way 
in which nationalists used liberalisation and liberal values is the most pertinent factor 
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for the purposes of the present research rather than calculating public participation 
in demonstrations.  In fact, the entire process was less about figures and mass 
participation, but more about instrumentalising liberalisation.   
 Beissinger identifies several tides of nationalism that escalated the situation 
across the former Soviet Union and he argues that repression could have limited the 
scale of violence (2002: 453).  Yet if the authorities had arrested nationalists en 
masse, they might have risked turning them into martyrs.  It was hard for a closed 
society to launch an open debate and find a compromise through the deliberation.  
The arrest of nationalists would have emphasized the meaning of identities and 
national pride.    
 As mentioned, the identities and their interpretations were part of the 
dilemma.  Ronald Suny discards realpolitik approaches and examines the 
construction of identities (1999-2000).  Suny argues that the political actors had 
exploited various identities that influenced their actions both domestically and 
internationally (1999-2000: 139-140).  He stresses that primordial readings of 
longevity and stability of identities marginalise the conceptual possibilities of identity 
(1999-2000: 142).  Suny’s point moves identities to central stage as he posits that 
opinion shapers perceive and construct the world out of those identities (1999-2000: 
177).  Indeed, the social construction of identities does produce an impact on 
formation of concepts and visions of elites, but the means and methods of the 
communication of perceptions is another factor that shapes the policies and polities.  
The formation and understanding of certain paradigms is one facet of an issue; 
nevertheless, methods and ways of transmission can change the primary meanings 
and re-shape them,  which brings us to the point that the arrest of nationalists could 
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have triggered further radicalisation among the ethno-nationally structured 
communities.  Having said that, one has to turn now to importance of myths and 
their relevance to nation-building.        
 For this, one has to touch upon the construction of the identities which are 
understood within the “self-perceived” boundaries (Armstrong, 1982: 6).  For this 
study it is relevant to introduce the concept of “mythomoteur” (Armstrong, 1982), 
which implies that myths are magnified by their fusion with other myths, thus 
defining identities in relation to a particular polity (9).  In other words, this 
combination offers a constitutive myth for the construction of a nation.  John 
Armstrong observes that ethnicity is a bundle of shifting interactions and it does not 
represent a nuclear component of social organization (Smith, 2015: 165).  To expand, 
Armstrong lays down the paradigm which helps us to understand methods that 
construct and consequently politicize identities.  As my empirical chapters will 
demonstrate, some stories were used to arouse intense solidarity against an “alien 
force” (Armstrong, 1982: 9).  Mythomoteurs have religious components (283) and 
help the narrator to increase his awareness of a “common fate” among the audience 
(people) (9).  By emphasizing symbols, an enunciator does not specify a time but 
offers a story which is floating in time.  This in turn is an effective tool of mobilisation, 
as symbolic interactions are communications that help to define boundaries between 
the groups.  Armstrong suggests that the mechanisms that produce the symbolic 
boundaries are words, as they warn a group or community where the separating 
barrier is located (1982: 8).  It is instrumental to pay attention to the frequency of 
the constitutive political myth or to have a mythomoteur which is defined as a force 
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that “sustains a polity and enables it to create an identity beyond that which can be 
imposed by force or purchased by peace and prosperity” (in Smith, 2015: 167).         
 Indeed, the reasons and causes featured and addressed in these multiple 
volumes and publications reflect some part of truth, but the often-exaggerated 
significance granted to a particular paradigm cannot denote the depth of problems.  
This argument highlights the selectivity of utterances and historic narratives.  The 
words that mobilised and marginalised millions of citizens are to be placed under 
scrutiny.  The majority of authors pay less attention to the meaning attributed to 
historic facts; although Victor Shnirelman views conflict as the present lived through 
the lenses of the past.  The extreme politicisation of ethno-political relations within 
the USSR served as catalyst of the conflicts (Shnirelman, 2001: 3).  Nationalism 
became an integral part of political life at all levels boosted by distorted history 
promoted by the Soviet ideological machine.  Soviet propaganda hailed the 
primordial approach to ethnicity and largely benefited from this evaluation 
(Shnirelman, 2001: 4).  The country was administered through national autonomous 
republics or districts (oblast).  Ethno-nationalism was one of the major organising 
principles of the Soviet system, because it helped to divide.  The indisputable 
“historical truth” that bolstered the cleavages was the result of political manipulation 
of scholarship (Shnirelman, 2001: 5) that was widely practiced across the country.  
History was an efficient instrument for the political establishment seeking total and 
utter control over the hearts and minds of the people they governed.  One Russian 
historian accurately defined social memory as “a creative process” rather than 
historical facts or records (Gurevich in Shnirelman, 2001: 5).  Consequently, such 
manipulated views have influenced political behaviour in the South Caucasus.  The 
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scholarship in the 1920s and 1930s combined with political engineering gave a 
violent aspect to patriotism.  Historians gave credence to the struggle of “indigenous 
people” against “newcomers”, and it became a competition for ancient ancestors 
confirming rights and sovereignty over the given territories (Shnirelman, 2001: 386).  
The mass polarisation of mainstream thought became one of the key features of 
ethnic conflict.  Political narratives have fostered the rise of “in-group” solidarity and 
“out-group” hostility making “newcomers” unwelcome guests (Shnirelman, 2001: 
387).  Another dichotomy concerned continuity and discontinuity of languages 
(Shnirelman, 2001: 387).  The age and origin of the various languages was part of the 
divisive discourse that promoted an instrumentalist approach to the perception and 
interpretation of the past; scholars were exposed to massive pressure by censorship 
and government, incorporating school textbooks and historic maps (Shnirelman, 
2001: 391-392).  In the struggle for a better past, an imagined community of 
marginalised people was created.  In other words, education policy aimed to teach 
loyalty through falsehood and mythmaking, at the same time creating “others” and 
a permanent sense of danger in those they ruled.  In fact, historic narratives based 
on a revised history curriculum were part of the securitization and to a certain extent 
predisposed the process of securitization.   
 To sum up, nationalism was depicted as a system of absolute values and 
ethnic belonging helping to forge a sense of belonging to a particular in-group.  
Instead of its original objective of state-building, nationalism became a category that 
atomized the countries and widened the rifts inherited from the Soviet past.   
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2.4.Trajectory of delusion  
 
The people behind the nationalistic movements in the region aimed to gain 
legitimacy and replace the Soviet authorities.  Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as 
a double vacuum, which is “naturally engendered” after “Soviet Jacobinism”, during 
which time there were no rival ideologies and, particularly, rival institutions (Gellner, 
1992: 250).  Nationalism embraced several determining principles, including territory 
and cultural affiliations, to draw the borders (1992: 250).  The lack of institutions 
enabled a reification of discourses.  That is, the speeches and opinions of nationalist 
leaders were equated to sacred sermons.  The words and speech acts became an 
invisible security threat, leaders began hunting for potential enemies, dividing people 
into us and them.  Referring back to Gellner’s point about institutions, the thesis will 
demonstrate how institutional opportunities were rejected and missed.  The us 
against them dichotomy increased this apathy, exacerbating the sense of ‘tragic 
delusion’ instead of supporting transition from a community to a society.   
 The empty spaces left by the vacuum of authority paved the way for political 
entrepreneurs and warlords in a search for power. Ethnic differences were 
highlighted by security discourse at a time when the public felt insecure after the 
sudden collapse of the country. The Soviet version of Marxism was “a rigid doctrine 
of economic determinism” and was endorsed as “objective science” (Rupert, 2010: 
166).  However, the regime provided some basic services, including education, 
healthcare and perceived security (it was not security but fear of state power).    
Therefore, the sudden meltdown caused a degree of insecurity, which became a 
lucrative opportunity for certain groups poised to seize the power from the 
Communist Party.   
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 Nationalism was an incentive to consolidate around an objective "them" to 
divert the wave of expectations.  Vicken Cheterian partially shares this viewpoint.  He 
argues that it is a widely accepted view among politicians, the media and academia 
that the conflicts in the Caucasus were determined by nationalism and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union lacked deeper analysis.  He concludes that the cleavages were 
more the “exception” rather than “normality” (2008: 2); thus, he rejects traditional 
narratives including the “Russian factor” and insists on a “reconstructed” perspective 
of the clashes.  Simply putting aside the nationalistic paradigm, he considers the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union as a possible cause of conflicts (2008: 5).  However, 
Cheterian is does not accept “uncertainties” like the collapse of the USSR to be a 
cause of war, as such an approach will limit the scope of scholarship (2008: 5). Thus, 
his position further strengthens the debate about constructivist approaches to the 
South Caucasian conflicts.    
 Moreover, whilst attempting to explain the conflicts, Cheterian devotes 
attention to the distorted interpretation of history and the lack of marketplace for 
exchange of ideas and discourse during the Soviet times (2008: 41-42).  Indeed, 
differences in the evaluation of the past had a role in all three conflicts; additionally, 
the nationalistic approach to federal structure and military preferences for certain 
ethnicities have their own stake in the conflict (2008: 43-46).  Cheterian insists that 
the wars were the outcome of a dichotomy — the collapse of the state and state 
building (2008: 7).  While addressing nationalism, Cheterian believes that nobody 
thought about the empty spaces left after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the 
breakup was just labelled as a “primary” (author’s emphasis) cause (2008: 21).   He 
notes that, overall, both Western and Soviet scholars lacked the tools and expertise 
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to deal with the complex patterns and consequences of the dissolution of the empire 
(2008: 22).  This was a case where nationalism had passed the phase of state making 
and become a state-breaker (Cobban, 1969: 17).  Cheterian argues that wars and 
violence were primarily caused by the “shrinking of the state” and the rise of private 
actors; whereas, the growing nationalistic mobilisation was addressed in best Soviet 
traditions with military force (2008: 26 and 32).  Therefore, it must be noted, that 
political leaders highlighted only differences and empty spaces were filled in with 
hostile narratives, laying down the foundations of a new Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia.  Consequently, the emerging new states were locked up into a narrative, 
which was mostly the continuation of the Soviet ethno-nationalism (see ch. 4).  A 
vacant social space was infused with a sense of exhilaration, one which emboldened 
the nationalists.  At the same time contemporary scholarship was not ready to face 
the complexities of conflicts.             
 The new elites applied the old rules, thus proving their lack of innovation and 
political insolvency.  Indeed, in the late 1980s the state was diminishing daily, failing 
to provide any services, but the way the private actors chose to substitute the state 
became a problem.  The aforementioned, rigid outlook and fixed ideas [of the actors] 
had a part to play.  Here we need to scrutinise the actions and discourse of the private 
actors and their audience — how fear was mutually constituted between them.   
 Rogers Brubaker considers nationalism to be a category of practice, and in 
order to understand the patterns of nationalism, he argues, we have to explore “the 
practical uses” of this very category and the means by which it can organise political 
discourses and action (2003: 7).  The question is not ‘what is a nation?’  but rather, is 
‘how is nationhood institutionalised as a cultural and political nexus?’  How does the 
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nation perform as a practical enterprise, or “classificatory scheme or cognitive 
frame”?  Why are the “nation-evoking” and “nation-invoking” undertakings of 
politicians relatively successful  (Brubaker, 2003: 16)?   Brubaker also argues that it is 
not quite appropriate to consider ethnic groups as protagonists of struggles; rather, 
“vernacular categories” have more an explanatory power (2002: 166).  He suggests 
that “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” largely reify the ethnic groups as they crystallise 
group feelings (Brubaker, 2002: 167).  Nationalism is an instrument with dual effect 
— Cheterian (2008: 26 and 32) rightly notes the dichotomy involved in the conflicts.  
Therefore, it is vital to question the content attributed to nationalism and its 
interpretation across the elites.  How was it explained and communicated, and at the 
same time accepted, by the communities?  Borrowing Brubaker’s classification will 
help us to identify how nationalism was used for selective othering.                 
     
2.5.Perils of the Soviet legacy 
 
It became a “conventional wisdom” that the Soviet Union served as a policeman of 
multiple ethnic groups and nations, and the collapse of the authoritarian regime 
lifted the “lid” on the old rivalries and “long-suppressed” resentments (Brown, 1993: 
6).  However, this viewpoint fails to explain why certain republics have avoided 
conflict and others have not.  For Michael Brown, there are three main levels of 
possible escalation.  The systemic explanation reckons with security concerns of 
certain ethnic groups.  The empire that served as a guarantor of security has 
disappeared and thus the groups have to defend themselves.  The Realist view 
whereby offensive operations have an advantage over defensive actions inclines 
groups towards the first choice.  Another important factor is ethnic geography, when 
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the ethnic “island” is relatively small, offensive operations could be beneficial for 
certain actors (Brown, 1993: 7).  The next level responsible for triggering the rift is 
domestic:  i.e. if the state fails or is inefficient in addressing the problems of its own 
constituents or there is a nationalistic agenda in the relations between groups, or 
finally it could be attributed to democratisation (Brown, 1993: 8).  Yet the level and 
quality of democracy could make the difference, as Nina Caspersen argues, if 
competition between the elites is centred around the conflict (2012).  Moreover, 
Barry Posen argues that the post-Soviet conflicts were mostly determined by the 
“security dilemma” (1993: 103).  In Posen’s view, the people who found themselves 
responsible for security are inclined to act in the “absence of a sovereign”.  In other 
words, the state i.e. the Soviet Union, was unable to provide basic services and as a 
result, actors who rendered themselves responsible occupied the vacated positions 
(across the republics) of the sovereign.  Additionally, Posen explains that in 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union sovereigns had disappeared from the stage 
(1993: 104).  According to Posen, the security dilemma affects ethnic groups in the 
same way as it works in international politics (1993: 105).  He refers to the lack of 
truth in “historical scholarship” that helps to develop the oral history of every group, 
which has not been subject to critical review.  Storytelling then becomes a persuasive 
argument in political speeches and political mobilisation (1993: 107).  The central 
authority that suppresses the truth breaks down, and distorted records boost the 
political assets of new power-hunters.  However, in this case it is misleading to 
identify this as main source because particular agents boosted that sense of 
insecurity; that is, fear was not a given factor.  Posen insists that fear prevailed, but 
in this thesis the point is that fear was constructed.  Here, it is useful to use Didier 
Bigo’s point that fears need to be understood, their social construction 
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deconstructed (2000: 174).  It is important to analyse the redefinition of security by 
the agencies who participate in a “field of security” (Bigo, 2000: 174).  Bigo 
emphasizes the factor of structural evaluation and the emergence of a transformed 
idea of security, which includes collective behaviour and cultural norms that shape 
the security framework of a given society.  He also notes the significance of producers 
of the social construction of threats and their connection with securitization (2000: 
174).  These threats need an independent analysis as “social constructs”, but at the 
same time we need to acknowledge the interdependence of agencies that proclaim 
their legitimacy (Bigo, 2000: 174).   
 David Lake and Donald Rothchild provide a useful assessment of the existing 
explanations for ethnic conflict, defining them as simply “incomplete” or “wrong” 
(1996: 41).  Violence is neither an “ancient hatred” nor an anxiety caused by 
modernity; rather, conflict is viewed as an interconnection of several variables and 
particularly as “collective fears for future” (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 41).  The 
weakness of the state authority serves as one explanation for the violent clashes in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The authors argue that the lack of force 
might be less apparent, however, governments rely mostly upon “coercion” rather 
than legitimacy.  The suppressed and threatened groups take action, which gradually 
ignites ethnic violence.  In the “emerging anarchy”, conflict precipitates from the 
“strategic interactions” between and within actors.  There are three key dilemmas 
predisposing violence amongst the groups: failure in information, credibility 
problems and the stimulus to use pre-emptive force or a security dilemma (Lake and 
Rothchild, 1996: 44).  Having said that, one must still investigate the causes of fears 
and the scale of state weakness.  Fears are considered to be the most “corrosive” 
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forces of politics that could endanger societies (Shklar in Wæver, 2011: 472).  While 
focusing on fears, politics are mostly concentrated on avoiding the largest negatives 
rather than adhering to positive values (Wæver, 2011: 472).  Governments tend to 
balance legitimacy with coercion, while misinformation and credibility problems 
result from poor communication and fall into the structurationist category.  In other 
words, violence is not a product of an ancient hatred, but the weakness of 
governments is often caused by inability and the incapacity to adjust to the 
anarchical order and to find the most “stable” point comprising, an “optimum mix of 
legitimacy and advantage” (Watson in Suganami, 2005: 32).  The degree of the 
acuteness exercised by leaders to defend and promote such ethnic approaches is 
truly fascinating.  Clifford Geertz offers an example from the speech of the Indian 
statesman Ambedkar, who reiterates that “fellow feelings” are the foundation of a 
stable state, thus emphasising primordial sentiments (Geertz, 1963: 110-11).  
Ostensibly, groups that are formed along such lines could not be considered “as self-
standing” units or contenders for nationhood; contrarily, the exclusiveness and 
absence of alternative definitions undermine not only governments but nations as 
well.  The heads not only of leaders but of nations fall as the victims of primordial 
discontent (Geertz, 1963: 111).  The South Caucasian turmoil demonstrates perfectly 
how the nations fell as victims of constructed discontents.     
 Lake and Rothchild emphasize the friction inside the group, when moderate 
actors are upstaged by “ethnic activists” who successfully exploit emotions, myths 
and historical memories and create a vicious circle that triggers violence in multi-
ethnic communities (1996: 44).  By analysing the methods and the grammar (the 
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structure of practices) of policies practiced by ethnic activists in the South Caucasus 
one might reveal the contribution of agency to the case.   
 Fear of extinction, and myths justifying ethnic violence along with 
mobilisation opportunities, are seen as preconditions of war by Stuart Kaufman 
(2001: 212).  Kaufman emphasizes the power of symbols in the clashes between Azeri 
and Armenians as well as Georgians and Abkhazians.  Kaufman offers a set of essays 
about former Soviet and Yugoslav conflicts where he rejects the primordial or 
security dilemma approaches (Kaplan and Posen accordingly) to the problem.  In his 
reading of Posen’s argument that the ethnic wars (in Yugoslavia) were attempts of 
self-defence in the times of ‘anarchy’, Kaufman argues that this anarchy was caused 
by the federal government’s loss of control over republics and was a result of war 
preparation (2001: 9-10).  Kaufman emphasises the “politics of ethnic symbolism” 
going to extremes and provoking hostility, which then leads to a security dilemma, 
making a war “a mutually reinforced process” escalated by extremist politics and 
insecurity (2001: 12).  A problem with Kaufman’s claim is that symbols have been re-
branded: ethnic symbolism was securitised at the same time, boosting the sense of 
insecurity among the public.  However, it was not symbolism per se, but rather the 
very way it was interpreted, together with the resulting fears of the target audience, 
which came together and thus made a case for conflict.    
 Jack Snyder renounces the unchangeable paradigm of conflicts including 
nationalism and ethnicity (Snyder, 1993: 80).  He cites the study conducted by Human 
Rights Watch stipulating that “deliberate government policies” are causations of 
contemporary ethnic violence (Snyder, 1993: 80).  Snyder suggests that the crisis 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan was a result of economic change and revolution 
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(1993: 80).  He notes that the promotion of the economic shock therapy laid the 
groundwork for a nationalist reaction (Snyder, 1993: 80).  Thus, the nationalist stance 
enabled the key actors to ignore the economic factors that were decisive for a 
smooth transition from the hierarchy to anarchy.   
 As Snyder notes, aggressive nationalism emerges in areas where states fail to 
carry out their tasks (1993: 81).  Failing or non-existent institutions are unable to 
meet public demands and people strive to create more effective states (Snyder, 
1993: 81).  Nationalism then comes to the point when borders and sovereignty are 
in doubt, armies are in disarray and economies are out of control (1993: 81).  Snyder 
argues that improving the effectiveness of post-Soviet states is the best way of 
managing prevailing nationalist sentiments (1993: 81).  But, when the improvements 
are delayed, ethnic nationalism thrives in places where failing institutions cause a 
vacuum (Snyder, 1993: 86).  As he refers to Karl Polanyi, hyper-nationalism and 
fascism are products of incompatibility of mass-suffrage in democracy with the 
adjustment shocks of laissez-faire economics (in Snyder, 1993: 88).  In the Soviet 
Union, it was a failure of institutional adjustment that created the vacuum; in other 
words, the transition process was disorganized, and Gorbachev was unable to assure 
smooth change of the system.  In the meantime, the nationalists did not seize the 
moment and acted to acquire power.  They worked toward legitimizing a new order 
and eroded the “peripheral nations” by hailing homogeneity (Hechter, 2000: 28).   
Politics in the post-Soviet states encompassed sporadic voting and appeals 
for popular support, but such democratic activities were conducted by weak political 
parties under unstable constitutional rules (Snyder, 1993: 91).  Yet it is notable that 
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those political actors created the rules and instability was part of the plan to retain 
power. 
 It is worth saying a few words about the Yugoslavian case, as there are some 
similarities as well as differences.  Susan Woodward attaches significance to the 
sense of community, though argues that historical persistence and ethnic identities 
cannot be essential, as the ethnic conflict school argues, but rather that the inability 
of a government to deliver its functions shakes the foundations of communities 
(1995: 17).  In other words, communities and links between people do not collapse 
because of their ethnic affiliation or legends, but there are actual reasons and actors 
that direct social behaviour.   
 As Woodward rightly notes, certain conditions were necessary to transform 
ethnic differences into ethnic conflict, and conflict into war over territory and status 
(Woodward, 1995: 349).  Before we mention the very instrumentalist approach to 
ethnicity, we should note that the differences do not imply conflict, let alone war.  
The stories across the Balkans and the South Caucasus were similar: the events 
involved extremely powerful nationalistic mobilisation and political entrepreneurs 
with ambitions to gain/retain power.   
 Woodward rightly states that the wars of Yugoslavia were the part of a 
process that had commenced with economic reforms and constitutional conflict, 
where nationalism and territorial claims heavily relied on other factors (1995: 335).  
These factors and conditions are very important in mapping down the South 
Caucasian cases.  This research project aims to emphasize the structure and 
sequence of those conditions.  In fact, studies of the region will acquire more 
scientific tools if the instrumentalisation of nationalism and politics is investigated 
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and better explained.  As it was in Yugoslavia, the culture of collective security was 
largely defined by instigating violence against the other, who was typically a 
neighbour or a friend (Woodward, 1995: 337).   
 Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated into the ‘new wars’ concept by Mary 
Kaldor (2012).  Kaldor defines new wars as complex emergencies that are local, but 
at the same time “involve a myriad of transnational connections” (2012: 2). These 
types of wars have a political goal based on traditional identities, including nation, 
tribe and religion (Kaldor, 2012: 71).  Kaldor’s case study focuses on the demise of 
Yugoslavia, and she argues that globalisation has caused the emergence of new wars.  
However, despite Kaldor’s examples, it is not very clear whether they are really new 
or have been simply rebranded for political purposes.   Additionally, the analysis of a 
complex emergency should include the examination of methods and strategies 
practiced in a particular country.  Herfried Münkler does not find anything special in 
new types of warfare; on the contrary, he argues that things remain mostly the same 
(2005: 22).  Edward Newman disagrees with the label  ‘new’, and argues that, despite 
the growing relationship between security and development and the economic 
factors involved that might explain modern wars, they do not differ significantly from 
similar conflicts hundred years ago (2004: 179).  His argument defines the change as 
a more natural occurrence rather than something  altogether ‘new’ (2004: 185).  I 
would argue that these wars were new for the population of the South Caucasus 
republics, because their awareness about intra-state conflicts was limited at that 
time.  However, the methods and slogans used were old, and general mobilisation 
was conducted along the lines of us versus them lines.          
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 Having identified the issues linked to the Soviet legacy, one must consider 
that despite the totalitarian imprint, the political actors exploited fellow feelings and 
constructed discontents that escalated into armed conflicts.  The next section will 
review the writings that examine the importance of geopolitical paradigms in the 
South Caucasus.   
        
2.6.Geopolitical Paradigms 
 
The overwhelming majority of the books and essays mostly written by local authors 
on this subject choose empowering nouns and adjectives such as: crossroads, 
strategic geopolitical location, borderland, and many other striking word collocations 
(Bertsch, 2000, Cornell, 2001, Nuriyev, 2007, Masih and Krikorian, 1999).  A variety 
of geometric triangles, quadrangles and circles are used to map the region and the 
interactions of its units.  Many experts and scholars work to find the right ladder of 
abstraction and produce an exclusive answer to all questions raised by the 
developments of last twenty-five years or so.  The literature resembles a contest for 
the best apocalyptic scenario.  Different authors develop their perspectives of 
events, elaborating on possible arrangements in the near future.  They advocate 
diverse strategies and include almost every local, regional and global actor in 
potential future wars, setting out possible regional arrangements for the near future 
— Svante Cornell, for example (2001: 139).  Ronald Suny rightly emphasizes that 
ignoring factors such as political discourse and cultural norms simplifies the 
neorealist analysis of conflicts; but the change in the balance of power does affect 
interests (1999-2000: 142).  Caroline Cox and John Eibner define the Karabakh 
conflict as “an epic struggle between the traditions and institutions of the Turkic and 
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Armenian nations” and see it as a “fundamental conflict of civilizations” (1993: 6-14).  
Yet one should be critical of such an all-encompassing perspective, as my empirical 
chapter demonstrates that “traditions” in an atheist state (i.e., the USSR) could have 
a more equivocal meaning.         
 Svante Cornell defines the Caucasus as a “museum of peoples” (2001: 20),10 
and points to religious and geopolitical conditions as sources of rivalries, adding that 
territorial control is a significant criterion in the argument between the clashing 
parties.  However, Cornell also includes nationalism, national interests, politicisation 
of ethnic differences and the Soviet legacy as defining factors (2001: 54-60).  The 
South Caucasus is described as a ‘game’ encompassing national interests and security 
of all actors/units.  The geometrical map of political conditions and alignments, the 
inner and outer triangles and quadrangles, sheds light on the actual situation and 
balance of interests but says less about the context and implicit paradigms of 
tensions.  Armenia perceives Turkey and Azerbaijan as a threat to its own survival 
and existence (Cornell, 2001: 396), and this study seeks to unpack the very ideas and 
content of such a perception during the years of turmoil.  At the same time, 
Azerbaijan saw both Russia and Iran as threats and aligned with Turkey instead 
(Cornell, 2001: 396).  Georgia depicted Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s demands in the 
1980s as a threat to its existence, and territorial integrity with Russia as being the 
main conspirator against Georgia’s sovereignty.  The Russian “hidden hand” is singled 
out and blamed in pieces by Thomas Goltz (1993) and Svetlana Chervonnaya (1994).  
Both authors describe and emphasize the role of the Russian government and 
military leadership in the South Caucasian conflicts.       
 10	He	emphasizes	the	ethnic	diversity	of	the	area.	
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 Another geopolitical paradigm is offered by Alexander Rondeli, who 
foregrounds geopolitics and unpleasant neighbours and alliances (Rondeli, 2000: 50-
51).    Rondeli defines the Caucasus as a “regional security complex in formation” 
where a “security dilemma”, the “great game”, the ethnic tensions and self-
determination claims are intertwined (2000: 52).  Moreover, he suggests the creation 
of a “buffer zone” between great powers under their “responsible supervision” 
seems as the best possible outcome and prospect for the region.  Interestingly, 
Rondeli does not clarify the meaning he allocates to the notion of “responsible 
supervision”.  Nor does he indicate the meaning and interpretation of the word 
“responsible” or suggest any tools to measure the degree of responsibility.          
 The scholar and former journalist Thomas De Waal refers to a brief 
conversation between President Heidar Aliev and the American envoy Carey 
Cavanaugh during the peace talks in Florida, USA, in 2001 (2003: 253).  Their dialogue 
is a prime example of interpretation problems between the peace-brokers and 
peace-dealers and mediators.  Aliev and Kocharian, who came close to signing a 
peace treaty, were participating in the five-day Key West meeting.   Ambassador 
Cavanaugh hailed Aliev’s courage and emphasized that foreign friends can only 
provide “political, financial and logistical support for a deal”, but that the peace deal 
was solely the business of the two presidents: Heidar Aliev and Robert Kocharian (De 
Waal, 2003: 5).  Despite being very close to an agreement, President Kocharian 
rejected a compromise and the negotiation froze.  De Waal provides an in-depth 
story of the divisions and conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  He offers a profound and detailed analysis of the events and their 
outcomes, covering the outbreak of war and peace negotiations.  De Waal describes 
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the power-games in Baku and Yerevan, as well as the realpolitik vision of the conflict 
dominating the political elites (De Waal, 2003: 253-261).  It is apparent that the 
parties expected assistance from elsewhere, while in fact the mediating states (US, 
Russia and EU) miscommunicated with each other (De Waal, 2003: 254).  The 
chronological record of events described by de Waal leaves the reader under 
impression that the war and its outcomes were a lucrative political commodity for 
politicians.  The post-Soviet states had multiple problems and conflicts like Nagorno-
Karabakh served as trade-offs.  De Waal points to the differences between Heidar 
Aliev’s public and private statements (2003: 268), which proves the importance of 
language and the content of speeches.  
 De Waal identifies three broad reasons for the escalation of conflict in the 
late 1980s: (a) Karabakhi Armenians succeeded in mobilisation using “their dusty 
autonomous institutions”; (b) the speed at which the hatred of others spread;11 (c) 
the USSR Politburo’s failure to exercise control over crisis situation (2003: 142-144).  
Moreover, “decorative nationalism” became a destructive power, smashing the 
nationalists on its way and causing a mixed response from the target audiences (De 
Waal, 2003: 144).  Elaborating further, De Waal notes that the Soviet authorities, 
apart from “doing nothing”, handed over weaponry to both sides (2003: 144).  These 
three broad reasons were instrumental factors that were generated and 
implemented by particular people looking for various ends.  The ideas of those agents 
who constructed the hostility and hatred were ultimately more significant than the 
Politburo’s failures.   
 11	Two	famous	nationalistic	intellectuals,	Zori	Balayan	and	Ziya	Buniatov,	publicised	copies	of	Vasil	Velichko’s	racist	report	about	Armenians	in	1904.		
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 Moreover, Laurence Broers suggests that focusing on the militarization of 
these societies stunted their economic development and political cultures helped the 
elites to construct even more radically exclusive identities than had existed before 
the armed conflict (2005: 9-11).  Interestingly, the parties to the conflict tend to 
highlight the most extreme examples of violence (Khojaly or Sumgait), which Broers 
argues are not “representative” but become deeply embedded in the public memory 
as being the most significant (2005: 11).  It may be that such trends are the 
consequences of the hostile discourse that helped to trigger the conflict in the first 
place.    
 To conclude, this idea of allies balancing against threats has led to the 
formation of a Caucasus Security Complex (Cornell, 2001: 392), where the conflicts 
became a centre of the region and caused the “interrelationships” (Cornell, 2001: 
392) — i.e., interrelationships in the region are defined by the centrality of conflicts.  
The national security strategies of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia depict these de-
facto states as primary threats to their own security and survival.  The territorial 
claims dominate the agenda of official meetings, thus upstaging other contemporary 
challenges.   
 The next section will address the literature that deals with causes of the 
conflicts in the region and possible solutions.    
 
2.7.Territory, history and solutions          
 
One work that examines the density of Caucasian boundaries disputes, the out-dated 
“territorial framework” of the Stalin era, and calls for the establishment of new, 
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mutually acceptable borders for all nations — including both large and small, nation-
states and sub-states (Wright et al., 1995: 11).  Here the weakness of the 
governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the consequent failure to fill 
the vacuum after the demise of the Soviet Union is highlighted (1995: 140).  Edward 
Ozhiganov remarks that a close analysis of Georgia’s two conflicts demonstrates that 
concepts of “historic enmity” or “communist restoration” are inadequate 
(Ozhiganov, 1997: 342).  Christopher J. Walker offers a brief history of the tensions 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, and describes the situation just before and during the 
emergency (Wright et al., 1995: 89-115).  Julian Birch and George Hewitt (in Wright 
et al., 1995) write about the South Ossetian and Abkhazian wars respectively.  Both 
contributions focus extensively on ethnic differences and outline the decisions of 
politicians shortly before the conflicts.  They argue that ethnic differences were the 
major causes of the conflicts.  Yet, as noted earlier in this section, ethnicity was not 
a decisive factor.  People in other parts of the country continued to live peacefully.  
As a result, such an evaluation is quite narrow, with weak explanatory power.   
 “Gha-ra-bagh!” is Mark Malkasian’s (1996) monograph about the emergence 
of the national democratic movements in Armenia.  It is a work that attempts to 
analyse the events in 1988 and place them into a historical and political context.  
Malkasian talks of the “aspirations, ideals, and frustrations” of the Karabakh 
Movement and discusses the legacy of the initiative (1996: 2).  The book describes 
the events of 1988 and the role of the movement in the political reality of Armenia.  
The author is an eyewitness of the occurrence and delves into historic details, 
wanting to explain the issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh dilemma.  Addressing 
struggles and fights, the work wishes to drop the argument that the Karabakh 
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movement was “a vehicle to gain power” (Malkasian, 1996: 3).  It is an important 
work about the emergence of the crisis, yet it mostly focuses on the role of the 
national movement in the political life of Armenia.         
 Elkhan Nuriyev highlights the geographical location and Russia’s influence 
(2007).  Nuriyev looks for a solution between the powers and their interests.  He 
views the challenges facing the oil and conflict-rich region as a result of political 
turmoil between great powers.  He argues that the criminals of the ungoverned 
territories (de-facto states) are connected to colleagues in the North Caucasus, 
Central Asia and Middle East (2007: 337).  According to Nuriyev, Russia-US relations 
have a significant imprint on the situation in the region, respectively hindering the 
establishment of “common security system” and integration (2007: 340).  Nuriyev 
emphasizes a “just” settlement of the disputes among the parties (2007: 5).  The 
problem of this perception lies in an overemphasis on the outside actors.  None of 
the powers mentioned by the author, including the United States, Russia or the 
European Union, have capacities to deal with internal dilemmas of sovereign states.  
Nuriyev himself points to the significance of sovereign rights and democracy in terms 
of a solution throughout the book.  Yet one must bear in mind, that a solution implies 
a particular goal achieved, such as partition, unification or recognition or another 
mutually acceptable framework.  But before that target is reached (or is not), there 
is a constant process of interactions that can amend the perception of any future 
model.   
 Therefore, a one-dimensional outlook restricts other opportunities, and the 
parties face stalemate partially for this reason.  High hopes and expectations about 
a solution that will be just and embraced by all parties are an illusion with a faith that 
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it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  This research project is concerned with the 
lack of multi-dimensional and diverse appraisal of mistakes and setbacks that caused 
the stalemate in the first place.  On this point, one must adhere to the argument 
mapped out by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001: xvii-xviii) that conflicts and 
divisions cannot be eliminated as they are neither simply disturbances nor empirical 
impediments, and a belief that a “final resolution” is possible is a risky enterprise.  
Perhaps the idea of a solution remains at the level of speculation and boosts the 
bargaining possibilities for political elites.  
 To sum up this section, the authors attempt to address the reasons and 
emphasize the significance of territory, history and the Soviet order as well as offer 
suggestions about possible solution.   
 
2.8.Political measures of security 
 
Menon et al.’s work, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Menon et al., 1999), 
provides a short review of security challenges and implications in the Southern Tier 
of the former USSR.  The authors emphasize several decisive criteria, where the 
balance of power takes primary position, focusing on political and economic as well 
as nationalism and external leverages (Menon, 1999: 22).  The concept of security in 
the volume is defined as an issue increasing the “likelihood of conflict” and instability 
while boosting the risk of external involvement (Menon, 1999: 5).  The contributing 
authors are concerned with Russia’s unsettled strategies towards the Southern Tier 
and zero-sum outcome of the game (Fedorov and Nodia, 1999).  However, the 
strategies of the Southern Tier countries are ignored, and the authors continue to 
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insist on the prevalence of realpolitik approaches (Fedorov and Nodia, 1999).  Yet, 
such prioritising of the ‘balance of power’ approach precisely eradicates the 
possibility of a different assessment and shall be abandoned [in this thesis] as a 
primary method whilst operationalizing the South Caucasus problems.  The 
articulatory power of such a notion serves as a stricture for further extension of the 
problem.  In the end, alliances and treaties are agreed through discourses and 
negotiations, thus before assessing them it is worth exploring the grammar of 
language accelerating the events.  Lubin addresses the new threats for national 
security: corruption and crime (1999: 206-208).  Yet this thesis is about the 
understanding and the meaning of national security in the region, among the elites 
in particular.  They, the elites, are mediums that communicate political terms to 
public and generally use or even abuse ‘national security’ for different reasons.  
According to David Campbell security is the foremost “performative discourse” that 
constitutes a political order, where “securing” demands “differentiation, 
classification and definition” because this is the way of identification (1992: 253).  
The Caucasian discourse of identification and definition was a failure of the elites 
who planned and implemented the project.  It did classify and define, but the lines 
of differences obviously were not acceptable.  The newly emerged political actors 
had varying interests and that was the major and decisive difference that triggered 
the wars.  
 Graham Smith et al. (1998) consider links between national identities and 
nation-building activities.  By underlining myths, histories and cultural belonging the 
work is a good analysis of practices of essentialism, historicising and totalising.  The 
nationalist policies were an attempt at de-sovietisation as well as a search for the 
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other (i.e. enemies) among national minorities (Smith et al., 1998: 13-18), which had 
various degrees of approval across the former Soviet Union.  The book sketches out 
the application of myths and history in the development of conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia and shows how arguments were built upon 
historical controversies dating back two millennia (Smith et al., 1998: 50-54).   History 
was a factor for mobilisation, but the facts were put into a favourable12 context, as 
Victor Shnirelman’s work about the past of the South Caucasus demonstrates.  
History had a privileged meaning and status in Soviet scholarship, and propaganda 
employed it as a way of imposing and reinforcing statism across up to one-sixth of 
the world.           
 In the chosen reading of the situation, hostile discourses and nationalistic 
sentiments have securitised territorial claims and escalated the conflict.  Other 
variables including the involvement of foreign powers and geopolitical interests had 
a lesser contribution to the conflict; they were convenient slogans for a rally around 
the flag.  Where there was no violent conflict, great powers had to work out a 
different strategy of action.  But the local leaders mobilised communities to fight the 
other, to fight them — the other which only the day before had been us.      
    
2.9.Summary  
 
As already suggested this project takes a structurationist approach.  The literature 
demonstrates the gap that exists in studies of the region.  The main emphasis across 




power interests.  The authors reviewed here attempt to convince the reader that 
structures are given categories that are almost unchangeable (Posen, 1993, Rondeli, 
2000, Nuriyev, 2007).  Few scholars take into account the importance of the role of 
agency in making and shaping the divisions (Suny, 1999-2000, Cheterian, 2008).  One 
must note that the attitude of scholarship is divided between the local or Soviet 
views and the Western evaluations.  The Soviet or post-Soviet scientists tend to 
address geopolitics and ethnic differences whereas the Western academics 
acknowledge the social constructivist features of the clashes.  Victor Shnirelman does 
emphasize this fact which is mentioned above.  It is true that sovereigns disappeared 
and the ‘lid’ was taken off the communities, but we need to examine and understand 
the methods and choices that filled and permeated the vacated space.  This project 
will use securitization as a fact-finding concept.  By re-engaging with the events under 
investigation, that is, the discourses and narratives, the research will focus on the 
context of violence, rather than “givens” (Wilkinson, 2011: 98).  The research will 
study the securitization of nationalism and ethnic differences, speeches, historic 
narratives and other tools used by the elites.    
 Indeed, nationalism, historical narratives and insecurity had a share in post-
Soviet turmoil, but it is essential to understand and explain how these assumptions 
were used and classified by particular actors — politicians and political 
entrepreneurs.  Individual actors and decision-makers pushed nationalism, symbols 
and revised history to extremes and it would be inaccurate to think that the very 
existence of such symbols was a driving force behind the conflicts.  Here Brubaker’s 
argument that the ways in which nationhood has been institutionalised and 
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instrumentalized as cultural and political idea needs to be scrutinised is most 
pertinent (Brubaker, 2003).      
 The discourse about geopolitical location and engagement of great powers — 
Russia and the United States in particular — does not possess much explanatory 
power.  International relations are the sum of the interaction of its units, and 
analysing only one side of such interactions would be erroneous.  The example 
offered from De Waal’s work, about the negotiations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, demonstrates the power and influence that the political actors have over 
definition of situations as well as their outcomes.   
 Russia is an important factor and actor in the South Caucasus.  It was and 
remains a former empire whose identity is closely linked to that status.  But this does 
not mean that the policies pursued from the North (Russia is the North for the South 
Caucasus) were unilateral.  The parties in the South Caucasus have accepted the 
norms and rules offered to them.  Suffice to say that defining some constructed 
categories as fixed and given created a problem for understanding the conflicts.  This 
thesis will deconstruct the events and avoid fixed presumptions about the origins of 
wars.  The work will focus on how and why governments and states/communities 
securitized and othered certain groups within themselves.                                      
 The research project will argue that despite geopolitical dilemmas and 
Russia–dominated political alignments, the conflicts were more of a domestic 
construction.  Bearing in mind the role that hardliner patriots and their followers 
played in the build-up of hostilities.  Securitization of discourses, symbols and ethnic 
differences changed the context of security in the region.  While taking into 
consideration the diversity of evaluations, it will put agents and the instruments they 
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used to form and shape the conflicts at the centre of the analysis.  The excessive 
focus on a solution overshadowed the need for study of other factors and variables 
and thus altered the path of both explanation and understanding of patterns of 











3. Chapter Three 




This chapter outlines the concepts and methodology used in the study.  Every crisis 
has to be analysed through a set of different angles that will allow revealing complex 
perplexities that constitute a case and thus explain and apprehend the context.  In 
other words, a crisis is an intrinsic part of social life and its assessment must serve as 
a rationalizer that has a capacity to restore rationality (Fairclough and Fairclough, 
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2012: 3).  By elaborating on that theoretical framework, this chapter aids the reader 
in navigating the concepts and definitions that explain the events.  Drawing on 
Balzacq this study uses the following approach to identify the link between discourse 
and political conflict;  
• Referent objects — issues that were seen to be threatened (e.g. nation, 
identity); 
• Securitizing actors — political actors (or members of the intelligentsia) who 
considered the referent objects to be under threat; 
• Context — as discourse does not emerge out of vacuum the study explains 
the specific context that helped the process of securitization (Balzacq, 2011a: 
35-36).    
These referent objects were imbued with certain meaning by political actors, and had 
the effect of securitizing public discourse.  The conceptual framework of 
securitization is explained in section 3.1., which outlines the theory and explains the 
method that is chosen to prove the acts of securitization in the region.  In order to 
identify securitization, one must look into the discourse of the time and analyse 
words that accelerated differences.  Therefore, the section presents the notions of 
discourse analysis that are applied to the forthcoming chapters.  It will also address 
the issue of the interpretation of symbols and language, how the events were 
communicated to the public and which stories were emphasized.  Additionally, there 
is a part which explains why the language is a significant designator of causes of the 
crises.     
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 It is the importance of language and its usage that defined the selection of 
the methodology.  The discursive dimensions of the crises in the South Caucasus 
were important part of channelling and shaping social relations that made these 
relations entirely rhetorical (Herzfield, 1997: 141).  They created a vernacular that 
escalated divisions and weaponized the differences.   Examining those dimensions 
will help to unveil the ways toward normalization and the institutionalization of 
dilemmas.  Prevalence of hostile and divisive narratives had shaped the content of 
the age that was marked by the dissolution of the biggest state in the world and the 
emergence of new subjects of international law.  By studying the language of 
discontentment, one can reveal “ethnic shifters” (Galaty, 1982: 5) that served as 




A theory in social science is an accurate and coherent speculation about both the 
research question and the recommended answer.  Consisting of descriptive or causal 
hypotheses, theories must adhere to prior evidence regarding the question and 
should not ignore it.  Otherwise, it cannot be defined as a theory (Goertz, 2006: 72).  
King, et al, note that the general notion that a theory is a first step of any research is 
not always true.  It might come first in certain circumstances, but a theory is based 
on antecedent knowledge and expertise (King et al., 1994: 19).  In other words, these 
two notions are very much intertwined and form a process of accumulation of 
theoretical and practical skills.  
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 Different events in international politics are divided into various categories 
and are classified, which may serve several purposes, but the appropriate 
classification can be driven inductively — applying a bottom-up approach (Sartori, 
1970: 1043).  Or to explain further, this project will examine the language of discord 
between the countries and communities.  The ladder of abstraction (the prism that 
defines the application of concepts from a broader to a more specific category) for 
the research project consists of (1) a broad theory of securitization; (2) ethnicity and 
history curtailed and fitted into securitization discourse; and (3) the testing of 
indicators — that is, the definition of trends that constitute the offer of the 
securitization moves.  Giovanni Sartori argues that the logic of “either-or” cannot be 
substituted by a “more-and-less” alternative, albeit these two logics are 
“complementary” and both have their own field of application (Sartori, 1970: 1039).  
It is a researcher’s job to accommodate both approaches and to consider their inter-
relation.  In other words, an overly black and white categorisation of concepts may 
not provide accurate findings.  Following Sartori’s argument, this thesis will argue 
that the either/or dichotomies applied to the studies of the South Caucasus need to 
be accompanied by a complementary knowledge of “more-and-less” or more-or-less.  
Strict classification of variables makes them mutually exclusive, and a scholar is 
forced to side with one option without being able to incorporate “greater-lesser” 
attributes within the argument (Sartori, 1970: 1038).  Sartori insists that the two 
logics of either-or and more-or-less are complementary and have their legitimate 
field of application (1970: 1039).  Because when certain notions or concepts are 
attributed with power, a specific phenomenon occurs where the nature of the things 
and materials involved are in more or less measure responsible for the occurring 
event (Harre, 1970: 273).  Perhaps for a researcher it is necessary to be holistic and 
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acknowledge interplay between variables.  Examination of language of discord is an 
attempt to bridge that divide and emphasize more-or-less indicators.  To extend the 
argument, there is no need to choose between two lines of thought: form and 
meaning, rather, think about movements which make them communicate (when 
form acquires meaning or vice versa) indefinitely could be more productive (Derrida, 
1982: 173).  Thus, if one studies circulations of narratives that assigned form and 
meaning to words, one can produce findings capable of explaining the securitization 
trend.  This research will conduct a qualitative study of those policies and actions that 
deepened the crisis in the South Caucasus.  It aims to fill the scholarly gap that mostly 
blames geopolitical dimensions of the republics, and bring some equilibrium to the 
study of these conflicts, that is, leave aside strictly realist or neorealist viewpoints 
and assign more prominence to agency in relation to structure.  In other words, look 
into the actions of individual actors and nationalist politicians who participated in the 
escalation of the conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.  As Sartori notes, it is 
better to be an over-conscious thinker than an unconscious one, as steering the 
middle ground should be the aim of the research (1970: 1033).  If one is totally 
consumed by the “theory” and “method” than he/she is in danger of becoming 
unconscious (Sartori, 1970: 1033-34).  By engaging in the study of the interactions 
and narratives of conflict this study will seek that conscious ground that has the 
capacity to reconceptualise regional divisions.            
 Building on Sartori’s conceptual approach one has to look into the circulations 
of narratives that will help to define part of the explanation.  An event in international 
relations is an occurrence that shifted the position of a country, and its consideration 
implies a decision to find the point of departure for research, as understanding 
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predisposes the outcome of an explanation (Suganami, 2008: 334).  Hidemi Suganami 
argues that even structural explanations are causal and processual, because they 
explain how a particular process produces a certain outcome, in which case the 
explanation acquires historical features (Suganami, 2008: 334).  Here, three 
components are essential to analyse the issue: chance coincidences, mechanistic 
processes and human acts (2008: 334).  Suganami argues that referring to this 
combination is vital for the explanation of events under scrutiny (2008: 334-336).  
Overall, Suganami refers to chance coincidences, mechanistic processes and relevant 
human acts and their consequences as key factors for unveiling social phenomena.  
In order to attain a higher level of understanding, these factors need to be examined 
and studied in a chosen time frame.   
 The current research project aims to emphasize neither security nor 
nationalism, but rather the way in which security and nationalistic problems were 
contextualized and applied to policymaking.  The goal of this thesis is to understand 
how ethnic differences emerged as a source of insecurity for the newly independent 
units of the Soviet Union.  It posits that insecurities are constructed, and are 
constitutive of knowledge and action (Bourdieu, 2002: 128-129).   
 It is also important to note that meta-theories like realism assert states as 
security actors, and focus on threats to the state.  Yet they overlook the populace 
that constitutes a state, and which shares a stake in security.  The warmongering over 
the status of the three territorial entities in the South Caucasus was largely defined 
by the grammar and the adjectives selected to define and shape the controversy.  
This is why it is significant to track the words of those leaders who exercised influence 
at the time of the collapse of the USSR.   
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 It is political power that draws boundaries and erects walls, not nature (Searle 
in Booth, 2007: 151).    Words such as ‘historical’ or ‘natural’ came to be seen in a 
dogmatic context in the late 1980s.  They were assigned to the majority of issues 
under consideration.  It is fundamental to examine the way in which modifiers were 
attributed to dilemmas and problems in the South Caucasus.  Furthermore, all sides 
suffered from the perhaps “ahistorical” assumption that the state is a categorical and 
a natural order of affairs, and one that will remain in place forever (Booth, 2007: 
189).    
 Upholding the critical research approach is not an attempt to create new 
overarching theory, but instead seeks to develop innovative and distinct assemblages 
by mixing and experimenting methods, concepts and empirical evidence, which allow 
for the reinvigoration of perceptions that were previously acclaimed as “granted” 
(Aradau et al., 2015: 9).  What is important for this study is to acknowledge the 
second layer of conflicts, and to research agency through the mix of analytical tools 
and methods.  This research looks for a new way of problematizing the issue through 
practices and processes that have conditioned political activity and, later on, brought 
parties to military actions.         
 In fact, this research project will help to dissect the political practices that 
were at the disposal of political entrepreneurs in the 1980s.  Political practices here 
mean the entirety of ideas, nationalism, and history, coordinated together so as to 
produce narratives that helped reinforce feeling of insecurity.  Frightened 
communities were more vulnerable to mobilisation and calls for othering.  
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3.2.Securitization – theoretical framework  
 
For further facilitation of the research, one has to refer to the theory of securitization 
which allows the researcher to bridge the interdisciplinary boundaries and look 
beyond established conditions of political power.  The concept of securitization was 
developed by the Copenhagen School, the group of scholars who reified the meaning 
and outcome of security within political discourse.  They separated the traditional 
understanding of security from its political application and came up with the notion 
of securitization, which could be defined as doing security with discursive means.13  
Developed in the 1980s, the theory has acquired significance as it combines 
constructivist and Schmittian elements and accentuates the role of discourse in 
politics.  It stands at the intersection of three strains of IR theory — realism, 
poststructuralism and constructivism (Balzacq et al., 2016: 518).  It was derived from 
the idea of societal security, which was a response to a number of national conflicts 
from the 1980s and was defined as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Buzan and 
Hansen, 2011: 213).  The state used to be the referent object for military, political, 
environment and economic security, but now ‘society’ has become a referent object 
of societal security — which, however, advanced the studies of ‘identity security’ in 
the settings where states and societies had clashed, or where other political actors 
had mobilised society against perceived threats (Buzan and Hansen, 2011: 213).   
 Being in the middle of the theory, societal security did experience a certain 
ambiguity, as it focused on two levels: state and society.  Yet later, this vagueness 
was resolved when the discursive dimension of security was outlined (Buzan and 
 13	Similar	to	Clausewitzian	definition	of	war	as	continuation	of	politics	by	other	means		
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Hansen, 2011: 213).  Now securitization depended on three main pillars — speech 
act theory, the Schmittian understanding of security and exceptional politics, and 
traditionalist security debates, which emphasises authority, precisely on the 
confronting and construction of threats, and a capacity to make decisions and adopt 
appropriate measures (Buzan and Hansen, 2011: 213-14, Balzacq et al., 2016: 496-
497).  In other words, security has acquired a discursive dimension with the ability to 
do things (see Wæver in the forthcoming paragraphs) making it the specialist theory 
for understanding conflicts.                 
 The notion of securitization has undergone various different interpretations.  
For Stefano Guzzini it is an analytical tool, a conceptual move, an empirical theory 
and a political theory of security (2011: 332).  For Buzan et al. (1998), securitization 
is the move that drives politics “beyond the established rules of the game” and makes 
it part of special politics or reifies it altogether (1998: 23).  This analytical framework 
will be applied to understand and interpret the following ideas and speech acts that 
have radicalised communities.  Didier Bigo considers securitization as a “capacity” or 
potential of management.  He interprets security as a process of the 
securitization/insecuritization of borders, identities and of the conception of orders; 
as a result, securitization is transformed into a tool for controlling security or 
insecurity (Bigo, 2000: 173-174).  The choice is between particular actors who shape 
the structure of events in a given case.  Yet any actor or group of actors that possesses 
the capabilities to control security space or the insecurities of a population at the 
same time has the power to influence the dominant narrative about threats and risks.    
 Jef Huysmans draws attention to securitization in the power-knowledge 
nexus.  Yet at the same time he indicates that much more could be studied if 
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attention is shifted to the management of security utterances through an 
institutional and symbolic context (2002: 52).  In power discourse, threats and 
security are the primary commodities that can ensure public attention.  The choice 
of the right symbols constructs rules that govern the securitized issue.  It is up to the 
agents to “make” security by allocating definitions (Huysmans, 2002: 42).  For 
example, one can securitize migration statistics and announce that growing a number 
of foreign workers threatens national security, whilst ignoring the input they make 
to the economy and to society in general.  The degree to which political actors 
dominate public discourse gives a normative dimension to the language of power 
and security.  Hence, placing an emphasis on power and the governance of security 
will allow social constructivists to get more in-depth knowledge about security 
formation and its role in social practices (Huysmans, 2002: 60). 
 Explaining the concept further, one must mention Ken Booth’s interpretation 
of security as a derivative concept or, as he puts it, a distinct behaviour and an 
attitude linked to security which are interpreted differently across political theories 
(2007: 160).  He states that the mainstream policies in strategic studies “derive” from 
a particular social context (2007: 150).   Semantic shifts do make a difference, and 
transform the context and the meaning of the discourse: if conventional realists talk 
of “European Security”, for example, another configuration (e.g. “Security in 
Europe”) might spark a very different train of thought (2007: 150).  Mostly the issue 
is about the meaning that is agreed by a community or within a state.  There is one 
world, but many realities that are “facts by human agreement”, hence, strategic 
policies are forged by human agreements rather than a genetic predisposition to 
conflict (Booth, 2007: 150).       
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 Securitization theory does not see a threat in any particular issue; rather, the 
meaning and content applied to a particular topic shapes the security discourse.  
Discursive politics makes problems out of security.  Security both constructs, and is 
constructed by, language — more specifically, by moving from representational 
utterances to a performative view (Huysmans, 2002: 60).  A securitization process is 
not only an abandonment of rules or the creation of threats, it is an activity in which 
“existential threats legitimise the breaking of rules” (Balzacq, 2011b: 1).  It is an act 
that reconfigures the state of affairs,  and it places the power in-between humans as 
it explains security to be the quality of handling a challenge rather than a threat itself 
(Wæver, 2011: 468).  As Wæver explains that securitization is the theory that looks 
for power in the things that are internal to a community (2011: 468).  The clarification 
offered by Buzan et al. indicates that securitization is not always a “civilised 
discussion” but rather the order always consists of coercion as well as consent, and 
can “never be imposed” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25).  In other words, the suggestion is 
that the analysis must exclude the possibility of imposition.  Securitization is 
dependent on the capacity of actors to “constitute statistics” about the aim and 
assign their own categories to that aim, they have to create “truth” that will be in 
accordance with the public knowledge of an issue and offer a “hierarchy of threats” 
(Bigo, 2000: 195).  In this case, statistics means the science of the state or the 
dimensions and factors of power (Foucault, 1991a: 96) that allow us to measure the 
state according to certain principles, creating a hierarchy of values.  However, as 
indicated in the introduction, “imposition”, for the purpose of this research, means 
the creation of certain circumstances: e.g. the closure of an information space to 
alternative views.  Here this thesis examines a case when securitization theory is 
applied to a non-democratic order and thus requires some “stretching” of the 
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concept (Vuori, 2008).  Conceptual stretching implies a loosening of the concepts 
when they involve new cases, i.e. a number of empirical studies are added together, 
and the concepts are relaxed by using fewer attributes.  In other words, when 
applying a concept to a study, a researcher can exclude some attributes that are 
deemed necessary in typical cases.  The securitization may vary depending on a 
regime of values that are emphasized for achieving the purpose. That is, every regime 
highlights the values it holds most dear (Vuori, 2008: 69); in this case, the values are 
history and ethnicity.  Extension of this concept will help to reveal the grey zones 
rather than employing a realpolitik interpretation of the conflicts.       
 Wilkinson argues that going beyond what security means to how security 
means is central for scholarship (2011: 97).  In other words, the examination of 
events has to include an answer as to how they occurred.  The patterns of 
securitization often reveal the interests of political actors and make it possible to 
analyse the environment that created and escalated the conflict.  Consequently, 
study of the language and construction of a narrative allows scholars to situate and 
interpret the events in the relevant context.    The language of a conflict is not a given 
variable, but a process that is shaped and reshaped by the words and gestures of 
participating actors.  The meaning allocated to the words and utterances translate 
them into discontent.  However, this does not mean that scholars seek to impose a 
theory upon the people; rather, it emanates from the assumption that the “local 
perspectives” enable us to ponder “other cultural formulations” that serve as an 
anthology of accumulated knowledge and experience that will enrich the existing 
studies (2011: 97).  Addressing the semantics of the conflict allows for a greater 
comprehension of violence in general.  An understanding of “cultural formulations”, 
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which are the products of discourse, might also explain why realist interpretations 
tend to prevail. 
 Wilkinson explains that securitization theory is far from an “unproblematic” 
use of empirical data, which produces a theoretically consistent story but is unable 
to reflect local conditions and dynamics in a meaningful way (Wilkinson, 2011: 99).  
He warns that the application of the securitization theory might produce an edited 
version of events and analysis risks erasing “local knowledge” that can be generated 
through fieldwork and empirical examination (Wilkinson, 2011: 96).  By applying this 
theory, the research might limit itself to normative assumptions in the form of a 
“Westphalian straitjacket” that implies the global validity of the Euro-American 
model of state (2011: 96).  Despite a risk of producing an “edited” sequence of 
events, securitization theory does help to reflect the local conditions as it focuses on 
narratives.  Additionally, one has to remember that the local actors used the West as 
a model, as a template of their future political system.  In the light of their Western 
aspirations, it is important to emphasize that the new political movements admired 
European culture and values as they were abandoning the Soviet concepts.  Hence, 
the Westphalian system was considered to be a better and more acceptable 
alternative compared to the Soviet model.           
 The current research identifies those local conditions that cultivated hostility 
in the region.  Historic narratives and hostile discourses had designed the social 
reality of the republics in 1980s.  Application of this theory will unveil the influence 
that narratives produced and how they contributed to the securitization of the 
political scene.  Securitization theory will be stretched, in other words, to illuminate 
the performatives that securitized particular events, issues and ethnicities.  Local 
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views will not be lost because of the observations that have been collected across 
the decades.  Political decisions, actions and/or inactions were context-specific, and 
this study will not ignore that aspect during its analysis.  This research will incorporate 
the radical views that nationalists presented to their constituents and how the 
independence battle was fought along ethnic lines.  It is very important to emphasize 
that Westphalian order was widely welcomed by the nationalists, who seemed to 
admire the Western idea of the nation-state.  In the nationalists’ understanding, 
then-Soviet republics had to become independent nation-states; however, they also 
thought that dominant ethnic groups had to have more rights.14 The USSR was a 
hybrid version of the state with a nationalist regime, which was totally incompatible 
with the organizational model of a nation-state (Brubaker, 2003: 29).  In other words, 
the Soviet founders mixed and matched concepts that were difficult to merge when 
they defined component parts of the citizenry in national terms, whilst the state and 
citizenship as a whole was not placed in the wide national framework (Brubaker, 
2003: 29).  As Brubaker rightly points out, the USSR invented nationhood on the sub-
state level but did nothing to institutionalize it at the state level (2003: 29).  This study 
will demonstrate how a securitization theory can deconstruct the narratives and help 
to understand the discursive side of the conflicts in the South Caucasus. 
 Wilkinson addresses the context of securitization as a level of analysis that 
can be used in the studies of securitization (Wilkinson, 2011: 96).  Indeed, there is a 
risk of distorting the trajectories of securitization, however it will not be an “edited” 
version of the events that are fitted into the theoretical framework.  This research 
 14	Georgian	nationalists	talked	about	democracy	and	Western	values,	however	they	also	did	not	wish	to	acknowledge	the	rights	of	Abkhaz	and	Ossetians	within	sovereign	Georgia.		The	fine	line	between	liberalism	and	oppression	was	blurred.			
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project will interpret the language of enmity through a securitization lens, and 
explain how the disagreements were constructed and managed.  Building on that 
argument it will be possible to partially answer why confrontations had escalated 
causing widespread crisis with such far-reaching consequences.        
 In addition to securitization theory, this thesis will refer to critical security 
studies.  One must note that this thesis does not treat security as a given object or a 
value, but, as critical security studies interprets it, security is a practice that creates 
the “securitiness” (securitiness is not a value approach) of situations (Aradau et al., 
2015: 3).  This is because, for an issue to become a security concern, institutional, 
political, technological and other actions are performed to place it into the security 
basket (Aradau et al., 2015: 3).  The methods and approaches to creating insecurity 
vary across societies and states, as some opt for speech acts, some mobilize the 
public by manipulation of vulnerabilities in social and political life and choose it as a 
dominant political tactic (Aradau et al., 2015: 3).  For the purpose of this research, 
one has to consider security is looked at from a critical perspective that implies 
understanding of practice including discourses, ideas, power relationships, bodies of 
knowledge, techniques of government and interactions between them (Aradau et 
al., 2015: 3).   
 Despite the Copenhagen School’s firm position on securitization, Karin Fierke 
questions how the success or failure of securitization could be defined if it depends 
on the ability to convince the audience which she considers as unaccounted for in 
the theory (2015: 114-15).  Another aspect of the critique comes from Paul Roe, who 
thinks that e.g. Aradau accentuates the Schmittian aspects but does not pay enough 
attention to the ‘positive’ side of securitization (2012: 250).  Insisting that wars are 
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not necessarily an outcome of securitization, he presents a normatively positive 
securitization where recognizing the value of human equality can help to re-engage 
with the normativity of securitization (2012: 260, Fierke, 2015: 115).  One should not 
argue that all cases of securitization end up with war, but it is that lack of 
acknowledging human equality that alienates parties, and, despite Roe suggesting 
that ‘others’ are ‘selves’ (2012: 260), one must pay more attention to the distal 
context that in fact frequently contains the most important aspects of securitization 
that make it impossible to engage with normativity.   
 Another point in the criticism of the theory is the fixed conceptualization of 
identity compared to a constructed one, but one must analytically separate the 
process of identity constitution and identity fortification; because identities function 
as fixed concepts within security discourse (Buzan and Hansen, 2011: 215), they do 
not emerge without a specific narrative.  If one looks closer, all identities are 
constructs and co-constructs of previously constructed beliefs and ideas.  Yet despite 
the criticism, securitization “developed a broad and powerful research agenda of 
significance across the field of security” (Williams, 2003: 511). Overall, the 
securitization theory helps to find and outline those identities which are preferred 
during the political discourse of securitization.  Certain political actors select the 
identities that are considered to be vulnerable and which build the narrative of threat 
or enmity.  It might be argued that those multiple dimensions and pillars that 
constitute the theory make it more adaptable and flexible for research of political 
conflicts and their discursive paradigm.                   
 The organization of discourse and the calls for mobilisation along ethnic lines 
were instrumental in constructing rivalries across the South Caucasus.  Discursive 
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approach permits close analysis of nationalist language, which was a leading voice 
during the dissolution of the USSR.  Following the securitization theory is helpful 
because of its distinct feature: that it does not test “regularities” but instead puts 
emphasis on “a distinct rationality and political operation” that makes it possible to 
understand them (Wæver, 2011: 471).  By choosing to focus on the political discourse 
of the discontent, it will be possible to study the grammar of social and political 
differentiation.  Existential challenges to the future of former republics were created 
with words and utterances, which formed public opinion and secured consent for 
violent actions.  Thus, this thesis chooses to study securitising moves, actions and 
actors during the process.  This study will measure the causal power of discourses 
within the escalation of tensions in the South Caucasus.  Securitization theory is 
capable of analysing the meta-narrative of threat and offers a “snap-shot” of the 
dominant public narrative at the given time (Wilkinson, 2011: 114).  This analysis will 
follow an account of hostile language and reshape the prevailing evaluations of 
enmity in the region.  It will allow scholars to re-classify the aims of political discourse 
at the given period.      
 
3.2.1. Securitization as acts  
 
 
Ole Wæver outlines three “felicitous" conditions needed for a securitization move to 
be successful: (1) the grammar or plot of security; (2) the social capital of the 
enunciator; and (3) threat-related conditions (in Vuori, 2008: 70). However, Vuori 
argues that there is another condition essential for the action: the audience of 
securitization.  To be more specific, he notes that not everybody entitled to speak is 
equally privileged to form the “structured field of practices” i.e. security (Vuori, 2008: 
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70).  There is a competition over the production of truth between the actors 
(nationalists) as they transform social space in the field of power and aim to 
“homogenise” the ways of identifying a problem and contend “to define a ‘focus’” 
that will be shared by everyone (Bigo, 2000: 196).    
For Wæver, the utterance of the word “security” is an act in itself, which 
means that, by merely mentioning the word, something is done which makes it a 
“speech act” (in Balzacq, 2011b: 1).  According to Balzacq, the main locus of the 
Copenhagen School implies that some speech acts describe or perhaps distort reality, 
but they cannot be simply false or true; instead they “do” things, i.e. they are 
“performatives” rather than “constatives” that merely report the developments.  
Balzacq defines this approach as “philosophical”.  However, Balzacq argues that the 
sociological realm of securitization including practices and power relations 
contributes to the construction of threats (Balzacq, 2011b: 1).  The philosophical view 
reduces securitization to a “conventional procedure” in which “felicity 
circumstances” [sic] (conditions which define the success of speech act) must prevail; 
whereas the sociological view elaborates on securitization as a strategic process, in 
which the context, the psycho-cultural character of the audience and the power of a 
speaker and a listener all interact (Balzacq, 2011b: 1-2).  To be more specific, the 
strategic action of discourse acts at the level of persuasion using a variety of artefacts 
including metaphors, emotions stereotypes and even lies to reach the target 
audience (Balzacq, 2011b: 1).  The securitization divide between strategic and speech 
act views simultaneously differentiate between “pragmatics” and “universal 
pragmatics”.  The first (pragmatics) address language usage and the last (universal 
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pragmatics) the fundamental principles (rules) implied in the communicative action 
(Balzacq, 2011b: 1).   
 In the sociological understanding, performatives are “situated actions 
mediated by agents” (habitus), in other words, they are the results of communicative 
practices and power games within the social space.  Securitization is a different type 
of agency which is “temporarily constructed engagement” by actors of a distinctive 
structural environment, which, utilizing the interplay of habit, imagination and 
judgement, reproduce and transform structures which are aimed to respond to the 
problems caused by a changing historical situation (Balzacq, 2011b: 2).  As Jacques 
Derrida explains further, a performative is a “communication” which does not 
essentially limit itself to transporting an already constituted semantic content that 
has its own aim for truth (1982: 322).  Political agents assign content according to a 
particular matter, and have a tendency to amend truth.  In other words, language 
has an ideological a goal, and is adjusted according to the situation.       
 The audience is important for both approaches to securitization, but there is 
a slight difference in each: for the philosophical approach the audience is a given, 
formal category; but for sociological practitioners there is a process of the mutual 
constitution of securitising actors and the audience (Balzacq, 2011b: 2).  Balzacq 
argues that securitization is an intersubjective process and thus offers a slightly 
amended definition, which will be applied to the current study: 
Securitization is an assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, 
policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes emotions, etc.) are 
contextually mobilised by a securitising actor, who works to prompt an audience to 
build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and 
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intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the 
securitising actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject 
with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy 
must be undertaken immediately to block its development (Balzacq, 2011b: 2) [italic 
is original].   
The study of securitization is a study of discourse and political constellations, where 
the definition and criteria of securitization is made up by the “intersubjective 
establishment of an existential threat” which has a sufficiently important political 
effect (Buzan et al., 1998: 25).  This empirical study, as with any other study of the 
social world, must “abstract from the total social context”, but at the same time it 
must have a theoretical connotation as to how to “reintegrate” the abstracted 
elements (Wight, 2006: 288).  To borrow from Wight, different theories explain the 
same patterns differently, but have distinct levels of structural understanding (2006: 
288).  Therefore, “abstracts” will realign the understanding of obtaining public 
unanimity.     
 This research project will use discourse analysis in order to determine to what 
extent reality was imagined and constructed in the history of the South Caucasus.  
Discourses and narratives became vehicles for the propagation of ideas about threats 
to the public.  Thorough investigations of these means of communication will provide 
us with new explanatory tools.  It is significant to investigate what ‘security’ actually 
meant in the context of the time, and how this meaning was produced and 
communicated.  By conducting three case studies separately, this research project 
will allow us to demonstrate the shared problems and trends of alienation.  It will 
avoid adopting a “unique” position or approach to the topic (King et al., 1994: 42, 
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Wight, 2006); all events are unique, and thus different from all other occurrences, 
though the real question is whether it is possible to identify the key features 
contributing to that particular social reality — in other words to emphasize the right 
facts from the millions out there (King et al., 1994: 42)(italic my own).  As King et al. 
note, the challenge of simplification is an important vulnerability (1994: 42) facing 
the researcher.  However, they acknowledge the importance of systematic 
simplification in the research process.  Being a researcher is to be both general and 
specific — consolidating knowledge about classes of events as well as events in 
particular places/spaces (King et al., 1994: 42).  In other words, a researcher has to 
be at once both timeless and bounded by time; and these two goals or targets are 
leaning more to words being mutually supportive rather than opposing although they 
vary on a case by case basis (King et al., 1994: 43).  A turbulent period of the USSR’s 
demise clashed with the meaning allocated to history, which requires a researcher 
to remember the parts of a story that were left behind by the active discourse.  One 
has to engage with the period of discontent as well as the history that has assigned 
a different meaning to conflicts.  For King et al. the best way to understand an event 
is to use scientific inference and to research systematic patterns in similar parallel 
events.   
 Here the project will follow this methodological suggestion.  These three case 
studies have both general and specific patterns, and took place almost 
simultaneously during the break-up of the Soviet hierarchy.  The problem they faced 
was the adjustment to anarchy. 15   The national movements mostly focused on 
symbols like sovereignty and territorial integrity, leaving no room for societies to 
 15	In	the	terms	of	the	English	School	
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participate in the debate.  The South Caucasus polities, and accordingly their policies, 
are mostly governed along emotional or affective lines.  Hence, few undertakings or 
practices are institutionalised.  The actors base their decisions on emotional rather 
than rational choices, and as a result halt the institutionalisation of rules and 
practices.  It will try to emphasize the leverage and implications that securitization 
has had, and continues to impose on the security in the region. 
 
3.2.2. Performatives  
 
Certain words and ideas propagated by nationalist leaders have acquired the power 
of performative utterance (Austin, 1975: 6), i.e., their speeches have transformed 
social reality.  By stating words and applying adjectives they performed the acts that 
had wider consequences.  It does not matter whether they be commands, questions, 
wishes, warnings or assertions; they say something (the locutionary act), and at the 
same time they do things by saying (the illocutionary act), and finally, they yield 
effects by saying (i.e. the perlocutionary act) (Ricoeur, 1976: 14).  In order to explain 
this phenomenon and how speech acts influenced the discourse, one must look into 
performatives, the words that imply action and do the things for enunciators.  The 
performatives depict how power is transmitted and produced by words or political 
statements and actions.    
 It is the illocutionary act that distinguishes a promise and an order, and 
becomes a distinctive “force” by using specific “grammar”, creating a “dialectical 
unity of the event and the meaning” in speech (Ricoeur, 1976: 11).   As Michael 
Herzfeld argues, a sign becomes an icon only after someone uses it that way and 
114 
others agree to accept that particular understanding of the notion or a word (1997: 
57).  To be more precise, this thesis seeks for meaning(s) allocated to the 
interpretation of social and political challenges in 1980s.  Those acts were “ascribed 
responsibility” and a society was able to locate agency (Wæver, 2011: 473).  Taking 
the long view, this work wishes to argue that it is not the ethnic distinctions that are 
central, but rather their definition and interpretation.  It offers a perception-based 
analysis of the events where the new understanding derived from the perceptions 
and fears of nationalist party leaders and their allies.          
 As Bourdieu argues, the social sciences deal with pre-named and pre-
classified realities, and they need to focus on the process of naming and defining 
those events and the practices that created them (2002: 105).   When agents use 
words they become actions, as the speech concentrates on the symbolic capital of 
the group which is represented. Bourdieu argues that a performative utterance is 
successful only when a person with the authority or “power” pronounces it 
(Bourdieu, 2002: 111).  In other words, a person with the authority to speak has the 
capacity to shape public opinion.  A performative utterance is a political “pre-vision” 
and at the same time a “pre-diction” which will carry out the programme it voices 
(2002: 111).  Bourdieu notes that, in crisis situations, the “constitutive power” of 
language increases due to “extra-ordinary” discourse that dominates the 
“paradoxical” events (Bourdieu, 2002: 128).     
 Language and the discourse of separation have caused social rifts and 
escalated conflicts over the status and borders in the post-Soviet South Caucasus, 
and they were the products of a politics that produced othering images between 
neighbours.  The nationalist political leaders had the ability to control the general 
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discourse concerning politics and ideology, and their power thus shaped public 
opinion.  Social practice formed by this hostile discourse changed and radicalized the 
reality of the public’s political views.  It determined the social structure that 
instigated war among communities.         
 There were political actors facing challenges as they communicated with the 
public about the new system that was to replace the USSR.  For a re-assessment of 
that period, one has to study the language of communications and politicians’ 
attitudes in crisis situations.  The entire discourse of independence, nationalism and 
ethnicity was securitized in the period.  It was the attempt to mobilise public support 
for the independence or self-determination, and at the same time to secure power.  
They spoke of ethnicity, national unity, historic justice and security that organized 
the discourse of the post-soviet political system along divisive lines.  Along with the 
“security” of a nation, ethnic belonging was also an articulation that mobilised the 
audience.  Ethnic origin acquired a normative dimension that was a security issue 
accepted by the public.  As nationalists considered ethnicity to be the central point 
in the post-Soviet order it became an essential part of security discourse.  In other 
words, ethnicity was the main denominator of a nation — the public demanded its 
defence whilst the political actors used history and myths to magnify the importance 
of ethnicity.       
 This research project concerns the language of nationalists and freedom 
fighters that shaped and formed the post-Soviet polity.  Debate launched by 
nationalists was hostile, and it intensified divisions. In essence, the dominant 
discourse emphasized only separating patterns and ignored everything that was 
common among the communities. Those perplexities are best manifested in the 
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discourse of conflicts and divisions that defined social and political life as well as 
redrew the map of the region.  The ideas and articulations that constitute social 
reality are capable of providing better explanations for critical researchers.      
 The narrative that was presented to the public inflamed emotions that 
targeted nation and pride, which had been largely suppressed by the Soviet 
authorities for decades.  On the one hand, this discourse guaranteed the acquisition 
of power; however, it also became a dangerous trigger of alienation.  Images and 
discourses of threat are routinely designed by particular political actors who struggle 
against other groups from a given position of power (Stritzel and Schmittchen, 2011: 
171).  Accordingly, the alienation of ethnicities and production of threat images 
incorporate the language that result from sociolinguistic, social, political and cultural 
processes, ones that define the context of a society (Stritzel and Schmittchen, 2011: 
171).  Radical nationalistic narratives helped nationalist leaders and parties to 
redirect the attention of the public from the grave consequences of the economic 
collapse of the USSR to the symbolic capital that precipitated their rise to power.   
 For political actors across the South Caucasus, the linguistic reservoir was 
empowered by historic narratives and security discourses that allowed them to 
securitize neighbours and minorities.  They misinterpreted legal requirements that 
were prompted by the dissolution of preceding legislative order, i.e. the constitution 
of the Soviet Union.  This study will argue that the result of the crisis was defined by 
the way that it was “symbolized” giving the ideological interpretation to differences 
(Žižek in Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 3).  It will suggest that security and its 
consequent challenges are social constructs that are activated when a securitizing 
move is facilitated by a context that ‘selects’ specific aspects of the concept leaving 
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out others (Vultee, 2011: 81).  Nationalistic narratives had redirected the legislative 
and constitutional uncertainties toward hostility.  The dissolution of the USSR was 
“symbolized” in a divisive and exclusive way that resulted in full-scale wars in Georgia 
and between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  By focusing on the analysis of the narrative, 
one chooses to outline the why question that can reveal the experience behind the 
story — which parts of the plot were included and which ignored (Riessman, 1993: 
2).     
 It is still not clear whether the imposition of narratives was a goal itself or a 
means to a further goal — the acquisition of power. Yet the semantics illustrates that 
pattern.  Freedom was perhaps a goal, but it conveniently supported the desire of 
the nationalists to make a grab for power.  This research will offer a re-invigoration 
of the interpretation of the symbols that collided with one another and transformed 




3.2.1. Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse is a social use of language in a social context (Fairclough and Fairclough, 
2012: 81).  Society is produced and reproduced by the use or abuse of language 
(Fairclough, 2001: 19).  Spoken words affect the way communities are organized and 
perceive daily dilemmas. Language is the ultimate instrument that organizes politics, 
by assigning meaning to words and directing disputes.  Language and discourse have 
had a remarkable, if not a crucial influence on the entire process of confrontation in 
these regions.  Michel Foucault has the structuralist understanding of words as a 
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mediating presence between objects in the world and thoughts in our minds, that 
words have to epitomize thoughts, while at the same time he stresses that 
representation in this case is reciprocal, that is: “language represents thought as 
thought represents itself” (2001: 86).  Language and words on both sides of the 
confrontation, in all three cases, collided and clashed.  Harsh rhetoric and historic 
narratives dominated the scene, and if it is assumed that “language is an analysis of 
thought” with the power to establish order in space (Foucault, 2001: 91), then one 
must consider the role and influence of language and representation in the South 
Caucasus. The aim of this section is to outline the method that will help to trace the 
formation of this narrative.  By integrating discourse analysis, frame analysis and 
notions of symbolic power, one can understand the link between the discursive 
practices and armed confrontation.                
 As a main method for the deconstruction of the speech acts and 
actions/decisions/inactions, discourse analysis will be applied.  Discourse theory 
seeks new interpretations of practices through their meaning whilst analysing the 
techniques and strategies that political forces and social actors utilise to construct 
“meanings within incomplete and decidable social structures” (Buzan et al., 1998: 
25).  Discourse theory examines these practices and utterances in larger historical 
and social contexts, paving the way to the critique and transformation of existing 
practices and meanings (Howarth, 2000: 129).  It is a “constitutive theory” as it 
includes a framework of “consistently related concepts” conjoined with a social 
ontology that offers a common language for the description, interpretation and 
assessment of social phenomena (Howarth, 2000: 129).  Discourse analysis offers the 
theoretical and methodological tools that allow us to conduct a well-founded critical 
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examination of social problems, power and inequality (Dijk, 1997: 32).  Language 
means and is observable and it creates symbolic content that has to be observed and 
researched (Teubert, 2010: 77).  Wolfgang Teubert argues that discourse is the 
collective mind that could be inspected and investigated, and, because of this, the 
discourse is more real than the reality which is often taken for granted (2010: 108).  
He argues that it is discourse that can help us to tell who is the freedom fighter or a 
terrorist, as it is the contributions to discourse that are shared and available for 
interpretation (Teubert, 2010: 108).  Thus, the examination of narratives offers a 
clearer picture of an event than would otherwise be attainable.  Discourse involves 
conditions that could be formulated as  the “social conditions of production and social 
conditions of interpretation” [italics original] (Fairclough, 2001: 20).  Such social 
conditions correlate with three different levels of social organization that inevitably 
shape the production and interpretation of discourse, as they define an immediate 
social environment wherein discourse takes place, the level of the social institution 
that creates a “wider matrix” for the discourse and, the level of society as whole 
(2001: 21).         
 As mentioned earlier, the problem (its genealogy) is a product of mutually 
implicating/constituting units — structures and agency. Thus, discourse analysis will 
allow us to evaluate particular interpretations of socially constructed phenomena 
(Howarth, 2000: 129).  Words and their collocations create political reality.  
Politicians exploit the potential that is inherent in the polysemy of the legitimate 
language, that is, the multiple meanings that can be allocated to concepts that 
legitimize controversial discourse (Howarth, 2000: 130).  The ‘grammar’16 of the 
 16	Clauses	and	provisions	that	govern	a	conflicting	discourse	
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conflict holds the clue to the divisions between states and their organizational 
principles.  This grammar serves those in power, as it is not nature that creates “silent 
majorities”, “poor people” or “the powerless”; it is politics that silences, 
disenfranchises, and disempowers (Foucault, 1991b: 64).  Accordingly, security is a 
product of grammar too; it is made up of utterances, silences and ignorance (Booth, 
2007: 160).  The “linguistic market”, as borrowed from Bourdieu, allocates more and 
more meaning to each sign in a language and forms a political marketplace where, 
during “revolutionary situations, common words take an opposite meaning” and 
securitise any available issue (Bakhtin in Bourdieu, 1991: 40).  Words are the very 
texture of actions, and their meaning predisposes what people do, how they do it 
and why they do it.  Bourdieu notes that the autonomy and specific logic of language, 
combined with particular rules of operation, needs to be taken into account by social 
scientists (1991: 40).  The selection of words used by nationalists, including the 
number of superlative adjectives in mobilising speeches as well as patriotic songs, 
had an opposite meaning during the securitization process in the South Caucasus.  It 
might be considered that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a “revolutionary 
situation” that bred discontent and changed the meaning of speech and actions.  
Thus language, and its possibilities, were fully mobilised by political actors. 
 National definitions of identity emphasized the psychological consequences 
of in-group/out-group distinctions, and at the same time triggered an inflation of 
threats, as well as enhanced national solidarity, through the dehumanisation of other 
groups (Booth, 2007: 242).  Such methods, including the inflation of threats and the 
stereotyping of other groups, help to mobilize popular support, and the state, the 
intellectuals, protectionists and the military paint the world in Hobbesian terms 
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(Snyder, 1993: 93).  As a result, the process of mobilization that causes war is 
conducted through words and utterances and these utterances therefore need 
greater scrutiny.   
 As hermeneutical approaches have become substantial in the light of greater 
concern about the meaning of language, it is instrumental to explore that meaning 
(Snyder, 1993: 93).  This research shall consider “designative connections” that assign 
meaning to words (Taylor, 1985: 216).  Language is not a mere “assemblage of 
words”, but the capacity to speak (express/realize) the reflective awareness implicit 
in using words to say something, and these words form a type of web (1985: 226).  
By speaking, one touches parts of a web which than resonate across the whole, as 
the words only have sense because of their place in the whole web (Taylor, 1985: 
230-31).  What was said and done by the leaders in the South Caucasus resonated 
across the region, and determined the foreign and security policies of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia for years to come.  The nationalist delirium ended up being 
a costly undertaking for each side in the disputes.   
 The world of our making (Onuf, 1989) is created by speaking.  Words create 
the symbolic power that, through utterances, make people see and believe the vision 
offered, and enables the holders of that power to “obtain the equivalent of what is 
obtained through force [only] by virtue of the specific effect of mobilisation”; 
additionally, this power can be exercised when it receives recognition, i.e. when it is 
accepted by its audience (Bourdieu, 1991: 41).  Therefore, this research project 
deconstructs the speeches and discourses antecedent to conflicts and statements 
made during the clashes.  The evaluation of words and the actions that followed will 
help to analyse the entire process of securitization.  Bourdieu thinks that it is the 
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“belief in the legitimacy” of words which empowers those who speak rather than 
words alone having the power (Bourdieu, 1991: 170).  It could be said that it is a 
process of mutual constitution, the words, their agency empowers and brings 
legitimacy.  Security-focused and nationalistic utterances garnered support that was 
gradually exchanged into a legitimating currency.  This thesis seeks to describe, 
understand and explain these processes.  It will present explanation as a supplement 
to understanding, and delineate a distinctive interpretation (Bourdieu, 1991: 170).  
This research will reveal how these mobilising speeches and practices have amended 
the security of the region. 
 The meaning allocated to words endows individuals with the power to 
manipulate and form public opinion.  Examining the discourses that influence public 
opinion will help this project to answer the research question as to whether political 
narratives contributed to the escalation of differences in the South Caucasus.  To 
support this assertion, my research project will elaborate on the discourse of local 
nationalist leaders (activists and intelligentsia) and their followers that helped to 
radicalise people.  When fear is an intrinsic part of daily life it “produces sterility”, as 
people stop expressing what they think, and they start to think in “reference to their 
critics” rather than to the facts (Lippmann, 1920: 20).  Public opinion was blockaded, 
as societies were unable to judge freely the imposed narratives about ethnic 
belonging and supremacy.  Lippmann argues that socially toxic thoughts force people 
to focus on the threat instead of cultivating their own ideas (Lippmann, 1920: 20).   
 Discourse is not an area where subjectivity arises suddenly, but rather it is a 
space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions (Foucault, 2001: 91).  
Political discourse is not a system of language or of rules of grammar, but of the “law” 
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of the existence of language and grammar rules — that which made those 
statements possible, the condition of their emergence and their correlations with 
simultaneous events (Foucault, 1991b: 58).   It is about the trajectory of declarations 
and the precepts that made them acceptable.   Further, and following Foucault’s 
explanation, studying discourse stipulates the examination of the set of rules at the 
given time for a given society that expounds: (a) the limits and forms of “what is 
sayable” (i.e. what is the domain of discourse?); (b) the limits and forms of 
“conversation” or utterances designed to affect memory or that need to be 
repressed or censored; (c) the limits and forms of memory, or which words are 
recognized as valid or invalid; (d) the limits and forms of “reactivation”, or in other 
words, utterances that are foreign or date back to previous epochs, how they are 
transformed or transmuted; (e) the limits and forms of appropriation or who has the 
access to the discourse, which groups are the audience and who are the speakers; 
and whether there is a class struggle between actors for control of discourse 
(Foucault, 1991b: 59).   
 Foucault suggests that discourse has to be addressed as a “monument” rather 
than a document,17 and it is necessary to investigate the conditions of its existence 
and to relate discourse to a practical field in which it is deployed (Foucault, 1991b: 
60).  In particular, the scopes of discourses produced by political actors in the South 
Caucasus were monuments that had a long-term impact on societies and social 
discourses for years to come.  They emerged as a result of myths and flawed theories 
used in Soviet scholarship, and they became possible because the government 
 17	Foucault	uses	Georges	Canguilhem’s	argument	about	documents	that	become	monuments	because	of	their	significance.		By	monuments,	Foucault	means	artifacts,	events	or	ideas	that	acquire	significance.					
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allowed the free expression of thoughts and ideas.  In other words, the ‘truths’ that 
were based on a dubious interpretation of history were the building blocks of those 
“monuments” that were erected to abet nationals who sought power and influence 
in the new reality.  To further clarify, Foucault’s point is to look at any practice 
through the scope of the discourse that it comprehends, so that if one looks into the 
history of discursive practices, certain dependencies can be unveiled (1991b: 60-61).    
       
3.2.1.1. Method of discourse analysis  
 
If the previous section helped to identify what discourse is, here one has to outline 
the methods that are applied to define those discourses and analyse them.  For this 
study, one must focus on performatives in the speeches and language of political 
actors and the intellectual elite.  Fine analysis will be chosen, which focuses on 
context, the surface of a text, and rhetorical means (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 28).  
When a study aims to research the ways in which “some speakers or writers exercise 
power in or by their discourse”, the study must pay attention to properties that can 
vary as a function of social power:  
• Speech acts — a statement, promise, threat, warning or a question that does 
multiple things simultaneously and assigns multiple values to one [speech] 
act (Fairclough, 2001: 130) 
• Rhetorical figures 
• Topic choice (historical topics were chosen to ‘unite’ people) 
• Lexical style (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 29) 
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When addressing rhetoric, one must note that it is used as a Foucauldian notion of 
“creating truth”, when political discourse appeals to emotions and social instincts 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 56). 
 When analysing the speeches and texts or newspaper articles the main 
method will be critical discourse analysis (CDA).  The method assumes that the 
relationship between text and social structures is indirect but meditated by discourse 
(Fairclough, 2001: 117).  Without interpretation and explanation, the ideological 
properties or background of the speeches are not visible to an observer (Fairclough, 
2001: 118).  Critical discourse analysis studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in 
the social and political context (van Dijk, 2008: 85).  As Teun van Dijk notes, such 
evaluation aims to present a different “mode” or “perspective” of theorizing an issue, 
because discourse has social value and influences, and is influenced by, social 
structures and interactions (2008: 85-86).   
The main principles of the critical discourse analysis assume that: 
• Power relations are discursive 
• Discourse constitutes society and culture 
• Discourse does ideological work 
• Discourse is historical 
• The link between text and society is mediated 
• Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 
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• Discourse is a form of social action (Fairclough and Wodak in van Dijk, 2008: 
86) 
Hence the empirical chapters in this thesis will address the ideological, historic, and 
cultural context of the speeches and actions.  Their interpretation will explain the 
power of discourse and how it affected the political reality at the time.      
 Additionally, when addressing the analysis of discourses, this research will 
look into the “situational context”, which questions the examination of the event 
(what is going?); participation (who is involved?); relationships (power relations and 
social distance enacted in the event); and finally, what is the role of the language? 
(Fairclough, 2001: 122-124).  Such an approach will guide the reader in 
understanding the various dimensions of the disputes and their relation to 
emergence of conflicts.         
 Another method that will be applied to the study is framing, which casts 
interpretative perspective on the social interactions (Lindekilde, 2014: 196).  One has 
to pay attention to the actors as “signifying agents” who possess a crucial role in 
interpreting protest and defining the goals as they (actors) are not just the carriers 
of ideology (Lindekilde, 2014).  In other words, the individuals who transmit the 
ideology to the public and gain their support for securitization need to be studied.  
Framing the discourse in this way reveals the relationship between the text and its 
broader context (Lindekilde, 2014: 196).  It emphasizes how ideological constructs 
and ideas are strategically applied to “frame” a particular topic — like a picture frame 
that puts something into the spotlight, hides other things, and in a certain way shifts 
reality (Lindekilde, 2014: 200).  In other words, the method allows the researcher and 
the reader to focus on issues that are “in frame” that produce mental scripts helping 
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the recognition of occurrence (Goffman, 1974: 21).  Highlighting frames in speech 
acts explains their political (in certain cases, even historical) context.  Paying 
attention to words that “frame” the issue will help to define the symbols that were 
produced for mobilisation.       
 After considering extracts in the empirical chapters of this thesis, one can 
understand their meaning by scrutinising the words that had the crucial significance 
in the communication of meaning.  Fairclough and Fairclough suggest that the 
arguments offered involve descriptions, narratives, as well as explanations of the 
context in order to provide reasons in support of a particular course of action (2012: 
7).  Following their observation, this study will look into the words that were used to 
support hostile sentiments.  This approach will help to explain why the nationalist 
discourse about history or justice superseded all other voices.  This approach shows 
how the actors had relied on (a) constructive strategies — aiming at the creation of 
national identities; (b) justificatory strategies — aiming at the conservation and 
reproduction of identities (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 18).         
   
3.2.2. Interpretation  
 
In this thesis, the interpretative approach features the ability to use multiple 
perspectives and analyse events according to discourse-specific situations (Howarth, 
2000: 130).  Almost all universally applicable theories have certain features when 
applied to particular examples, which make the cases distinct and hold the answers 
to complex questions of causation and consequences.  To borrow from the 
hermeneutics, every communicative action implies interpretation making every 
research an act of reconstruction (Seale in Patton, 2015: 137).  “To understand 
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human action we must not take the position of an outside observer who “sets” only 
the physical manifestations of the actor — from his or her own point of view — 
“means” in his or her actions… in focusing on actions, we can and must speak of its 
subjective meaning” (Yanow, 1996: 235).  Having said that, further scrutiny of the 
meaning will lead scholarship to new avenues of interpretation.  As social science is 
an activity of understanding of understanding itself, it is an understanding of the 
“second degree” (Soeffner in Patton, 2015: 137).   
 This interpretive method allows the researcher to offer one of many 
competing interpretations of a social environment and to open more space for 
deliberation (Wilkinson, 2011: 97).  Perhaps it is extremely difficult to find a genuine 
causation in the social world, and such a method provides healthier analysis by 
unravelling a more candid reassessment of the events.  This method aims to focus on 
the context and content of the enquiry, it negates the “given” in relation to the object 
of analysis (Wilkinson, 2011: 102).  The proximate context is concerned with the 
“questions of who, what, when, where, to whom and with what effect”, whereas the 
distal context focuses on far broader, hence less attainable, details (Schegloff in 
Wilkinson, 2011: 98).  Distal context is a significant part of the research in avoiding 
the duplication of normative interpretations of security and uncovering local 
perplexities and comprehensions of security and its architecture.  The researcher has 
to differentiate between local knowledge and expert knowledge and make findings 
“experiential, context-specific and tacit” (Wilkinson, 2011: 99).  Such knowledge 
allows the researcher to explore words and actions that are left behind the 
theoretical framework of securitization (Yanow in Wilkinson, 2011: 99).  Having said 
that, it is worth noting that this method does not ask the researcher to choose 
129 
between either/or dichotomies, but to use local perspectives to facilitate the 
accommodation of multiple cultural formulations that will produce “a corpus of 
knowledge” as well as experience that contributes to expanding the overall 
comprehension of the issue (Wilkinson, 2011: 99).       
 A symbol holds several meanings that are mostly dependent on the context 
and meaning-maker, and that flexibility gives power to a symbol (Bernstein in Yanow, 
1996: 6).  Accordingly, their interpretation and allocation of meaning will help us to 
uncover the complex layers behind the South Caucasian turmoil.  Such a method will 
focus on disjuncture and inconsistencies, and will show the context whereby ethnic 
difference took on the meaning of discontent.  In these three conflicts, the ethnic 
narrative supported by historical references to national myths created the hostile 
environment.  Priorities were assigned to symbols that securitised the political 
discourse over status and independence after the demise of the USSR.   
 By deconstructing the contexts of securitization, one could reveal the 
dynamics of local contributions to the challenges of transformation.  Analysis of the 
proximate and distal contexts of securitization will uncover the ‘how’ questions of 
conflicts as well as show the experiences that created enmity.  Territorial disputes 
became matters of urgency and security and were assigned priority over all other 
immediate problems that followed from the collapse of the USSR. The distal context 
reveals how the participants interpreted the events at the particular time, and not 
what analysts conclude (Yanow, 1996: 9).  A proximate context, as mentioned, 
concerns the internal structure of who said what or how they acted during a 
securitization episode (Wilkinson, 2011: 106).    
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 A discourse can be a text, or simply everything that the public ‘reads’, 
including TV and films, newspapers and other media, which makes it an intrinsic part 
of structuring behaviour (Wilkinson, 2011: 107).  The texts and images that the public 
read on a large scale thus have the power to inform and affect public opinion.  Hence 
the analysis of these events should not focus on the geopolitics of the issue, or 
chronological accounts, but rather the narrative that caused the events to unravel 
should be scrutinised.   
 In the case of the South Caucasus, there was a goal, an objective — 
independence — but was it a goal or an instrument of destruction or perhaps the 
direction selected toward independence implied destruction?  The telos of 
nationalists was to make republics independent and to join the international 
community; however, it was excluded from the discourse that independence was 
more about cooperation rather than seclusion.       
  
3.3. Summary  
 
This study will look at the events through a discursive lens.  In other words, observing 
words and speeches will unfold the plethora of underlying issues that predisposed 
communities to behave the way they did.  Researching performatives will 
demonstrate how the escalation was architected by political actors.  This thesis will 
foreground the relevant discourses and use the three conflicts as units of analysis to 
suggest that particular political agents determined the content of ethnic differences.  
The adjectives they employed defined the context in which this dissolution battle 
was fought.    
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 Summing up this chapter, it is significant to point out that the theory of 
securitization offers a pluralistic approach to the problem and its interdisciplinary 
character will help to reassess the conflicts.  Applying discourse analysis to the 
symbolic power which was generated by securitizing moves explains the perplexities 
that were hidden behind the veil of nationalism and historic justice in the South 
Caucasus.  By studying the discourses of securitization, one can be better equipped 
to understand the reasons for wars in the region.  The methods applied analyse the 
metrics and statistics that were used to trigger the conflicts.  As already explained, 
this chapter outlined the theory of securitization, discourse analysis and the method 





4. Chapter Four 
 
Nationalism and its Perils  
 
“Gave us the world to possess with all its unlimited varieties” 






This chapter adds an explanatory power to the empirical part, one that focuses on 
the discourses of history and nationalism.  One must look into how the ethno-
nationalism intoxicated the political and social environment and helped to create a 
rather different version of history and its reading.  It outlines the approach to ethno-
nationalism and its effects on Perestroika and the South Caucasian turmoil.  It 
addresses the hierarchical system and the role of ethno-nationalism in preserving 
that order.  Additionally, in order to make the point more explicit, this section will 
allot attention to understanding of history in the Soviet Union.  As one can observe, 
historical narratives and ancient territories engulfed the former republics.  The 
misuse and abuse of many historical facts and myths helped to define the ethnic 
paradigm of the armed clashes.  When addressing conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and South Ossetia, one must bear in mind the complicated structure of 
historical narrative propagated by Soviet scholarship, and, later on, its reflection in 
the discourse of nationalist leaders.  Therefore, for a better understanding of this 
paradigm, one must look into the structure and organization of the USSR itself.     
 The guiding principle of this section is to show the pretexts behind the 
selection and interpretation of history that were used as mobilizing tools in the 
conflicts under discussion (Geller and Nekrich, 1986).  Most audiences in the Soviet 
Union were broadly more familiar with ‘what’ (the timeline of the events) side of 
history, rather than ‘why’ (a critical assessment).  In other words, interpretive 
questions are fundamental before establishing conclusions about the past.  When 
discussing the conflicting parties of the South Caucasus it is vital to understand why 
and how the confluence of certain factors and actors led to wars over status and 
territories.   
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 History changed the meaning and status of a republic or its autonomous unit 
in the USSR.  For this research, it is necessary to explain the role of a modified history 
and how it affected the union republics and paved the way toward its weaponisation.  
This section aims to explain the context of political manipulations and argues that 
interpretation of the patterns behind them is essential for building a sustainable 
future that will embrace social inclusiveness and reject political particularism.   
 It is significant to recall that, in the USSR, history was part of the propaganda 
of nation-building. Therefore, one must acknowledge how nationalism was glorified, 
and the way in which the past (which had mostly been forged to fit the political 
agenda) was used as a shield, aimed at protecting and safeguarding the Soviet 
regime, which became a tool of segregation.  As the USSR authorities used ethnic 
differences to build and sustain the state, its local instantiation was erecting walls.  
Ultimately, for the conflicting parties, the acknowledgement of this historical blunder 
can lead to the realignment of previously held beliefs.  In many respects, the 
republican intellectual elites had voiced dissent against the Soviet policies that had a 
selective approach to nationalism.  This trend had bred the idealization of the part of 
the history which was suppressed or prohibited.  It might be argued that Soviet 
mythmaking caused a resonance on the other side of the barricade.  As a result, the 
past and its selective interpretation were constitutive elements in the discourse of 
the 1980s South Caucasus and defined the lines of divisions among communities. This 
thesis argues for a reassessment of these constitutive discourses, as well as the facts 
that were deployed by the various parties at the time. 
 This chapter will outline the principles that forged the Communist ideas which 
shaped the Soviet Union.  It will examine the system that nurtured the ideology of 
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the Soviets and was then later engulfed by internecine struggles.  By providing this 
outline of the Soviet system, one might reveal the predicaments that contributed to 
the discourse and which caused a deterioration in interethnic relations.    
 
4.1. Hierarchy  
 
As already mentioned elsewhere, the USSR was a strictly hierarchical order, the fact 
that influenced its units in the aftermath of the collapse.  The USSR was created in 
1922 and became a federation in 1924 (Francis, 2011: 64).  The Constitution of the 
USSR from 1977 onwards indicated that it was “an integral, federal, multinational 
state formed in accordance with the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the 
free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet 
Socialist Republics” (Art. 70) (Francis, 2011: 64).  The USSR was based on territoriality 
and ethnically defined entities.  That is, the territory and ethnical affiliations were a 
source of either advantage or a disadvantage.  At large it was Joseph Stalin who 
decided which nations were superior and which inferior.  Hence, the classification of 
ethnical groups had designed a cluster of privileged nations — Union Republics, 
followed by the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous districts or areas (or Oblasts).  
 There were union republics that were eligible to secede according to the 
Constitution, and enjoyed some privileges; then the next tier consisted of the 
autonomous republics that were formally entitled to a certain degree of autonomy 
but were essentially subjects of the republican government (see the chart below).  
The third tier represented a type of limited autonomy, and the fourth, the “oblast”, 
was a nominal unit.  In the current study, there are three tiers involved: Georgia, 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan were the union republics, Abkhazia was an Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic in the Georgian SSR, whereas Nagorno-Karabakh and South 
Ossetia had the rank of an autonomous oblast (Chapters 10 and 11, 1977).      
        
 
The members of the USSR were not considered equal; in fact, only fifty-three out of 
more than one hundred nationalities got a particular territory, some of them 
alongside the status of a “titular nation”.  Titular entities possessed administrative 
powers due to economic, demographic, cultural, or political reasons (Bremmer, 
1993: 13).  Fifteen out of the fifty-three were union republics, and others were either 
autonomous republics, autonomous regions (oblast) or autonomous areas (oblast) 
(Bremmer and Taras, 1997: 8).  In sum, the Soviet policies toward nationalities were 
defined as a combination of “the satisfaction of the interests of all nations with their 
drawing together and mutual assistance” that was utterly incompatible with 
nationalism and chauvinism (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 300).  The rights and 
Autonomous Okrugs (e.g. Evenski located in the Union republic) 
Autonomous Oblasts (AO) including South Ossetia and Nagorno 
Karabakh were part of the Union Republic 
Autonomous Republics 
including Abkhazia was part of the Union Republic 
The Soviet Socialist Republics 
(15 units including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) 
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duties of the entities were enshrined in the Soviet Constitution, though only fifteen 
republics were allowed to secede.  Such inequalities have influenced the methods 
and tools used by local elites in competition for power.  They helped to produce and 
re-produce the differences and build up securitization discourse.  It was a fruitful 
condition for othering those who did not share certain ideas.      
 
4.2. Ethno-nationalism: instrument of the order  
 
The ethnonationalistic structure of the state created a parallel ethnic hierarchy, 
separate from the political order.  The fifteen republics were considered to be titular 
nations with a higher status in the hierarchy.  This assumption was based on the ideas 
of prominent Soviet scholar Yulian Bromley who defined ethnos as a “historically 
stable entity of people developed on a certain territory and possessing common, 
relatively stable features of culture (language) and psyche as well as a consciousness 
of their unity and of their difference from other similar entities fixed in a self-name” 
(in Tishkov, 1997: 3).  The ideologists of  ethnic management were convinced that 
ethnoses were ancient, self-contained bodies making a journey through history, and 
provided a special taxonomy of ethnoses, emphasizing “ethnikos” or “ethnos” in its 
narrow sense (Tishkov, 1997: 3).  Bromley’s vision was incorporated into the political 
distribution of ethnic territories, as the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography 
of the USSR Academy of Science served as a research think tank for the government 
(Tishkov, 1992: 371-373).  Bromley was the head of the key institute that directed 
the research of ethnic groups and provided the policymakers with policy papers.  
Bruno Coppieters highlights that research was heavily politicized and based on an 
ethnocentric attitude, which resulted in a production of “definitive answers” for 
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complicated scientific issues, often without there being any firm evidence (2002: 
105).  The main ethnoses were permitted to have union republics, i.e., the “nation 
was not an ethnic group with a titular statehood — it is exclusively that part of the 
group which resides on its own national territory” (Tishkov, 1997: 3).  As Yuri Slezkine 
observes, the USSR represented a socialist content but lacked a “national form” 
(1994: 435, see also Brubaker, 2003).    
 Bromley’s works, along with the work of his colleagues, created a new type 
of ethnic concept based on the definition offered by Stalin.  It was Stalin’s idea to 
include “psychological make-up” as a criterion for ethnic belonging (Bromley and 
Kozlov, 1989: 426).  When Stalin proposed the framework as an interpretation of 
ethnicity, the academic debate was limited exclusively to that particular denotation.  
Hence, it became impossible to engage with alternative views or propose a distinct 
theory.  His definition stipulated that a nation was: “an historically formed and stable 
community of people which has emerged on the basis of common language, 
territory, economic life and psychological make-up, the latter being manifest in a 
common shared culture” (in Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 426, see also Slezkine, 1994).  
In other words, Stalin had decided to re-invent the Russian Empire along nationalistic 
lines.  This was a shift from a Marxist view toward the “deep primordial roots” of 
nations (Martin, 2001: 443).  One must note, that the Soviet Union amalgamated all 
the above-mentioned characteristics and created a system where ethno-nationalism 
was institutionalised through ethno-territorial federalism, where citizens were 
classified according to their biological nationalities as some of them had a 
“preferential” treatment because they belonged to a certain ethnic group (Slezkine, 
1994: 415).  Accordingly, all scholars followed the guideline and launched a 
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competition to align their views with those of their leader.  Nationalism had become 
bound to ethnography, and politics, and ultimately became a matter of life and 
death, as Stalin never tolerated dissenting voices.  It was necessary to preserve the 
ethno-territorial entities in order to hold the state together (Slezkine, 1994: 438).  
After Stalin’s death, there was a wider debate during the 1960s about the concept of 
ethnicity; however, the majority of scholars drew the conclusion that there was no 
nation without a “self-name” and “self-identity” (Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 426).  
Despite some voices calling on the official academic line to consider objective factors 
in defining the ethnicity, in Soviet academia self-identity was a self-evident aspect of 
ethnicity (Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 427).  Purporting such assumptions helped the 
Soviet leadership to claim that they had resolved the major question that capitalists 
were unable to fathom, i.e. relations between nations (Lapidus, 1984: 556).  One can 
argue that the issue of ethnicity was one of those topics that the Soviet ideologists 
fought to depict differently from the Western world.  Russian leaders, and Bolsheviks 
in particular, strove to promote their distinctiveness, which for them meant 
superiority over the culture of European Enlightenment.           
 Soviet academia accepted the view that ethnic self-identity was the major 
denominator of ethnic entities (Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 426).  Viktor Kozlov 
formed a more extended concept and included “psychic make-up” (emotional) in the 
wording: 
“An ethnic community is a social organism which has formed, over certain territory, 
out of a group of people with similarities of language, common traits of culture and 
everyday life, some common social values and traditions and a considerable blending 
of different social components achieved in the course of the development of 
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economic and social cultural relations. The basic features of an ethnic community 
are ethnic self- identity and self-name, language, territory, specific features of 
psychic make-up, culture and every-day life as well as some specific forms of socio-
territorial organisations or a drive to create one” (in Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 427).   
Later on, Bromley proposed differentiating between those ethnicities who shared 
common territory, and those who did not (Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 428).  His 
theory created a terminological distinction between the ethno-social organisms and 
“ethnicoses”, which in turn were defined “as historically formed aggregates of 
people” who shared culture and psychological traits (Bromley and Kozlov, 1989: 428).  
Bromley has incorporated the psychological element into the broader theory of 
ethnic nationalism.  These ‘scientific’ myths about ethnicity have had concrete 
consequences.  As Soviet academia was isolated from the rest of the world and 
lacked opportunities for the exchange of ideas, most scholars believed in the theory 
(or else they had no choice).  As Valery Tishkov observes, it was “self-satisfaction and 
intellectual isolationism” that caused the crisis in the field (1992: 372).  
Consequently, nationalism became the keynote aspect of the Communist ideology 
that aimed to suppress and diminish the individual.  It may be, then, that Stalin’s 
version of nationalism was a very particular weapon for establishing the order that 
made the Soviet Union a superpower.  Such an interpretation of the concept of 
nationalism was responsible for its negative accommodation in the 1980s.              
 Tishkov points out that even in the post-Soviet period, scholarship was unable 
to get away from the primordial vision deeply embedded in studies of nationalism 
and history (1997: 4).  When a new edition of the ethnology textbook was published 
it still included the formulation that “ethnoses emerge through human evolution, 
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being one of the forms of the group integration... With full assurance that it is 
possible to tell that ethnoses have existed since the upper-paleolithic times when 
Homo sapiens erectus appeared” (Tishkov, 1997: 4).   
 To demonstrate the crisis in identity and ethnicity studies, Tishkov offers an 
extract from a textbook that harshly denies any intellectual or social constructivist 
scholarship indicating that Russian social science viewed ethnic communities as 
existing realities, as objects produced by “historical law” that will remain the 
founding principle of the domestic ethnology (in 1997: 4).  Such an example 
illuminates the sources of the ethnic interpretation of differences as well as the 
indoctrination of history, nationalism and social science overall.  Tishkov confirms 
that scholars heavily rely on a long-shared methodology and fiercely reject any 
change (1997: 5).  Social sciences in the USSR were allocated an apologetic position 
and they supported the dissemination of some of the mysterious and powerful 
mythologies that upheld the order (Kemp-Welch, 1980: 124).  The scientific elite had 
to cooperate with the requirements of the Communist regime in analysing the impact 
of industrialisation — in other words, hide unpleasant truths concerning the 
economy and collectivisation, and create myths about the USSR (Kemp-Welch, 1980: 
124-125).          
 This flawed theory and methodology was reused and abused in the post-
Soviet space (Tishkov, 1997: 7), with the South Caucasus being a good example.  
Primordialism acquired the potential to shape the discourse of new identities and 
national politics (Tishkov, 1997: 7).  Distorted and backward views about nationalism 
and ethnicity combined with historic narratives became an efficient vernacular for 
the mobilization as well as marginalization of the newly independent societies.  The 
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term “ethnos” gained traction, and was a central point in intellectual and political 
debates of the 1980s and early 1990s (Tishkov, 1997: 7).19  Fallacies stipulated in the 
ethnos theory that was propagated in the USSR served as conflict-generators and 
instruments for political entrepreneurs (Tishkov, 1997: 7).  Virtually all leaders 
started to refer to the categories and paradigms of that theory in their language 
(Tishkov, 1997: 7).  Tishkov offers an illuminating example of an explanation of 
ideological mobilization, written by a nationalist leader from Tatarstan: “Ethnos is a 
biosocial phenomenon, combining nature and society.  Ethnos carries in itself a 
biological energy and is subject to other laws than those for social processes” (1997: 
7).     
 One further variable — the dominance of one party — could explain the 
failure of the Soviet Union.  Marx had never thought about the one-party system, as 
he expected that the proletariat could rule without an “intermediary organization” 
(Sakwa, 1998: 280).  Marxism, a western philosophy, was reabsorbed into a national 
setting and fairly quickly took a national colour (Carr, 1956: 386).  Karl Marx’s 
doctrine required Russia to develop on capitalist lines, and only after the Western 
path of industrialisation was fulfilled could Russia move on to its Marxist destiny 
(Carr, 1956: 386).  Peter Struve, a founder of legal Marxism, advocated recognition 
of “our uncultured condition” and need to “go to school to the capitalists” (in Carr, 
1956: 386).  Yet, it did not materialize, as the Soviet system nurtured its own style of 
Marxism excluding capitalism from the development cycle.      
 19	It	is	worth	noting	that	ethnic	belonging	and	nationalism	still	influence	the	former	Communist	states,	especially	Russia	and	its	foreign	policy	preferences.		The	Soviet	imprint	of	false	scholarship	has	not	been	removed.				
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Being dependent on the one party made it an ideological establishment, 
which provided a programme that was a substitution of the Constitution itself (Hill 
and Frank, 1981: 106).  Party was intertwined with the “organs of state power” and 
“administration” who were unable to reject the official line upheld by the Communist 
Party (Hill and Frank, 1981: 107).   Another aspect that contradicted the Marxist ideas 
was the cult of personality, which was hindering the idea of socialism (Scanlan, 1992: 
20).  Roy Medvedev argues that Stalinism was equal to the concept that depicted the 
socialist system as one that does not respect the law (in Scanlan, 1992: 20).  A 
monolithic structure had sustained a politically repressive and economically 
inefficient regime, after which the Soviet Union was facing the existential crisis by 
1990 (Brown, 1996: 90-91).  According to Sigmund Neumann, the very definition of 
the party implies a “democratic climate”, which makes it deceptive in a dictatorship, 
as “a one-party system is a contradiction in itself.  Only the coexistence of at least 
one other competitive group makes a political party real” (in Hill and Frank, 1981: 
139).   Lacking pluralism and dissenting voices, the Communist Party became 
entrapped into its fading ideology.  Constant reference to the ideals of Marxism-
Leninism bred a culture of unquestionable loyalty.  Even during the Perestroika years 
the officials upheld Leninist ideas, arguing that it was time to go “not back to Lenin, 
but forward to Lenin” (Brown, 1996: 120).  Despite the failures that the Bolshevik 
ideology had spawned for decades, the Party was still referring to it in search of a 
“distant, beautiful and rosy future” (White, 2001: 4).  Even reform was seen through 
the prism of the past, hence political discourse largely took a nostalgic tone.  Perhaps 
this oxymoron, of the past and the future, was one of the reasons for the failure of 
the reform.     
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4.2.1. Other shortcomings  
 
Asides from ethno-nationalism, there were other systemic challenges that plagued 
the USSR.  The Constitutional order of the Soviet Union was more about individual 
personalities than institutions, and it was usually determined by the status of the 
man who presided over the institution rather than the other way around (Sakwa, 
1998: 107).  Sakwa argues that constitutionalism and legalism are alien to the Russian 
political tradition (1998: 107).  This is the reason why the four constitutions of the 
USSR were programme-like documents that did not reveal any details about the 
operations of the political system in the state (Sakwa, 1998: 107).  Brezhnev’s version 
of the document, despite containing ambitious plans, did not differ fundamentally 
from the previous three (Sakwa, 1998: 109).  Notably, the constitution was often 
upstaged by the ideas of the Communist Party, which strove toward an “ultimate 
goal” of Communism they viewed as “a highly organized society of free, socially 
conscious working people” where the ability of each person will be employed for the 
good of a society (White, 2001: 3).  On the way towards their bright future, the 
Constitution stated that the Communist Party was the nucleus of the political system 
(1977).      
 Terence Rigby argues that the Soviet Constitution was a “notoriously 
misleading and incomplete” document about the distribution of power within the 
system (1980: 12).  Reflecting this extremely centralized power structure, it was 
almost impossible to find a concrete line separating the powers of the Party bodies 
and the government (Rigby, 1980: 12).  This aspect demonstrated that the Soviet 
system did not operate based on law but on discretion (Rigby, 1980: 12).  Because 
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the Soviet system was never prepared to adhere even to the laws and rules set by 
the system itself (Schapiro in Rigby, 1980: 12) it was therefore impossible to carry 
out its reform in a succinct way.    
 A citizen of the USSR was obliged to protect the Soviet Union and its interests, 
as well as to help “strengthen its might and prestige” (1977).  This same document 
also acknowledged the right of the republics to secede freely from the USSR, but 
Soviet Constitution was an item of decoration that existed because a state had to 
have a constitution.  It stipulated and combined the ideology of Soviet socialism and 
communism, which was largely delusional.  The USSR never achieved the ultimate 
goal of “building the Communism” that had been promised by its founders and 
consequent leaders.     
 Indeed, Russians ruled the Soviet Union but ethnic elites governed their own 
regions (Sakwa, 1998: 251).  One of the setbacks created by the nationalities policies 
was the nationality line in the job application or university admission form that gave 
certain groups advantages or disadvantages (Martin, 2001: 449).  When the state was 
officially telling its people that their nationality was the most important attribute of 
their identity, it of course reinforced a sense of ethnic belonging in its members 
(Martin, 2001: 449), when the political entrepreneurs launched their campaigns.  
Accordingly, their discourse had a profound influence on the development of local 
ideas and perceptions about the future political direction. Geoffrey Hosking 
emphasizes the influence of the local Communist leaders who shaped their 
respective Soviet republics (Hosking, 1985).  Republican administrations had a better 
knowledge of local attitudes, and they interacted with dissenting voices that 
threatened to shake the USSR for decades.  Hence ignorance of the importance of 
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these leaders leaves a chasmic gap in the studies of the former units of the Soviet 
Union.   Local elites governed on the behalf of the central authorities, but the central 
institutions were interpreted to enforce the matters in the local way (Sakwa, 1998: 
253).  Put another way, the elites translated their own rules, serving their own 
interests.  Simultaneously, the USSR lacked the “positive content” to be “a dynamic 
pole of attraction” (Sakwa, 1998: 253).  Perhaps that lack of positive content 
backfired and failed the government in the years of Perestroika, which Gorbachev 
partially admits (Gorbachev, 1995: 329 and 336).  The aggressive narrative that was 
embedded in the foundations of the USSR could not attract the populace.      
 It is possible that the nationalists who launched independence campaigns and 
appealed to Gorbachev to fulfil the Constitution were hoping to test the limits of the 
Soviet Constitution (see Gamsakhurdia’s letter to Gorbachev).  Yet the Constitution 
was a frozen document, separate from the polity without providing any viable 
guarantees of rights and freedoms.  It stipulated norms that the state was unable to 
accomplish.  Archie Brown argues that Gorbachev wished to make that constitution 
viable, and in fact his aim was the liberalisation of the USSR rather than a reform 
(1996).  Gorbachev himself thought that there were fundamental differences 
between the federations proposed by Lenin and later by Stalin, he argues that Lenin 
had offered a project where the nation-states could have wider participation and 
retain a greater degree of independence; but Stalin adopted a different approach 
and “interpreted” Lenin’s principles in his own way — by empowering the centre and 
stripping union republics of real powers (1995: 329). 
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4.3. Branding history 
 
History was a very special science in the USSR.  Understood as a “totality” and  a 
“unified process”, it was one of the pillars that shaped the “historical and dialectical 
processes” at the time (Kedourie, 1984: 137).  It was propaganda and a didactic tool 
at the same time, combining powerful ideological functions.  Soviet historiography at 
the first stage served revolutionary principles and then shifted to maintain and 
strengthen the political stability of the regime (Heer, 1971: 13).  Pressure was 
imposed on historians to provide upright historical examples to demonstrate the 
revolutionary spirit of forbears (Heer, 1971: 14).  This could explain the rule when 
every single book or public speech had to start with the name and a quote of a 
predecessor — usually Lenin.      
 As Heer remarks, Marx took the Hegelian god of history to preside over a 
dialectic of modes of production because he wanted to change the world rather than 
to explain it (Heer, 1971: 1-3).  Marx allocated a function to the historical context and 
timing of its application (in Heer, 1971: 4).  He proclaimed that “Men make their own 
history, but ... they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” (in 
Heer, 1971: 4).  Lenin carefully reinterpreted Marxian views, accommodating his 
interests and perceptions of the future state of the proletariat.  This, as Elie Kedourie 
observes, was an “illusion and misapprehension” (Kedourie, 1984: 138).  
 Lenin was convinced that knowledge of only history was insufficient, and he 
suggested applying a critical attitude and independent tests to historiography.  His 
vision of history was instrumental and didactic at the same time, using history as the 
vehicle for the party to move history forward (Heer, 1971: 6).  Lenin thought that 
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Marxism must differentiate between developing and developed capitalism, and, in 
developing capitalist states like Russia, it was important to overthrow the “absolutist 
regime” and “draw all classes of the population into politics” (Hirsch, 2005: 28-29).  
Those who control the past have power over the institutional memory of people, 
hence the Bolsheviks had worked out special techniques to “manipulate the past, 
control history” at an unprecedented scale (Geller and Nekrich, 1986: 8).  
Fundamental teachings based on Marx, Lenin and Stalin amended and corrected the 
history of Russia, the union republics and even the USSR itself (Geller and Nekrich, 
1986: 8).      
 The leader of the Russian Revolution went beyond the scientific 
interpretation of history and rewrote the theory of history in an active voice (Heer, 
1971: 10), giving inception to the new ideology that used history for political 
purposes.  One might argue that history is often used for political legitimation; 
however, the scale of the abuse in the Soviet Union was unprecedented.  It was an 
imperative tool, glue to bind together millions of people, yet it was mostly illusory.  
For millions of Soviet citizens, it was unthinkable to realise that the world they 
inhabited was partially fake.  In other words, re-fashioned history, that served the 
interests of the Bolshevik putsch and their subsequent elite, was neither precise nor 
a dogma.  A special status was assigned to history as it served as an instrument in 
creating a pro-Communist society.  It is worth noting that Marx himself was not sure 
that Communist ideas could be implemented in Russia, as he thought Russian society 
was unable to stay true to his project (Heer, 1971).  History became a medium that 
was aimed at filling that gap within the Russian society.        
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 After Lenin’s interpretations of Marx were deemed out-dated, Khrushchev 
launched another re-evaluation of historiography when history officially became a 
political science linked to political life, because it helped society to define the tasks 
through the examples of the past (Heer, 1971).  To be more specific, Soviet ideology 
perceived history as a scientific tool and historians were the “Party’s worthy 
helpmeets in the communist education of the working people” (Heer, 1971: 15).  As 
one can notice, a continued re-imagination of history did not help the ideas of the 
Perestroika.  The nucleus of a society was swayed to believe in a narrative that served 
to empower the pontifical regime of truth.             
 The USSR was to be the country where class and national antagonism was 
absent, and the didactic function of history was guided toward formation of the 
highest, most positive, spirit of man (Heer, 1971: 16).  The party hierarchy 
manipulated history for the sake of Communist ideals, but the incorporation of only 
‘correct’ myths did not help the dysfunctional regime in its quest for survival.  Heer 
argues that historical writings are clues to dominant political hierarchy, and a 
historical treatment of any political figure is a weapon in the hands of a ruling party 
or individual (Heer, 1971: 30).  Slezkine observes how, in 1934, the Congress of Soviet 
Writers celebrated an international stature that the culture of all Soviet peoples 
possessed, with their own classics, founding fathers and folkloric riches (1994: 446).  
History was involved in an attempt to sustain the regime, but as with most absolutist 
systems which tend to represent all the events of history as depending upon the 
great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, they in fact assisted the further 
suppression of men and their role in history altogether (Tocqueville in Arendt, 1986: 
345).   
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 Historians in the USSR were subjected to multiple regulations and the 
administrative decisions of the State Committee for the Coordination of the Scientific 
Research; alongside this regulation, history teaching was under the tight supervision 
of the Ministry of Higher Education (Heer, 1971: 35). Which means that it was an 
instrument of political mobilisation assisting the government to run the hierarchy.  
However, despite such profound restrictions and tight regulations the USSR could 
not avert the catastrophe.  Apparently, the dilemma was in the ability of 
communication and adjustability, as mentioned in the introduction, Huntington 
argues that the power has to be “dispersed” and shared.  The level of restraint 
embedded in the system made it impossible to disperse power.  To be more precise, 
the absolute control of historiography and historic thought entrapped the discourse 
on history and nationalism as well as independence into an echo-chamber, making 
communication and open deliberation almost impossible.        
 There was another significant role allocated to history that represented 
Russia as a saviour of small nations including Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians.  
For state-building in the USSR it was essential to convince the communities that their 
life before Russian suzerainty was economically impoverished and politically 
dysfunctional.  The majority of studies emphasized the great contribution made by 
the Russian Empire to “save” the small nations from Persian or Ottoman occupation 
(in Altstadt, 1992: 41).  Aron Milman attempts to argue the point from the first 
sentence of his introduction, which quotes the newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii: it 
stipulates that Azerbaijan’s merger with Russia had an “immense” influence on the 
Azerbaijani people and helped them to get rid of “alien” conquerors, as well as bring 
to an end internecine clashes and feudal isolation, and finally become attached to 
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Russian culture (Milman, 1966: 26).20 In other words, even for the Soviet leadership 
it was instrumental to be respected by smaller nations and to depict Russia as a 
principal state to be appreciated for the survival of tiny kingdoms in the dominantly 
Islamic neighbourhood.  Communists had a selective approach to the Tsarist legacy.  
Partially they condemned the bourgeoisie and class society, yet they wished to retain 
the influence that the Romanov Empire had accumulated over the course of three 
centuries.  Policies toward the South Caucasus followed that template.  The Tsar was 
bad, so the discourse ran, yet the colonization by Russians was positive.  This was the 
broad message stipulated in the history of the three states.   
 
4.4. Crafting history 
 
Historical variables are a useful tool for tracing the trajectory of developments 
(Habermas, 1987: 248).  In the case of the South Caucasus  historiography has 
forgotten or ignored the fact that the “validity of counterdiscourses count no more 
and no less than those of the discourses in power” and that they represent “nothing 
else than the effects of power they unleash” (Habermas, 1987: 281).  The stories and 
narratives of political agents have not considered that counter-discourse, which 
deserves examination.  
 The quotation at the start of this chapter is the opening verse of the twelfth 
century Georgian poem ‘Knight in the Panther’s Skin’ and celebrates the power of 
the diverse and colourful world.  A twelfth century poet glorifies the many colours of 
the universe.  The poem celebrates diversity and multiplicity of the world.  That 
 20	Translation	my	own	
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multifaceted story of the past raises the question: why and how did the process of 
alienation and isolation prevail across the area in one particular time-frame?21  How 
and why did the people and their leaders re-design the past in its worst context and 
choose war over peace?  It is important to re-evaluate the events that have been 
categorised as the roots of the turmoil in the 1980s and were then used to support 
the primordial argument of the wars.  At the same time, cultures are neither givens, 
nor “natural” conditions, but are constructed “through collective action and 
reinforced through the manipulation of collective consciousness” (Renan in Laitin, 
2007: 30).  This is the reason for citing this old text:   if the diversity was expressed 
openly in poetry and culture then there must have been other reasons for structuring 
and modifying differences.  This verse demonstrates the values of medieval societies 
better than any other historical or chronological document.  The poetry reflects the 
texture and perception of a society of one era.  Consequently, it can serve as a focal 
point for assumptions about the past, revealing more truthful dynamics of social and 
political attitudes of people in the given area.  This is because a historicised text by a 
chronicler or historian is inclined to demonstrate loyalty to a ruling regime rather 
than offer a holistic picture of the time.     
 When addressing history, one must always keep in mind that the story of the 
past is “a narrative construction” which is communicated through “the epistemic and 
ontological decisions of historians” (Munslow, 2012: 3).  Alun Munslow argues that a 
historian’s ethical choices, as well as their ideological inclinations, have a 
fundamental effect on their act of historical narration, which makes history a fictive 
act (2012: 9).  The very origins of historical facts and the methods and approaches 
 21	This	thesis	focuses	on	the	1980s	and	1990s		
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used by historians to evaluate the past are questionable.  In the Cambridge Modern 
History, knowledge of the past is considered to be a fluid distilled through one or 
more minds and thus cannot be impersonal and unalterable, hence there is no 
“objective” historical truth (Carr, 1962: 2).  For E.H. Carr, history is a personal position 
in time, which forms an answer for a vision of the society in a given period (1962: 2).  
History is a corpus of discovered facts.  However, these facts are derived from scripts 
or documents written by certain people, who have had their own visions and 
perceptions.  The notion that facts speak for themselves is untrue as well.  Facts 
speak indeed, but somebody makes the choice between them and depicts those 
which are relevant for him or for her (Carr, 1962: 5).  Historians are selective and 
opinionated, thus historical facts are the product of interpretation, making belief in 
facts as a single truth a simple fallacy (Carr, 1962: 6).  Carr elaborates on an example 
drawn from Greek history,: despite much factual information, all those writings are 
the views of Athenian citizens; moreover, the Medieval history of Europe is a vision 
of religious chroniclers that emphasizes the clerical view of the world at the time 
(1962: 7-8).  Accordingly, Geoffrey Barraclough’s argument that the history we read 
is not factual, rather “a series of accepted judgements” seems accurate (in Carr, 
1962: 8).  All documents are interpretations of the thoughts of their authors.  
American historian Carl Becker went even further and declared that historical facts 
are the creations of authors and had not existed before these acts of creation (Carr, 
1962: 15).  In addition to Carr’s scepticism, Jurgen Habermas defines “the space of 
history” as filled with “contingent occurrences” of “disordered” formations of 
discourses that come up and go away with time (1987: 253).  In Soviet historiography, 
this fluidity or flux of time was completely ignored.  This trend of ignorance 
transforms history into a force or an ‘event’ in the Habermasian understanding, when 
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“the reversal of relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of 
a vocabulary... the entry of a masked other” is an event itself (Habermas, 1987: 253).  
It was Hegel’s vision of history which was mainly founded on human needs, drives, 
inclinations and passions that in turn “gave currency” to laws and principles (Hegel, 
2011: 91).  He argues that world history begins with a single purpose aimed to satisfy 
“some sort of conscious purpose” (Hegel, 2011: 93), which means that it is 
determined and shaped by clashes, volitions, interests and activities that constitute 
“instruments” toward the purpose (Hegel, 2011: 93).      
 Karl Popper suggests that such an approach is not quite accurate, as it risks 
denying that society develops (2002: 6).  Understanding that social uniformities are 
not “laws of nature”, but are rather man-made, empowers human beings to alter 
and even control them (Popper, 2002: 6).  To understand a social event, Popper 
proposes three options in the doctrine of intuitive understanding, arguing that (a) a 
social event should be explained in terms of the forces that brought it; (b) to 
understand the meaning of a social event, teleological causations are not enough — 
rather it must explain the “meaning and significance” of its occurrence, which 
changes the “situational values” of a wide range of events; (c) one must understand 
the meaning, underlying historical trends and tendencies existing during the period 
in question and then analyse the contribution the event has made to the process by 
which such trends are manifested (Popper, 2002: 18-20).   
 For Carr, the key function of the historian is “neither to love the past nor to 
emancipate … from the past” rather to master and understand it, so that it 
transforms into the key of unfolding the present (1962: 20).  History is mostly an 
interaction between a historian and his facts, a kind of perpetual dialogue of the 
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present and the past (Carr, 1962: 24).  Carr explains history as a social process, one 
that is constructed by meanings given to the investigated facts by historians (Carr, 
1962: 49).  It is very important to remember that ”every society has its regime of 
truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth”, in other words, that there is always a different 
discourse which a society or a group accepts and casts in the role of truth (Foucault 
in Habermas, 1987: 270).       
 Thucydides provides a detailed account of the Peloponnesian War.  It was 
both a political and a military report, and Thucydides considered the role of a 
historian in finding and describing truth (Donnelly and Norton, 2011: 21).  Yet, what 
is considered to be the truth?  Any type of writing is the reflection of an author: his 
or her perception of the events considered.  Thus, discovering truth in accounts 
dating back hundreds or thousands of years becomes a dangerous undertaking.     
 Broadly speaking, a fixed and dogmatic approach to the past among the 
academics in the USSR has developed and strengthened a category of truth that had 
functioned as true.  This very truth was used to legitimise the wars and hostilities in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.  The reclusive character of Soviet academia, and 
particularly of social scientists, excluded the possibility of contesting the meaning 
and content of history or ethnography (Tishkov, 1992).  It was acknowledged as an 
un-doubted truth rarely scrutinised or questioned.  Postmodern ideas of 
historiography were not accepted among scholars.   
 The nationalist version of history is a way of bringing together past, present 
and future, but history in that case is the “chief” collector and method of gathering 
the time (Breuilly, 2009: 7).  History became a force for achieving goals through 
individuals rather than being just a record of deed and events (Breuilly, 2009: 9).  The 
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past of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was largely selected and engineered during 
the formative years of the Bolshevik regime.  History was remodelled, re-evaluated 
and re-written in a way that was comfortable for a typical totalitarian state that 
sought total control over its people.  History was a tool to keep the huge landmass 
together and was firmly incorporated in the system of Soviet governance.  The 
instrumentalist approach to history became a fruitful basis for a national 
appropriation of the past, historicising everything from language and literature, to 
law and institutions (Breuilly, 2009: 10).  An uncontested or unquestioned attitude 
to the past idealised it, and became a convenient instrument to nationalist leaders in 
the aftermath of the USSR.  The ‘patriots’ (this word epitomized freedom) reused and 
abused that Soviet instrument successfully (see chapters 5 and 6).  
 When addressing the intellectual foundations of nationalist history, John 
Breuilly notes several elements that caused shifts in history: a civilisation (European 
Christendom), a state (France or Britain), a social group (bourgeoisie) or a “world-
historical” individual (Napoleon) (2009: 9).  Breuilly insists that intellectuals who 
supported such a view of history found a certain attractiveness in the achievements 
of the past (2009: 10).  In some ways they supported the creation of “natural 
symbols” that exclude “demographic minorities” which become “symbolic 
pollutants” (Herzfield, 1997: 68).  Nationalists saw the past to be an attractive tool 
for the mobilization of the public.  At the same time, many intellectuals lent their 
voices to nationalists by possessing “authoritative control” over the concept and 
interpretation of culture (Herzfield, 1997: 68).  In the 1980s, public intellectuals 
promoted heroic history by commemorating the past in a sacred way.  A good 
example of such development took place in 1987, in the canonization of Ilia 
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Chavchavadze, a nineteenth-century Georgian poet and a public figure (Forsyth, 
2013: 585).  He became a symbol of the new Georgia, nationalist in its depth and 
democratic in its context.  This was despite the fact that Chavchavadze had never 
hailed the Church, but had instead often criticized it.  It was in vogue to quote him, 
often out of context, which in turn created a false myth about his ideas.22         
 
4.5. Why did history matter? 
 
This thesis does not refer to essentialist evaluation, where history is considered as 
an important causation.  Rather, interpretation of its meaning and validity is what 
transformed the study of the past into a dangerous peril for the generations to come.  
History acquired a value that was worshipped by certain actors.  Later, during the 
collapse of the USSR, history became the dominant subject of nationalistic and 
independence discourse.           
 Jurgen Habermas calls history a process of crisis-ridden experiences, where 
the present is a “sudden critical branching” and the future is represented as the 
“pressure of unresolved problems”, hence the trend shapes “an existentially 
sharpened consciousness of the danger of missed decisions and neglected 
interventions” (Habermas, 1987: 58).  The Soviet authorities had created a specific 
interrelation of myths about the history of the units and their relations.  The myths 
were dogmatised thanks to the universal ‘filter’ that was utilised to crystallise alien 
thought and science in the most useful way.  This ‘filter’ was created over the course 
of many years, and served as a medium for Soviet elites to govern the vast landmass 
 22	Author:	his	quotes	were	very	popular;	everyone	at	school,	on	television	shows	or	at	a	meeting	repeatedly	used	his	word,	often	without	any	comprehension	of	his	ideas.			
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they claimed to be a destiny of the Russian people.  Therefore, this ideological filter, 
which amounted to an epistemic violence, did influence the demise of the USSR and 
the ideas that dominated the “dissident” movements.  This epistemic filter degraded 
the rational interpretation of political issues, the unity of the proletariat was 
achieved and initiated in the interest of dominant groups and supported by “popular 
emotions and hysteria” (Niebuhr, 1960: 88).   
 The actual use of history in nation-building strategies was more important 
than a structural change in the order.  The USSR did collapse from the centre, but the 
mobilisation of communities against each other was local.  There are many facts and 
documents that prove the involvement of the Soviet/Russian security agencies in the 
turmoil (Sigua, Chervonnaya), though the major actors were local nationalists and 
freedom fighters.  The nationalists used the Bolshevik-style oppression widely to 
support their causes.  Yet they defined it as anti-Bolshevism and love of the 
fatherland.  This pattern has resulted in something worse:  hyper-nationalism.  In 
fact, there were fewer idols but there was a new truth — this was ethnic affiliation.   
 Nationalism provides a general outline and language for the majority of 
political discussions (Harris in Billig, 1995: 99) in the context of this study.  Political 
actors seek grand items for their political agenda as they produce a sublime vision of 
the nation.  Consequently, nationalism is a “condition for conventional strategies” 
rather than a political strategy itself (Billig, 1995).  It might be argued that the fabric 
of multicultural society as well as the historical context was the appropriate condition 
for the application of nationalistic strategies.  It is noteworthy that narratives and 
history were used for securitization and mobilisation around the leader or a flag.  The 
fact that nobody calculated any possible setbacks and negative consequences from 
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the decisions is striking.  The stories offered were never questioned by the broad 
audience, besides, thousands of people took part in the marches and demonstrations 
to add legitimacy to those political entrepreneurs of the time.  Addressing national 
identity, Billig argues that it is embodied in habits that constitute social life, including 
thinking and use of language (1995: 8).  The process of talking about nationhood is 
equal to the possession of national identity (Billig, 1995: 8).  Soviet historiography 
was a source of “useful” language for addressing and securitising national identity in 
suppressed communities.   
 Donnelly and Norton suggest that almost all cultures write themselves 
through historical heritage, and that the historic genre is a mirror that helps a group 
to envision and reify an identity (2011: 192).  Practicing history in this way gives it an 
ontological function: mnemonic practices constitute a fundamental part of what it 
means to be human, they are activities that all human societies engage in as a part 
of “self-definition and the articulation of identity” (Donnelly and Norton, 2011: 192).    
It is fundamental to remember that all parties who were involved in the 
conflict debated territorial boundaries and the legal status of their respective lands 
— contesting sovereignty based on historical myths, either written or interpreted by 
those Soviet historians who served the interests of the Communist Party of the USSR.  
In fact, even before this period, Russian ethnographers and geographers in the 
nineteenth century started to classify languages and people of the South Caucasus 
by assigning priority to race and religion (Broers, 2010: 9).  Whereas in the Soviet 
period most of the borders were drawn by Stalin and his colleagues, who kept in 
mind the distribution of resources and land, and thus positioned industries in a way 
that became the source of problems during the reform (Gorbachev, 1995: 329).  
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Therefore, the historic context did acquire a significant position in the political 
narrative of 1980s.      
 Georgian scholars have debated the opportunities that Georgia could have 
availed itself of at the end of the eighteenth century, had it not signed the 
Georgievsky Agreement.23  Most intellectuals thought that Georgia was unable to 
survive the Islamic encirclement.  However, it is uncertain whether that 
“encirclement” existed at all or was engineered for political goals by Soviet 
academics.  Russia was the choice of a relatively small elite of princes and a King who 
ruled only half of Georgia (Kartli and Kakheti).  In fact, all alternative views were 
suppressed and excluded from the discussion.  Georgian princes who were against 
closer ties with the Russian Empire were marginalized (Ioseliani, 1895).  As a result, 
the “facts” that became contested in the 1980s were effectively an invented reality 
that was convenient for the Soviet authorities whilst they engaged in the 
reengineering of history.  The nationalism that triggered the armed confrontations 
was an imagined artefact produced by the historians of the repressive regime that 
the nationalists wished to topple.  Milman points to how inefficient the feudal 
administration of Azerbaijan used to be before Tsarist Russia took over the territory 
(Milman, 1966: 3).  Russia represented positive change — that has been the overall 
message of policies and academics.  Yet his monograph was written in 1966 when 
the Soviet government required additional arguments to legitimize the Russian 
presence in the South Caucasus.  In the 1960s, Armenians started to dispute the 
legality of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status in Azerbaijan.  Soviet authorities were 
 23	The	Georgevskiy	Tractate	was	an	agreement	signed	between	the	envoys	of	the	King	of	Kartl-Kakheti,	Erekle	II	and	the	Russian	Empress	Catherine	II,	which	aimed	to	assure	the	Russian	protection	of	the	Georgian	kingdom	from	Persian	invasions.					
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producing myths to assure the units of the USSR that they belonged to the home of 
the global proletariat.  While history was a mere tool used to legitimize the 
oppressive Communist regime, nationalist leaders took it literally, building the 
discourse of independence on myths written and propagated by their very 
oppressors.       
 History had become a regulated science that served the Communist Party and 
its leadership.  As a result, when the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the 
deterioration of relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and Georgians and 
its autonomous entities — South Ossetia and Abkhazia — observers were quick to 
conclude that historic legacies and ethnic hatreds embedded in communal memories 
and the abolition of hierarchical order were the major causes of wars and cleavages.  
While on the surface historical narrative was the ultimate weapon in fighting the war 
of words, it was not a given variable or an unalterable truth, but rather an instrument 
of alienation and division.  
 
4.6. The concept of “political” applied to history 
 
It is worth addressing the issue of the political in the light of the developments that 
have triggered and escalated conflicts. This is the case when Carl Schmitt’s theory is 
partially applicable to the theory of securitization and adds explanatory power to it.  
Any enunciator in the process of securitization works to intensify the antagonism felt 
toward the issue (Williams, 2003: 516).  Jason Glynos and David Howarth offer 
definitions and evaluations of the concept of the political and argue that it does not 
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belong to any particular social domain, but rather refer to Claude Lefort (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007):  
“the political is... revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the double 
movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured.  It 
appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across 
its divisions becomes visible.  It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the 
locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape 
and is reproduced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which 
generates the overall configuration is concealed” (in Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 
113). 
In other words, the meaning that the political allocates during the process that takes 
place within a society has reprecussions.  It is about the way the principles are 
defined and the hierarchy that is allocated to their importance.  The context of 
“political” helps political actors in a process of cosolidation.  To take the point further, 
the concept of securitization is closely linked to Carl Schmitt’s thought concerning 
the construction of enemies and friends in any given social space: 
“the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a 
union or separation, of an association or dissociation.  It can exist theoretically and 
practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, 
economic, or other distinctions.  The political enemy need not necessarily be morally 
evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may 
even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions.  But he is, 
nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in 
a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the 
extreme case conflicts with him are possible.  These can neither be decided by a 
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previously determined general norm nor by the judgement of a disinterested and 
neutral third party” (Schmitt and Strong, 2007: 26-27) .  
Making an adversary “the other” does not require any moral or aesthetic differences, 
albeit the creation of an existential dilemma could make an extreme case where 
existing general norms and rules cease operation and exceptional order could apply.  
Creating a sense of urgency and emergency helps the securitizing actor to influence 
a referent object and achieve a goal.  Once a person or an ethnic group is 
“dehumanized” it becomes legitimate to fight them.    
 Glynos and Howarth offer Ernesto Laclau’s rendition of a link between the 
social and the political, where he argues that “any political construction takes place 
against the background of a range of sedimented practices” and the boundaries 
between the two definitions change permanently (Laclau in Glynos and Howarth, 
2007: 116).   In other words, enemies were constructed as many themes were 
concealed, limiting discourse to the topics and parts of history that remained 
comfortable for the short-term goals of nationalists.  The ‘political’ was the 
interpretation given to myths, unconfirmed historic events or perceptions of 
particular individuals; everything else was outside the meaning of politics.  Alienating 
certain groups became a tactic of nationalists.  Out-grouping Abkhazians, Ossetians, 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis was a “political construction” performed against a 
“historical” background.    
 
4.7. Perestroika – an attempt to change the unchangeable  
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In the final part of this chapter, the Perestroika is being addressed, an attempt to 
change the country based on the aforementioned principles.  Mikhail Gorbachev 
encapsulated that long-awaited change in the Soviet Union.  He outlined his 
intentions and offered three directions for reform: the restructuring of the economy 
(Perestroika), acceleration (Uskorenie24) and openness (Glasnost) (Sakwa, 1998: 77).  
Gorbachev believed that, the Soviet Union could not cope with economic reforms as 
it was impossible to continue existance (Gorbachev, 1987, Brown, 1996).  Perestroika 
was about increased public participation, a more open information policy, economic 
reform that was supposed to help the stagnant economy, and “new thinking” — a 
re-evaluation of foreign policy (Sharlet, 1992: 11).  In April 1985, Gorbachev 
presented some figures to the Politburo meeting that revealed harrowing data about 
the state of the Soviet economy, where the productivity of the food industry was 
almost three times lower than in capitalist countries; as a result, the USSR lost 30 per 
cent of its agricultural produce annually (in Chernyaev, 2000: 27).  It was an 
unambiguous reality that the Communist rule could not compete with the capitalist 
world, and the change was inexorable.       
 Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to create an effective government.  He was a 
new type of person in the Communist Party, free of hierarchical prejudices, and a 
normal person with common sense (Chernyaev, 2000: 14).  Prior to Gorbachev, the 
party leader was required to possess one talent, which implied that he/she had the 
ability to be “in charge” and “give general instructions” about every issue whilst 
lacking any particular acumen or expertise (Geller and Nekrich, 1986: 679).  Despite 
Gorbachev’s efforts, the Soviet government struggled to become effective.  Ronald 
 24	This	was	a	Soviet:	dream	to	catch	up	with	the	US.	
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Suny argues that a lack of broad social bases was one of the reasons for this 
ineffectuality (2003: 492).   Sakwa compares this to Walter Bagehot’s distinction of 
the dignified and efficient parts of government, where the dignified part of the 
constitution was a network of soviets, the Council of Ministers and some declared 
rights that allowed Stalin to argue that the Soviet constitution was “the most 
democratic in the world” (1998: 119).  Yet, there is a caveat, which is that the 
meaning and function of the document are defined by the representation of the 
citizens and their belonging to the legal system (Arendt, 1986: 312) — criteria which 
the Soviet Constitution could not uphold.  
 It was Gorbachev’s ambition up until the end to re-negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the USSR and make it a (con)federation, but the USSR did not have a 
core, as Russians themselves felt to be affected by Soviet ideology and nationalism, 
so they were unable to fit into the function of the core  (Hanson, 2003: 6).  This point 
proves the hybrid nationalism developed by the Bolshevik regime.  The confluence 
of Stalinist theories on ethnicity and the distortion of history created a country that, 
in the end, was impossible to govern or reform.  One cause of perplexity was that of 
the core ideology that toppled the value of an individual and fomented antagonism.  
Restrictions on independent thought had produced dire consequences for the 
system and its reformers.  The Communist regime prohibited agents from thinking 
and contributing to the evolution of the system.  Such a tendency made the USSR 
immune to change, as the system wiped out the virtue of thinking from the 
institutional memory of the population, which created a ‘pause’ in the mutual 
construction of social reality.  There were no agents left to shape the structure, which 
eventually collapsed.  It is a striking fact that the regime that endorsed Darwin’s 
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theory of evolution in its curriculums neglected its fundamental principle: the need 
for constant change and adaptation in order to survive and remain the fittest.  In fact, 
the centre of the USSR was the Communist Party which was a very closed and isolated 
group — a party that was preponderant in social fragmentation and polarization, and 
which resisted reforms.  It was a glorification of a rigid ideology that failed to 
ascertain the functions of the core institution.  In other words, the Party sought total 
control over the state and the people yet had no capacity to adjust to change.      
 In Gorbachev’s vision, Perestroika was a qualitatively new kind of growth that 
implied the “intensification of production on the basis of scientific and technological 
progress, the structural reorganisation of the economy, improved management and 
better incentives for labour” (Sakwa, 1998: 77).  He was prepared to pursue this goal, 
notwithstanding obstacles, and was determined to successfully integrate the Soviet 
Union into the world community by peaceful means (Brown, 1996: 102).  Gorbachev 
himself described this course as “an urgent necessity arising from the profound 
processes of development in our socialist society” (1987: 17). Despite being unsure 
about the final outcome of his reform project, Gorbachev was clear that he could 
give “socialism the most progressive forms of social organization; it is the fullest 
exposure of the humanist nature of our social system” (1987: 35).  In his view, the 
idea that the USSR was a “problem-free” system had backfired (Gorbachev, 1987: 
22).  Yet speaking about this much-needed change, he hailed Lenin’s principles 
because they were “in the minds and hearts of the millions of people” (Gorbachev, 
1987: 25) and he was inclined to think that he was not in a position to alter that 
reality.   Apparently his vision was not prepared to admit the mistakes of the previous 
leaders.  When addressing the issues of collectivisation and industrialization, he 
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argues that that was the only way to “rehabilitate” the country (Gorbachev, 1987: 
41). It might be said that the system was intoxicated by doctrines and unchangeable 
dogmas, which could be considered the main reason of the failure of reforms.  Could 
Gorbachev have handled things better?  Perhaps the answer is closer to the negative: 
it is highly unlikely.  Archie Brown suggests that Gorbachev unknowingly opened “a 
Pandora’s box” that revealed suppressed grievances and, most importantly, new 
demands that exposed him to challenges he was unable to withstand (Brown, 1996: 
13).  Another feasible argument is proposed by Eero Loone, who suggests that 
Perestroika could not revitalise socialism but rather transformed Soviet societies into 
early capitalist ones (1993: 741).  This is because Gorbachev was incapable of 
challenging the “fundamentals”, albeit he hoped to make the reform “dynamic and 
politically meaningful” (1987: 54).     
 A primary dilemma of the Soviet authorities was working towards a “mono-
organisational society” wherein the regime was not regulating activities but was 
mostly preoccupied with directing them (Rigby, 1980: 19).  In other words, the 
government did not work to improve the norms and rules that could allow a society 
to operate, but rather issued directives that enlisting individuals for particular tasks 
(Rigby, 1980: 19).  The regime was focusing on task-fulfilment that restricted the 
freedoms of individuals, as they did not want society to evolve.  The economic five-
year plans were a good example of such policies.  The keyword for the authorities 
was “zadanie” i.e. ‘task’ — a criterion that was used to measure the success of 
writers, teachers, judges and others that is reminiscent of a military order that 
“mobilises” resources and peoples to fulfil operation tasks — thus ideologically 
preparing them to “struggle” for “victory” on various fronts, including factories, 
167 
farms (kolkhoz), theatres and other institutions (Rigby, 1980: 20).  To take this idea 
further, the system promoted “task-achieving” people who were in complete 
harmony with it (Rigby, 1980: 20); it guaranteed that no independent individuals 
could break into it.  The idea of achieving full Communism was the goal that 
legitimised the regime. 
 The Soviet Union failed to re-invent itself in a new age of change.  Accordingly, 
reforms launched by the new leadership could not deliver positive results for society.  
As Sakwa notes, a negative destructive logic loomed over perestroika, which 
appeared to be unable to construct comprehensible political institutions (Sakwa, 
1998: 77).  Institutions were instrumental in replacing the Communist party and 
assure transition from a planned order to a market economy (Sakwa, 1998: 77).  Yet 
those institutions were not flexible and vibrant enough to withstand the pressure 
and produce new policies, or to offer new opportunities to the stakeholders.   
 Sakwa suggests that the authors of perestroika acknowledged deep problems 
that petrified the Soviet system but which failed to offer a credible and adequate 
programme to tackle those acknowledgements (Sakwa, 1998: 77).  In other words, 
perestroika failed in its implementation.  It was a well-manifested project that 
promised to destroy the Soviet prison from within, but eventually the USSR ceased 
to exist.  One could argue that the Soviet system was insubstantial, as it was a 
caricature of socialism.  In fact, it was a truly totalitarian state that failed as a result 
of its isolation and superficiality.      
 In tracing the reasons behind the failure of reform in the times of Perestroika, 
we need to return to the founding principles of the USSR.  The Bolsheviks were 
uncompromising toward dissenting thoughts and did everything to fight pluralism.  It 
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was not a revolt against the monarchy of the Romanov house, but a full-scale war 
against free-thinking people.  By attacking the intellectual elite back in the 1920s, 
they destroyed the nucleus that could have ensured development of Russia as a state 
and as a society.  Yet Lenin personally oversaw the deportation or slaughter of 
intellectuals across the country (Lenin, 2003).  In the letter to Stalin in 1922, he orders 
the deportation of certain members of the Popular Socialists, whom he considers 
more “harmful” than any other socialist revolutionary because they are “more 
clever” (Lenin, 2003: 117).  Bolsheviks waged the most devastating epistemic warfare 
against Russia and its provinces.  Millions of people were killed or were forced to flee 
Russia, an intellectual exodus that Russia never recovered from.  It was a life-
threatening crime to be clever or to possess an opinion in the new Russia that was 
ordered to convert to Communism.   The creation of a country where every citizen 
was forced to have the same view and exposed to daily epistemic violence backfired 
during the Perestroika.  It appeared that the Soviet Union did not have the 
intellectual resources to adjust and reform. 
 Glasnost provided a chance for the political leaders of union republics to 
speak up, however the central authorities in Moscow were not prepared to digest 
that freedom of expression.  They were used to review and permit editorial themes, 
receive editors’ reports and discuss them during the Party plenums (Hill and Frank, 
1981: 133).  Having been accustomed to such a degree of involvement in the work of 
the media, it was perplexing for the authorities to adjust to openness.  Prior to the 
official policy of Glasnost, the press was regarded as the servant of the party with the 
aim to “educate the Soviet public” and support government policies (Hill and Frank, 
1981: 133).  The Party obliged everybody to listen to them, whilst the change now 
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required the Communists to take note of others’ opinions.  The task was too complex, 
and the Party was mostly unprepared.  Nationalism and history crafted a discourse 
that emphasized enmity and differences.  The freedom to speak turned out to be a 
freedom to manipulate history and oppress the lower units of the Soviet hierarchy.      
 
4.8. Unchangeable  
 
The prominent philosopher Petr Egides argues that the state was not truly socialist.  
He was sent to a mental hospital and later was forced to leave the USSR.  Egides 
openly attacked the dogmatism of the Soviet ideology (1967), accusing the party 
ideologists of creating algorithms and forcing a society to live according to those 
algorithms (Egides, 1967: 107).  He writes that many party officials were “afraid to 
come forward” and speak up against the “specific perpetrators of the 
algorithmization of man and against specific algorithms” (Egides, 1967: 107).  In other 
words, there were dissenting voices who prepared the soil for Gorbachev to 
announce change.     
 The USSR failed because of the huge economic pressure as the GNP, including 
the large-scale military sector that made an insignificant contribution to domestic 
economy whilst exploiting a large proportion of raw materials (White, 2001: 44).  
Additionally, in a time when Western societies progressed toward post-industrial 
service economies, the USSR still focused on producing goods to meet centrally 
specified targets that had little relation to social needs (Sakwa, 1998: 285, White, 
2001: 44-46).  In addition to these challenges, the absence of foreign competition 
due to a closely regulated market worsened conditions (White, 2001: 46).  Even 
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before Gorbachev, the USSR was using 80 per cent more resources for one industrial 
output than the US in fixed assets, 60 per cent more in materials, 110 per cent more 
energy and 100 per cent more in shipping (Scanlan, 1992: 24).  Considering the 
figures and this state of affairs, it becomes apparent that the country was wasting its 
material and human resources and failing to produce economic growth.     
 The Soviet planning system did not match resources to capacity as a means 
to stimulate growth of economy that made economy commanded rather than 
planned (Sakwa, 1998: 278).  Gorbachev’s initiative could not alter the economic 
system that as Philip Hanson argues was an outcome of the limits of the system itself, 
rooted in the industrialisation of 1930s (2003: 6). These Soviet foundations ruled out 
the existence of a private sector in the economy, and it was aimed at stripping away 
everything personal. Therefore, this systemic vacuum could not allow a private sector 
to prosper (Hanson, 2003: 236)  
 The Perestroika was intended to change a system that  had been designed to 
withstand change (Sakwa, 1998: 285).  The project was ambitious as it tested the 
entire system of values and economic organization of the Union led by Russia.  If 
Russian history is viewed from the perspective of reforms and the reaction of society, 
Peter the Great and Stalin were despots who relinquished society for the sake of 
modernization (Sakwa, 1998: 286).  Perhaps they enforced cultures and agendas that 
were alien to Russia and its people.  However, the Great Reforms launched by 
Alexander II and Gorbachev’s Perestroika involved the political activation of citizenry 
(1998: 287).  Sakwa’s parallels are noteworthy as both attempts at liberalization 
failed.  The revolutionaries toppled the monarchy and Perestroika destroyed the 
USSR.          
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 This was a system that Perestroika and Glasnost were designed to reform.  
Gorbachev believed in the possibility of change in the USSR.  Yet change ultimately 
appeared to be impossible due to the enumerated causes and dilemmas.  As Kenneth 
Waltz explains, systems are either maintained or transformed (1979: 199).  In this 




This chapter has addressed the perils of the Soviet ethno-nationalism and 
operationalisation of history in developing the verbal fabric of post-Soviet political 
discourse.  As mentioned above, “any political construction takes place against the 
background of a range of sedimented practices” and those practices were actively 
used in the nation-building in the aftermath of the USSR.  Ethno-nationalism was 
instrumentalized and inserted into the discourse of differentiation.  One could see 
that historical and ethnographic scholarship were transformed into an ideological 
powerhouse of Soviet-era party elites.  The isolated life of scholars created fertile soil 
for such scientific distortions.  They did not participate in international debates, nor 
had they enjoyed the broad access to literature and resources available to their 
colleagues in the Western Europe or the US.  Arts and humanities and social sciences 
had a peripheral status in academia in the USSR.  These marginalised scholars, 
representing separate groups of historians, held radicalised views of the past that are 
apparent in all three conflicts in the South Caucasus.  As mentioned earlier, they had 
forgotten or ignored the fact that the “validity of counter discourses count no more 
and no less than those of the discourses in power "(Habermas, 1987).  Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Abkhazians, and Georgians and Ossetians used the 
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stories to mobilise the in-groups against the out-groups.  Such operationalisation of 
historiography and ethnography made an ‘in-group’ of ‘indigenous’ people a 
privileged class, but almost outlawed the ‘out-group’ of ‘newcomers’ or guests.  As 
Victor Shnirelman argues, this history escalated the crisis in Abkhazia, Nagorno-









5. Chapter Five  
Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia and 




This chapter focuses on the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the 
jurisdiction in Nagorno-Karabakh.  If Georgia went to war with itself, with conflicts 
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erupting in two of its three autonomous entities, then Armenia and Azerbaijan went 
to war over an ethnically mixed Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-majority 
autonomous district (oblast) of Azerbaijan.  The operationalization of history was and 
remains one of the key paradigms that characterises the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh.  The nationalities policies employed across the USSR by its founders 
caused the initial dispute over the jurisdiction of the territory.  Nagorno-Karabakh 
was an ethnically Armenian enclave in the South of Azerbaijan, close to the Armenian 
border.  The Soviet authorities in 1920s decided to grant the territory to the 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, while also awarding it autonomous status.  Ever 
since then, the issue has been on the agenda of Armenian nationalists, who believe 
that it is a matter of historic justice to return the province to Armenia.   
 As mentioned previously, this current section will demonstrate the 
significance of discourse in Yerevan, Baku and Moscow (because the conflict started 
in the Soviet period in 1988) during the crisis, and will attempt to explain the reason 
for the escalation of armed conflict in the region.  It will describe the events that 
unfolded and will offer an analysis that emphasizes the role of the formation of a 
dominant nationalist and historic narrative, as well as the role of Gorbachev’s policies 
in contributing to the crisis.  When addressing the actions or in-actions of the 
Kremlin, one has to bear in mind that the members of the Politburo were politicians 
whose ideas and words (statements) were especially crucial in the time of 
Perestroika.  To what extent was the Nagorno-Karabakh a litmus test for Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika?  Whose political agenda failed and whose prevailed in the conflict?  How 
was this enmity constructed and how did it escalate?  How did certain performatives 
securitise ethnicity?  
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 The case of Nagorno-Karabakh vividly demonstrates the way in which the 
priorities assigned to particular symbols transformed the republics and established 
enmity.  As is demonstrated in the third chapter of this thesis, one has to look into 
the “symbolic power” that was assigned both to the past and to nationalism.  It is 
possible to explain the trend of securitization by examining the narratives that 
circulated and were used as “capacities of management” (Bigo 2000).  This chapter 
guides the reader through those practices that are “heuristic artefacts (metaphors, 
policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes emotions, etc.), which are 
contextually mobilised by a securitising actor” as they worked to prompt an audience 
“to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and 
intuitions), about critical vulnerability” (see Balzacq chapter 3).        
 Those are the questions around which this chapter revolves; it will begin with 
an introduction to the enmities constructed throughout the Soviet period, then will 
address the Armenian discourse on Nagorno-Karabakh.  It will also include the 
reactions of Gorbachev’s government to the pogroms and describe Azerbaijan’s 
response. Overall, it describes the process of the securitization of Armenians in 
Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in Armenia, and it demonstrates how certain political 
actors abused their authority to undermine peace and inflict divisions in order to gain 
public support for their struggle toward power in the post-Soviet reality.  
 This problem was largely ignored by the Soviet authorities who assured the 
parties that the USSR was one common home of all nations and that the borders did 
not matter at all.  But, in the 1980s, when the end of the USSR was drawing near, and 
when self-determination and freedom became often-heard words across the area, 
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borders and ethnicity acquired symbolic power as the political agenda was in a state 
of rapid transformation. 
 Gorbachev’s ideals consisted of platitudes that acknowledged the need for 
reform, but which were lacking in detail.  By introducing a new concept to Soviet 
citizens, Gorbachev attempted to reconcile the dignified and efficient components 
of the government (the Council of Ministers and the Politburo) (see chapter 4), but 
his approach instead caused the collapse of both (Sakwa, 1998: 119).  In an 
ethnonational state like the USSR, Perestroika and Glasnost were dangerous 
instruments as they granted an opportunity to the latent resentments to be awoken 
(Hunter, 1994: 99) and at the same time distorted certain aspects of debates that 
were vulnerable to misinterpretation.  Mostly, the government did not thoroughly 
think through the perils and perplexities of opening up a closed state.  It is debatable 
as to whether Gorbachev and his team had foreseen the unintended consequences 
of Perestroika and if they had a contingency plan for the crisis.  In their analysis, 
Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda note that, by 1987, Glasnost was mainly a cover 
for the nationalities question (1990: 265).  In other words, Glasnost brought the 
question to the public domain, and it became acceptable to openly address the issue.  
Problems relating to nationality were on the front-pages of newspapers, and Soviet 
television brought up the complexity and intricacy of the issue to the homes of 
millions of viewers (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 265).  The same authors note that 
the Kremlin, as well as the authorities in republican capitals, ignored the voices of 
non-Russians regarding national issues (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 263).  It is 
thought that Glasnost helped the national movements in activating their voices and, 
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according to Nahaylo and Swoboda, the question over the national hierarchy became 
the dominant problem.25    
 The case of Nagorno-Karabakh is a perfect demonstration of these two 
failures.  On the one hand, the Soviet government proved itself to be politically 
insolvent and on the other, the local political elites demonstrated a willingness to use 
hostile discourses in their fight for power.  They securitised almost every aspect of 
life: nationality, history, ethnicity, which laid the foundation for the public 
involvement in the cross-border enmity.  In the space of a few days, Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis found themselves to be enemies.  The rise of nationalism in Armenia 
spurred the same sentiments in Azerbaijan, and both groups focused on the issue of 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Hunter, 1994: 99).  The political life of these two countries was 
basically constituted by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Neumann, 1993: 1).  It 
could be argued that modern Armenia and Azerbaijan formed their post-Soviet states 
based on a mutual antagonism over Nagorno-Karabakh, an antagonism that 
continues to this day.           
 The paradigms that defined and shaped the South Caucasian conflict circle 
raise the question of the value of independence, and sovereignty along with security.  
As Tamara Dragadze notes, further analysis is necessary because “crude are the 
sentiments involved and tragic the consequences of communal hatred” (1989: 69).  
This chapter will interrogate how ethnicity, history and nationalism were tools for 





The constitution of the USSR was a complex document that regulated the hierarchical 
order of the state.  Nagorno-Karabakh was the Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within 
the Azerbaijani SSR.  The term Oblast meant that the region had fewer rights than, 
e.g., Abkhazia (see ch. 3).  The enclave served as a bone of contention between the 
two republics during the Soviet period.  Armenians complained that Nagorno-
Karabakh was economically backward because Azerbaijan could not manage it 
properly.  They then proceeded to reference the fact of the Armenian majority in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and to request Armenian jurisdiction over the oblast.  Glasnost 
and Perestroika strengthened the debate and gave hope to Armenians in particular 
(Mutafian, 1994, Hunter, 1994).  This crisis was the first harbinger of the 
disintegration process of the USSR.  Nagorno-Karabakh was the first problem to be 
handled in the era of Perestroika and Glasnost that shows that the government of 
the Soviet Union was capable of reform and transformation, as well as able to deal 
with a complex crisis that involved nationalities, policies, and intra-union borders.  
The Oblast was one of those many areas of the USSR that had a status and had rights 
on paper according to the Constitution, but which in fact did not have any of them in 
practice (Panossian, 2001: 147).  Gorbachev faced a Soviet government with a huge 
bureaucracy that never accepted the need for reform and change.  Gorbachev and 
his allies hailed the possibilities of Perestroika and Glasnost, yet Gorbachev knew that 
the transformation of the system had to be launched by transforming peoples’ minds 
and assurance that they (people) understand the objectives of change, he wanted 
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the goals (change and reform) to be all encompassing and inclusive.26.  He wanted to 
involve the public, which one has to note was not used to engagement and dialogue 
with the government.27  As Gorbachev (1995) writes in his memoirs, it was impossible 
to proceed the way the USSR existed, and there was an imminent need for reforms.  
Despite the general acknowledgment of the need for change, it ended up being the 
single biggest challenge the USSR faced since the Second World War.   
 Nagorno-Karabakh was the first legal, territorial and political dispute in the 
South Caucasus and in the Soviet Union.  It started in 1988, before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall — a symbol of Soviet power in the Western World.  Technically speaking, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis was still under control of the Soviet administration and 
the USSR was responsible for peace and security within its borders.  However, as the 
crisis showed, the resources (political governance, the mobilisation of forces) to 
handle the situation existed mostly on paper, making the Kremlin elites incapable of 
dealing with the consequences of glasnost and perestroika.  Gorbachev did not 
create a special committee, nor did he agree to take direct control over Nagorno-
Karabakh.28 When he did it was too late, as deadly clashes were already taking place 
between the two sides.    
In contrast with other fellow republics of the USSR, the national movement 
in Azerbaijan had developed slowly, as they were “informal groups” concerned with 
environmental issues (Hunter, 1994: 66).  Shireen Hunter notes that many such 
 26	Gorbachev,	M.	1986.	Address	to	the	Assembly	of	the	Communist	Party.	http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/GORBACHEV/doklad_xxvi.txt	[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018	27	The	Soviet	people	were	not	electing	leaders	and	did	not	have	a	say	in	how	the	country	was	governed,	hence	Gorbachev	addressed	the	need	for	inclusiveness.			28	Parfenev,	L.	1988.	Karabakh	Nevozmozhno	Peredat’	Armenii.	Available	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hvzlNPsoxc	[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018]	
179 
groups were created by Moscow in order to fulfil the new “openness” agenda, yet 
the government was unprepared for the transformation of these groups into civil 
society actors (1994: 66).  Hunter observes that many of the groups had changed the 
course (openess) and did not cooperate with the government.  Further, she argues 
that openness offered opportunities to all subjugated peoples who vented their 
cultural, religious or national frustrations (Hunter, 1994: 66).  Yet leaders of those 
groups, who led the nationalist movements across the region, managed the selection 
of topics for public discussion.  They emphasized divisions but refrained from 
mentioning commonalities.  This strengthened the nationalist movement in 
Azerbaijan, as they were confronted by the demands of their Armenian colleagues.  
The hyper-inflation of national tensions in Armenia has encouraged and empowered 
Azerbaijan’s national movement.  The ‘Popular Front’ of Azerbaijan was a gathering 
of academic figures who initially aimed to “facilitate Perestroika in Azerbaijan” 
(Hunter, 1994: 68, Swietochowski, 1995: 199).  Their programme aimed to enhance 
the political and cultural sovereignty of Azerbaijan within the USSR (Hunter, 1994: 
69).  
 As tensions were rising in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh became the tipping 
point that possessed the capacity to consolidate public opinion in favour of the 
nationalist groups.  This tiny part of a mountainous enclave in Azerbaijan became a 
symbol of the new Armenia.  Nagorno-Karabakh was a symbolic capital that, in the 
end, both parties used to mobilise the public.  Suren Aivazian, a geologist, wrote an 
extensive letter to the USSR leader Gorbachev on 5 March 1987, that launched the 
Armenian appeal.  It was signed by thousands of workers from Nagorno-Karabakh 
who opposed this historical injustice: 
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“The exclusion of the Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhichevan from Armenia 
represents the highest expression of injustice, contradicting the articles in the laws 
of boundaries of the Soviet Union as laid down according to Leninist principles. 
Nakhichevan in the consciousness of the Armenian people has the same place as 
Moscow or Novgorod have in the consciousness of the Russian people” (Libaridian, 
1988: 81).29   
Firstly, Aivazian referred to the meeting between the high-profile Bolshevik leaders 
in 1921 that defined the fate of boundaries of Armenia and Azerbaijan within the 
Soviet Union.  Ever since then, Armenians had felt that the allocation of lands in the 
South Caucasus was unjust and expressed hope to change the state of affairs.  
Aivazian laid down the Armenian position on the Azerbaijani SSR.  Armenians thought 
that Azerbaijan was founded on the territory of Eastern Armenia and “Mountainous 
Tatars” started to call themselves Azerbaijanis, which further inflamed the situation 
(Libaridian, 1988: 81).  Aivazian challenged the right of Azerbaijanis, i.e. the ‘Turks’, 
to exercise sovereignty on the territory of Azerbaijan and Baku in particular, as they 
were a minority in the republic.  As a result, Armenians felt disadvantaged in two 
ways: Nagorno-Karabakh was given to Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, an autonomous 
oblast between Turkey and Armenia was allocated to Baku as well (Libaridian, 1988: 
81).  According to the letter at least, Nakhichevan should be part of Armenia as it is 
stipulated in the law on boundaries of the USSR (Libaridian, 1988: 81).  Drawing on 
the ethnic differences across the region, the dispatch is openly anti-Azerbaijani, 
accusing them of the forced migration of Armenians both from Nakhichevan and 
 29	The	book	is	a	primary	source,	it	is	a	collection	of	all	official	documents	related	to	the	conflict	translated	into	English	and	published	by	the	Zoryan	Institute	
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Nagorno-Karabakh (Libaridian, 1988: 82).  Aivazian then turns to historic sites and 
monuments:  
“But if people can abandon their homes, move away and create a new home, then 
what should become of historical monuments? These are being destroyed 
barbarously by the vandals of the 20th century for the mere reason that they are 
Armenian ... There have already been such practices with the Armenian khatchkars 
[stone-carved crosses]. The ''enthusiastic" Azerbaijani historians have started to 
vandalize cemeteries; they have declared the Armenian khatchkars to be the artwork 
of the Islamic Turks” (Libaridian, 1988: 82).   
For Armenians, Katchkars are significant artefacts or signposts that epitomize 
Armenianess, they are reminders of who they are as a people as they have been a 
symbol that marks Armenian lands for centuries (Tchilingirian, 1999: 438).  
 Armenians accused Azerbaijanis of stealing their history, cultural heritage and 
architectural monuments.  At the same time, one author noted that a book published 
in Moscow about Azerbaijan’s architecture did not include the most important 
monument Gandzasar Vank (a thirteenth-century Armenian monastery in Nagorno-
Karabakh (Tchilingirian, 1999: 438)), which is another symbol of Armenia  (Libaridian, 
1988: 82).  Aivazian described Armenian fury over the classification of ancient 
Armenian monuments, allowing Azerbaijanis to present them as “Turkish” 
(Libaridian, 1988: 82).  In his letter he complained about the unfair treatment of 
Armenian scholars traveling to Azerbaijan to explore the monuments (Libaridian, 
1988: 83).  Further, he made multiple allegations about ethnic belonging, suppressed 
the rights of Armenians in Azerbaijan, and asked Gorbachev what, precisely, the 
Armenians had contributed to the Soviet homeland — hence they were entitled to 
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the jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, which accounted for 80 
per cent of Armenians in 1913 compared to only 1.5 per cent in 1988 (Libaridian, 
1988: 82).  Aivazian called on the Moscow authorities to give fair treatment to the 
Armenian people, taking into account the number of Armenians who died in ‘the 
Great Patriotic War’ [sic] (the WWII was defined in the USSR as a ‘Great Patriotic 
War’, and even the dates were changed to 1941-1945) (Libaridian, 1988: 83).  
Armenians made the biggest sacrifice in the Second World War compared to all the 
other nations in the South Caucasus, and now they asked for the share of the right 
to justice they thought Armenia deserved (Libaridian, 1988: 84).  Aivazian defined 
Nagorno-Karabakh as the part of Eastern Armenia that had to be re-united with the 
rest of the nation (Libaridian, 1988: 84).  The letter emphasized anti-Turkish 
sentiments among Armenians and stipulated that it was a Turkish plan to annihilate 
Armenians, and that Azerbaijan was completing that mission in the USSR (Mutafian, 
1994: 148). 
 
5.1.1. Performing “justice” 
The letter demonstrates the way in which performatives can be used to support the 
idea of national unity, to re-gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh.  As already 
explained in the third chapter of this thesis, performatives are words that have the 
power to transform and change social reality.  They are acts that help to secure 
“differentiation, classification and definition” as the way of identification (see 
Campbell ch. 2).  Indicating that the Armenian people are asking for justice because 
the separation of the “Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhichevan from Armenia 
represents the highest expression of injustice” directly does things with words, as it 
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assures the total support for mobilisation in the name of a goal.  As explained in 
chapter 3, when a speech concentrates on symbolic capital, it has the capacity to 
construct public opinion.  There is a “plot of security” (Wæver ch. 3), the enunciator 
refers to social capital, and there are threat-related conditions (see ch. 3).   
 Aivazian writes that “according to the law of boundaries of the Soviet Union, 
any autonomous region located within a republic must be under the jurisdiction of 
that republic”,30 and he refers to the law which contradicts the “articles in the laws 
of boundaries of the Soviet Union” according to “Leninist principles” and symbolises 
the provinces by comparing them to a Russian example: “Nakhichevan in the 
consciousness of the Armenian people has the same place as Moscow or Novgorod 
have in the consciousness of the Russian people” (Libaridian, 1988: 81).  In other 
words, he implies an ideological interpretation of events, and “symbolizes” Nagorno-
Karabakh (see Fairclough 2001).  Aivazian applies different modifiers to Azerbaijanis 
including, “Turks”, “Tatars” or “Islamic Turks” that are performatives (“Turks”, 
“Tatars” or “Islamic Turks”) in their own right, as they help to alienate the 
Azerbaijani people, make them enemies, and imply their complicity in the Armenian 
Genocide of 1915 (see Masih and Krikorian, 1999: 8).  The term ‘genocide’ became a 
speech act as well.31   Sumgait was branded as a genocide too, and as Dudwick 
observes “every social and political problem took on additional significance as 
containing a threat to the Armenians” (1989: 64).  These performatives are 
“justificatory strategies” (see ch.3) that help to “regulate” the way of thinking about 
an issue (in this case, Azerbaijanis).  It is vital to consider these texts and letters as 
 30	The	enunciator	from	the	Armenian	side,	a	person	who	drafted	the	letter	to	Gorbachev.		31	It	was	the	same	in	Georgian-Abkhaz	discourse	—	see	the	following	chapter	
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policymaking and opinion-forming tools that manipulated adjectives and in a 
Schmittian (see chapter 4) sense made Azerbaijanis non-humans, who had to be 
evicted from Armenia and other territories claimed by Armenia.  To borrow Derrida’s 
clarification, “performative communications become communication of an 
intentional meaning”, which implies the totality of the operation, and indicates that 
no one among the public can escape the totalization (Derrida, 1982: 322).  
Totalization implies that the discourse will involve the majority of the public and 
affect their opinion.  The words of Aivazian (who had full support of the Karabakh 
Committee) were vehicles for the nationalists’ intentions towards other rivals — in 
this case, Azerbaijanis.              
 The majority of Armenians, Azerbaijanis or other Soviet people would have 
hardly ever thought about the justice/injustice dichotomy in Armeno-Azerbaijani 
relations within the USSR.  However, the affiliation of Azerbaijanis to Turks shows 
how discourse objects are the results of recombination and distortion of certain 
concepts that previously were interpreted differently.  Turks, Tatars and injustice are 
keywords with intentional meaning that help to label Azerbaijanis and make them an 
out-group.       
 Aivazian’s appeal was followed by declarations by prominent members of 
Armenian society, including the writer Zori Balayan32, historian Sergei Mikoyan and 
the economist Abel Aganberyan, who had been Gorbachev’s economic advisor.  




been returned to Armenia” and that the problem should be settled “in the context 
of perestroika and democracy” (Mutafian, 1994: 148, Geukjian, 2012: 131). 
Subsequently, these announcements were followed by various individual and 
collective letters sent to Moscow that were full of accusations and demands to return 
Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR.  The Armenian Democratic Liberal 
Organization in the USA appealed to Gorbachev during his visit to the US.  The letter 
followed the general line of Armenian demands, and stated that reunification with 
Armenia would “rectify historic errors which were committed during the formation 
of the Soviet Union” (Libaridian, 1988: 107).  The US-based organization asked for 
reassurance of Armenia’s territorial integrity, and the prevention of the expansion of 
“the inhuman imperialism of the Pan-Turanist movement” and help for Armenia’s 
economic growth, “to allow any Armenian to return to ancestral homeland;  to create 
opportunities for the Diaspora Armenians to contribute to Armenia and to invest in 
its future” (Libaridian, 1988: 109).  Another of the dispatches accused Azerbaijan’s 
authorities of “a genocide” against Armenian nationals from 1920 to 1987 (Mutafian, 
1994: 148).  By the end of 1987 the situation had deteriorated, as Azerbaijanis were 
accused of attempts to drive out the Armenian population from the villages 
bordering the NKAO (Mutafian, 1994: 148).  Once the news had spread to Yerevan, 
tensions increased, bringing public figures Silva Kaputikian, Maro Markarian and 
Victor Hambarstumian into the spotlight of the national discourse (Mutafian, 1994: 
149).   
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5.1.2. “Turkey” as a Speech Act 
There was a further letter allegedly drafted by Suren Aivazian and signed by 75,000 
Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.  It was in the form of a memorandum addressed 
to Mikhail Gorbachev and it expressed nationalistic sentiments as well as raising 
security issues regarding residents of the oblast (Libaridian, 1988: 86).33  The authors 
openly assigned a great role to the territory by situating it in the broader Russo-
Turkish discourse.  By emphasizing the word “Turkish” the text figured as another 
performative that promoted enmity, i.e. Armenians attempted to make the Karabakh 
problem an issue of Soviet foreign policy, by associating it with Turkey.  Nagorno-
Karabakh thus became an existential problem for Armenia, a matter of memory, 
principle and dignity.  It rallied a nation around the flag with the demand for “historic 
justice”, which was also a powerful performative used by Armenians:   
“Over many centuries its geographic position has made Armenia a garrison for Russia 
and the most important strategic centre.  For centuries Armenia has also shed its 
blood particularly during Russo-Turkish wars.  It was gradually losing the space 
necessary for its existence, its national core.  By occupying Armenian territories, and 
faithful to its barbarian policy of fait accompli, Turkey in 1915-16 organized the 
Genocide of the Armenians, which reached monstrous proportions.  When creating 
the Soviet State V. I. Lenin took into consideration the political situation in which 
Armenians found themselves” (Libaridian, 1988: 86).   
The letter to Gorbachev illustrates how the Armenian intellectuals perceived the 
conflict, and called on the Kremlin to react.  Turkey, a NATO member, was not among 
the friendly nations of the USSR.  Additionally, Muslims historically had a reputation 
 33	Libaridian	thinks	that	the	letter	was	written	by	Aivazian,	but	sent	by	a	group	of	Armenians	from	Nagorno-Karabakh.			
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as the conquerors of Christian Armenians and Georgians.  A brief history of both 
nations could be described as a timeline of battles between the Persian and Ottoman 
empires, with an emphasis on religion.  The wording of the appeal is reminiscent of 
the Soviet-era history books that presented Armenia and Georgia as the last Christian 
garrisons on the Eastern edge of Europe.  For both Armenia and Georgia, the Russian 
Empire, and later on the Soviet Union, were guarantors of their existence.  Despite 
the widespread atheism, there always existed the sense of shared religion with 
Russia in the form of Christianity — because Armenians are Gregorian, and Georgians 
are Orthodox, hence Christianity was a unifying doctrine.  To a certain extent, the 
Soviets re-branded history and introduced the ‘evil’ notion of Islam — the Persian 
and Ottoman Empire — so that the Soviet Union was depicted “as a lesser of two 
evils” (see Masih and Krikorian, 1999: xxix, Malkasian, 1996: 57). The school 
curriculum in history focused on the negative aspects of relations with Ottomans or 
Persians and emphasized religious difference, as it included stories of martyrs who 
were punished by Muslims for their belief in Christ (see Lortkipanidze and Asatiani, 
1993).  The books were always emphasizing the oppressive policies of Persian Shahs 
who forced Georgians in particular, to apostatize and become Muslim, or fought wars 
over the possession of Armenia (Forsyth, 2013: 188 and 195).               
 Returning to the letter, one should mention the significance of Lenin in the 
debate.  It is worth noting that Lenin’s approaches were widely mentioned during 
the Politburo discussion of the issue that is described later in this chapter.  Armenians 
attempted to combine Lenin’s proletarian vision with conservative nationalism and 
asked the Gorbachev administration to help their cause in order to legitimise their 
appeal.  Leninism in this context is became a tool that could be used to ‘prove’ to the 
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Communist Party the best intentions of the letter’s authors.  Lenin was given the role 
of arbiter of the Armenian requests (see chapter 4).  There was the principle or 
implied rule, that every idea expressed or communicated to a Soviet citizen had to 
start with admiration for Lenin and his product — the Great October Revolution.  As 
Ronald Suny and Michael Kennedy note, it was hard to imagine an apolitical 
intellectual responsibility under Communism, and submission to that political stance 
was an act of refusal of intellectual responsibility (1999: 10).  Apparently, nationalist 
groups still adhered to the Communist rulebook when drafting the appeal.  The letter 
addresses historic details about the fate of Armenian territories that ended up within 
Azerbaijan’s borders in the 1920s.  The authors express concern about the ever-
increasing “Turkish” population in Nagorno-Karabakh.  In 1979 the USSR census 
showed a 23 per cent growth among the Azerbaijani population of Karabakh, 
compared to the figures of 1926, —although there were 123,000 Armenians and 
37,264 Azerbaijanis and notably 350,000 Armenians living in other parts of 
Azerbaijan while only 161,000 Azerbaijanis lived in Armenia (Baguirov, 2008: 14, 
Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 285). Turks served as symbols of an enemy that sought 
to annihilate the entire ethnos of the Armenians.  Hence, by referring to Azerbaijanis 
as Turks, the problem becomes an existential threat.  It is also an example of a 
“constituting statistic” (see Bigo chapter 3) that assigns a category to the information 
and creates a certain regime of truth:    
“By stepping over the Leninist principles of nationalities policy, by separating historic 
territories from Soviet Armenia and incorporating them in Soviet Azerbaijan, it is as 
if someone in the past was working in favour of the interests of the Soviet Union’s 
enemy Turkey, which is the guardian of imperialism, backwardness and aggression 
in the south of our country” (Libaridian, 1988: 87).   
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Armenian authors protest against the name of Karabakh, which does not 
demonstrate its ethnical affiliation to Armenia, whilst all other autonomies in the 
USSR were named after the ethnic groups (e.g. Abkhazia, Tatarstan) (Libaridian, 
1988: 87).  The Armenian memo ends with an appeal to Gorbachev to respect historic 
justice and reunite the Armenian lands of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan with 
the homeland (Libaridian, 1988: 88). 
 The active participation of the intelligentsia in the discourse of the period, 
and the internationalization of the issue, radicalized the public.  Azerbaijani people 
who were next-door neighbours for decades ended up being designated Turks.  As 
mentioned, an elaborate institutional memory gave space to nationalist groups.  The 
words ‘Azerbaijan’ and ‘Azeri’ became performatives, words associated with Turks 
and consequently linked to the genocide of 1915, and thus still capable of genocide 
and harming Armenian nationals.  This was a reference to the memories, analogies 
and emotions of the public pointing to the critical vulnerability of identity and 
nationality.  The Azerbaijanis were enemies who threatened a vulnerable Armenian 
nation; this enmity implied the religious difference and historic mission to serve as a 
bastion of Christianity.  Turkey was perceived in the context of medieval wars over 
the lands of Armenia and influence in the South Caucasus (see Coulie, 2013: 41, Cox 
and Eibner, 1993: 14).34  Additionally, there was a division between the Armenian 
intellectuals regarding the role of Islamism in the conflict.  Balayan claimed that pan-
Turkism was a threat for Russia as well as Armenia; Khachik Stamboltsyan35 denied 
 34	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	discourse	about	the	Muslim	threat	to	Transcaucasia	became	relevant	in	this	period.		The	public	discussed	the	history	of	the	16-17th	centuries	and	considered	the	possibility	of	Islamisation,	as	Islam	was	perceived	negatively	in	Georgian	and	Armenian	historiography,	and	many	intellectuals	highlighted	the	issue	during	1980s	(See	Ivane	Javakhishvili,	Kartveli	Eris	Istoria)		35	A	member	of	the	Karabakh-Committee,	an	actor	and	activist	
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this, saying that pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were not relevant (Khronika, 1989).  
It is worth noting that the isolated communities of the USSR had a very one-
dimensional picture of the world order.  Every non-Communist country was a 
“capitalist threat” and the USSR lived in hostile encirclement (see Kennan, 1946).  
Capitalism and imperialism were major threats to the proletarian Soviet state.  The 
letter uses that same language regarding Turkey, a NATO member, and thus is clearly 
of the hostile camp.  Imperialism and capitalism were synonyms in the vocabulary of 
a Soviet apparatchik.  Turkey was part of that (other) world and Armenian authors 
sought to emphasize that otherness.  This appeal rests on symbols, and on historic 
monuments and the past.  The utterance of “Turkey” was used as a speech act that 
mobilized public opinion as it established a threat.  Overall, Armenians demanded 
“historic justice” as they thought that the main symbols of Armenian nationhood lay 
in the mountains of Karabakh. The incorporation of such a powerful symbolic capital 
in the discourse strengthened the influence and capacity of performative words 
included in the letters discussed above or uttered in the streets of Yerevan.    
5.2. Outbreak  
In October 1987 Armenians refused to accept the Azeri appointed Sovkhoz director 
in the village of Chardakhly (Armenian) in North-western Azerbaijan, causing clashes 
between local party members and fury in Yerevan (Cornell, 1999: 13).  The 
radicalisation reached its peak with mutual accusations and the dismissal of people 
based on their ethnic origin (Mutafian, 1994: 148).  Azerbaijani officials were tried 
forcefully to involve the Armenian population of Azerbaijan in joint events.  The head 
of the Shamkhor region, M. Asadov, was accused of forcing Armenian residents to 
participate in the commemoration of the Soviet Armenian general Baghramian.  
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Armenians refused to participate, and they gained more support from Yerevan, while 
the Karabakh Committee, composed of fifteen people, subsequently emerged from 
the protests (Mutafian, 1994: 148-149).  
 On 20 February 1988, the authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast summed up the results of the plebiscite and urged the Congress of Public 
Deputies of the USSR to allow the oblast to join the jurisdiction on Armenian Soviet 
Socialist Republic.  A copy of the letter was sent to the governments in Yerevan and 
Baku.  The majority of the population petitioned to join Armenia.  The letter was a 
request for a change of jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijan SSR 
to the Armenian SSR, and the council indicated that they had listened to the opinions 
of the people’s deputies in the NKAO, taking into consideration the “wishes of the 
workers of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh to request the 
supreme soviets of Azerbaijani and Armenian SSR for the transfer of the region” 
(Libaridian, 1988: 90).  The letter urged the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan “to 
intercede” with the USSR government (Libaridian, 1988: 90).  Joseph Masih and 
Robert Krikorian consider it “naïve” to think that the demands of Armenians were in 
line with Gorbachev’s new thinking (1999: 5).              
 David Laitin and Ronald Suny question the widely accepted reasons for the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (1999: 145).  They suggest that ethnic hatreds, which by 
some scholars are considered to be the cornerstone of the dispute, are supported by 
little historic evidence and that the antagonism between the Christians and Muslims 
of the region played only an insignificant role in the contemporary problem (1999: 
146).  The authors define three major causes of the Karabakh crisis.  The number one 
point is the pattern of “nation-making” that took place in the former Soviet Union, 
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and that Armenia and Azerbaijan found themselves in a world “in which the nation-
states in order to be legitimate, are required to present a cultural community of 
people who believe that their shared characteristics entitle them to sovereignty in 
their historic ‘homeland’” (Suny and Laitin, 1999: 146).  Accordingly, they based the 
discourse in the narrative of a nation’s antiquity and continuous inhabitancy of the 
“historic” homeland — the discourse that place political and cultural boundaries in 
equilibrium (1999: 146).  The majority of political actors at the time wished to depict 
the nations as older, thus logically more eligible for independence and sovereignty.  
The Caucasus the diverse region, with a long history of intermingling polities and 
cultures, although the nationalists stubbornly drew harder and clearer boundaries 
between their own people and their neighbours (Suny and Laitin, 1999: 146).            
 Another major pattern was the nationalities policy in the Soviet Union (Suny 
and Laitin, 1999: 148).  The Soviet nation-making practices created the problem of 
titular nations (those whose names were assigned to the republics) and “minorities” 
subordinated to the dominant nations (Suny and Laitin, 1999: 148).  The most striking 
was the paradox of the approach: the USSR denied national self-determination, yet 
at the same time “national loyalty and national consciousness were engendered by 
emphasis in educational and cultural programs” (Suny and Laitin, 1999: 149).  Rogers 
Brubaker emphasizes this point when he suggests there was an invented nationhood 
on the sub-state level but no institutionalization at the state level (see Chapter 3).  It 
was already too late when Gorbachev and the Soviet intelligentsia started to talk 
about this flaw in the system.  In part, the reason was the attitude of the system 
toward intellectuals, as it sought to contain them, make them cooperate with the 
regime and thus force them to abandon “intellectual responsibility” (Suny and 
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Kennedy, 1999: 13).  Shortly after the clashes in Baku, the issue was raised in the 
Writer’s Union of the USSR by admitting the existence of “acute problems” that were 
hidden behind the “shiny façade of official pronouncements” (Baruzdin, 1988: 5).  
Although the head of the Writer’s Union of the USSR talks about the possible 
involvement of Western hostile forces in the escalation of the nationalities issues, he 
warns that a society cannot let the process “take its own course” that could be 
incompatible with “our ideology and morality” (Baruzdin, 1988: 5).  Yet the assertions 
sounded more like a platitude, as they were unable to offer new approaches for 
deliberation.       
 The third reason outlined is the “rapid collapse of the Soviet State”, the weak 
state authority, and the fragility of nations (Suny and Laitin, 1999: 149).  Suny and 
Laitin suggest that there was a misconception among nationalists or democrats who 
thought that the old state was a major impediment to the reconstruction of social 
order, and their revolutionary approach further accelerated the dissolution of the 
state authority (1999: 149).  In the South Caucasus, the nationalists launched an anti-
governmental discourse and gained public confidence, to the extent that the public 
began to express distrust in the Soviet authorities.  Nationalism flavoured with 
freedom and democracy became an attractive commodity.  However, as 
developments revealed, nationalists were not ready to substitute the Soviet 
apparatchiks, in part because they lacked skills and experience in publicity and 
populism.     
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5.3. Sumgait 
The tragedy of Sumgait was the most vivid example of mismanagement and a lack of 
governance in the modern history of the South Caucasus.  The Politburo and 
Gorbachev were drafting letters and statements whilst the situation deteriorated 
and tensions rose to their highest.  The Politburo members apparently did not assess 
the risks that riots could cause in Sumgait, a small industrial town close to Baku.  The 
minutes show how they approached the harrowing information they had from Baku.  
The city of two hundred thousand had a big Armenian community.  Gorbachev’s main 
goal was to stop the rebellion at any price and allow the government to think about 
new approaches.  The discourse of the discussion demonstrates the level of 
unpreparedness to face this type of crisis [in the Soviet government], as well as the 
inability to handle the situation coherently.   
 According to the Soviet Interior Minister, the youth was rioting and the militia 
tried to stop them (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  However, the youth groups had formed 
smaller groups and were now rioting in the town.  One has to observe that there is a 
general trend when ethnic entrepreneurs recruit young men already inclined toward 
violence (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 426).  Such details of the case illustrate the 
constructivist character of the conflict.  Additionally, there was a careful 
categorization of victims: they went for Armenians.  The Interior Minister had 
information about 14 dead and 110 wounded, though Gorbachev notes that the 
situation might have got worse if they had not reacted, surmising that the actions of 
the militia had prevented the massacre (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  However, Malkasian 
provides a different take and argues that in fact nobody will ever know what took 
place over the course of those three days in Sumgait (1996: 52).  It was said that 26 
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Armenians died, yet Malkasian insists that it was not about the death toll, rather 
about the massacre which was “more than massacre” (1996: 52).  One can see how 
the discourse was gradually transforming Sumgait into a symbol of victimhood, 
making it part of the symbolic capital on par with the Genocide of 1915.   
 The events in Sumgait again demonstrated the lack of governance and trust 
in the system.  The crowd followed particular actors and the victims responded with 
violence because the Soviet justice system was flawed.  The Politburo in Moscow 
ordered an investigation of the crimes committed in Sumgait.  The minutes show that 
high profile officials discussed the importance of a “proper investigation”, as even 
they knew that justice in the realm of the Soviets was far from perfect.  Providing 
that the Politburo members did emphasize the significance of real investigation, it is 
possible to understand how justice was categorized in the USSR, or, to be more 
precise, one can see that at any event the Politburo members were aware that the 
notion of justice did not have a value equal to its representation.  The Soviet 
government had failed to deal with the crisis, but the local actors and nomenclature 
let down their own people too.  The anti-Armenian discourse securitised Armenians 
as threats to Azerbaijan that had to be neutralised.  At the same time, the Politburo 
did not take any emergency measure to prevent the Sumgait massacres.  Gorbachev 
agreed to involve the military, but without arming them (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  
According to his belief, the armed forces would have caused far more severe 
consequences (Gorbachev, 1995: 335).  Overnight, Armenians in Sumgait became 
viewed as a threat to Azerbaijan and massacres started on 27 February 1988.    
 The first outbreak of violence was in Nagorno-Karabakh, when the Azerbaijani 
population attempted to block the roads for Armenians traveling to Stepanakert.  On 
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20 February, the local council was convening to discuss the future of the NKAO and 
join the jurisdiction of the Armenian Soviet Republic.  Azerbaijani volunteers, forces 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Militia had blocked the roads between the rural 
areas and Stepanakert.  They tried to prevent ethnic Armenians from travelling to 
Stepanakert.  On 22 February, residents of the Azerbaijani village Agdam marched 
toward the nearest Nagorno-Karabakh village, Askeran.  They smashed militia points, 
but official forces managed to dissolve the mass into smaller groups.  As a result of 
violent clashes, two Azerbaijani nationals from Agdam were killed and more than 50 
residents of Nagorno-Karabakh were injured, although, according to most sources, 
at least one of them died at the hands of Azerbaijani militia (Vasilevsky, 1988, 
Barringer and Keller, 1988)36.    
 Alexander Katusev, an investigator from Moscow, broke the news that 
clashes had taken place between the residents of two villages and that two people 
from Agdam had died (Barringer and Keller, 1988).  There were no further 
clarifications about the circumstances of the death of any of them (Vasilevsky, 1988, 
Barringer and Keller, 1988).  Malkasian argues that Henrik Poghosyan urged Katusev 
not to disclose the nationalities of the two, but the advice was disregarded 
(Malkasian, 1996: 52).  Alexander Vasilevsky includes the comments of a brother of 
one of the victims who claimed that the Azerbaijani militia (equivalent to the police) 
had murdered his brother (1988).  The acting prosecutor appointed from Moscow 
did admit the mistake of lack of information, but only after the news caused outrage 
in Baku and another tragedy in Sumgait.  Igor Nolyain directly accused the Soviet 
 36	This	is	an	article	from	series	dedicated	to	Nagorno-Karabakh	called	“Moscow’s	Karabakh	Frontline”,	published	by	the	Leningrad-based	(currently	Saint-Petersburg)	magazine	Avrora	from	1988	to	1991,	and	available	online	at:	http://nashasreda.ru/karabaxskij-front-moskvy/	[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018]	
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authorities of mishandling the communication and argues that it was impossible that 
the words of an investigator from Moscow, whether true or false, could not have 
caused such large scale violence (1994: 542).  In analysing the riots and violence in 
Sumgait he mostly focuses on the inability of the Soviet authorities to mobilise troops 
and stop pogroms that actually lasted four days (Nolyain, 1994: 543).  Besides this, 
he argues that Gorbachev adopted the definition of a “protracted inter-ethnic 
conflict” to cover up the inadequate measures (Nolyain, 1994: 544, New York Times, 
1990).  By following the timeline of the February events, Nolyain accuses the Soviet 
propaganda of stirring up the confrontation while he provides extracts from 
alternative statements and newspapers (1994: 555-556).  He criticizes the Soviet 
leadership for failing to differentiate between pluralism and national chauvinism that 
actually was the most important aspect in the discourse not only about Sumgait but 
other outbreaks in the Caucasus (Nolyain, 1994: 551).                
 Armenians worried about truth and justice in Sumgait, and Azerbaijanis 
wished to know the truth about the events in Armenia before Sumgait (Vasilevsky, 
1988).  Vasilevsky conducted some interviews shortly after the tragedy, with victims 
from both Armenian and Azeri sides.  He travelled to the region weeks after the 
clashes.  The victims tell stories of cruelty and ask why this happened, and how it was 
possible that certain groups set out to murder ethnic Armenians in Sumgait.  They 
recount how their Azeri neighbours risked their own lives to save them (Vasilevsky, 
1988).  But before the tragedy in Sumgait unfolded, and during the first 
demonstration in Stepanakert on 14 February 1988, the executive committee of the 
Azeri Communist Party summoned a meeting where comrade Asadov (a Party 
functioneer) stated that “one hundred thousand Azerbaijanis are ready to invade 
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Karabakh and conduct massacres” (Vasilevsky, 1988).  In other words, there were 
attempts at intimidation as well as the triggering of ethnic unrest.  Sumgait is an 
example of both apathy and empathy, when the Armenian community in an 
Azerbaijani town was robbed and harassed.  
 Alexander Vasilevsky describes the background of the Sumgait tragedy: the 
complete inaction of the government to take charge of the crisis and calm down the 
nationalist sentiments.  Soviet citizens had been always told that every guilty person 
would bear responsibility for any wrongdoing, but Vasilevsky argues that the 
“filtering” of information causes Chernobyls and Sumgaits, and the actual situation 
when it finally gets out to the public only exacerbates the situation  (1988).  The 
continued control of the information by means of secrecy and concealment had fatal 
results.  It seemed that the government of the USSR suffered from an ingrained fear 
of a mistake or misjudgement.  Within half an hour, a group of 40-50 people had 
transformed into a crowd of five thousand, shouting “Death to Armenians” 
(Vasilevsky, 1988, Masih and Krikorian, 1999: 7). 
 The same article contains examples told by the survivors of the massacre who 
fled to Yerevan.  Rioters were asking for identity documents to ensure that no 
Armenian was overlooked, yet at the same time Azerbaijani neighbours and friends 
saved the lives of many Armenians during the attack (Vasilevsky, 1988).  An Armenian 
who spoke fluent Azerbaijani saved himself and was lucky to escape (Vasilevsky, 
1988).  Narratives of other survivors are similar.  The rioters invaded their homes, 
many Azeri neighbours rushed to save them.  All of them did what they could to save 
lives as the invaders shouted, “they had to free Azerbaijan from Armenians” or “they 
came to drink the blood of Armenians” (Vasilevsky, 1988).  One of the survivors, 
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Vitalik, a 15-year-old says, that there would had been more casualties if hundreds of 
Azerbaijanis had not risked their lives to help Armenians to escape the massacre 
(Vasilevsky, 1988).   
 Riots were organized along ethnic lines and Armenians were othered — 
labelled as enemies, thus deserving to be murdered.  Armenians became the 
‘exception’ (see Schmitt), and that cleared the way to killings.  Crowds were 
mobilized to follow the order to annihilate their neighbours.  Vasilevky denounces 
the ethnic interpretation, stressing that it was a political decision that assigned an 
ethnic definition to a political and legal problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
(1988).  Looking into previous discourses, one has to acknowledge the significance of 
speech acts that signified ethnicity.  Vasilevsky was not alone in his assumptions.  An 
Armenian dissident, Paruir A. Airikyan, had told the New York Times that recent riots 
over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh “had been wrongly portrayed as an ethnic 
conflict to avoid discrediting Mr. Gorbachev's program of political openness” (Uhlig, 
1988).  Airikyan insists that the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh jurisdiction was a 
political problem, “a question of democracy and human rights” (Uhlig, 1988).  In his 
view, the Nagorno-Karabakh dilemma exposed the possibilities of democratic change 
within the Soviet Constitution, but the government’s response, to reject the 
transition from one republic to another, had shown that the reform was not 
prioritizing democracy, but “strengthening totalitarianism” (Uhlig, 1988).    Ethnicity 
was a good pretext for all parties, as the Moscow administration covered up 
governance failures, whereas for political groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan it was a 
political opportunity in the time of crisis to acquire power and authority.  As Brubaker 
and Laitin argue this could be defined as “ethnicization of political violence” which is 
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triggered by a declining state (Weberian monopoly on violence) and a lack of 
organisation (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 424).  Making further observations, they 
consider that “conflicts driven by struggles for power between challengers and 
incumbents are newly ethnicized, newly framed in ethnic terms” (1998: 425).   
Pointing to the confusion that is caused by the “ethnicization” of the conflict, it is 
instrumental to seek and identify and “analyse and explain the heterogeneous 
processes and mechanisms” that generate the branding of violence as “ethnic” 
(Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 447).  Elaborating on Brubaker’s and Laitin’s point, one 
could suggest that discourse framed the violence in an ethnic context.  The emphasis 
in speeches and the interpretation of problems was ethnic, but this paradigm was 
constructed, and served specific political purposes.  Sumgait was a turning point in 
the confrontation that made the normalisation process almost impossible, as 
Cheterian argues, because it opened the doors of history into the unknown that 
broke the old rules of the political game without defining new ones (2008: 98). 
    
5.4. Between the past and the present 
On 27 February 1988 the Pravda newspaper had published Gorbachev’s address to 
the Armenian and Azerbaijani people, which was titled “Social Internationalism — Is 
the source of Our Power” (TASS, 1988).  Gorbachev acknowledged the existence of 
“unresolved problems” in the USSR, though he argued that mistrust and the 
incitement of divisions was going to hinder the process further (TASS, 1988).  It was 
announced that the Party was intending to dedicate an entire plenum of the Central 
Committee to the issue of national relations within the USSR, but, in the meantime, 
Gorbachev urged the Armenians and Azerbaijanis to “strengthen the traditions of 
201 
friendship between the nations that were accumulated for years of the Soviet rule” 
and “demonstrate civil maturity” (TASS, 1988).  Yet the letter did not help, as the 
situation deteriorated whilst the Soviet government had been busy considering how 
to summon the plenum.   
 An examination of the minutes of the special session dedicated to the crisis 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates the approaches used by the Soviet 
government to resolve the issue.  The minutes show Secretary Gorbachev’s priorities, 
and his perception of the conflict.  Drawing on the conversations between the 
members of the Politburo (the executive committee of the Communist Party) one 
can observe how the Kremlin lost control over the situation (Gorbachev-Foundation, 
1995: 21-30).37  It is significant that Mikhail Gorbachev and Andrei Gromyko (former 
minister of foreign affairs of the USSR) evaluated the problem from Lenin’s 
perspective.  Both of them referred to Lenin’s experience with national minorities as 
Lenin was a source of legitimacy of the decision for the Soviet leadership.  Gorbachev 
mentioned during the session that he thought about Lenin’s approach to hard-core 
problems and decided to write a letter to the hostile parties, i.e. Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, or broker and participate in a bilateral meeting of Armenian and Azeri 
representatives personally (Lenin used to employ this tactic: either write a letter or 




 Gorbachev shared the conversation he had had earlier with Armenian 
nationalist activists Zori Balayan and Silva Kaputikian (see Rost, 1990: 21-22, 
Geukjian, 2012: 145). 38   Their conversation depicts the narrative that was built 
around the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Apparently, Kaputikian and Balayan 
insisted that the Kremlin transfer jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, 
telling Gorbachev that the decision to deny the plea would be interpreted as a hostile 
measure in Armenia (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  Gorbachev’s main demand was to stop 
the escalation of the conflict, and he argued that the decision was in the best 
common interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR.  Gorbachev asked Armenian 
nationalists to think about the tense situation in Azerbaijan, but they replied that it 
was not Azerbaijan that should be worried, but Armenia, because the Kremlin was 
on the “Azeri side" (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  As the minutes show, Kaputikian and 
Balayan seemed rather indifferent about tensions in Baku and the entire political 
crisis.     
 Zori Balayan recalls his and Kaputikyan’s conversation with Gorbachev and 
Yakovlev in an interview with Yuri Rost, when Gorbachev promised them that he 
would solve the problem, saying “you have my word”, and he asked to dissolve the 
700,000 crowd in the Theatre Square in Yerevan (in Rost, 1990: 21).  Balayan quotes 
Gorbachev, who told them to “put out the fire without worrying about the windows”, 
which they [Kaputikian and Balayan] understood as meaning they could say anything 
to the people, “but remember that we are Communists and are not going to beat 
about the bush” (in Rost, 1990: 21).  When Balayan was addressing the crowd in 
 38	Silva	Kaputikian	was	a	Soviet	Armenian	poet	and	writer,	and	a	very	active	member	of	the	nationalist	movement	in	Armenia.			
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Yerevan, the Sumgait tragedy was unfolding near Baku, but Armenians did not know 
about it yet.  The demonstration was eventually dissolved, though Muradian 
(addressing crowds in Russian) urged the people to return to the Square on 26 March 
(Rost, 1990: 22).  In another interview for the Radio Liberty Balayan observes that 
Gorbachev was a “convinced democrat” who did not want to listen to any of their 
[Balayan and Kaputikyan] stories about “historic rights, self-determination, or the will 
of the people”, because as a politician he was interested in resolving the dispute in a 
way that might satisfy Armenians without offending Azerbaijanis (Balayan, 1990: 13).  
However, and as he notes, they [Balayan and Kaputikyan] could not offer any 
proposal that would meet Gorbachev’s criteria, because he wished “Armenia’s 
demands met for the sake of justice” (Balayan, 1990).  One notices the importance 
of “justice” in the discourse again.  He insists on “justice”, thus creating a domain of 
truth, and directing the way of thinking about the issue.  Demanding “justice” allows 
Gorbachev to seek an “exception” from the previous order, i.e. the Soviet order 
before Perestroika (in Schmittian terms).  Speaking of the conversation with 
Gorbachev, Balayan observes a “bizarre phrase” uttered by the Soviet leader: “but 
have you thought about the hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Azerbaijan?” (in 
1990: 13).  Balayan speculates that either Gorbachev foresaw the events in Sumgait 
and Baku, or somebody threatened him with such actions, or there was an attempt 
of intimidation, or else the most staggering assumption could be that Gorbachev was 
“calling for reprisals” (Balayan, 1990: 13).  Interestingly, Balayan explains why both 
Kaputikyan and himself returned to Yerevan, and described the meeting “in rosy 
tones” — they “wanted so much to give the people hope” (Balayan, 1990: 13).      
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 In the meantime, in Azerbaijan public opinion deemed that Armenia had the 
most support from Moscow as well as the international community (Swietochowski, 
1995: 197).  Azerbaijan felt dispossessed, as Gorbachev showed sympathy toward 
the Armenian position, despite ostensibly supporting the status quo, and other 
republics sided with Armenia as well as Andrei Sakharov, a Nobel Prize-winning 
Russian scholar and a dissident, “the man symbolising the best of Russia” 
(Swietochowski, 1995: 197).  Indeed, Armenians had more support and were better 
prepared in terms of shaping international opinion than Azerbaijan.  Yuri Rost, a 
journalist and a photographer, dedicated a monograph to the conflict, offering his 
insights and observations across the two republics. When pressure in Armenia was 
particularly high, the Azerbaijanis were putting their slogans together: “not an inch”, 
“don’t give an inch” and “we won’t give up a single square centimetre” (Rost, 1990: 
17).   
 According to Gorbachev, he was clear about the immediate need to stop the 
escalation and that, in time to come, they (Armenian nationalists) would appreciate 
his moves to stop them, as the situation could become unmanageable (Gorbachev-
Foundation, 1995: 22-27, Sumgait.Info, 1988).  The content of the dialogue shows 
the degree of concern among the Politburo and the Soviet leadership.  Kaputikian 
and Balayan asked Gorbachev to form a special commission to deal with the issue.  
They accused Gorbachev of openly supporting Azerbaijan’s interests as he signed the 
letter that denied Armenians jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Gorbachev did not 
see the point in any separate commission when the Politburo and the Secretary 
General himself was involved in problem solving (in the USSR special commissions 
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were common practice and usually they were established to tackle particular 
problems).    
 It was Balayan who came up with a key question asking Gorbachev after the 
discussion: “what are we going to tell the people?” (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  In other 
words, they needed an answer for people in the streets of Yerevan.  They had 
mobilised the entire country to support the cause, which they were ultimately unable 
to deliver and thus unable to secure their authority.  To be more specific, they were 
worried that “the people” might demand answers.  Balayan and Kaputikian went to 
Moscow to meet Gorbachev and needed political dividends to claim legitimacy back 
in Yerevan.  Gorbachev answered that the people in Armenia had to acknowledge 
that the Soviet government did not discriminate against them and that there were 
no misunderstandings between them; further, that the Central Committee would 
continue to work on pressing Karabakh issues (see Balayan, 1990, Sumgait.Info, 
1988). Another activist, Igor Muradian, one of the founding members of the Karabakh 
Committee, told the New York Times in a phone conversation that “we just never 
expected it to get this big”; according to the reporters, Muradian seemed to be 
overwhelmed by the scale of civil disobedience and mass murders that the initiative 
on Nagorno-Karabakh had caused (Barringer and Keller, 1988).  In the interview he 
admits that new Soviet policies gave them a chance to exercise political activity that 
was previously “unthinkable” (Barringer and Keller, 1988).  Notably, Muradian did 
not speak fluent Armenian, as he was born and raised in Baku and moved to Armenia 
when he was 26 (Balayan quoted in Rost, 1990: 11).  He was a doctor of economics, 
who launched the campaign for Karabakh and organised meetings with Armenians in 
Moscow as well as wrote letters to the government on behalf of the Armenian nation 
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(Rost, 1990: 11).    His point illustrates the fact that nationalists and intellectuals who 
were supposed to champion the freedom of expression and civil liberties they 
admired so much in the West, mismanaged this “unthinkable” political activity.  
“Unthinkable” is an utterance that demonstrates how the enunciator attempts to 
control the discourse, and transmute the parts that are unfavourable for his position 
(see ch.3).  Apart from Balayan and Kaputikian, there were two other delegations 
visiting Moscow, that presented Armenian demands, and the trip was seen as a huge 
success for Armenia.  Talking to the New York Times, Mofses Gargisyan, editor of a 
dissident magazine in Yerevan, admitted that back in Armenia they [the delegates] 
“were celebrating their victory, as they really thought they had won'' (Barringer and 
Keller, 1988).         
 Gorbachev admitted, in his conversation with the Politburo, that both 
Armenian representatives were aspiring to improve their reputation by meeting him.  
It is his opinion that they wished to look influential because of their audience with 
Mikhail Gorbachev (see Rost, 1990, Sumgait.Info, 1988).  Kaputikian and Balayan 
were Communists too, and Gorbachev viewed them as very prominent members of 
the Armenian intelligentsia.  The Soviet leader also mentioned the recording of the 
multi-thousand gathering in Yerevan, which assembled Armenians to express their 
protest.  
 According to Gorbachev, Armenians were angry that the Kremlin called them 
“extremists” and abettors (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  Yet Gorbachev clarified that the 
Central Committee implied that some people were influenced by criminals both in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  The Soviet government did 
differentiate between the people and the abettors.  This pattern is significant and 
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demonstrates the ad-hoc reaction to the crisis.  The protests in Yerevan were massive 
and the Politburo was concerned about tens of thousands of people walking out of 
their jobs and wandering the streets.  As other members reported, the Armenians 
were getting calmer and returned to their jobs.  However, there were reports of 
Armenians leaving Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis fleeing Armenia.  The tensions 
increased fear among the population of both republics.  In the meantime Azerbaijanis 
accused the Kremlin of ignoring 200,000 Azerbaijanis deported from Armenia and 
being concerned with the interruption in the supply of goods instead (Swietochowski, 
1995: 198).      
 This crisis is an example of how the political issue of status transformed 
communities into enemies in a matter of days.  The people lived in a Soviet republic 
and knew little about politics, as they were ruled from Moscow.  This is partially the 
reason that Armenian nationalists sought Gorbachev’s audience.  It was usual for the 
local authorities not to make important decisions without consulting the Kremlin as 
the Central Committee had the reputation of an almighty club of leaders of the 
Communist Party.  It was a dominant polity that possessed the right to make 
decisions when the subordinate unit did not have that right (Lake, 1996: 7).  The 
hierarchy was very inflexible for the titular units, but it had huge flaws in the 
structure that made it impossible to tackle the crisis created by the nationalistic 
discourse and economic stagnation.  Thus, the USSR was unable to manage the 
dispute between two union republics.  Constitutionally, there was the possibility of 
changing the borders of the republics with consent from Moscow; however, the 
Kremlin was not ready to amend the borders because the precedent was too risky 
and dangerous.  The minutes show that the Soviet government was aware that ethnic 
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discourse and its securitization was a threat for the USSR.  At the same time, it seems 
they knew that radicalisation was being conducted by particular individuals but they 
were incapable of dissuading them from the actions and statements they made.   
 Gorbachev expressed his astonishment about this lack of interaction and 
communication.  It could be assumed that on the one hand Gorbachev was 
committed to sharing power and allocating more responsibility to local intelligentsia 
and governments, although the Soviet people and intelligentsia were not ready to 
digest the freedom of expression and thought.  Subsequently, Glasnost had a limited 
effect in terms of improving democratic credentials across the USSR.  It resulted in a 
decline of central power, and the race for power in the republics increased 
dramatically (Sharlet, 1992: 11).        
 Gorbachev seemed to have been worried about anti-Soviet sentiments.  The 
minutes do not show whether the leadership acknowledged the critical situation the 
USSR was going through.  Glasnost and Perestroika were about more freedom and 
pluralism, but they were obliged to think about the consequences of the new 
policies.  There is one important phrase voiced by Gorbachev: “there are no contacts 
(between leaders of the republics), do you understand! And this happens in a time 
when people are given the floor to speak” (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  The Soviet leader 
acknowledged the need for communication, as he insisted that officials have to speak 
to public — he added that the authorities have to oversee the process along with the 
intelligentsia (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  Yet although he thought that the people could 
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communicate new ideas to wider audiences, they were simply not ready for the 
mission.39   
 Gorbachev tried to involve the intelligentsia in the process of reforming the 
state and society.  However, the intelligentsia was not ready to become a via media 
(Wendt), a channel of communication capable of overseeing the new pluralist 
society.  On the contrary, they became the agency that supported further separation.  
The most prominent writers, actors or other representatives of Soviet intelligentsia, 
who were loyal to the Communist Party and were often members of the organisation, 
became hard-headed nationalists.  They created the discourse of national values, 
traditions, history and future security that became an instrumental factor in the 
escalation of conflicts.  They looked immature and unprepared to lead a society into 
the new world order.  They became opportunists rather than enlightened (epistemic) 
communities prepared for a change.  In a certain way, the public was much more 
liberal than these groups, but their attitude and positioning gained nationalistic 
legitimacy.  They appeared to be freedom fighters — truth seekers epitomising 
justice in an unjust Soviet state.  The intelligentsia now symbolized historic justice, 
national traditions and freedom, but interpretation and translation of these ideas 
shaped the discourse and content of the conflict.  It is hard to find a firm rationale 
for their behaviour, but one could claim that nationalism was destroying 
intellectuality as the intelligentsia was adhering to the discursive strategies that 
elevated the nation’s legitimacy into a teleological setting (Suny and Kennedy, 1999: 
5).  They emphasized the usable past, and defined the language through which it had 
 39	There	was	a	Friday	late	night	TV	show	“Vzglayd”	(Sight)	broadcast	by	the	major	channel	of	the	USSR,	which	was	perhaps	the	best	attempt	to	explain	what	Perestroika	was	about,	but	one	programme	was	unable	to	change	the	minds	of	entire	country.				
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to be expressed; then they turned nationalist ideas into a social force (Hroch, 1993: 
9-10).  A plethora of issues and interests coincided.  For example, in Armenia Balayan 
and Kaputikian, as well as other writers or scholars, constantly referred to the 
opportunity of the reunification of ancient Armenian lands, and it was defined as 
historic justice (see Libaridian, 1988).    
 Gorbachev emphasized one detail of the discourse between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan: an Azeri composer defines Nagorno-Karabakh as “my”, whereas 
Armenians say “ours” (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  These pronouns became significant: 
“my” showed that Azerbaijanis were not ready to compromise, and Armenians had 
cultural and historical bond to the place so it was “our”, which was a symbol of 
Armenianess, the pronouns had a symbolic power (see Bourdieu, ch. 3), an intended 
meaning that was dividing the two people.  For Gorbachev, the idea of Armenian 
autonomy in Azerbaijan was an oxymoron, but he argued that if they could secure 
“true autonomy”40 with multiple opportunities, then it might work (Sumgait.Info, 
1988). To be more specific, Gorbachev thought that Armenians were in fact 
disadvantaged in political terms, but that if Nagorno-Karabakh were to become 
autonomous, the problem could be solved.  However, Abkhazia, for example, was an 
autonomous republic within Georgia, but it did not prevent the conflict from 
escalating.  Simply changing the nomenclature in a crumbling system was doing too 
little, too late.      
 Gorbachev and other members of the Politburo agreed to address the issues 
of ethnicities and asked Julian Bromley (head of the Institute of Ethnography, a main 
state think tank on nationalism in the USSR) to research the issue, noting that these 
 40	Gorbachev	meant	real	devolution	of	power,	not	the	rights	written	on	paper	
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types of issues had never been addressed before (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  Gorbachev 
thought to calm the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and then continue to 
work on ethnicity problems.  
 Apparently, these communication issues were not addressed in the principles 
of Perestroika and Glasnost.  However, Gorbachev was aware of the problem, though 
the minutes reveal that his Politburo colleagues (Ligachev and Gromyko) did not 
comprehend the challenge (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  The Soviet government did not 
think about the underlying layers that could impede reform.  This again proves that 
they lacked a real strategy that might deliver glasnost to its recipients — the public.  
The pattern that is observable in the conflicts in the South Caucasus demonstrates a 
chain of events that intertwined with one another and caused armed confrontations.  
The Soviet government did not have a strategy of change, and they could not identify 
rational and balanced channel of communication, and the local actors found 
opportunities within the flaws of the government and, together with the 
intelligentsia, brought the republics to the brink.  
 The intelligentsia was in essence a Soviet version of the “epistemic 
community” but it was not ready for the mission, and in fact lacked the necessary 
epistemic resources (see ch. 1).  Hence, when the Politburo members were looking 
for solutions and Gorbachev emphasized the role of the intelligentsia in peace-
building, they demonstrated an inability to use normative instruments and to re-
direct the transformation to different avenues.  For example, Elena Bonner,41 Andrei 
 41	She	was	the	daughter	of	the	founder	of	the	Armenian	Communist	Party,	Georgy	Alikhanov		
212 
Sakharov’s wife and a human rights activist, wrote in the preface of the Caroline Cox 
and John Eibner report that:  
“I believe that basically the present tragedy is caused not by the specific religious or 
cultural features of the two peoples, but by insistence on the priority of the principle 
of territorial integrity, which is the right of a state, over the principle of national self-
determination, which is a part of human rights.” (in Cox and Eibner, 1993: 3) 
Bonner compares the siege to the Leningrad occupation: “Today Armenia is 
reminiscent of Leningrad under siege from Hitler's army during the Second World 
War” (in Cox and Eibner, 1993: 4).  Her stance and language act as a very powerful 
performative that was able to affect international opinion on the conflict, and not 
least to mobilise more Armenians against Azerbaijan.  She was a public figure who 
was listened to both in and outside the USSR.  In this turbulent period, every word 
she articulated had a magnifying effect. As argued in the second chapter of this 
thesis, in crisis situations words change their meanings, particularly when they are 
turned into a social force of nationalism.  Her comparison of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue to the Nazi occupation did not help dialogue and reconciliation.  She defines 
the blockade of Armenia as a “new form of racism” because they suffered for the 
simple reason of being Armenian (in 1993: 4) Bonner’s opening remarks in the report 
were a radical appeal to the international community to “save” Armenia (in 1993: 5).  
One can see the continuation of mobilising the fear for existence, as described by 
Dudwick earlier in this chapter.  Her words are speech acts that appeal to the 
justificatory strategy of reproduction of Armenian identity vis-a-vis the threat.  
Granted, she also admits that Armenia does not need weaponry or soldiers, but 
213 
rather, the robust diplomatic efforts of Western governments — but this is tucked 
away in the second part of her report.  
 Returning to the Politburo discussion, Gorbachev and his aides talked about 
the crisis in Sumgait and worried about the consequences if Armenians were to 
obtain that information (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  In the 1980s, information flows were 
slow, and mostly controlled by the state-owned and state-controlled news agency 
(ITAR-TASS).  Perhaps the government was uncertain as how to manage information 
about the tragedy.  They were convinced that the amount and content of information 
should be controlled by the Politburo.  For example, Gorbachev told the Interior 
Minister to ensure that criminal charges were lodged against the perpetrators in 
Sumgait (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  One could assume that without his confirmation the 
authorities did not intend to punish those responsible for the massacre.  The state 
system was paralyzed, as there was lack of efficient delegation of power.  Another 
member of the council, Alexander Yakovlev, stated: “we need to announce 
immediately, about the events in Sumgait, that criminal charges are brought against 
criminals and they are arrested.  We need this to cool down the passions.  The 
Sumgait newspaper has to declare this quickly and clearly” (Sumgait.Info, 1988). It 
has to be noted that the Politburo held a monopoly over information policy in the 
USSR (Dzirkals, 1982: vi), and that  the newspapers should have obeyed any directive 
from the top.    
 Gorbachev asked the ministers to involve “working-class” people and not to 
threaten them with the army (Sumgait.Info, 1988).  The underlying message from 
Gorbachev is to refrain from the use of force (see Chernyaev 2000).  Many across the 
former USSR think that the tragedy in Sumgait could have been avoided if the Soviet 
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government had used force immediately.  In private talks, many experts and 
professionals who followed the events felt that the government had failed and 
allowed Azerbaijanis to murder Armenians (Khaindrava, 2013).  It is thought (by the 
majority of Georgian experts) that this was a strategy to enhance enmity among the 
neighbouring countries.  
 The meeting concluded that the officials had to use all possible tools to 
prevent further escalation, and mobilize local communities, and demonstrate that 
the situation was under control.  Those attending the meeting discussed the TV 
reports aired in Armenia, and suggested that a demonstration of “calmness” could 
avert the worst-case scenarios (Gorbachev-Foundation, 1995, Sumgait.Info, 1988).   
 It could be argued that the declaration sent to the Kremlin about the transfer 
of the jurisdiction was the starting point of the escalation of violence, but the crisis 
and conflict was a multi-layered friction that had accumulated during the Soviet 
regime, primarily as a result of the large-scale epistemic violence against the 
communities in the units of the USSR.  Accordingly, to use the constructivist idea of 
a mutually constituted environment, the Soviet government isolated itself in a shell 
of inefficiency and incapacity.  They became trapped inside the illusory world that 
they had constructed behind the Iron Curtain (see Kedourie in ch. 4).  By introducing 
epistemic violence, they produced outcomes (and unintended consequence) of 
which they were unaware and unable to control.  They ended up as mere fire fighters 
in the dissolving and evaporating state and system.  In a different setting, Perestroika 
and Glasnost could have been effective tools of transformation, albeit if there had 
been a phase-by-phase plan of implementation and a project of large-scale 
devolution.  The USSR did not have either of these.  Gorbachev, the champion of 
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change, wished to bring greater freedom than before but lacked the instruments and 
means of implementation of the idea of Perestroika.  The conflicts that escalated in 
the Soviet space were caused by the interaction of several variables, and a hostile 
discourse that interpreted the situation in a particular framework that was 
convenient for the local political actors.  The comrades in Moscow in fact lacked the 
capacity to control, and they acted in order to give the appearance of being in charge, 
while the local politicians chose the role of freedom fighters in their quest to attain 
power.  At the same time, political entrepreneurs were using the government’s 
weakness and promoting their agendas.   
 For example, there were some incidents in the Crimea, which was the part of 
the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the status of Tatars residing there.  Crimean Tatars 
appealed to the Kremlin and demanded the restoration of the Autonomous republic, 
but the Communist administration rejected the plea and accused the Tatar activists 
of disregarding the “present administrative-territorial division” of the USSR that was 
granting opportunities to “accomplish the tasks of economic and social development 
of all ethnic groups in the country” (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 301).  Similarly to 
Armenians, Tatars were unhappy with the decision and intended to demonstrate 
further in Tashkent, but the leaderships of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan42 managed to 
“defuse” the problem and a number of agreements were achieved (Nahaylo and 
Swoboda, 1990: 301).  This example shows that there were the opportunities to 
settle the disagreements.   However, in the South Caucasus the local discourse 
 42	Tatars	were	exiled	to	Central	Asia	in	the	Soviet	period	and	most	of	them	lived	in	Tajikistan	and	Uzbekistan		
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combined with the incapacity of the central government produced disastrous policy 
outcomes.  
 
5.5. Armenian discourse.  Did Armenia Triumph?  
This change brought new words into public discourse, such as “justice” and “historic 
lands”, that amended previously accepted meanings and many people did not know 
their correct interpretation.  In Yerevan, emerging ambitious political actors 
launched the Nagorno-Karabakh campaign grabbing attention and legitimacy for 
their activities.  Tradition, history, justice and national pride were brought together 
to demonstrate the values of Armenia and gain nationwide support.  The acting 
Communist administration was paralyzed and depended largely on Kremlin 
directives.  Meanwhile, new political groups organized their speeches and manifestos 
along ethnic lines, and the majority of the intelligentsia aligned with them.  
 However, this section is about discourse in Armenia, and how words and 
speeches shaped enmity.  Talks of the nation, tradition, justice, “sacred” history — 
all those words that transformed what was once a community into a hostile group.  
The most pressing questions were “who the nation is?”, and “who is the subject to 
benefit from historic justice and which tradition is worth more than human life?”.  
The next sections will address the events and speech acts that further escalated the 
crisis.  
   
217 
5.5.1. Words as weapons 
In November 1987, one of the close aides to Gorbachev, Abel Aganbegyan (an 
Armenian), in an interview to a French newspaper L’Humanite, stated that the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) would soon fall under the jurisdiction 
of Armenia (in Cornell, 1999: 13).  He was and remains a prominent economist, and 
is considered to be the godfather of the Soviet economic reforms, and the generation 
of young Russian reformers of the 1990s.  He was a man whose opinion, let alone 
statements, could not be ignored.  Many have accused him of fuelling mass rallies in 
Armenia as a result of his remarks in Paris (Smith, 1988).  Quoted in The Karabagh 
Files, he emphasized the economic aspects of the issue and noted that from an 
economic point of view, Karabakh is much closer to Armenia and that he had written 
a memo to the government (in Libaridian, 1988: 71, Imranli-Lowe, 2015: 155).  By 
emphasizing closeness, he meant that the majority in the autonomous region were 
Armenians.  Yet, later in an interview to the New York Times he denied the claims, 
stating that he only talked about the commission that examined the possibility of 
changing jurisdiction of the NKAO, nothing more (Smith, 1988).           
 Many political actors and public across Armenia believed in the statement 
made by Gorbachev’s economic advisor, an ethnic Armenian.  It was believed that he 
discussed the issue with Gorbachev himself, that the Soviet leader considered the 
option to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.  The Politburo minutes reveal 
Gorbachev’s position on the issue: that “there is a dialectic (contradiction)” in this 
autonomy, though at the same time he was not prepared either here, nor in the 
Soviet system overall, to reconsider and change internal borders within the Union 
(Cornell, 1999: 14, Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 285, Gorbachev, 1995). Gorbachev 
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talked about enhanced autonomy within Azerbaijan, which would make Nagorno-
Karabakh a republic, not an oblast.  Yet according to Gorbachev the reason the Soviet 
regime at the time ignored the idea was because of the Armenian nationalists who 
used Karabakh to boost the national movement and seize power (in Cornell, 1999: 
14, 1990, Gorbachev, 1995: 336-37).  The then-Soviet leader argues in his memoirs 
that the “national feelings” became objects of “merciless exploitation” and that 
mistakes made by the Azerbaijani government, which did not “treat the Karabakh 
population in the spirit of the traditions of Lenin” had laid a bomb underneath 
Perestroika (Gorbachev, 1995: 336).  It is clear that Gorbachev saw the trends of 
securitization of ethnicity, he just did not use this word to define the process.  He 
also knew that the government should “never be blackmailed into this” (1995: 336), 
though high tensions played into the hands of nationalists.                 
 Armenian intellectuals like Zori Balayan began to talk about the legal dispute 
openly.  They thought Glasnost and Perestroika were the “weapons” that gave 
advantage to Armenia and her bid to unify (Libaridian, 1988: 71).  Balayan referred 
to Stalin’s policies that Glasnost and Perestroika had to address (Libaridian, 1988: 
71).  Insisting that it was very difficult to visualize a future Armenia without Karabakh, 
he argued that “the land of our historic fatherland continues to remain occupied and 
we are gathered in a small place and we cannot continue like this” (Libaridian, 1988: 
72).  He depicted patriotism as a “struggle in the real meaning of the word” 
(Libaridian, 1988: 72).  It is worth noting that “patriotism” has acquired a very 
negative connotation in all three republics, as it became a symbol of hatred rather 
than love.  Balayan explains his vision of the word: “we should not equate patriotism 
with nationalism, where one is disdainful of others and places oneself above others… 
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patriotism, first of all it is a struggle in the name of the fatherland” (Libaridian, 1988: 
72).  Yet the “struggle” was against the other, the people who were securitized and 
depicted as threats.  Armenia’s identity was focused on Karabakh, and legally it was 
part of Azerbaijan.  To refer back to Morgenthau, the “lust for power” transformed 
“love for country into imperialism” (see chapter 1).   
 In the same interview, Balayan put forward arguments against Azerbaijan.  He 
states that Armenians (note that he speaks in the name of the nation) reject the 
recognition of the word “Azerbaijan” (Libaridian, 1988: 76).  Armenians acknowledge 
“Georgia, Russia, Armenia, but not Azerbaijan” (Libaridian, 1988: 76).  By making such 
statements he acts against Azerbaijani people who are now non-existent in 
Armenia’s reality.  Balayan returns to the 1920s and argues that Azerbaijan was a 
constructed name given to Caucasian Tatars by Lenin (Libaridian, 1988: 76).  In the 
same conversation Balayan blames Stalin for the status of Nakhichevan, he states 
that the resources of Nagorno-Karabakh and its fertile soil can feed Armenia and 
guarantee Armenia’s existence for the “next hundred years” (Libaridian, 1988: 76).  
Balayan is openly declaring anti-Turkish sentiments through propagating a Turkish 
conspiracy theory against the Russian Empire (Libaridian, 1988: 77).  He accuses 
“Djugashvili, that is Stalin” (emphasizing his Georgian origin) of a pro-Turkish decision 
when he gave the jurisdiction over Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan (Libaridian, 1988: 77).  
Balayan argues that, despite strenuous efforts, the Turks failed to achieve their goals, 
as Azerbaijan was a Soviet Socialist Republic, and it was “ours, part of the Union of 
the Soviet Socialist Republics” (Libaridian, 1988: 77).  Almost every word pronounced 
by Balayan was a performative that aimed to change the origin and cultural belonging 
and identity of Azerbaijan.  It serves the aim of the dehumanisation of Azerbaijanis 
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and legitimizes enmity.  One could argue that he wished to create a new “regime of 
truth” where Azerbaijan is an exception from Georgia or Russia.  In other words, for 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis are not the same people as e.g., the Georgians.                                
 Zory Balayan published a column for the Golos Armenii, 43  a political 
newspaper in 2013, which marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Karabakh 
Movement and is a brief review of his memories of 1988.  Balayan describes his 
efforts and his work to start the movement and to bring Karabakh back to Armenia.  
But he remains silent about the price that Armenians had to pay for the Movement.  
The letter is full of historic references, national pride and explanations for the future 
generations to fight for justice.  Balyan professes himself proud to be among the 
initiators of the Karabakh Committee who published that letter in the newspaper 
Soviet Karabakh (Sovetskii Karabakh) that asked the Kremlin to transfer jurisdiction 
to Yerevan.  He proudly remembers the process of collecting the signatures of about 
eighty thousand residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, which in his column now appeared 
as Artsakh,44 and offers a historic review of almost all attempts during the Soviet rule 
to join Armenia. Despite the tragedies and the deaths of thousands of people, the 
nationalists still considered their cause to be rightful.  Their discourse continued to 
dominate the securitization of Azerbaijanis by reminding the public about the letter 
to the Kremlin, which cost many lives, and the political and the economic isolation of 





 Interviews and letters in The Karabagh File demonstrate the rising nationalist 
discourse across Armenia.  Prominent public figures and historians spoke up about 
Armenian lands under the control of Azerbaijan and Turkey that they thought had to 
be returned to Armenia (Libaridian, 1988: 73).  It is worth pointing out that historians 
were the most significant speakers in all three republics.  A historic narrative based 
on myths became a currency for the establishment of new states in the South 
Caucasus.  The historian and journalist Sergey Mikoyan 45  talked about the new 
opportunities that Perestroika gave to Armenia; he was sure that a clear possibility 
existed allowing Armenian to take back control of Karabakh and Nakhichevan.  He 
quoted Benjamin Disraeli and argued that politics is “the art of [the] possible”, hence 
Armenians were on the right track (Libaridian, 1988: 74).  Such statements had 
significant locutionary effect in the restricted reality of the USSR.  Historians in 
general did not consider the legal aspects that accompanied the issues.  Mikoyan says 
it was “realistic” to return the lands — not only Karabakh but also Nakhichevan 
(Libaridian, 1988: 74).  He appealed to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to be 
“strong and very decisive” otherwise they in Moscow cannot do anything (Libaridian, 
1988: 74).  In the interview he also mentions the Turkish territories that Armenians 
consider to be Armenian, Mikoyan said that change was possible and “we will never 
forget or forgive” (in Libaridian, 1988: 74).  Stating several times that “it was possible 
to return Karabakh” Mikoyan did boost nationalistic sentiments.  His background and 
influence were strengthening his assertions.  Armenians in Yerevan as well as 
worldwide listened to and read carefully his opinions, and they thought he was right 
and that it was possible to redraw the Soviet internal borders in the age of 
 45	Anastas	Mikoyan’s	son,	who	was	Stalin’s	friend	and	a	close	ally	
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Perestroika (see Papazian, 2001: 67).  Mikoyan admits that, thanks to Glasnost, he 
was able to write and appeal to wider audiences: “I can make my opinion known to 
wider circles of people” (Libaridian, 1988: 74).  It is apparent that he knew the power 
of every word and idea he subscribed to.   
“I wrote an article explaining that I could not understand why one autonomous 
region [Karabagh], one ethnic group [Armenian] was included in the republic of 
another ethnic group [Azerbaijan SSR].  So, I expressed my opinion in the press that 
this was a mistake of the period of the 1920s and that it was time to rectify it.  So I 
did it in the press.  I do not have other opportunities or channels” (Mikoyan in 
Libaridian, 1988: 74).   
Mikoyan also mentions “Turkey” as part of the problem.  One can see a full-scale 
securitization of artefacts, emotions, and history.  In other words, the Armenian 
nation has to follow the goal and not only request Karabakh and Nakhichevan but 
must also remember the territories in Turkey.  This emphasizes Armenian identity, as 
a nation that has to return the old glory, the discourse about “Greater Armenia”.   
 Another prominent member of the Karabakh movement was Silva Kaputikian, 
who met Gorbachev along with Zory Balayan. This is how she describes the argument 
over the lands between Armenia and Azerbaijan:  
“Bitterly we paid for this maturity, bitter was the price for crushing our great trust, 
a crushing which reminds us of 9 January 1905.  We, first the people of Karabakh, 
then the people of Armenia, marched to the winter palace, to the Lenin square in 
Stepanakert, and to the theatre square in Yerevan, convinced that the central power 
would understand us.  We marched with words of trust in the land of socialism, in 
the Russian people, in Perestroika, with portraits of the secretary general of the 
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party, M.S. Gorbachev.  But against us fire was opened.  The fire was the unjust 
solution of the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet, lies created with the help of mass 
information, a blackening propaganda which witnessed the badly concealed 
benevolence of the Azerbaijan side.  The fire was Sumgait” (Kaputikian in Cornell, 
1999: 3).   
Kaputikyan suggests that Armenians were prominent and active during the October 
Revolution, but believes the trust they invested in the Russian people backfired when 
they were treated “unjustly” in regard to the Karabakh issue.  Instead of loyalty they 
got “fire”, and that fire was Sumgait.  In her address to the crowd in the Theatre 
Square she said that “Armenians have triumphed”, but Gorbachev did not promise 
anything to the Armenian representatives — instead, the only demand was to calm 
the situation (in Cornell, 1999: 16).  Yet the word “triumphed” had significant 
repercussions, because the people thought that their demands had been met.  There 
were more than a half  a million protesters in the streets of Yerevan when Balayan 
added that ''Mikhail Sergeyevich understands'' (Barringer and Keller, 1988).  Later, 
Kaputikian changed her wording, insisting that she meant that it was Armenia’s moral 
triumph, as Armenians were used to being inspired by defeats (in Cornell, 1999: 16).  
This was an example of a communication that assigned a particular content to the 
words and to a certain extent had amended the truth by abstracting from the total 
social context; they repeated Gorbachev’s words but in slightly amended context 
(see Buzan et al ch. 3).  Here one has to address the distal context of securitization 
as well, as when there is such an emphasis put on history and historic victimhood, 
the local meaning of the speech acts has to be taken into the consideration.  
Victimisation was used by Gamsakhurdia too.  Putting emphasis on the negative past 
“establishes space for a specific kind of politics”, as it clears ground for a  “neutral or 
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indisputable” pitch (Jeffery and Candea, 2006: 289).  Speaking the victimhood is a 
performative that establishes its own reality (2006: 290).  It helps enunciators to 
make their speech act successful, notwithstanding whether it is true or false.  
Performatives quoted from her speech (“Bitterly we paid for this maturity, bitter was 
the price for crushing our great trust…”) show the distal context of a speech act, when 
Armenia is depicted as a suffering nation, which has to return to the glory of the past.           
 Additionally, writing for the Washington Post, Kaputikyan used radical 
language to exemplify the injustice and suffering of Armenians living in Nagorno-
Karabakh (1988).  She argues that, if Armenian people had ignored the pleas of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it would have been “a complete cowardice and shameful 
betrayal” on the part of Armenia (Kaputikyan, 1988).  She talks about reactions to 
the decision of the Supreme Soviet that denied the redrawing of the Soviet borders, 
when a young woman from Yerevan, an art historian, shouted: "If that's how it is, 
then I, too, will find some weapons. I, too, will learn how to cut up children. 
Apparently they give more attention to murderers than to us" (Kaputikyan, 1988).  
Another person replied that “we see that here [Soviet Union] they want to destroy 
us as a nation” (Kaputikyan, 1988).  After condemning Gorbachev and Perestroika, 
the closing lines are aimed at mobilisation of national pride: “we will call upon our 
millennial, thousand-year-old inexhaustible spiritual potential and we will go on 
living” (Kaputikyan, 1988).  These lines are illustrative of the common practice among 
the nationalists in Georgia too.  She mentions “spiritual potential” in an attempt to 
deploy the “debris” of the past for the purpose of the present (see Hertzfield) similar 
to Gamsakhurdia’s references to the “holy blood” and souls of thousands of martyrs 
to support the national cause against the Soviet Empire (see the next chapter).  Here 
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we see how ethnic entrepreneurs construct and use symbolic capital, while 
simultaneously generating a capacity to manage identities and beliefs (see Bigo ch. 
3).            
 The historian Bagrat Ulubanian addressed the crowds in Yerevan in February 
1988.  He referred to the “misfortunes throughout the history” of Armenia and that, 
in an era of democratization, justice would triumph (Libaridian, 1988: 92).  “The 
Armenian people finally woke up from its delightful slumber”, pronounced Levon 
Ter-Petrosian46  in the Parliament of Armenia (Dudwick, 1993: 261).  The use of 
metaphors pointing to the awakening of nations and rediscovery of the old glory 
expressed the trajectory of post-Soviet nationalism.  Ter-Petrosian’s address was 
quoted from The Wounds of Armenia, a historic novel by Khachatour Abovian which 
says: “wake up... from your death-inviting slumber of ignorance, remember your past 
glory, mourn your present state of wretchedness and heed the example of other 
enlightened nations” (Libaridian, 1983: 82).  One could see the references to 
unfortunate history and calls for justice.  As was already mentioned earlier, 
intellectuals like Ulubanian had the authority and people listened to his ideas 
carefully.     
 Andrei Sakharov, the prominent Soviet academic, wrote a letter to Gorbachev 
urging him to listen to the Armenian people and restore the justice violated in 1923 
(Sakharov, 1988: 131).  Sakharov’s voice was a big support to the Armenian cause, 
and his words and views were carefully listened to in the West as well.  A man who 
developed thermonuclear weapons for the USSR, and later became a civil rights 
activist and a dissident, was too important to ignore.  His letter sums up the legal-
 46	He	was	the	first	president	of	Armenia	
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political story of the Karabakh status (Sakharov, 1988: 131-132).  Using Perestroika 
as the main leitmotiv for the future of the USSR, Sakharov asks Gorbachev to heed 
the voices of Karabakh’s Armenians, and support a “constitutional” solution of the 
issue (1988: 132).  Sakharov notes that the maneuverers halted the constitutional 
and “normal” process, arguments directed mainly towards Armenians (1988: 132).  
Sakharov argues that the press coverage of the events was inadequate, because they 
denounced the legal demands of the Armenian people as a demonstration of 
extremism (1988: 131).  He refers to the tragic days in Baku in February, reminding 
him of the 1915 (genocide), as he expresses the opinion that the entire dispute might 
have been provoked and planned by an “anti-Perestroika mafia” (131).  According to 
him, the idea of Perestroika had been challenged and the USSR government had to 
find a way to resolve the issue “democratically and constitutionally” (Sakharov, 1988: 
132).  Finally, he appealed to Gorbachev not to delay the decision and to bring justice 
to the people (Sakharov, 1988: 132).  He stressed the importance of perestroika, as 
saving the ideals of the reform agenda was possible only if Gorbachev demonstrated 
the will to follow the constitution.   Sakharov’s voice was a big support for Armenia’s 
position both inside and outside the USSR (see Swietochowski, 1995).  
               
5.6. Azerbaijan’s Discourse 
In Armenia, the issue over Nagorno-Karabakh launched the independence 
movement, and, later on, brought the group to power – Levon Ter-Petrosyan was 
one of the prominent leaders of the Committee.  At the same time, in Azerbaijan, the 
Armenian initiative paved the way for nationalists to solidify their popularity.  
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Karabakh — a place, a word and a symbol — helped to mobilise the massive public 
support that was necessary to gain power in the post-Soviet state.        
 After this, the Azerbaijani government apparently panicked due to the 
Armenian demands, and decided to take action.  The central administration from 
Moscow was calling on the parties to keep calm and negotiate within the Soviet 
legislature, but the Baku authorities responded violently to the problem.  The then 
leader of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party Aiaz Mutalibov was hostile to Armenian 
demands, declaring that particular individuals [Karabakh Committee] demanded 
secession from the country (Libaridian, 1988: 99).  Azerbaijan’s Communist 
government declared that Nagorno-Karabakh was one of the best performing 
regions of the republic (Libaridian, 1988: 99).  Hence, despite its Armenian majority, 
Azerbaijan was considered to be very important because of its industrial output  
(Libaridian, 1988: 99).  Mutalibov was sure that if he had Gorbachev’s support in 
“cleansing” Nagorno-Karabakh, and arresting those individuals (the Karabakh 
Committee) who had triggered the independence talks, the problem would be 
solved; but it was only twenty-one years later that he revealed, to a Radio Liberty 
journalist, that he had indeed sought help from Gorbachev (Mutalibov, 2013).  
 Azerbaijan in the time of Perestroika was intellectually divided.  There was a 
gulf between the Baku-based Russian-speaking intellectuals and the rest of the 
country.  They were detested by the radical nationalists Etibar Mamedov and Neimet 
Panakhov, who were not interested in Perestroika (De Waal, 2003: 83).  Such 
disagreement resulted in a continuing power struggle and made the Karabakh 
problem the single biggest mobilising force in Armenia and Azerbaijan (De Waal, 
2003: 83, Steele, 1988).  Up until 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh was not part of Azerbaijani 
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politics, let alone on the national agenda: perhaps that was the reason that 
Azerbaijan’s leadership did not possess sufficient information to articulate clearly 
their responses to Armenia’s demands (Cheterian, 2008: 95-97).  An official from 
Moscow admitted that he had not encountered a single Armenian or Azeri who was 
able to suggest a compromise on the issue, (De Waal, 2003: 83).   
 Deteriorating relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan caused a mass 
exodus of Azerbaijanis from Armenia in November 1988. The protesters filled the 
former Lenin Square, reaching half a million in size during the daytime (De Waal, 
2003: 83).  Nemat Panakhov and Etibar Mamedov were the most radical and 
powerful anti-Armenian speakers: they claimed that Armenians were planning to 
build a guesthouse for workers of the Yerevan aluminium factory in the woods of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but De Waal notes that the story was a subject of mass 
manipulation, as some believed that an actual factory was planned on the site (De 
Waal, 2003: 83).  The mass protests were dissolved by force after eighteen days, and 
Pakhanov was arrested (De Waal, 2003: 83, Steele, 1988).  The Guardian also 
reported that foreign media were banned from the city and Soviet press accounts 
were censored but Panakhov faced “charges of defying the state of emergency by 
instigating public disorder and inciting ethnic hatred against Armenians” (Steele, 
1988).  Nemat Panakhov was a twenty-six-year-old lathe operator from the 
Lieutenant Schmidt Factory, who was called the “Son of the People”, as he had been 
able to articulate the concerns of the people demonstrating in the Lenin Square in 
Baku since November 1988 (Fuller, 1989: 4).  He joined the demonstration from its 
inception (17 November), and had three main demands shared by the majority of 
demonstrators: the creation of an autonomous formation in Armenia, similar to 
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Nagorno-Karabakh, for all Azerbaijanis living there; the transfer of trials of 
Azerbaijanis accused of Sumgait massacres from Moscow back to Baku; and asked 
for provision for the Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia to return safely back home 
(Fuller, 1989: 4).  Panakhov did not think that his demands were anti-Armenian or 
anti-Soviet or that asking Armenian people to alight from buses was not threatening 
any reprisals; rather he insisted they were in line with democracy and glasnost 
(Fuller, 1989: 4).  When asked about demonstrators with Islamic symbols, he called 
them “marginal” (Fuller, 1989). 
 In December Panakhov was arrested and charged with “violating the public 
order and inciting ethnic discord” (Fuller, 1989: 5), and he was described by the local 
press as a demagogue and political illiterate who engaged in distortions concerning 
the nationalities policy and even was thought to plot against the leadership and 
secession from the USSR (Fuller, 1989: 5).  Fuller reports suggest that it was not clear 
if Panakhov was used by different forces e.g. Geidar Aliev, but it was important that 
thousands of his countrymen shared the grievances articulated by him (1989: 5).       
 De Waal notes that the governmental crackdown on opposition stirred up 
intrigues and suspicions of treachery as most of the Soviet opposition groups were 
prone to the danger of being invaded by provocateurs or agents of KGB (De Waal, 
2003: 84).47  The KGB involvement was and remains an important variable in the 
exploration of the rallies and protests.  There were dozens of political actors who 
claimed they faced mostly “unsuccessful” attempts of infiltration (De Waal, 2003: 84, 
see Geukjian, 2012: 149).  Yet infiltration was a significant part of the discourse about 
 47	This	was	a	common	problem	in	Georgia,	Armenia	and	the	Baltic	republics.		Provocateurs	and	destabilising	agents	were	proclaimed	enemies	of	freedom	fighters.				
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national interests, freedom and enemies.  Emerging political actors were closely 
monitored by the KGB and many declassified documents revealed the trend (see 
Bakatin's interview in Chervonnaya, 1994).  Igor Nolyain claims that events in Sumgait 
were carefully organized and managed by the KGB, which had a double aim: first to 
calm Armenians while shedding blood, and to show that Azerbaijanis are moved by 
“ethnic hatred” rather than KGB manipulated provocateurs (558).  Malkasian argues 
that perhaps it was KGB “heavies” who were adamant to undermine Perestroika and 
could have supported the massacres (1996: 53).        
 The Popular Front of Azerbaijan had a consensus in 1989 that Azerbaijan 
needed more rights from Moscow, implying that they wanted a higher status for the 
Azeri language, more ties with Iranian kin and broader rights for Baku (De Waal, 2003: 
86).  De Waal observes that despite having a wish list, there was no settlement on 
political methods that could result in success (De Waal, 2003: 86).  The Front was 
divided between moderates and radicals.  Abulfaz Elchibey and his group were 
pushing for independence whilst moderates were focused on winning Azerbaijan’s 
parliamentary elections (De Waal, 2003: 86).  It is worth mentioning that new 
political organizations were struggling for power and somehow the interests of 
Azerbaijan (as well as in Armenia and Georgia) shifted behind the power struggle 
rather than securing independence and transition from a Soviet to modern state.  The 
majority of those actors outlined the priorities that deepened the crisis instead of 
easing it.  Leila Yunusova, one of the founders of the Popular Front wrote: “having 
condemned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for its totalitarianism, some of 
the leaders of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan had already managed to borrow the 
very worst from Bolshevism” (De Waal, 2003: 86).  They decided to block the railway 
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for supplies to Armenia, thus forcing them to denounce territorial claims for 
Nagorno-Karabakh (New York Times 1989).  The railway blockade was lifted after 
Azerbaijan’s Soviet authorities agreed to register the Front as a legal organisation, 
but the communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan never fully recovered (De 
Waal, 2003: 87).  For the National Front it was an instrument of leverage on the 
government as they held a meeting every day to solve the food crisis in Armenia (New 
York Times 1989); however, the blockade was effective for popular rhetoric and a 
leverage on the authorities.  In the end the NFA had managed to get all the necessary 
concession from the Communist government, including “legalizing the Popular Front, 
lifting a military curfew, and — most startling of all — convening a special session of 
the Azerbaijani Parliament to pass a new sovereignty law, and even a right to secede” 
(Keller, 1989).  In fact, the blockade helped the National Front to have a voice in the 
government, as they were allowed to attend the session of the Parliament that 
approved the amendments as it was televised in Azerbaijan (Keller, 1989).  Nagorno-
Karabakh was an apple of discord and a problem that needed legal and political as 
well as a social approach.  None of these methods were exercised; on the contrary, 
instead of dialogue, strikingly radical tactics further escalated the conflict.  
Nationalist activists and ‘patriots’ (as they liked to be called) brought the republics to 
a confrontation by radicalizing the political space.    
 It is remarkable how the  local intelligentsia in Azerbaijan was reluctant to 
condemn the massacres (the Georgian intelligentsia was also not very outspoken 
against Gamsakhurdia), but instead justified the pogroms, and some of them even 
accused the victims of being responsible for the violence (Cheterian, 2008: 104).  Ziya 
Buniyatov, another prominent Azerbaijani scholar claimed that the Sumgait tragedy 
232 
was a provocation organized by Armenian extremists and shadow entrepreneurs 
who aimed at increasing tensions (Sakharov, 2006: 581).  Bunyadov penned an open 
letter in the newsletter of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR (Bunyadov, 
2010), in which he offered a short summary of Armenian history, blaming Armenian 
nationalist group Dashnaks for the genocide in Turkey as well as wishing to create 
“Armenia between the three seas” (Bunyadov, 2010).  Bunyadov argues that 
Armenians planned and executed the massacres in Sumgait themselves:      
“The Sumqayit tragedy was planned very carefully by Armenian nationalists. Several 
hours before it began, Armenian TV and newspaper reporters secretly infiltrated the 
town and lay in wait. The first to commit a criminal act was a certain Grigoryan, who was 
disguised as an Azerbaijani and who personally killed five Sumqayit Armenians 
(Bunyadov, 2010).”   
The enunciator bases his claims on the quotes of historians and Russian army 
generals who described the events of 1915 in Turkey and wrote about the Armenian 
group “Dashnak” being the instigator of the genocide.  Hence, Buniatov’s article 
becomes a performative, one which accuses Armenians of lies and pre-planned 
massacres of fellow Armenians.  One could see the securitization of history and 
analogies that force the referent object [Azerbaijani nation] to accept the threat.  In 
the article, Buniatov claims that Dashnaks were disguised as Russian servicemen in 
Turkey in 1915 (Bunyadov, 2010).  
 One could argue that the confrontation underlined the ideas and thoughts 
expressed by Armenian authors regarding the issue of Karabakh.  Azerbaijanis 
remembered Balayan’s book “Ochag” (The Hotbed, 1984), a description of his travels 
around the “Armenian lands” including Nagorno-Karabakh.  Adalet Tahirzade, who 
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was an aide to Elchibey and deputy education minister criticized Balayan and lack of 
Moscow’s reaction to his ideas.   
“Azerbaijanis were called savages in that book. NKAO and Nakhchivan were referred 
as historic Armenian territories. Moscow did not react to letters and complaints from 
Azerbaijan with regards to the book. He was often visiting Khankandi (Stepanakert) 
and making inciting speeches there... 
Balayan became a hero and this book won the award of the Armenian Journalist 
Union... In general these actions were met by silence of Moscow and Baku.” 
(Tahirzade, 1997: 13-14)        
One has to remember that Balayan was a prominent writer and he was a reporter for 
the Literaturnaya Gazeta, the foremost newspaper of the Writers’ Union of the USSR. 
Defining Azerbaijanis as “savages” was further othering them in Armenia and at the 
same time deteriorating relations with Baku.     
The Armenian author and a translator Armen Oganesiyan published an article 
“Vodorozdel” (Watershed) (1988).  Oganesian emphasized the importance of justice 
for Armenia as he expressed his frustration regarding the court hearings about the 
Sumgait case.  As a counterfactual statement, Oganesian quotes Russian generals 
who wrote about the atrocities committed by Turks during the 1915 genocide.  Here 
we can observe the application of an analogy in the process of securitization (see 
chapter 3).  Both parties operationalize history and use it as a tool for the formation 
of public opinion.  Oganesian quotes the Qu’ran, the surah where Christians and Jews 
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are deemed untrustworthy, 48  arguing that in the Soviet Union one thousand 
Christian churches were destroyed, yet more than fifteen hundred mosques were 
erected (1988).  Here one sees how the religious aspect gradually emerged in the 
discourse.  The referent object (the Armenian nation) had been told that now they 
were Christians against Muslims and that when their churches were destroyed by the 
Communist government the number of mosques was on the rise (Oganesian, 1988).  
Following these powerful performatives, the author went further and questioned the 
silence of Azerbaijani intelligentsia.  According to Oganesian, only one Azeri writer, 
Chingiz Huseinov, stated that Sumgait was a “shame” of Azerbaijan (in Oganesian, 
1988). 
 Thus, the securitizing discourse between the intellectual elites in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan helped to accelerate hostilities as they stressed differences between two 
people.  In an atheist country, religious belonging was irrelevant, and most places of 
worship were closed.  Therefore, the inculcation of religion into discourse brought 
harm to potential settlement of the issue and helped the securitization of Islam in 
Armenia.        
            
5.7. Black January and Khojali  
‘Black January’ was the defining moment in the history of modern Azerbaijan, as well 
as in the escalation of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Political actors were 
 48	Surah	5,	Verse	51:	“O	you	who	have	believed,	do	not	take	the	Jews	and	the	Christians	as	allies.	They	are	[in	fact]	allies	of	one	another.	And	whoever	is	an	ally	to	them	among	you	—	then	indeed,	he	is	[one]	of	them.	Indeed,	Allah	guides	not	the	wrongdoing	people”	(translation:	Google	Translate,	the	original	text	is	in	Russian)	
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actively involved in preparations for the post-Soviet power distribution and used all 
possible methods at their disposal.  Azerbaijanis were unhappy with the work of the 
Party’s First Secretary Abdurrahman Vezirov, who was accused of conducting pro-
Armenian policies (De Waal, 2003: 88).  Despite his efforts to reform the Communist 
Party of Azerbaijan and keep Nagorno-Karabakh, the public remained critical of him 
(Cheterian, 2008: 116).  As a result, the second secretary Viktor Polyanichko, and not 
the First Secretary, was the real person in charge of the republic.  This concept 
implied that the Russian man ‘on-site’ was a Kremlin watchdog, and was also 
supposed to deal with emergencies.  Polyanichko was an Afghan veteran and thought 
that the Islamic factor was an important variable in Azerbaijan (De Waal, 2003: 88).  
He was a man of Moscow and was “a second in command” in Baku (Keller, 1989).     
 By December 1989 the radical wing (the young intellectuals, physicist Tofik 
Gasimov, the Arabist Abulfaz Elchibei and the historian Ekhtibar Mamedov 
(Cheterian, 2008: 117)) of the Popular Front was in charge of the party and was 
directing public protests (De Waal, 2003: 88).  The party was founded on the Baltic 
model, 49  and included populists like Nemat Panakhov and the Social Democrat 
Zarduhst Alizade; but it was the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute that gave the Front such 
mass support (Cheterian, 2008: 117).  People were appealing against rumours that 
the Armenian authorities, along with the aluminium enterprise, were cutting down 
trees in the vicinity of Shushi without authorisation from Baku (Cheterian, 2008: 116).  
It is significant to note that the radical positions promoted by the Popular Front 
secured them the support of the lower classes, mostly the unemployed and refugees 
 49	In	the	USSR,	the	three	Baltic	states	were	champions	of	pluralism,	as	they	formed	political	parties	and	offered	help	to	other	fellow	republics.		Their	approach	to	forming	political	parties	was	a	model	for	others.				
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from Nagorno-Karabakh; however they lost the backing of the urban intelligentsia 
which was unwilling to affiliate itself with the aims of “militant faction” of the Front 
(Cheterian, 2008: 118).     
 On 29 December, the National Front of Azerbaijan occupied the local offices 
of the Communist Party in the southern town of Jalilabad.  Protesters had ripped 
down the fences along the Iranian border as they demanded closer ties with six 
million Azeris who live on the Iranian side (Keller, 1990b).  The Soviet government 
denounced the move and accused the Front of sliding into Islamism (De Waal, 2003: 
89); however the party rejected Islamism and sided with secular pan-Turkist positions 
(Cheterian, 2008: 118).  Yet, the radical wing of the Front did sign an appeal to the 
Politburo and the Supreme Soviet urging them to “relax” the frontier between two 
Azerbaijans; referring to the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai, they claimed that 
Azerbaijan was “artificially split” (Swietochowski, 1995: 203).  The incident along the 
Iranian border gave grounds to the Soviet press to accuse the Popular Front of 
supporting Islamic fundamentalism (Swietochowski, 1995).  Whilst Panakhov 
demonstrated his nationalist ambitions to Baku and Moscow, the Armenian 
parliament on 10 January 1990 accepted Nagorno-Karabakh into the country’s 
budget and gave Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh the right to vote in 
Armenia’s elections, causing outrage across Azerbaijan (Swietochowski, 1995: 204).  
As a reaction to the events, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan summoned the National 
Council to oversee preparations to fight against Armenians (Swietochowski, 1995: 
204).  There were hostages taken during the fighting between Azeri and Armenian 
and Russian Interior Ministry soldiers were killed (De Waal, 2003: 89).  Apparently, 
the nationalists were determined to use all available resources in order to mobilise 
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public support and securitise both Armenia and Armenians.  Armenia became a word 
coterminous with evil and the enemy.  Azerbaijanis nicknamed Abdurrahman Vezirov 
“Vezirian” — i.e. as Armenian (De Waal, 2003: 88) — because of his concessions and 
incapacity to handle the crisis (see Keller, 1990b).  Radical members of the Front were 
constantly shouting anti-Armenian slogans: “Long live Baku without Armenians!” (De 
Waal, 2003: 91, see also Rost, 1990).  Nationalists were on the rise to power and the 
Soviet government did not have the tools to prevent the crisis.  
 Gorbachev jetted his advisors and high-profile officials to Baku, including 
Evgeny Primakov, in a desperate attempt to save the situation and the USSR.  
Primakov was worried about the fate of the Soviet Union and was preoccupied with 
the task of preventing the secession of Azerbaijan (De Waal, 2003: 92).  On 12 January 
Viktor Polyanichko held talks with the opposition leaders and established a “National 
[Defence] Council” that was meant to protect Azerbaijan’s borders from Armenian 
invasion (De Waal, 2003: 90).  The Council was dominated by the nationalist leaders 
of the Front, Nemat Panakhov and Rahim Gaziev appeared on the local TV and told 
the Azerbaijani audience that Baku was full of homeless refugees, while thousands 
of Armenians lived comfortably in Azerbaijan (De Waal, 2003: 90).  The 
announcement incited further violence and resulted in a mass rally on 13 January in 
Lenin Square.  During that rally, mobs broke away from the main gathering and 
attacked local Armenian residents in their homes, using typed lists of their addresses 
(Swietochowski, 1995: 205, Nolyain, 1994: 557). On the same evening gangs 
participating in the rally went to attack Armenians (De Waal, 2003: 90, Binyon, 1990).  
Baku was transformed into a killing ground, Armenians were thrown from the 
balconies and windows of apartments across the city’s Armenian quarter 
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(Teimourian and Knipe, 1990).  Threatened Armenians went to the local police 
stations and a cinema Shafag protected by the Soviet troops (De Waal, 2003: 90).  
The Soviet army managed to evacuate Armenian nationals with ferries to 
Turkmenistan and then flew them to Yerevan (Swietochowski, 1995: 205). Armenians 
died during the violence and some during evacuation (Radio Moscow reporting 
several hundred deaths (Blitz, 1990)) or in the hospitals of Yerevan, though the death 
toll would have been higher without evacuation (Teimourian and Knipe, 1990).  
Switochowski notes that certain members of the Front risked their lives to protect 
Armenians, yet others either refrained from condemning the pogroms, or even 
participated in the acts of violence (1995: 205).     
 De Waal emphasizes that despite the fact that Moscow sent thousands of 
troops to prevent the massacres and escalation of the conflict, the killings still took 
place (2003: 90-91).  According to Azerbaijani human rights activists, many 
Armenians appealing to the soldiers did not get support, and were told that there 
was no order to intervene (2003: 91).  It is also known that the writer Yusif Samedoglu 
called the Central Committee and asked it to intercede but was told: “Let them 
slaughter” (De Waal, 2003: 91, Grigorian, 2010, Vlasova et al., 1990).  Armenian 
refugees talked about young members of the Popular Front participating in the 
killings, whereas many other members of the Front contradict the story and argue 
that they saved the lives of many Armenians (De Waal, 2003: 91).  As De Waal notes, 
apparently both stories are true, the Front had diverse membership; Zardusht 
Alizadeh and Leyla Yunusova, who left the Front, blame the leaders for doing nothing 
to stop violence (2003: 91).  Zardusht Alizadeh goes further and says that there were 
lists of Armenian addresses hanging outside the Popular Front headquarters, and 
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that the rally was organized by the Front and pogroms began shortly after that (De 
Waal, 2003: 91, Vlasova et al., 1990).  Alizadeh states that the PF leaders were 
responsible for organisation and support of violence (De Waal, 2003: 91, Alizadeh, 
2016).       
 The question is open: why did this tragedy take place and who was 
responsible for triggering the large-scale violence?  De Waal writes about a “strange 
collaboration” between the nationalists and Polyanichko that gave credence to 
conspiracy theorists; however, one of the radical representatives of the Front, Etibar 
Mamedov, said that the National Defence Council presented an opportunity to arm 
their party legally (2003: 91).  Political actors competed for influence and power, and 
the Communist Party and the Nationalists were in desperate need of legitimacy.  Ghia 
Nodia and Thomas De Waal assert that maybe the Communist Party and Polyanichko 
in particular attempted to boost their authority by conceding to the NFA (see Nodia, 
1996, De Waal, 2003: 91). There is further evidence in a report of the New York Times 
that points to three reasons:  
“1). Communist Party officials actively encouraged the growth of a nationalist 
political movement in Azerbaijan, the Popular Front, and tried for almost a year to 
turn it toward more chauvinist and militant activities. 2). The police and the K.G.B. 
appear to have had advance knowledge of the anti-Armenian attacks that broke out 
in Baku on Jan. 13, but did not move to prevent them.  3). The creation in January of 
an unofficial Azerbaijani paramilitary organization, the so-called National Defense 
Committee, was initiated by local Communist Party officials in an attempt to 
discredit the Popular Front.” (Keller, 1990a).  
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The New York Times reports that the National Defence Committee was in fact an idea 
promoted and planned by Polyanichko himself (Keller, 1990a).  Whilst addressing the 
possible scenarios of the plot, Bill Keller offers another possible explanation, in which 
Gorbachev himself inspired the conspiracy in order to campaign for extended 
presidential powers (1990a).  However, one must bear in mind that the local 
politicians had a direct role in implementing any of these plans.        
 After the exodus of Armenians and the deadly violence, it seemed nothing 
worse could happen in Baku.  However, the situation deteriorated as the Soviet 
government came to restore the Soviet order in post-Soviet Baku.  Apparently, the 
Gorbachev administration was unaware that after failing to prevent the Sumgait 
tragedy, and losing control over the Karabakh dispute, they were incapable of 
governing Azerbaijan.  To argue further, the New York Times reported that the 
turmoil in Azerbaijan challenged Gorbachev’s faith in the possibility of smooth 
reform and whether the Kremlin could hold the country together without force and 
intimidation (Keller, 1990a).  Cheterian notes that after the Soviet operation in Baku, 
Azerbaijanis felt that it was they who were the victims of the Soviet troops, rather 
than the Armenians (2008: 120).  The Baku tragedy was just another phase of the 
failures committed by Moscow.  Gorbachev sent an authoritative delegation to 
handle the crisis.  His ally Primakov attempted to get the situation under control, and 
the Soviet defence minister Dmitry Yazov also went to command troops; they 
imposed a state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Ganje but not in Baku (De 
Waal, 2003: 92, Keller, 1990a).  This decision was made amid the a nationalist storm 
in the streets of Baku, when barricades blocked the streets and nationalist activists 
held access to the building of the Central Committee building (De Waal, 2003: 92).  
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One of the members of the Politburo’s delegation, Andrei Girenko, remembers his 
conversations with the radical leaders who were asked to ease the tensions and 
begged them “to take down the barricades... to rescue people from a dangerous 
confrontation with the troops” (De Waal, 2003: 92).   
 Etibar Mamedov discusses Primakov’s warnings about possible secession 
from the USSR, as the Moscow emissary thought that Azerbaijan was “one step away 
from independence”, saying that “we won’t permit it at any price” (De Waal, 2003: 
92, Keller, 1990a). The Soviet army started its operation shortly after midnight, rolling 
in with tanks around the city and crashing into cars, ambulances and barricades; 
soldiers wounded and stabbed citizens, with about 40 thousand combat troops 
involved (Keller, 1990a).  It is estimated that between 130 and 170 Bakuvians and 21 
soldiers were killed, with several hundred (more than 700) wounded and about 400 
unaccounted for on the night of the Soviet intervention. An independent military 
investigation “Shchit” (Shield) later50 judged this to be a “war” on our own [Soviet] 
city, calling on authorities to lodge a criminal case against defence minister Yazov (De 
Waal, 2003: 93, Swietochowski, 1995: 205).  But Yazov defined the operation as a 
necessary measure “to destroy the political structure of the Popular Front to prevent 
their victory in the upcoming elections scheduled for March 19, 1990," (Aliyev, 2010, 
Keller, 1990a).   
 De Waal evaluates the intervention as “a tragedy” for Azerbaijan and the 
USSR, whilst Moscow gained control of Baku but lost Azerbaijan (2003: 93).  Baku’s 
citizens came out for mass funerals, the Communist Party was at its lowest as 
 50	An	investigation	was	held	during	the	1990s	and	produced	a	report	later	that	year	KUSHEN,	R.	1991.	Conflict	in	the	Soviet	Union:	Black	January	in	Azerbaidzhan.	In:	NEIER,	A.	(ed.).	New	York:	Human	Rights	Watch.	
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members publicly burned their cards (De Waal, 2003: 94), and the military operation 
killed the last shreds of hope that the USSR was capable to reform (Aliyev, 2010).  If 
Gorbachev had reacted more rapidly and prevented the massacres, the nationalist 
would have failed to gain such massive support (Vlasova et al., 1990).  The public 
rallied around the flag of the Popular Front, which actually was a group of political 
actors without any particular plan for the transformation of the republic.  The Soviet 
leader blamed the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan for submitting to the 
pressures of the nationalist groups by particularly accusing Azerbaijan for permitting 
anti-constitutional extremists to carry out “anti-people” actions (Swietochowski, 
1995: 206).  In other words, Gorbachev did not admit any responsibility that the USSR 
authorities might have had in that particular situation.  His position of accusing the 
nationalists in fact strengthened their stance, and pushed Azerbaijan closer to 
independence.     
 There was another tragedy in 1992 that helped Azerbaijan to “other” 
Armenians.  The Khojali massacre in February of 1992 left another deep wound in 
the memory of Karabakh’s Azerbaijani population.  Like the Sumgait massacre, there 
are scarce sources that could explain what happened on a chilly February day in the 
town that controlled access to the Stepanakert airport and the woods near Khojali 
and the Armenian village of Nakhichevanik.  Most probably it was an evacuation 
operation which went terribly wrong and ended up in the deaths of almost one 
thousand Azerbaijani civilians (New York Times, 1992, Goltz, 1999: 122).  As Thomas 
Goltz observes, Khojali was a very poorly defended village in Nagorno-Karabakh with 
an Azerbaijani population (Goltz, 1999: 120).  Goltz, a journalist who visited the place 
shortly before the massacre and was among the first to report it, finds it odd that the 
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Azeri government did not open the road from Khojali to Aghdam, observing that the 
locals found it bewildering too, which suggested that “the government actually 
wanted the Karabakh business to simmer on, to distract public attention while the 
elite continued to plunder the country” (1999: 120).  Brubaker and Laitin define such 
tactics as an intra-group mechanism that helps the “incumbents seeking to deflect 
within-group challenges to their position” to instigate provocations or dramatization 
of situation (1998: 433)     
 Some civilians were evacuated via helicopters, but, after the Armenian 
assault began on 25-26 February 1992, apparently to mark the Sumgait anniversary 
(Goltz, 1999: 121), the OMON commander asked the people to escape to Aghdam.  
Instead of Aghdam, the refugees ended up in a wood near Armenian village occupied 
by Armenian forces (De Waal, 2003: 171).  Goltz argues that the Baku authorities had 
done nothing to help the non-combatant population evacuate after the Armenian 
ultimatum was delivered (1999: 122).  Further, Goltz claims that the government in 
Baku had been in denial and did not report the massacre; on the contrary, they 
announced that Azeri forces had successfully attacked Armenians with just two 
casualties (Goltz, 1999: 124-125, Lieven, 1992).  While the government in Baku was 
spreading fake reports about the war theatre, Armenians attacked the civilian 
population, committing the worst massacre of the conflict.  Goltz observes how 
difficult it was to assure the Moscow correspondents of the BBC and the Washington 
Post that Armenians had attacked Azerbaijanis (1999: 124).  Although many 
Armenian fighters did not admit killing civilians, in a conversation with a reporter 
from the Guardian they said that “they [Azerbaijanis] hide among the women and 
children. Any that were killed were an error.  We regret all such mistakes” (Waldron, 
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1992).  Armenians admit the civilian deaths, but one-time military leader Serzh 
Sarkisian, who later became the president of Armenia, noted that the Khojali helped 
Armenia “to break the stereotype” of not being “serious” about the demands and 
territorial claim (De Waal, 2003: 172).    
 After Khojali, both parties ended up possessing symbolic capital that was used 
for further mutual securitization.  A war of historic analogies, narratives and national 
symbols has been gaining the momentum ever since.  Both parties acquired 
discursive power that made it possible to affirm critical vulnerability of referent 
objects and dehumanized Armenians and Azerbaijanis for each other.  Now it became 
acceptable to implement policies of exception and call to arms and armed 
confrontation.  One must also note that two out of three of Armenia’s presidents 
were military leaders in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh (Robert Kocharian and Serzh 
Sarkisian).  Building on the facts, one could argue that the securitization of minor 
differences was a successful project for political entrepreneurs in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, provided that it helped them to dominate the political scene and even 
weaponize the Karabakh issue.     
          
5.7.1. Symbols   
The names of nationalist parties across the South Caucasus are revealing.  In all three 
republics, parties and political groups chose symbolic names, referring to the public, 
nationalism or patriotism or a particular historic problem, as had been the case with 
the Karabakh Committee.  For the former Armenian president and one of the leaders 
of the Committee, Karabakh was not land, it “was a human being” — a symbol of a 
people that  had suffered seventy five years “under national oppression” (in 
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Cheterian, 2008: 122).  Hence, the names of the political parties epitomised symbols 
and divided communities, fomenting violent discourse and building localized versions 
of the Berlin Wall.  When Azerbaijani nationalists appeared on TV and accused their 
Armenian co-habitants of leading comfortable lives whilst Karabakh refugees 
suffered in temporary shelters, the “psychological crowd” was formed (Le Bon, 2001: 
13).  Gustav Le Bon argues that in certain circumstances, under violent emotions, the 
entire nation may become a crowd with sentiments and ideas heading into the same 
direction, eliminating conscious personality (2001: 13).  Panakhov and Gaziev 
supported the creation of the crowd that massacred Armenians.  The Soviet 
government — which was legally responsible for providing security to all its citizens 
— failed to act.  The preamble of the Soviet Constitution stated that it was “a society” 
founded on the principles of musketeers, that the welfare of every single citizen was 
a “law of life” of every member of the society (1977).  Yet these principles did not 
apply to those Armenians and Azerbaijanis who died during the clashes in January 
1990.                           
 Levon Chorbajian argues that the Azerbaijani authorities started to 
“terrorise” Armenian residents in the area, forcing them to abandon their homes and 
settle Azerbaijani nationals (1994: 37).  The Karabakh Armenians raised a legal and 
political issue regarding the jurisdiction of the area, but the reactions from Baku and 
Yerevan, and the inconsistent policies of the Kremlin, escalated the situation.  This 
demographic engineering is documented by several organizations that went to 
monitor the process in Armenia and Azerbaijan during the 1991 (Chorbajian, 1994: 




This chapter outlined the main events that triggered the armed conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh in 1980-90s.  It called attention to the narratives and discourses which 
served as performatives during those turbulent years.  It cited letters and opinions 
or interviews of prominent members of the Armenian, Azerbaijani or Soviet society 
securitized Armenians and Azerbaijanis against each other.  It also showed how 
discourses concerning identity, history and historic injustice amended the direction 
of thought among the public.  The empirical data shows that the dehumanization of 
the other drove the politics in the republics beyond the established rules of the game 
(see ch. 3).  The choices of symbols and their cultural or historical interpretation show 
local conditions and, by emphasizing the distal context, i.e. “experiential, context-
specific and tacit” (see ch. 3) findings, it is possible to add capacity to the “corpus of 
knowledge” about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Thus, this chapter has 
contributed to the studies of discursive conflicts and the ways political actors inflict 
particular beliefs on societies.   
 The response of the Soviet government to the Karabakh issue influenced 
further developments in Baku and Yerevan.  The members of the intelligentsia had a 
profound influence in the Soviet Union, hence their opinion was taken into 
consideration by the wider public.  In the time of Perestroika, the public felt under 
threat and looked for guidance.  The new leadership evolved, but it chose negative 
trajectories of engagement.  Prioritising an us and them dichotomy was the choice of 
particular political actors, writers, historians and the public of the previously isolated 
Soviet republics following the cause.  “The competitive society celebrates its heroes, 
the hierarchy celebrates its patriarchs and the sect its martyrs” (Douglas, 1986: 80).  
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That was the case in Armenia and Azerbaijan, with both sides having successfully 
antagonized each other and were free to pursue a hostile agenda.   
 Questions remain: why did the clashes take place?  Why did the government 
in Moscow refer to ethnic politics and launch a debate about nationalities policies 
without getting involved in the full research of the problem?  Was it a result of 
Perestroika and Glasnost, or had the Soviet system used up its resources?  Or was it 
a revelation of ethnic hatreds?  Was it instrumental for the purpose of maintaining 
support of the regional/local leaders?   These questions are unlikely to receive all-
encompassing answers, but one can argue about factors or actors that more-or-less 
accelerated the events.  Indeed, the USSR was a system hugely dependent on 
nationalist and ethnic policies.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Brubaker 
addresses the gap in managing ethnic politics.  The system was based on nationalities 
policy but did not have the sufficient and relevant institutions for such a set-up.  
 Jan Koehler and Christoph Zurcher argue that it is not essential to pinpoint 
who started the conflict and instigated the first clashes, but rather it is about the 
process of disintegration of institutions that controlled the dispute and negotiated 
order between the groups, that matters the most (2003: 147).  Their argument brings 
us to the difficulties that the reforms and Perestroika in particular faced.  To quote 
Machiavelli, “it must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out 
nor more doubtful of success nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new 
order of things” (1950: 21).  Despite all the efforts to become a pluralistic society, the 
legal and social problems were mostly interpreted to be “national” that is, 
“ethnicity”-based.  The discussion of the members of Politburo demonstrate this 
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approach.  They constantly refer to ethnic relations and nationality policies (see 
section 4).    
 Finally, this empirical section shows how the actors on all sides of the 
barricade securitized symbols, artefacts, and history, in order to build symbolic 
capital to help them gain power in the post-Soviet order.  My findings depict how 
putting ethnicity into the spotlight of political discourse atomized and divided a 
society.  One can see how the clashes in Sumgait, Baku and finally in Khojali created 
the existential threats that helped legitimise the breaking of rules (see Balzacq 
2011b).  Armenia and Azerbaijan created the hierarchy of threats where their 
ethnicity was the key denominator of loyalty and possibility of survival.  In other 
words, if someone was Armenian in Azerbaijan, or the other way around, they were 
depicted as threats to national identity, national existence and the country.  The 
regime of truth that made these atrocities possible was a socially constructed 
undertaking.  The speech acts of prominent members of the intelligentsia 
demonstrate the vulnerability of pluralism, as it requires constant process of 
communication of diverse ideas and thoughts.  Yet the elites in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were selecting symbols from the past that in fact attacked the foundations 
of their consequent societies: diversity and multiculturalism.  The distal context of 
securitization uncovers how particular political entrepreneurs inflicted resentment 






6. Chapter Six  
Georgia at War with Itself 
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter addresses the discourses that divided Georgia between liberalism and 
nationalism, the rights of the majority and the minority, and how the force of 
liberation from the USSR transformed into “ethnic hegemonism and anti-pluralism” 
(Jones, 1993: 288).  Nationalist leaders built a discursive wall and fractured society 
into antagonistic clusters that were unable to communicate and negotiate.  As many 
agree, one will find it impossible to understand the reasons of alienation of minorities 
without reference to Gamsakhurdia’s concept of extreme nationalism (English, 2008: 
23).  This chapter acts as a thematic guide to the discursive wars between Tbilisi, 
Sokhumi and Tskhinvali at the time when Moscow’s involvement caused resentment 
among Georgians.  By engaging with the political debate about nationalism and 
ethnicity, it tells a story of securitization in the 1980s in the Soviet republic of 
Georgia.  At the time of the conflict, Georgia was a quasi-independent state and the 
Soviet Union was disintegrating (it was dissolved on 26 December 1991).   
 This chapter comprises two large sections, with one featuring Georgia’s 
Ossetian dilemma and the other providing insight into the escalation of the Abkhaz 
issue.  The first section outlines those performatives found in the speeches of 
politicians and intellectuals about South Ossetia, which eventually became messages 
aimed at Abkhaz.  It focuses on the ideas that governed public opinion at a time of 
great social turbulence.  The second section is about Abkhazia and deals with the 
language of disputes before the war in 1992.  In sum, this chapter, analyses the 
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power of performatives that created the discourse of destruction and shows how 
Georgians made a part of their “We”, the “Other”.  Finally, it concludes with some 
broader observations about securitization and society.  By supporting differentiation 
among its regions and citizens, Georgia gradually went to war with itself.  The country 
sleepwalked into what can be defined as the most significant crisis since the Soviet 
occupation of 1921.                  
  
6.2. Political escalation    
The story of the first escalation of the crisis in Georgia began with the decision, by 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, to abolish the autonomous status of South Ossetia.  
Gamsakhurdia always viewed Georgia as a unitary state and never tolerated 
devolution (see English, 2008: 21).  South Ossetia was the first ‘victim’ of those 
policies.  Or, to be more precise, it was easier to attack the status of an oblast than 
of a republic (Abkhazia) (see Chapter 4)51.    
 Gamsakhurdia, a literary critic, translator of Charles Baudelaire and a son of 
the renowned Georgian writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, was a favourite among 
nationalist leaders.  He was one of the intellectuals from Tbilisi who attached deep 
emotional content to the idea of nationalism and ethnicity (Tishkov, 1997: 13).  To 
borrow from Valery Tishkov, he was a “type” who converted myths and emotions 
into a socio-political tool (1997: 13).  He was seen by Georgians as an emblematic 
example of a patriot and a charismatic leader (see English, 2008, Ditrych, 2010: 13) 
who was treated as “a superhuman” with “exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber, 
 51	Constitutionally,	South	Ossetia	had	a	less	significant	status	than	Abkhazia.	
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1964: 358, see Geoika, 2009).  He placed great emphasis on the emotional response 
of the public and often manipulated the facts in his favour.  Such credentials had 
seemed to damage his authority and ability to govern the country, although it was 
his charisma that helped him to win Presidency in 1991.   
 Georgian dissidents pursued two separate lines: on the one hand they were 
reporting human rights abuses, exposing the Soviet regime, and at the same time 
they promoted the discourse of nationalism, campaigning for the Georgian language 
and sensitive to issues of ethnic relations (Cheterian, 2008: 158-159).  Making the 
cultural and national pre-eminence of Georgians the central point of the 
independence discourse had produced tremendous consequences.  Allocating 
principal significance to ethnicity made Georgia vulnerable to divisions, while at the 
same time disenfranchising non-Georgian citizens.  The perception of the majority of 
Georgian dissidents was defined as a struggle between Soviet “cosmopolitanism” 
and Georgian national heritage, which, according to Cheterian, was problematic as it 
excluded almost a third of Georgia’s population (2008: 159).  For Gamsakhurdia, 
democracy was a secondary achievement after independence (Jones, 2013: 57).  
However, the prism chosen by the dissidents-turned-nationalists was not very 
Georgian.  This was a product of a fragmented history that was taught to their 
generation of students (see chapter 4).  Having been a bridge between civilizations 
and continents, Georgia always celebrated its diversity and culture.  Heterogeneity 
was reflected in architecture, as well as in poetry and literature.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, the operationalisation of history demeaned the significance and 
role of multiculturalism.  Cheterian argues that the nationalist discourse threatened 
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ethnic minorities, but that they thought that the Soviet government could be a 
guarantor of their rights, or at the very least of the status quo (2008: 159).           
 Gamsakhurdia was arrested in 1977 for anti-Soviet activities which he 
recounted on Soviet television (see also Cheterian, 2008: 160, Gugushvili, 2011), and 
later testified against two Western reporters (Nodia, 1996: 77).  In the speech, he 
names officials of the US Embassy in Moscow who allegedly gave him anti-Soviet 
literature.  Thanks to his confession, he received a mild sentence and lived in a 
remote North Caucasus town (Kachubey) for three years before being released, 
whilst his accomplice, Merab Kostava, refused to confess and was sent to a Siberian 
(Perm) prison (Chagelishvili, 2002b).  Kostava was only released in 1987.  This episode 
had cast a doubt on Gamsakhurdia’s further political career, particularly after the 
sudden death of Kostava amid dubious circumstances in late 1989.      
 Later Gamsakhurdia claimed that he left prison because was concerned that 
the nationalist movement had been left leaderless after his and Kostava’s arrest 
(Nodia, 1996: 77).  Apart from his ambiguous political biography, he managed to 
consolidate the nationalist forces and gain power in post-Communist Georgia.  His 
political party, “Round Table — Independent Georgia” (the name was associated with 
King Arthur), won the majority of parliamentary seats and made him the leader of 
the country.  His allies and party members introduced radical hyper-nationalism as a 
new norm.  They fundamentally changed the tone and language of the official 
narrative, instilling aggression and intolerance toward non-Georgian citizens 
(Chagelishvili, 2002b).  The “Round Table” representatives controlled the main TV 
channel and the country gradually started to slide into autocracy.  This was a new 
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post-Communist Georgia that embraced the worst traditions of Bolshevism with a 
new vigour.   
 Nationalistic discourse was activated in Georgia in 1980s and peaked during 
1987-1990.  The very first nationalist rally was held on 14 April 1978, when the 
students of Tbilisi State University came into the streets to defend the status of the 
Georgian language (see Sakwa, 1998: 241, Cheterian, 2008: 161).  The Soviet 
Government prepared a constitutional amendment that was to limit the status of the 
Georgian language and replace the official language of the republic with Russian 
(Smith et al., 1998: 172).  Eduard Shevardnadze (then the First Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia) sided with the youth, 
referring to the public opinions of workers and the intelligentsia (Archive, 2017, 
Shevardnadze, 2006: 87-100).  He managed to secure the status of the Georgian 
language.  In an interview from 1998, Shevardnadze insisted that it was his decision 
to side with students and to preserve the official status of Georgian language (Reality, 
2015).       
 Those events were fruitful soil on which to build the nationalistic narrative 
and ignite patriotism across the country.  Leaders such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
Merab Kostava, Giorgi Chanturia, and others gained popular support and 
campaigned for an independent Georgia.  Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost in 
particular, had opened up new avenues for the nationalist groups.  Now they had a 
chance to participate in the debates that Gorbachev was offering to the suppressed 
and isolated Soviet people.  However, the nationalist leaders opted for a radical 
discourse and decided to rally the people around the Georgian flag that had originally 
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been a symbol of the Mensheviks.52 1988 and 1989 were the crucial years for the 
freedom fighters, when they organized and led mass protests across the country.  
The main message of that undertaking was an independent Georgia that would 
embrace the values and ideals of the French Revolution. 
 The first wave of demonstrations started in November 1988, when almost 
two hundred thousand people gathered to reject the proposed changes to the Soviet 
Constitution that would strip republics of the theoretical right to secede from the 
USSR, but the proposed amendments were withdrawn for fear of further national 
mobilization (Cheterian, 2008: 162).  By organizing massive protests, the nationalists 
and freedom fighters saw new momentum and the opportunity now that the USSR 
was disintegrating, and it saw possible to obtain independence.  To quote a leading 
Georgian intellectual of the time, Akaki Bakradze: “I wish for the imploding of the 
Soviet Empire as soon as possible”. Cheterian notes that the nationalists succeeded 
in creating a sense of urgency and that change was on its way (in 2008: 163).  
Bakradze was a prominent public intellectual and an academic whose ideas shaped 
the political discourse of the time, and he admitted that Georgia was competing with 
a far bigger adversary: Russia.  In an interview in 1991, he emphasizes the fact that 
Georgia was conducting a “battle” and that the only resource it could use was 
intellectual supremacy and the management of economic problems (Bakradze, 
1991).  Yet Bakradze was disliked by Gamsakhurdia, and his party and was pushed to 




 In January 1989, the London newspaper The Independent reported on the 
events in the South Caucasus based on a piece in the Soviet newspaper, Pravda.  The 
Soviet newspaper identified “Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava and Gia Chanturia 
as the main instigators of 'inhumanity, adventurism and barbarism,' and of organising 
meetings and marches 'to stir up national hatreds’” (Cornwell, 1989). Since 
November 1988, there had been mass protests across Georgia, including hunger 
strikes.  The “speakers at the rallies demanded Georgia's withdrawal from the Soviet 
Union, and shouted slogans such as 'Georgia for the Georgians,' 'Long live Georgian 
independence,' 'Let blood flow' and 'To terror we will reply with terror'” (Cornwell, 
1989).  Many leaders in the aftermath of the tragedy that happened on 9 April 1989 
denied the slogans, though those words were uttered and groups marched through 
the streets of Tbilisi crying out those words, threatening and mobilizing communities 
(Chagelishvili, 2002b).  These protests and demands articulated by the nationalist 
groups caused a sense of insecurity among the citizens.  Everyone discussed politics: 
taxi drivers, shopkeepers, teachers, students and their parents.  The discourse of 
national identity and nationalism transformed multicultural Tbilisi into an arena for 
chauvinists and nationalists.  They looked for ‘others’ in their midst, which led to the 
disintegration and segregation of society.  Georgia was heading toward a rift 
between Zviadists (those who shared Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist views) and anti-
Zviadists — the section of society that knew nationalism was a self-defeating tool and 
rejected Gamsakhurdia’s stance.  One of the participants of those events and a 
prominent film director, Goga Khaindrava, confirmed during an interview that 
Gamsakhurdia’s discourse was a deliberate attempt to stir enmity through his 
speeches (Khaindrava, 2013).   
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 The culmination of the nationalist discourse and anti-Soviet demands was 9 
April 1989.  In the early hours of the morning, Soviet special forces dissolved the anti-
Soviet hunger strike in Rustaveli Avenue in central Tbilisi.  The leaders of the 
opposition, i.e. the nationalists, knew there might be bloodshed, as Soviet tanks were 
ready to intervene in Lenin Square, just few hundred meters away from the hunger 
strike.  The leader of the Church of All Georgia Ilia II went to address the protesters 
and asked them to dissolve the strike and follow him to the church across the street. 
Ilia said “there was a threat” and that the “threat is a few minutes away” (see also 
Cheterian, 2008: 164, Imedi, 2013).  However, the footage demonstrates how the 
nationalist leaders reacted to the news.  They were furious about the Patriarch’s plea, 
and, concerned about their reputation and accusations of treason, they rejected a 
compromise.  They were worried they might be accused of “national treason” and 
stayed on the site (Imedi, 2013).  After refusing to disband, several thousand people 
faced the tanks which were rolling in, while Soviet forces used tear gas and batons to 
dissolve the protesters.  Interestingly, none of the nationalist leaders were injured, 
but 21 young people died and hundreds of poisoned or injured individuals were taken 
to the hospitals in Tbilisi, with the government commission estimating that about 
4000 applied for medical treatment (see Cheterian, 2008: 164, Glebov and Crowfoot, 
1989: 65).  The April tragedy was a watershed moment for nationalists and the 
Communist Party, and the Central Committee’s incapacity to manage the crisis 
helped the freedom fighters to accentuate their nationalistic sentiments.      
The next day Tbilisi was quiet — in mourning — and its citizens were asking 
why the tragedy had happened in the first place.  It is argued that some of the 
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nationalist leaders were in favour of a violent scenario,53 because a bloody outcome 
meant more tools for the political mobilization of the nation around the flag of unity 
and against the Communist regime.  That morning of 9 April was the beginning of the 
final stage in empowerment of the nationalist and historic narratives that were later 
used to escalate the situation in the republic.  The tragedy, which was a 
demonstration of inability of the USSR government to deal with the crisis, helped the 
nationalist leaders to strengthen their positions and pursue an agenda of identity-
based political order.  Similarly, to the crisis in Baku, the Soviet government had only 
one option — the use of force.  And force meant more power and authority to the 
nationalist groups who in the public perception defended national interests.  By 
opting for a violent response, the Soviet government in effect outsourced power to 
the opposition groups, and was left unable to govern.  According to a poll presented 
to the Central Committee in Tbilisi shortly after the events, 71 per cent of 
respondents had a negative view of the Communist leadership and 42 per cent 
claimed that the Communist Party was against the public interest (Slider, 1991: 66).  
Tensions were so high that eventually the Soviet Deputy from Georgian SSR Tamaz 
Gamkrelidze warned the Congress of Soviet Deputies that “it may give rise to 
unforeseeable actions at any moment” (speech quoted in Glebov and Crowfoot, 
1989: 69).  On that Sunday morning of 9 April, Tbilisi residents began to ask about 
the first secretary of the Communist Party Jumber Patiashvili, who was absent from 
the public scene.  The formal leader of the republic was unable to prevent the tragedy 
 53	Gamsakhurdia,	Z.	1992.	‘Baton	Igor	Yakovlevs’.	Available	at:	http://www.nplg.gov.ge/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.exe?e=d-01000-00---off-0preziden--00-1----0-10-0---0---0direct-10---4-------0-1l--11-ka-50---20-about---00-3-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&cl=CL4.7&d=HASH4b769f64c2b7db295da449		This	is	a	copy	of	the	letter	addressed	to	Igor	Yakovlev,	head	of	the	Soviet	TV,	Gamsakhurdia	accuses	him	of	misinformation	when	the	First	Channel	of	the	Soviet	TV	broadcast	news	that	Gamsakhurdia	said	in	an	interview	that	“blood”	was	necessary.			
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(Kaufman, 2001: 102), which resulted in a loss of credibility for the Communist 
government. 
 In an interview in 2013, Patiashvili did explain his position, arguing that he 
was a victim of the nationalists’ behaviour (Patiashvili, 2013).  Apparently, he was not 
prepared for a massive nationalist mobilization.  Yet he denied any affiliation with 
nationalists, while admitting that most of his colleagues from other republics, 
particularly the Baltic states, thought that Patiashvili was empowering national 
forces in order to secure his post-Soviet position in the government. This is an 
accusation that he categorically denies (Patiashvili, 2013).   
 However, in his notes from the meeting of the Politburo on 20 April 1989 
,Gorbachev’s aide Anatoly Chernyaev writes that Gorbachev had accused Patiashvili 
of “having a taste” for “decisive action” — i.e. the use of force (2000: 219).  Despite 
preaching about democracy and the need for engagement ,Gorbachev could not 
persuade his cadres54 to work through political means, as they thought that would 
be an apparent sign of weakness (Chernyaev, 2000: 219).  For Gorbachev, 9 April was 
a “crisis of methods” where the KGB, the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Party and 
the Foreign Ministry had their own interests, and he could recognise their 
“handwriting” in the events in Tbilisi (Chernyaev, 2000: 219).  Not only was 
Gorbachev adamant on this point, but his head of the government Nikolai Ryzhkov 
also claimed that he (Ryzhkov) got the news about Tbilisi from Pravda (Chernyaev, 
2000).  Chernyaev’s reports reveal that the Ministry of Defence and the conservative 
block of the Soviet leadership, who considered Perestroika as betrayal of the 
 54	Patiashvili	was	a	personal	friend	of	Gorbachev;	they	went	to	the	Soviet	Party	School	together	
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principles of the 1917 October Revolution, ordered the breakup of the peaceful 
protestors.  Gorbachev directly accused Dmitry Yazov (Minister of Defence) of an 
abuse of authority and declared, “the army cannot get involved in civilian affairs 
without the knowledge of the Politburo” (Chernyaev, 2000: 220).  Chernyaev 
remembers his private discussion the next day with Gorbachev (after their Politburo 
session), when he stated that “the Georgian leadership crap in their pants and send 
the army, Russian boys, against the people” (2000: 220).  Gorbachev was let down 
by the siloviki55 (security forces allied with the military) branch of the Communist 
government.  Yet at the same time his own “cadres” were ill-prepared to fulfil his 
agenda of the liberalization and transformation of the USSR.  Patiashvili possessed 
the capabilities to limit the radicals, but he did not use them.  He allowed the radicals 
to escalate the situation and, later on, was entrapped by his own inaction/passivity.  
Undoubtedly, he wished to deny any of those accusations, yet there are too many 
facts that speak against him.                   
 A moderate politician of the time, Nodar Natadze, confirms the claims that 
the Communists in fact helped and deliberately encouraged “radicals”, and in 
particular supported Gamsakhurdia’s eminence (Nodia, 1996: 76).  As Nodia argues, 
the Communists had a “reason” to boost radicals because the Baltic states’ example 
demonstrated that moderate opposition politicians were much more consistent and 
dangerous compared to populists, who just rallied in the streets and had loud slogans 
(1996: 76).  At the same time, Nodia acknowledges that the “morally bankrupted” 




illegal methods of political competition (1996: 76).  Suffice to say that both views 
may be valid as the post 9 April leader of the Communist Party Givi Gumbaridze, 
supported many of the initiatives of nationalists and Gamsakhurdia in particular, 
while a tandem of Communists and radicals side-lined the moderate parties.             
 The failure of the Soviet experiment to promote openness and democracy 
across the republics and communities had unintended consequences.  Article 9 of 
the Soviet Constitution stipulated that social democracy was the main direction of 
the political development of the state (1977).  It emphasized the importance of social 
participation, the expansion of openness and the consideration of public opinion 
(1977).  Yet this article was not practiced; it was a symbol of the Soviet democracy 
rather than a working instrument supposed to serve the state and its units (see 
Sakwa 1998).  Now nationalists referred to the Constitution and asked the 
government in Moscow to acknowledge the rights of the republics, which also 
implied the right to secede (1977).  As mentioned earlier, the 9 April strengthened 
the demands of nationalists and added legitimacy to their cause.  After the tragedy, 
the Communist government lost credibility as the public sided with the nationalists 
(Chagelishvili, 2002b).  One could argue that national identification became a political 
force powerful enough to challenge the Communist monopoly on power.  Shortly 
after the crisis the freedom fighters organized marches against the Communist 
regime chanting assaulting words and accusing then Communist administration of 
the Georgian SSR of treason of their country (Chagelishvili, 2002b).  Gamsakhurdia 
and his party were on the road to power and by May 1991, Georgia, although 
formally part of the Soviet Union, had an elected Supreme Soviet and its leader Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia.  Gamsakhurdia was a radical who manipulated the moderate 
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Georgian populace into a chauvinistic mob (Jones, 2006: 257).  His ideas were based 
mainly on the threat of Georgia’s disintegration, the fear of Russian power and the 
possible neglect of Georgian interests (Jones, 2006: 257).  Gamsakhurdia portrayed 
Georgians as victims in their own state, referring to two national traumas: the 9 April 
1989 and the 15 July clashes in Sokhumi (Jones, 2006: 257).  His discourse was the 
source of the oppressor/oppressed dichotomy in Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-
Ossetian relations.  He openly claimed that the Abkhaz as a nation does not exist at 
all, and that it was just a name of a Western Georgian province (Chagelishvili, 2002a).  
Stephen Jones thinks that in a time of volatility and instability, of physical and 
economic insecurity it was understandable that a tiny country like Georgia led by 
inexperienced elites could have had a different attitude toward political issues (2006: 
257).  Yet it was the boundary between the discrimination and privilege defined by 
ethnicity that played the major role.  A normative authority was assigned to ethnic 
belonging that weaponised the difference.  Indeed, insecurity was part of the post-
Communist agenda, although taking into consideration Gamsakhurdia’s knowledge 
of nationalism he would have been aware of the risks inherent in dogmatized 
discourse.       
 Gamsakhurdia’s vision of a unitary Georgia was translated into nationalist 
discourse and stirred up ethnic sentiments. He thought that his project would take 
time to be implemented, but he chose to start with South Ossetia (George, 2009: 
110).  He always demonstrated his religious (Christian) outlook and the belief that 
Georgia was a “martyr” nation.56 Gamsakhurdia called on paramilitary groups such 
as Jaba Ioseliani’s Mkhedrioni to arrange a defensive force during the rally to 
 56	He	used	the	word	in	several	speeches	that	are	quoted	in	the	thesis.	
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Tskhinvali, “to protect independence” (George, 2009: 111).  Ioseliani’s group, along 
with other armed militias, went to Tskhinvali to “fix the situation” (George, 2009: 
111), that was their interpretation of the action.  “Fixing” the problem, meant the 
use of force against Ossetians who shared the secessionist idea and wished to 
separate from Georgia.  The “peaceful” rally ended in violent clashes that lasted for 
two days, killing six, and injuring 140 people on both sides (George, 2009: 111). 
 Another important decision that served to increase the segregation between 
the multinational communities, was the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet 
Georgia in August 1990 that banned regionally-based political organizations and 
parties from parliamentary elections (planned for October of 1990) (Zverev, 1996: 
42).  Such policies were clearly a demonstration of a nationalistic stance.  The Central 
Committee of the Communist Party in Tbilisi was under pressure from the nationalist 
groups and issued an exclusive decision that side-lined Abkhaz and Ossetian political 
entities.  After winning the elections Gamsakhurdia announced that the autonomous 
regions/oblasts would be preserved, but despite his declaration Ossetian autonomy 
was abolished on 22 November 1990.  He saw the autonomies as “divisive vestiges” 
of the Soviet system (English, 2008: 23).  At the same time, the regional (Abkhaz and 
Ossetian) political actors were isolated from the main political events in Tbilisi — the 
elections disenfranchised the national minorities, making them ‘others’, and thus 
different from the rest of Georgia (see also Cheterian, 2008: 174).  The main reason 
for this disenfranchisement was the decision of the Communist administration to ban 
the Abkhaz and Ossetian political parties from the first parliamentary elections in the 
history of Soviet Georgia.  Additionally, Gamsakhurdia offered a new citizenship law 
in summer 1990; he insisted that only those Georgians whose forbears had lived in 
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Georgia before the Tsarist occupation in 1801 were eligible to qualify (Jones, 1993: 
295, Forsyth, 2013: 681).   
 Some of the nationalists disagreed with Gamsakhurdia and announced the 
decision to abolish South Ossetia’s autonomous status as “politically unjustified and 
premature”, for example, Giorgi Chanturia thought it was an inappropriate and 
premature step given that Georgia was not yet a fully independent state (Zverev, 
1996: 44).  Chantuaria thought that such a move was a trump card awarded to the 
Kremlin (Zverev, 1996: 44), because Georgian nationalists thought that ethnic 
differences would be the first pressure point for the Kremlin against the 
independence movement in Georgia (Chagelishvili, 2002b).  In a personal interview 
Irakli Shengleaia57 confirmed these disagreements, and he cited their conversations 
when Chanturia was against the radical alienation of ethnic minorities (2013).  The 
problem with the entire nationalist movement was their radicalism, for despite being 
against the abolition of autonomy, Chantuaria’s analysis had its own flaws.  He did 
not offer any middle ground, but was convinced that the autonomy should be 
abolished after Georgia received international recognition.  The footage of those 
years demonstrate that, overall, the entire movement shared Gamsakhurdia’s radical 
ideology about the unitary state in Georgia (Chagelishvili, 2002b).   
 Gamsakhurdia went further in the Ossetian issue and sent paramilitaries to 
Tskhinvali in December 1990, launching a blockade of the region that lasted until July 
1992 (Zverev, 1996: 44).  Gorbachev reacted on 7 January 1991, by repealing both 
decisions i.e. proclamation of the Ossetian Autonomous Republic and the Georgian 
 57	He	was	an	active	and	influential	member	of	the	independence	movement	but	did	not	join	Gamsakhurdia’s	party.		He	is	an	academic	specializing	in	the	studies	of	Caucasus.			
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decision to abolish the autonomy (Zverev, 1996: 44).  Gorbachev’s decree ordered 
both parties to withdraw paramilitaries and military formations within three days, 
but the Georgian Supreme Soviet rejected the order and no steps were taken toward 
de-escalation (Zverev, 1996: 44).  However, a week later the president of the 
Chamber of Nationalities of the USSR visited Tbilisi and found a compromise: Georgia 
was asked to acknowledge that its police force was under the subordination of the 
Soviet Ministry of Interior and in return was given an opportunity to deal with South 
Ossetia “as it saw fit” (Zverev, 1996: 44).   
 This deal was again a demonstration of the failure of the Soviet authorities to 
govern the units and use appropriate instruments to solve the conflicts.  Instead, the 
Soviet government demonstrated that it sought formal acknowledgement of its 
power, while in reality it controlled nothing.  While the Kremlin received an assurance 
that they still supervised the police (militia) in Georgia on paper, in reality they had 
no tools of leverage.   
 In response to Gorbachev’s decision, Gamsakhurdia wrote an open letter to 
the Soviet leader asking him to rethink the issue and to refrain from intervention in 
the internal matters of Georgia.  Gamsakhurdia denounced the order on the 
withdrawal of armed forces, as the Soviet army was entitled to stay in the premises 
(Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 48).58  Gamsakhurdia spoke in the name of the Georgian 
people and wrote to Gorbachev about the ‘fury’ experienced across Georgia by non-
Georgians as well as those who wished to continue the path to independence along 
the Georgian nation (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 48).  The Georgian nationalist leader 
 58	This	is	a	collection	of	primary	sources	about	conflicts	in	Georgia	collected	and	published	by	the	Centre	for	Study	of	Regionalism,	Tbilisi,	Georgia	
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thought that a few separatists and extremists who managed to occupy high-profile 
positions in South Ossetia had tried to impede Georgia’s 2000-year struggle for 
territorial integrity and for that region in particular (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 48).  
Gamsakhurdia then offered a short course in the history of Shida Kartli or 
Samachablo59 and restated his position that Ossetians were not entitled to the lands 
they resided in, defining the autonomous status as an illegal act imposed upon the 
Georgian people by the Soviet occupiers who did not have the consent of the 
Georgian people in the 1920s (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 48-49). For Gamsakhurdia, 
then, the status was illegal and he was radical in defining it thus, appealing to 
Gorbachev to deal with the South Ossetian issue exclusively, without reference to 
other Soviet autonomies, as he emphasized the unique case of Samachablo 
(Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 49).  Gamsakhurdia referred to Ossetians as “a bunch of 
extremists” who were wrapped in the ‘mantle of fighters for self-determination’ and 
requested the USSR government to recognize Georgia’s right to sovereignty 
(Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 49).  By highlighting many historical examples and using 
powerful rhetoric, the letter aimed to demonstrate a patriotic stance and expose the 
Soviet regime.  Further, the letter asked Gorbachev to make it clear to the 
“separatists” that they would not have the backing of the central government in 
Moscow (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 51).   
 Gamsakhurdia’s letter and explicit contextualization of history securitized the 
historic narrative.  His language and empowerment of symbols helps to define a 
subjective meaning of an action (see Yanow ch.3).  It reveals how ethnic difference 
 59	These	are	the	alternative	names	of	the	territory.		Shida	Kartli	means	middle	Kartli	(Kartli	is	an	ancient	Georgian	province	that	gave	name	to	Saqartvelo	[Georgia])	and	Samachablo	is	a	name	of	princedom	after	prince	Machabeli	who	owned	the	province	in	the	medieval	period.			
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was assigned a priority in the discourse, making the securitization of ethnic 
difference the main policy of nationalists.  It was Gamsakhurida’s choice to interpret 
historic myths in hostile terms, and it is hard to overestimate the importance of his 
influence.  It was his preference to paint the world in Hobbesian terms (see Snyder 
ch.3) that wove “designative connections” between the meaning of the words (see 
Taylor ch.3).  Lexical choices represent thought as thought represents itself (Foucault 
ch.3) helping to examine and understand the distal context of the securitization in 
Georgia at the time.  The narrative of us v them created mental images of an enemy 
(e.g. Abkhaz or Ossetian) that was an existential threat to Georgia and Georgianess.         
A mutual boycott of elections and referendums added radicalism to the 
debate over the future of Georgia and South Ossetia as a federative unit.  In 1991, 
Gorbachev initiated a USSR-wide referendum about the future of the Union.  The 
question was simple: whether the people of the USSR were for or against keeping 
the Union.  Gamsakhurdia denounced the referendum and announced that it would 
be boycotted by Georgia (Zverev, 1996: 45).  Contrary to his point, the South Ossetian 
and Abkhaz authorities decided to take part in the referendum and they voted for 
the Union.  Meanwhile, in Georgia, Gamsakhurdia proposed a referendum on the 
independence of Georgia from the USSR, which was boycotted by the Ossetians (as 
well as Abkhaz), and Georgians voted for independence with over 90 per cent voting 
in favour.   
 In 1992 there was another referendum in South Ossetia where the people 
were asked whether they wished to join Russia, with more than 90 per cent voting 
for the proposal, while the local Georgian population boycotted the vote (Zverev, 
1996: 45).  South Ossetian authorities put up two questions for the public 
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referendum.  The first one was about the independence of South Ossetia: “Do you 
agree or disagree that South Ossetia be an independent republic?”.  And the second 
question was: “Do you agree or disagree with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of 
the South Ossetian Republic to join Russia?” (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 287).  On 24 
January 1992, the Ossetian Electoral Commission announced that 99 per cent of 
voters supported self-determination and at the same time voted to join Russia.  The 
statement emphasized the aspirations of the Ossetian people toward self-
determination and political change (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 289).  It stressed the 
significance of the people’s will that was freely expressed despite the accusations of 
pressure (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 289).60  Simultaneously, the Commission rejected 
the Georgian claims that Ossetians who lived outside the autonomous oblast did not 
support the independence and join Russia, as the refugees who participated in the 
referendum in North Ossetia praised the idea (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 289).  It was 
indicated in the statement that the South Ossetian authorities were firmly following 
international norms and their path to democratic transition was lawful (Diasamidze, 
2002-2011: 289).     
 
6.3. Mutual accusations  
Georgians linked the territorial issue and Ossetian discontent to being “historical 
victim” in-between empires and viewed national minorities as a fifth column 
(Sammut, 1996: 8).  The historical pattern permeates ethnic difference, as the history 
of the Georgian kingdom is ethnicized, particularly in Soviet historiography.  
 60	Georgian	political	groups	accused	extremist	forces	in	instigating	the	public	unrest.			
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Ultimately, the history that was published and publicized during Soviet times is the 
one that dominates the hearts and minds of the nation.  That particular approach to 
history was the only method used in Soviet historiography.   Instrumentalization of 
stories and myths opened political opportunities for nationalists.  It is worth noting 
that several generations of Georgian schoolchildren did not study the history of 
Georgia at all in the Soviet period.  The lack of education, lack of knowledge of history 
and multiple existing myths about the heroic past of the Georgian nation made for 
very fruitful soil for the nationalist leaders and their followers to create an 
advantageous discourse for the mobilization of popular support.        
 The Ossetian version of this dilemma contradicts the Georgian.  Ludwig 
Chibirov, then chairman of the South Ossetian Supreme Council, defined the 
aspirations for independence as a “pragmatic” matter for the Ossetian people, who 
had suffered “genocide” from Georgians (Sammut, 1996: 8).  The language of 
communication between polities had underlined only negative memories.  Ossetians 
defined the local clashes during the Menshevik government as an attempt by 
Georgians to annihilate Ossetians in the 1920s.  The struggle between the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks in the post-imperialist South Caucasus was a political matter of 
clashing ideologies and political leaders.  Mensheviks ran the short-lived 
independent Georgian Democratic Republic, while the Bolsheviks wished to seize 
power and managed to bring Ossetians into their camp.  Accordingly, the Menshevik 
leadership fought against the Ossetian rebels who supported the Bolsheviks.   
 In the 1990s, Chibirov declared that South Ossetia was looking for security 
and Russia was the only guarantor of the small nation’s survival: “...this striving for 
survival as an ethno-political entity — and identity — drove us to ‘side with Soviet 
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Russia’ — not our genetic love for Bolshevism, Sovietism and other ‘isms’...” 
(Sammut, 1996: 8).  In other words, Chibirov used the events of the 1920s to claim 
the threat and depict the Georgians as enemies.  In the 1920s the Bolsheviks 
overtook the Menshevik government and annexed Georgia.  The South Ossetian 
territory, which was previously known as Samachablo, was granted an autonomous 
status within Georgia.  If Ossetians viewed autonomy as a legal shield or as a 
protection from future threats, Georgians perceived the autonomous status as a 
forcible tool or an artificial edifice to pursue Russian imperial interests in Georgia 
(Sammut, 1996: 9).  The discourse illuminates the insecurities experienced by the 
Ossetian authorities and public as a result (see Zverev, 1996: 14-17).  Residents of 
the tiny region were scared to listen to Georgian radicals, whose leaders used the 
sense of insecurity to promote power positions.  On the one hand, Georgian 
nationalists disliked all non-Georgians and depicted them as threats, but Ossetian 
leaders felt insecure and gained public support for their own nationalist projects.  
Ossetians asked for support from kindred ethnicity in the North, set up paramilitary 
formations, and expelled foreigners from their territories (Zverev, 1996: 14).   
 Notably for the Ossetians, the separation from Tbilisi was as legitimate as 
Georgia’s drive for independence from the USSR (Cheterian, 2008: 172).  Besides, the 
Ossetians feared an independent Georgia as they were worried about a nationalist 
backlash, because the Georgian nationalists were prepared to return to the 
Constitution of 1921, which did not allocate any legal status to South Ossetia or 
Abkhazia (Cheterian, 2008: 172).  Another dimension for the Ossetians was the 
perspective of losing Moscow as an “overlord” who for them represented a judge, a 
mediator and preserved the balance in the Caucasus.  This made Ossetians fearful of 
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facing their bigger neighbour, Georgia, without any institutional instruments of 
negotiation or dispute resolution (Cheterian, 2008: 173).  The nationalists’ speeches 
and narratives embodied divisions that indeed intensified the fear of South 
Ossetians.  Gamsakhurdia’s performatives emphasizing the holy mission of Georgians 
and statements that non-Georgians were unwelcome guests widened the gulf 
between the two groups.  The reinforcement of the Menshevik Constitution from 
1921 by the Supreme Council under his leadership produced an even bigger schism 
within the country.            
 Alexei Zverev notes that history was one of the main variables that escalated 
the conflict, along with geopolitical and socio-economic factors (Zverev, 1996: 15).  
These two different discourses about the history of Georgian and South Ossetian 
relations clashed and caused a political crisis after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
This political ambiguity was constructed out of an ethnicized history, and alleged 
security threats to the existence of both parties and ethnos as such.  In other words, 
the political entrepreneurs referred to the possibility of the annihilation of ethnic 
minority groups.  Georgian nationalists referred to the widespread Georgian fear of 
becoming extinct.  Georgian medieval noblemen had, for centuries, exploited the 
fear that one day Georgia might cease to exist altogether.61   
 In the light of the mutually aggressive discourse between Georgians and 
Ossetians, as well as the overall instability, the South Ossetians founded  a political 
party, “Adamon Nykhas” (Popular Shrine), and expressed solidarity with the Abkhaz 
 61	There	is	a	phrase,	“ar	gadavshendebit”,	which	means	“we	will	never	get	extinct”	—	the	ideas	that	Georgia	has	to	fight	for	existence	in	the	world,	perhaps	was	one	of	the	ways	to	legitimize	multiple	struggles	and	war	that	Georgian	noblemen	fought	in	medieval	times.		
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people and declared their own national aspirations (Sammut, 1996: 10).  AN’s leader, 
Alan Chochiev, was a historian at the Tskhinvali Pedagogical Institute (Cheterian, 
2008: 173). He published an open letter in the Abkhaz newspaper Bzib and expressed 
full support for the aspirations to sovereignty of the Abkhaz people.    Chochiev 
appeals to the Abkhaz people and hails their struggle for sovereignty: “...we are 
worried by the tendency to ignore the legal requests of the Abkhaz people that are 
aspiring toward genuine sovereignty” (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 14).  Chochiev notes 
that the “brotherly” Georgian nation used to block the initiatives of the Abkhaz 
people to gain independence, and that by then Ossetians hoped the attempt will be 
successful (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 14).  They were hoping for a legal precedent to 
be just and equal, 
“...and no longer be a part of the discriminated vertical, a hierarchy that allocated 
rights and privileges according to ranks, we are delighted with the courage and unity 
of Abkhaz people, which rejects any compromise and fights for the re-installation of 
sovereignty that is the only way of development for an ancient nation with rich 
culture and economic potential” (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 14).     
Chochiev’s closing remarks are to Abkhaz people and he indicates that the official 
South Ossetian authorities think the same way, albeit they lack “courage” to speak 
out (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 15).  The noteworthy fact is that the Abkhaz 
newspapers were not distributed in the rest of Georgia and it was a Georgian weekly 
newspaper, Literaturuli Saqartvelo (Literary Georgia), that re-printed selected anti-
Georgian letters or extracts from the Abkhaz or Ossetian press.  One can argue that 
the newspaper of the writers of Georgia was distributing selective stories that 
securitized and “othered” ethnically different citizens of their country.  Additionally, 
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Gamsakhurdia, along with his allies, were in control of the nationwide discourse 
about identity, statehood and the purity of Georgia.  They were promoting the idea 
of a unitary Georgia.  Eventually, such publications caused public outrage, and many 
intellectuals started to challenge the ideas expressed in the autonomous entities that 
were unacceptable for Georgians and the perceptions of nationalists. One 
newspaper eventually became a medium between communities, and this news 
outlet was totally controlled by nationalist ideology.   
 Chochiev’s letter was followed by a response from the Supreme Soviet of 
South Ossetia that denounced his beliefs, declarations and ideas about the 
differences in the autonomy.  The letter stated that the people of South Ossetia 
disagree with Chochiev’s remarks and were “deeply concerned” with Chochiev’s 
intention to trigger inter-ethnic conflict (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 15).  In the answer 
to Chochiev, the Soviet points to the “attempt” to “artificially” deteriorate the 
relations between different ethnicities and accuses Chochiev of presenting his 
“hideous subjective ideas” as widely accepted by the Ossetian people (Diasamidze, 
2002-2011: 15).  The supreme soviet letter expresses the belief that the millennia of 
cohabitation and cooperation could not be wiped out by individuals who wish to stir 
up ethnic hatred (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 16).      
 It has to be noted that the status of South Ossetia was not a political matter 
in the Soviet period, unlike that of Abkhazia.  Ossetians suffered along with the rest 






did not complain widely nor did they campaign for an upgrade of status (George, 
2009: 105).  George notes that Abkhazians and South Ossetians similarly had an icon 
of the Soviet villain — Stalin — an ethnic Georgian who was the main architect of the 
Soviet hierarchy.  Stalin epitomized all the sufferings experienced in the 1930s, but 
his repressions and assassinations affected ethnic Georgians too.  However, his 
ethnicity helped to prevent his legacy from being reassessed, and few Georgians 
criticized his policies.   
 Julie George argues that there was a three sided victimisation, all parties had 
their complaints and they could not manage to channel them through political lines 
(2009: 104).  Radicals on all sides made enough efforts to escalate the differences.  
Georgians suddenly stopped using the name South Ossetia, substituting it with 
Samachablo (Machabeli’s land, a princedom in medieval Georgia), Shida Kartli or 
Tskhinvali region, making Ossetians angry and enraged (Zverev, 1996: 43).     
 
6.4. Normative wars 
The South Ossetian okrug presented its secessionist demands in 1989-90.  Georgian 
authorities passed the law in August 1989 (under nationalist demands), declaring the 
Georgian language to be the official language for all administrative and policy organs 
(George, 2009: 110).  Concerned about the constitutional status of the Georgian 
language, the Communist government created a special commission to assure the 
purity of the language at all levels in all cities, towns and regions of the Georgian SSR 
(Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 25).  This new law implicitly excluded the citizens of the 
Georgian SSR who did not speak Georgian from all forthcoming projects of 
independence and political process altogether.  It also ordered the translation of all 
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foreign language media broadcasted across the republic into Georgian or the 
insertion of Georgian subtitles (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 26).  With such exclusionary 
and divisive steps toward independence and sovereignty, Georgia left its own citizens 
outside the space of the new state.  Amid the disintegrating Soviet Union, divisive 
political decisions were fuelling nationalism and granting more space for action to 
radical leaders.     
 South Ossetian authorities prepared their answer to the norm of exclusivity.   
They ordered the implementation of the State Programme of the Ossetian Language 
(Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 27).  A New decree allowed students from South Ossetia to 
gain exemptions from the law about Georgian language (Diasamidze, 2002-2011: 28).  
The excessive patriotism demonstrated by Georgian nationalists and the Communist 
government that followed their demands increased the rift between Georgians and 
the minorities residing in the republic [the similar to Abkhazia, when Abkhaz gained 
privileges and exemptions to get into universities (Slider, 1985)].  Tbilisi and 
Tskhinvali launched a normative war that escalated the conflict and made the 
negotiation process much more difficult.  One could argue that the steps taken by 
the Georgian officials to improve relations with minorities were in fact widening the 
gap and dividing societies.             
 In November 1989 the South Ossetian Congress of People’s Deputies 
requested a status upgrade to the ASSR from the Georgian Communist Party sending 
the same appeal to the Soviet Union Communist Party (George, 2009: 110).  The 
authorities in Tbilisi swiftly declared the request to be illegal, stating that Adamon 
Nykhas was not an official political group and had no right to participate in the 
drafting of the demand (George, 2009: 110).  On 23 November 1989, the situation 
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deteriorated as 20,000 Georgians marched to Tskhinvali, “to defend the Georgian 
population” (Zverev, 1996: 43, Cheterian, 2008: 175).  The Soviet Ministry of Interior 
managed to prevent the crowd from entering Tskhinvali, but some of the 
paramilitary groups went to the nearby villages causing small skirmishes with 
Ossetian communities (Zverev, 1996: 43).  There were casualties and negotiations 
between Gamsakhurdia and Ossetian representative Kim Tsagolov did not succeed 
in securing peace.  Gamsakhurdia told him: “I shall bring a 200,000-strong army. Not 
a single Ossetian will remain in the land of Samachablo.  I demand that the Soviet 
flags be removed!” (Zverev, 1996: 43, Cheterian, 2008: 175). One of the leaders of 
the nationalists, Giorgi Chantuaria (assassinated in 1994), admitted that the march 
to Tskhinvali was a “great mistake” (Zverev, 1996: 44).  It is apparent how Georgian 
nationalist leaders had managed strained relations with the autonomous units of the 
Soviet Republic of Georgia.  Their discourse and threats built further antagonism and 
alienated the public in Tskhinvali.  The wording chosen by Gamsakhurdia, “no single 
Ossetian will remain”, was a powerful performative that helped the local political 
groups to secure support against Tbilisi and Georgians altogether.             
 At the same time, power shifts were taking place in South Ossetia.  Local 
political actors competed for leadership, forming a post-Soviet political elite there.  
Alan Chochiev, a leader of the National Front was the frontrunner (George, 2009: 
113).  Julie George notes that the position held by Gamsakhurdia was an impediment 
to the forging of ties between elites in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali (2009: 113).  There were 
no actual negotiations between the disputing parties, thus increasing the possibility 
of violence (George, 2009: 113).  George quotes a historian, David Darchiashvili, who 
suggests that it was mainly the “inexperience of Gamsakhurdia’s and South Ossetian 
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leadership” to be blamed, and that only Russians were experienced in the craft of 
diplomacy (George, 2009: 113).  Inexperience could be taken into consideration 
when looking for the reason, but the entire doctrine of the Round Table was anti-
federalist and uncompromising.  The state-building plan championed by 
Gamsakhurdia was exclusive, rejecting the consideration of any other ethnicities.  
The nationalist agenda was ethnicity-centred, producing divisive unintended or 
intended consequences.  Additionally, Gamsakhurdia was one of the most well-
educated and intelligent members of the movement.         
 The situation worsened when the Russia-brokered negotiations between 
Georgians and Ossetians took place in January 1991.  Gamsakhurdia arrested the 
Ossetian leader Kulumbegov for treason in presence of the Russian officers (Zverev, 
1996: 45, George, 2009: 113 ).   The violent and aggressive approach of Georgian 
representatives fuelled tensions and George notes that the dominant language of 
communication was either the parliamentary declarations or radical démarches 
(2009: 114).  Such an evaluation is confirmed by then foreign minister Giorgi 
Khoshtaria, who admits the mistakes made during the crisis blaming lack of any 
political negotiation (George, 2009: 114).   
 A senior politician who is one of the leading experts on the conflicts in the 
South Caucasus spoke anonymously about the normative war between Tskhinvali 
and Tbilisi, as he notes “unlawful” was the word applied to every Ossetian paper sent 
to the Georgian capital, that actually moved Tskhinvali closer to Moscow 
(Anonymous, 2013).  He confirms that Georgian authorities put zero effort toward 
understanding of Ossetia’s problems and demands.  Arguing about the geopolitical 
character of the conflict he defines as “irresponsible” when rhetoric was reminiscent 
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of the Soviet totalitarian discourse, hence Georgia did not receive as much support 
as the Baltic states did (Anonymous, 2013).  
“The problem of Georgia was that nationalism was driving the change in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union.  Gamsakhurdia’s language was unacceptable for the 
West, and that is the reason why Georgia started to receive the Western support 
later than the Baltic states.  For the West nationalism and Soviet imperialism were 
both intolerable” (Anonymous, 2013).  
By using harsh language, Gamsakhurdia equalled Ossetian people to a handful 
of extremist leaders bringing Moscow and Tskhinvali ever closer (Anonymous, 2013).  
Being an active supporter of the independence the respondent thinks that is was an 
act of “hypocrisy” to think that it was possible to build a new state without 
incorporating ethnic minorities across Georgia (Anonymous, 2013).  
Notwithstanding, vociferous nationalists who were part of the emerging political 
elite were aware of the risks, 63  yet they lost the argument with more active 
demagogues who bred intolerance and enmity between ethnically diverse 
population of Georgia.            
 
6.5. Escalating decisions 
If Nagorno-Karabakh was the first conflict in the South Caucasus on the Soviet watch, 
South Ossetia was the first dilemma faced by the political elite of semi-independent 
Georgia.  By the time of disputes Georgia had a Communist Party Committee and 
quasi-legal nationalists with popular support who managed to force the Communists 
 63	A	private	conversation	with	a	former	nationalist	leader	in	Tbilisi,	2013	
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to hold elections.  To a certain extent, the immature and inexperienced political 
groups that gained power in post-Soviet Georgia did not consider the political 
consequences of their populist narrative.  They cherished Georgian nationalism and 
largely ignored the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country.  The Round Table 
chose one paradigm, focusing on nationalistic discourse and exclusivity.  
Gamsakhurdia positioned himself as the saviour of the Georgian nation that had 
been suppressed by the USSR.   
 The legal battle between the units of the Soviet Republic of Georgia started 
with a declaration sanctioned by the last Communist government of Georgia.  After 
the tragedy of 9 April 1989, the nationalists acquired extra leverage over the local 
Soviet government.  As a result, the new First Secretary Givi Gumbaridze opted for a 
soft approach toward new political groups.  He was put under pressure and the 
government adopted a declaration on “Providing Guarantees for Protection of State 
Sovereignty of Georgia” (1990) — this document based on the findings of a legal task 
force of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR, admitted that the military operation 
conducted by Russia in February 1921 was an act of military intervention and 
occupation aimed at changing the regime and annexing the state politically (1990).  
This act demanded respect for the Russo-Georgian agreement from May 1920 and 
the aggression was classified as the violation of that agreement (1990).  The Supreme 
Soviet of the Georgian SSR was urged to reinstate the rights of the Georgian republic 
set out in the 1920 agreement (1990).  According to the declaration the agreement 
from May 1920 between Peasants and Labourers of the Georgian SSR and the Russian 
SFSR and the Unions Treaty from March 1922 forming Transcaucasian Federal 
Republic was annulled (1990).  The declaration stated that Georgian SSR was to 
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launch negotiations about the independence from the Soviet Union and that the 
Union Treaty of December 1922 founding the USSR was unlawful in relation to 
Georgia (1990)64.   
 The declaration was an additional boost for nationalist groups who claimed 
victory against the USSR government, which was then forced to make concessions.  
It was the first signal to autonomous entities that Georgia intended to revise the 
treaties and agreements of the Soviet period unilaterally.  Yet, none of the nationalist 
leaders considered inviting the representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
discuss new legal framework for a post-Soviet order.    
 Apparently, the decision mostly focused on acknowledging populist discourse 
championed by the nationalists and their leaders.  The unilateral declaration and 
abolition of the union treaties was a sign to the autonomous units that their legal 
status was under threat and the antagonistic discourse gained governmental 
support.  To be more specific, the Communist government in Tbilisi acted to pacify 
the nationalists but ignored the challenges of autonomies and their status.  The 
Central Committee adopted a declaration that put independence on the immediate 
agenda, but forgot the multi-ethnic texture of the republic.  In this case both 
nationalists and Communists contributed to furthering the aggravation of the 
situation.     
 The Communist Party leadership went further and ordered the establishment 
of a special commission to prepare the legal framework for proclamation of 
 64	Dadgenileba	Saqartvelos	sakhelmtsipo	suverenitetis	datsvis	garantiebis	shesakheb.	1990.	Saqartvelos	SSR	Uzenaesi	Sabchos	Utskebebi.	no.	3	p.	8-10.	Available	at:		http://www.rrc.ge/law/dadg_1990_03_09_q.htm?lawid=223&lng_3=ge	[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018]	
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independence of Georgia in line “with international legal norms guaranteeing 
national self-determination, the UN Charter, international pacts on human rights, 
including the Helsinki and Vienna acts” referring to the fact that the Georgian people 
made a decision to be independent in May 1918, and the communiqué 
acknowledged the right of Georgia to restore the independence (1990).65   
 Events developed rapidly without the need for popular consent.  The 
Communist Party in Georgia listened to the nationalist leaders, whose discourse had 
a more profound influence than any other organisation or institution.  It is widely 
believed in Georgian society that the Communist government allowed the 
nationalists to cross a red line (Nodia, 1996).  They saw the opportunity to occupy 
the public space, and popularize historic and nationalist narratives that created 
cleavages in the country.     
 The High Council of the Republic of Georgia abolished the decision of the 
Supreme Soviet of the South Ossetian Autonomous District (Oblast) to become a 
Democratic Republic of the Soviet Union.  The declaration states: 
“The Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia notes that in the recent period the 
separatist movements have become active in the South Ossetian Autonomous 




The declaration adopted by the Council of People’s Deputies of the District on 20 
September 1990 to declare the Soviet Democratic Republic of South Ossetia is a 
proving the intent” (NPLG).     
The Council was preoccupied by the activities of the autonomous oblast, and issued 
a full statement that abolished the initiative of Ossetians to hold elections on 2 
December 1990.  The statement declared:  
“To abolish the decision of the Council of People’s Deputies of the District about 
transformation of the autonomous oblast into so called ‘Soviet Democratic Republic 
of South Ossetia’ and hence all the decision made by the entity, including a 
declaration to hold elections on 2 December 1990, as they contradict the acting 
Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, as well as clauses of the USSR Constitution 
and the declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
from 21 September 1990. 
The Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia calls upon the residents of the 
Autonomous District, particularly those of Ossetian ethnic origin to demonstrate 
prudence, political perception, vigilance and give rightful evaluation to the separatist 
movements and their activities, that can cause massive destabilization and heavy 
unforeseen outcomes” (NPLG).  
The declaration is derogatory towards the residents of the autonomy.  It 
demonstrates the supreme position of the authorities in Tbilisi and calls on a minority 
okrug to adhere to the central government without holding any consultations.  The 
term “separatist” was used in Tbilisi, but in South Ossetia they were “freedom 
fighters”; the conflict of adjectives and modifiers between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali was 
aggressive causing further escalation of tensions.  In autumn 1990, the Soviet Union 
still existed but Georgia was on the path to independence.  Nationalist movements 
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had increased in position and popularity due to the events of April 1989.  The harsh 
rhetoric of the nationalist parties and political groups brought Georgia to the 
forefront of anti-Soviet demonstrations, so the National Democratic Party, the Round 
Table and other political entities gained widespread support as they emphasized 
Georgian nationalism and the importance of independence.  Their discourse created 
a bubble which meant most Georgians believed that Georgia had to gain 
independence from the Soviet Union and become a unitary state.   
 Most political groups did miss one important point: Georgia was a republic 
with three autonomous entities, and any constitutional change had to be carefully 
negotiated between all parties.  The nationalist groups ignored the legal framework 
that existed in reality, and tried to invent an imaginary state for Georgians.  
Independence was a huge issue; apart from political actors, it occupied the hearts 
and minds of writers, actors, poets and artists — in other words, nationalist groups 
allured the intelligentsia of the Soviet Georgia.  The possible establishment of a 
unitary Georgian state was the biggest delusion offered by the nationalists.     
 It could be said that the political and legal limits that had to be carefully 
thought out and negotiated with autonomous entities were totally ignored and 
became victims of the independence discourse.  The Soviet Union was collapsing and 
the active political groups and their leaders knew it.  Despite Moscow’s efforts to 
save the empire, the economic problems were too deep and widespread.  The Soviet 
project was doomed to fail, but nationalists were actively pursuing their goals.  Their 
discourse paved the way to an exclusive community of Georgians who wished to be 
independent but could not fully comprehend what independence implied.  One of 
the leaders of the movement at the time revealed in a private discussion that they of 
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course were aware of risks that exclusive discourse implied for the future of 
autonomous units, but he said independence was the most important, in essence a 
holy mission for them.66  
 The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia stated that the decision was 
in the best interest of the state, because they “had fought” for the “sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” of Georgia but restated that their intention was to protect the 
rights of minorities in the country (NPLG).  Yet the understanding of sovereignty in 
1980s in Georgia was distorted, as the footage of the public rallies show many 
nationalist leaders believed that Georgia was capable of sustaining an isolated 
existence in the world.  Almost none of the leaders had thought out a plan of 
economic development and international integration.  By creating a conversational 
reality, they disregarded the factual challenges that a newly independent state had 
to face.  The nationalistic discourse not only alienated the autonomous entities but 
put Georgian society under threat, because of fictional reality they had created.       
 The Supreme Soviet of Georgia went further and abolished the autonomous 
status of South Ossetia altogether on 11 December 1990.  The law adopted by the 
Council states that despite “several notifications” the South Ossetian authorities held 
illegal elections on 9 December 1990 (Georgia).  Therefore, the Council decided to 
abolish the autonomy and the Soviet of Deputies along with the decree from 1922 
that founded the district (Georgia).  Referring to the absence of the consent of the 
Georgian population in 1922, the law states that the autonomy was “against the 
interests of Georgia” (Georgia).  According to the text the fact (i.e. the violation of 
 66	A	private	talk	with	a	one-time	nationalist	leader	who	did	not	wish	to	disclose	his	name	and	affiliation.		Tbilisi,	2013				
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Georgia’s interests) had been proved several times during the existence of the 
autonomy (though the law did not indicate any particular examples) (Georgia).  The 
statement elucidates that the Ossetian people have their “statehood” in the Soviet 
Union, i.e. the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia, and finally because more 
Ossetians live outside South Ossetia enjoying “cultural autonomy”, the Supreme 
Council of Georgia decided to nullify the status (Georgia).   
 The ‘independent’ Supreme Council was elected on 28 October 1990 and 
while it was a representative body, at the same time, Georgia was still part of the 
Soviet Union.  Georgians thus managed to have two governments at that time, 
although neither of them could claim efficiency.  Notably, the new leadership 
operated on the basis of popular legitimacy, while the old Soviet government was in 
a crisis of governance and unable to prevent the nationalist fervour, as the new 
Council set out a hyper-nationalistic agenda. 
 The language of the law about the abolition of the status was divisive, and 
the Council in Tbilisi decided to close the issue of the region without any 
consultations.  If the point is evaluated as a communicative action, it is apparent that 
the Council that was a ‘legitimate’ representative of new Georgia diminished the 
importance of the autonomous entities and ethnic minorities altogether.67  That was 
message spread to the ethnic minorities across Georgia was threatening in tone.  The 
autonomous status in the hierarchical system of the Soviet Union did not imply rights 
in its Western understanding, but the status was a symbol for the small nations 
elucidating their authenticity.  While the Constitution of the USSR enshrined many 
 67	However,	the	autonomous	republics	did	not	elect	the	Supreme	Council,	because	they	boycotted	the	elections.	
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pluralistic doctrines, they were never actually implemented, because the essential 
law of the Union was a symbolic document that did not apply to reality.  According 
to Article 76 of the Constitution the Soviet, Socialist Republics had their own 
constitutions and were “independent to perform state power on their territories”, 
whilst the USSR was the guarantor of their sovereignty (1977).  The same document 
indicated that the laws about the autonomous oblast are delegated to the Supreme 
Soviet of Deputies of the Republic and must be presented by the autonomous Soviet 
of Deputies (1977).  However, the Soviet government in Tbilisi was strictly following 
directives from Moscow, which meant that Soviet-era rules had to be renegotiated 
carefully, with the involvement of all parties.  Instead of entering into dialogue, a 
body empowered by the majority of Georgia’s population, nullified the status of 
South Ossetia.       
 In the case of South Ossetia, the Georgian authorities prioritized territorial 
integrity.  It could be claimed that not only the authorities but the populace overall 
held this priority, as the recordings of the rallies show the depth and gravity of public 
outrage toward the demands of Ossetians and Abkhaz.  The declarations and bills 
that were passed by the parliament referred exclusively to the importance of the 
territorial integrity of Georgia.  It meant that only territories were important for 
future development, ignoring human agency and society in the autonomous entities.  
This discourse comfortably coincided with the historic narratives used by political 
groups to mobilize popular consent.   
 Eric Labs argues that weak states choose sovereignty over security when 
making alignment choices, in other words they opt for territorial control against 
physical well-being (in Jebb, 2004: 6).  Undoubtedly, Georgia was a weak and fragile 
286 
entity in the fragmenting Soviet Union.  Consequently, the rhetoric of might and 
territorial control was the nation-building tool used by the power-hungry political 
groups.  It was popular to write a nation rather than draw up a coherent strategy for 
further development.  Perhaps it was less demanding to shout out nationalist slogans 
than it was to work out a step-by-step guide for a new state and its citizens. 
Gamsakhurdia’s favourite practices were mass rallies, mobilized around the 
discourse of the greatness of Georgia.  During the rally on 26 May 1989 (the 
independence day proclaimed by Mensheviks in 1918), he addressed a crowd by 
hailing Georgia’s great and heroic past that made it possible to defeat the “empires 
of darkness” and stated that Georgia was prepared to fight even bigger “empires of 
darkness” (Geoika, 2009).  He declared that Saint George and other saints, as well as 
“saintly blood” were standing with them (Geoika, 2009).  In the same speech 
Gamsakhurdia uses the word “blood” about 10 times (in the space of 4 minutes) 
saying that the path of the Georgian nation is the path of martyrdom, which is Christ’s 
way and that Georgia has no other option.  He ended the speech hailing and cheering 
the unbeatable and Christian Georgia (Geoika, 2009). Gamsakhurdia intentionally 
created the discourse of bloodshed and martyrdom that, as he believed, Georgia was 
destined to follow.  Every time he spoke about Georgia he used the expression 
“Georgian nation” or “Kartveli Eri” — an exclusive and nationalistic definition any 
leader should avoid, because Kartveli defines people from the region of central 
Georgia — Kartli — but it does not include any other areas like Guria or Kakheti, let 
alone Abkhazia or South Ossetia.      
 Gamsakhurdia gained power and succeeded in the competition for the 
leadership.  He placed a great emphasis on symbols and history, as he depicted 
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himself to be a heavenly messenger, a saviour of Georgia.  As a result, symbols 
became the main focus of the statehood.  It seemed like Georgia was an artefact 
rather than a living nation in progress.  Of course, the new leadership had to design 
a nation-building project, but the liminal (transitional) process had to focus on 
physical welfare and human security rather than on the symbolic capital of the past.  
That capital was aimed at dividing communities and was destined to fail both the 
leadership and the country.  Additionally, as explained in Chapter 3, the past used by 
the nationalist groups was mostly contested, and overall the armed confrontation 
was ignited by rhetoric which professed an imagined symbolic capital, but which only 
delayed the possibility of re-assessment of the former Communist order and creation 
of an open and dynamic society.       
 
6.6. Disagreements over Constitutional History with Abkhazia  
A constitutional blunder between Tbilisi and Sokhumi was at the centre of the 
political disagreements.  Abkhazia was a semi-independent princedom that joined 
the Tsarist Russia in 1864.  The Tsarist Russia had viewed the South Caucasus as a 
single entity and governed it as gubernias, subsequently, Abkhazia was a part of 
Kutaisi Gubernia.  Yet the fall of the Romanov dynasty and the short-lived 
independence of Georgia illuminated the challenges that a state had to manage.  
Despite having been a kingdom for centuries, Georgia lacked any institutions that 
could provide institutional memory and the capacity to adjust to independence.  In 
other words, to become a nation-state that incorporates pluralism and embraces its 
minorities on a normative basis was seen as difficult.  This apparent lack of norms 
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and rules that could have assured functioning of a tolerant society were not put in 
place by any of monarchs.   
 In 1918, Georgia was facing a very different reality — a world of sovereign 
states that worked toward the institutionalisation of political and legal disputes.  The 
Menshevik government attempted to face these challenges and introduced a 
Constitution that was adopted on 21 February 1921, but the Bolsheviks annexed 
Georgia four days later. Despite the Mensheviks’ efforts to lay down the founding 
principles of the Georgian state (as a nation-state) the issue of autonomous entities 
was rather vague.  Article 107 of the document stated: “Abkhazia, Sokhumi district, 
Muslim Georgia, [Batumi district] and Zakatala district are inviolable parts of Georgia 
and are granted local autonomous rights”(1921).  In fact, that Constitution failed to 
clarify what the local autonomy implied for the districts and how they were allowed 
to exercise the rights.  Autonomy was a platitude, a word that implied a different 
status but did not clarify the actual rights that it was supposed to secure.  It is worth 
emphasising that valency of “autonomy” has been under scrutiny ever since.  
Particularly for Abkhaz, the promise of wider autonomy and devolution was 
associated with broken promises of Mensheviks (see Hewitt, 1993: 279).         
 The next stage in the constitutional misunderstanding started with the 
Bolshevik rule.  On 31 March 1921, Abkhazia proclaimed itself to be an independent 
Soviet Socialist Republic, a status which was kept until December 1921, when the 
Abkhazian SSR joined Georgian SSR under the Treaty of Union (Zverev, 1996: 39, 
Hewitt, 1993: 281).  The Treaty of Union stipulated “the military, political and 
financial-economic cooperation with each-other” where foreign affairs were 
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delegated to Georgian side.68  Georgia and Abkhazia co-habited under the Treaty up 
until 1931, when the Abkhazian Republic was incorporated into Georgian SSR and 
joined the USSR with entitlement to autonomous republic rather than Soviet republic 
(Zverev, 1996: 39).  Hence, Abkhazia ended up in the second tier of the Soviet 
hierarchy.  
 There is one ethnic argument in the dispute: the leaders who engineered the 
establishment of the USSR and arranged Abkhazia’s autonomous status in Georgia 
were Georgians — Joseph Stalin and Lavrenti Beria (see Coppieters, 2002: 92).  The 
Abkhaz were confident that the reason behind such constitutional arrangement was 
a bias in favour of Georgia.  To be more precise, they thought that two Georgians 
made a decision in the best Georgian interest, and that they were victims of Stalinist 
repressions, even though hundreds of thousands of Georgians were victims of the 
same regime (Zverev, 1996: 39).  The entire population of the Soviet Union was a 
victim of epistemic, physiological or physical violence and it is difficult to argue as to 
who had the bigger share in the suffering.  If Tsarist rulers forcefully evicted the 
Muslim population of Abkhazia to Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire), the Soviet 
administration conducted planned resettlement of Georgians to Abkhazia (Zverev, 
1996: 39).  During the USSR there were three petitions (1956, 1967 and 1978) 
addressed to the Moscow government, as Abkhaz intellectuals asked to separate 
from Georgia and join the Russian Federation, but the only results were some cultural 
or educational concessions (Zverev, 1996: 39).     
 68	Union	Treaty	Between	the	SSR	of	Georgia	and	the	SSR	of	Abkhazia	-	16	December	1921.	Available	at:	http://abkhazworld.com/aw/reports-and-key-texts/601-union-treaty-between-december-1921		[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018]	
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 Dating back to 1920s, the differences continued to divide the polities of 
Abkhazia and Soviet Georgia.  Another significant issue was a perception formed 
during the Soviet times.  Georgians viewed Abkhazians as a tool of manipulation used 
by Moscow that was deceitful and needed to be broken (Carrère d'Encausse, 1993: 
75).  However, Abkhazians saw Georgians as a dominant force that was too weak to 
form a federal state but appealed to history to claim that Georgia was hospitable and 
tolerant (Carrère d'Encausse, 1993: 75).   
 In the 1980s the bilateral ties were not at the best between Tbilisi and 
Sokhumi, but the discourse initiated by the nationalist leaders in Georgia further 
escalated their complex relationship.  Freedom fighters organized their narratives 
along ethnic lines and the ideals of the French Revolution.  Nationalism and ethnicity 
became a politically virulent commodity that triggered an explosion of legal and 
political differences.      
 
6.7. The ‘Letter of Abkhaz’ (Likhny Declaration) and other open statements  
The Abkhaz community organized an assembly of All Abkhaz in the village of Likhny 
in March 1989.  “Aidgilara”, the political movement for independence, was the main 
organiser of the congress, which assembled about thirty thousand delegates. The 
gathering adopted a special letter/declaration 69  addressed to the Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev and asked him to reinstate Lenin’s principles — to make Abkhazia 
a Soviet Socialist Republic.  This meant that Abkhazia was asking the Kremlin to 




Union.70 Stuart Kaufman argues that the official leaders in Sokhumi were “pressured” 
to sign the declaration as they faced more 30 000 people in the village that 
symbolized the historic place of Abkhaz uprising in 1866 (2001: 103), whereas Hewitt 
claims that even ethnic Georgians subscribed to the principles of the declaration 
(1993: 283, see Ardzinba in Glebov and Crowfoot, 1989: 80), as they watched the 
suppression of the rights of the Abkhaz.   
 Notably, this was not the first letter drafted for the Kremlin.  In 1978, when 
changes were proposed to the Soviet Constitution, 130 prominent Abkhaz 
intellectuals drafted a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
Moscow and complained about political status of Abkhazia. They accused Georgian 
government of “Beria-ite” policies, aimed at the further Georgianisation of the region 
(Slider, 1985: 59).  However, the local leader Valery Khintba accused protesters of 
“an apolitical, slanderous letter” that was distorting relations between Abkhaz and 
Georgians, and claimed that some of the signatures were forged (Slider, 1985: 59).  
Shevardnadze, the leader of the Communist Party of Georgia at the time, tried to 
resolve the crisis and admitted that the Abkhaz leadership failed as they were not 
close enough to the “people to share their interests and control the situation” 
(quoted in Slider, 1985: 60, see also Hewitt, 1993: 282).  Despite the Politburo 
sending a special delegation to Sokhumi there was no actual decision made about 
the constitutional changes in the status, instead there were several “cadre” changes 
and delays in addressing the issue.  The biggest breakthrough for Abkhaz was the 
upgrade of the Pedagogical Institute to the Abkhaz State University in 1979, the deed 
 70	Text	of	the	declaration	available	here	in	Russian:	http://abkhazia.narod.ru/Glava1-3.htm	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]		
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Shevardnadze was proud of up until his death.  Yet the concessions or changes did 
not create a long-term impact, with the rise of Georgian nationalism the dilemma 
arouse again.  Darrell Slider thinks that, in 1978, the relatively low visibility of the 
Abkhaz people and their problems defined Moscow’s relatively low-key involvement 
in addressing the issue (Slider, 1985: 66).   
 Abkhazia was initially a republic in the full right, but as the authors of the 
letter argue, it was Stalin who changed the balance of power in favour of Georgia 
(see Hewitt, 1993).  In the end, Abkhazia became an autonomous republic in Georgia, 
and joined the USSR via Georgia.  Interestingly, the Georgian public thought that it 
was Stalin’s project to grant Abkhazia autonomy and thus lay a political mine that 
could detonate at any time (Forsyth, 2013: 629).  In other words, both sides were 
unanimous in their objection to Stalin’s vision.  Both of them believed that the Soviet 
arrangement was designed to diminish their status and position within the region.  
Therefore, the parties launched a hostile deliberation about the issue in the 1980s.        
 The author of one letter complained about oppression and the restriction of 
rights within Georgia and asked Gorbachev to protect the Abkhaz nation.71 They 
stated that the experience of cohabitation with Georgia “demonstrated the 
impossibility of equal existence” and that it was necessary to reinstall “Lenin’s 
principles of Soviet federation, that granted real sovereignty to its members”.72  One 
has to question the definition of sovereignty in this debate.  Sovereignty in its 
Westphalian understanding was not granted to any units of the Soviet Union.  It was 
 71	Likhny	Declaration	http://abkhazia.narod.ru/Glava1-3.htm	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]	72		Likhny	Declaration	http://abkhazia.narod.ru/Glava1-3.htm	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]	
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the USSR which enjoyed full sovereignty and acted in the name of its republics.   The 
1977 Constitution of the USSR laid down the main principles and granted the Soviet 
Socialist Republics the right to secede but in reality, it was impossible to implement.  
Accordingly, the quest for “real sovereignty” was unsustainable.  In fact, the Abkhaz 
were asking for the right to be a Soviet Socialist Republic, rather than an autonomous 
entity within Georgia.   
 The Letter stated that due to changing circumstances, pluralism, glasnost and 
democracy the Abkhaz people thought it was reasonable to ask for changes and 
amend the terms of USSR membership. 73   A broad historic explanation of the 
decision is outlined in the letter.  The Abkhaz refer to correspondence between 
Abkhaz leaders in the 1920s and Lenin and Stalin.  They indicate that Lenin did grant 
Abkhazia republican status, but that it was Stalin who defined the decision as 
“unreasonable” and made Abkhazia an autonomous republic instead, because he 
considered Abkhazia to be “politically and economically unsustainable”.74 The letter 
recalls the repressed and assassinated leaders and citizens of Abkhazia, the time of 
terror and insecurity.  However, what they do not mention is that the terror and 
insecurity was USSR-wide and that not a single republic escaped the aggressive hand 
of the regime. 
 Another significant issue in the discourse of the tie is the demographic data, 
which the Abkhaz link to Soviet and Tsarist social engineering.  The Likhny Letter 




culture” and an “independent history” (see Hewitt, 1993).75  The authors remind the 
Soviet government of the oppression and discrimination to which the Menshevik 
government exposed them, and praise the Bolsheviks for saving Abkhazia.  But the 
formulation is somehow unclear: they claim that the Soviet regime was a time of 
terror and oppression, and at the same time thank them for their support.  They wish 
Stalin to be seen as representative of another regime, yet Stalin was the main 
architect of the state from which they sought support and direct control.   
 In the Letter Abkhaz refer to a false history they thought was aimed at 
downgrading the importance of the Abkhaz nation and shatter its very existence.  
They were unhappy with the Georgian (Tbilisi) government’s  dominant role in 
Abkhaz life, because they saw a continuity in policies of Mensheviks and Beria that 
benefited ethnic Georgians (Hewitt, 1993: 283).  The letter notes the growing 
nationalistic rhetoric across Georgia and referenced to a quote from the newspaper 
Literaturuli Saqartvelo, where one author calls on everyone wishing to live in Georgia 
to behave like a Georgian, speak Georgian, or else leave (see also Hewitt, 2013: 61-
63).  The declaration mentioned “forced assimilation” and the problem of the 
decreasing population.  They criticized Georgian historiography and urged that the 
Moscow government should consider modifications due to changing global 
circumstances, as they thought that the Abkhazian constitutional status was no 
longer an efficient tool for the economic and social development of Abkhazia.76  
 75	Likhny	Declaration	http://abkhazia.narod.ru/Glava1-3.htm	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]	76	Likhny	Declaration	http://abkhazia.narod.ru/Glava1-3.htm	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]	
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 It is hard to disagree that the changing global order demanded change within 
the Soviet Union.  Yet why did the Abkhaz decide to ask Moscow for support, and 
why did they not negotiate with Tbilisi?  Perhaps the Georgian leadership was not 
receptive to start talks with the Abkhaz, and the Abkhaz went directly to ask 
Moscow’s assistance rather than look for allies in Tbilisi.  George Hewitt notes that 
the Abkhaz left the room for the Georgians to offer credible policies, when they re-
established the 1925 Constitution, which according to Hewitt meant that the Abkhaz 
were ready to negotiate a new union treaty between Tbilisi and Sokhumi (Hewitt, 
1993: 291).  Like Hewitt, Stanislav Lakoba also points to the attempts to put proposals 
and “build bridges”, though he argues that they were rejected (1995: 98).  However, 
the Georgian government, particularly the Gamsakhurdia, chose the 1921 
constitution which did not include the Abkhaz status at all.  At the time, Georgian 
nationalists, equipped with rhetoric and a nationalist discourse, were threatening all 
non-Georgians across Georgia (Kaufman, 2001: 101).  In the time of uncertainty, 
opposition parties in Tbilisi were further radicalising the differences and narratives 
featuring ethnic minorities in Georgia.  Their nationalistic discourse and persistent 
reference to historic narratives legitimized the Abkhaz plea to Moscow.  During an 
informal conversation, one of the leaders of the nationalist movement 
acknowledged the threat that nationalism posed to minorities, but indicated that the 
main goal of their movement was independence for Georgia, and if some people felt 
insecure it was irrelevant for the just cause of freedom.77  Yet the same person did 
not answer the question as to how the nationalists measured what was just.  Hewitt 
argues that it was the “fatal mistake” made by the Georgian (Kartvelian) side when, 
 77	Private	talk	by	the	author	with	one	of	the	popular	leaders	of	nationalists	in	Georgia,	July	2013	
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instead of consolidating 30 per cent of non-Georgian population for the cause of 
independence from the USSR, they “played a nationalist card”, as the motto “Georgia 
for Georgians” was shared by all main opposition leaders (1993: 286).                                    
 The Letter of Abkhaz was the main manifesto addressed to Gorbachev and 
some of his aides.  Such an appeal meant a new page in Abkhaz-Georgian relations, 
particularly in the times of Perestroika and Glasnost.  The Abkhaz people demanded 
a new contract, and it was Tbilisi’s turn to respond.  However, the Communist 
government in Tbilisi lacked legitimacy, whilst the nationalist opposition was deluded 
and could not ascertain the scale of threats to the nation and a society.  In the midst 
of the Abkhaz crisis, the nationalist opposition (Irina Sarishvili) told Newsweek that a 
nationwide strike could persuade Gorbachev to listen to their demands (Bogert, 
1989), rather than open a conversation about existing legal contradictions with 
Abkhaz representatives.  
 The Georgian intelligentsia summoned an emergency meeting in Tbilisi, 
where most of the nationalists condemned the proposals of Abkhaz and refused to 
acknowledge the complexity of the situation (Gugushvili, 2009, Hewitt, 2013: 62).  
Gamsakhuridia assessed the “events in Abkhazia” as a “trap” designed by the Kremlin 
and stated that Georgia was not going to “fall into it” (Gugushvili, 2009).  He declared 
that “we” (Georgia) would use “legal and scientific methods” to solve the problem, 
but if that could not prove “our truth” then Georgia will use “other ways” that will 
inevitably be productive (Gugushvili, 2009).  Gamsakhurdia sent an ultimatum to 
Moscow, arguing that if Gorbachev refuses to back Georgia than they will call “a 
nationwide strike” and show their muscles to the Kremlin (Gugushvili, 2009).  Apart 
from Gamsakhurdia, other participants were alarmed about the possibility of 
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Abkhazia’s secession and labelled those as “extremists” who acted against the 
Georgian people (Hewitt, 2013: 62).  At the same time, “extremist” was a word of 
choice on the other side in Abkhazia.  Vladislav Ardzinba, then director of the 
Institute of Language, Literature and History in Sokhumi stated that “extremist 
forces” (Georgian nationalists) were concentrating resources to “stir up conflict” and 
then blame the Abkhaz for it (quoted in Glebov and Crowfoot, 1989: 81).     
 In a certain way, this discourse was a watershed in relations between 
Sokhumi and Tbilisi regarding the re-vision of the constitutional provisions.  If the 
Abkhaz asked for rights and an improved status, Georgian nationalists had 
interpreted the demands in the most extreme way when they called it a “slanderous 
and criminal statement” against the Georgian people (Bakradze in Hewitt, 2013: 62).  
By uttering those words, Bakradze securitized the issue, transforming the Abkhaz 
requests into full-fledged threats against the people of Georgia.  It is hard to 
overstate the contribution of this narrative, and it also helps to measure the direction 
and quality of ideas nurtured by the polities of the time.  In his address to the 
Congress of the Soviet Deputies, Valdislav Ardzinba accused Georgian intellectuals of 
attempting to blame the Abkhaz petition for causing the tragedy in April, but he 
insisted that the goals of the Likhny declaration were different from those of 
nationalists and joined the Georgian delegation in demanding the full investigation78 




 A few days later, Merab Kostava went to Abkhazia and addressed ethnic 
Georgians, indicating that they were “core-inhabitants” of the territory and the 
“separatists” who wished to split Georgia and Abkhazia were “traitors to united 
Georgia” (Hewitt, 2013: 63).79  Such radical statements had closed the space for 
alternative views, thus legitimising the breaking of rules and dehumanisation of an 
adversary.  Going further, Kostava attacked Kosntantin Ozgan for his Turkish origin 
and declared that: “we are constructing a black day for the little group of Abkhazian 
separatists!... We will teach the Abkhazians sense and reason!!!” (quoted in Hewitt, 
2013: 63).  This was the linguistic market of the time, as political actors formed 
through performatives an age of extremes to divide a society (Lefort ch.3), and seek 
to dehumanise with labels e.g. “criminals”, “separatists”, “extremists” or “traitors”.         
 In light of the escalation, there are several newspaper articles and essays that 
acquired importance because of their aggressive tone or the authors’ background.  
The next section will feature some extracts and examples of the Georgian-Abkhaz 
discourse. 
 
6.8. In search of the truth – Voices from Tbilisi 
The Public in Tbilisi listened to Abkhaz through the prism of leaders of nationalistic 
movements.  The Communist government completely lost the trust of the people by 
April 1989, and nationalists claimed a huge influence on public opinion.  The leaders 




informing the public.  They called it a “sainpormatsio mitingi” (an informational 
meeting).80  The Georgian press and media engaged in the battle for truth too, by 
allocating space to voices of nationalism and homogeneity.  The most significant and 
in-depth answer to the Abkhaz accusations was the essay “Truth about Abkhazia” by 
Guram Panjikidze, a renowned Georgian writer (Roman Miminoshvili a co-author) 
(see Hewitt, 1993: 284).  The essay is an analysis of the bilateral relations and 
represents the attitude of part of Georgian society toward Abkhazia.  There is a 
reason for such a detailed analysis of the publication as it encompasses every point 
in the bilateral discourse.  In so doing, one can envisage the lines of discontent that 
draw communities apart.  A rather longer piece embodies all the allegations 
discussed among Georgians and printed in the press.  Their essay could be seen as a 
symbol of the epistemic crisis (or the crisis of modernity) Georgia went through the 
late 1980s.  George Hewitt branded the piece as an “admixture of arrogance, irony, 
aprioristic argumentation, avoidance of the issues and the inevitable downright 
abuse” (1993: 283).  Both statements and comparisons demonstrate how the past 
and certain prejudices dominated discourse about the ethnic minorities.  It helps to 
recapture the meaning of the concepts, such as ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic minority’, that 
determined the future of South Caucasian alignments.  Published in November 1989, 
shortly after the deadly clashes in July in Sokhumi, the long article has crystallised 
position held by the Georgian intelligentsia about the Letter of Abkhaz.  It offers a 
mixture of condemnations, allegations, irony, proclamations, trenchancy and 
unconfirmed facts.           
 80	This	was	an	alternative	broadcasting	tool,	as	the	Soviet	media	had	lost	credibility	by	that	time.			
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 The essay opens with a strong condemnation of 15 July 1989, the day when 
first deadly clashes happened in Sokhumi.  Applying framing, one can define the 
language and words that built the public “perspective” about the disagreement.  
Guram Panjikidze and Roman Miminoshvili brand Abkhaz being extremist.  An 
“extremist is an extremist”, 81  they note, but question the behaviour of Abkhaz 
doctors who denied medical assistance to ethnic Georgians (1990: 92).  “What 
caused these events?  What caused the frenzy of these extremists?  Was the Sokhumi 
massacre a demonstration of an unintended fury or was it caused by the launch of 
the Sokhumi branch of the Tbilisi State University?” — so asked the authors (1990: 
92).  Asserting that the incident was a very well-planned action against the Abkhaz 
nation, the Georgian writers thought that it was managed and almost openly 
supported by the party workers, writers, scholars and other representatives of 
intelligentsia (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 92).  The comments are full of 
words of pity toward the Abkhaz people, who will have to carry the burden of that 
“shameful” day, shame that is impossible (the Georgian word for ‘never’ is used) to 
remove from history (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 92).   
 The authors contradict the Abkhaz accusations of Georgian colonial 
approaches, referring to the data that demonstrates that they were a minority who 
were enjoying privileges of majority.  “Abkhaz (Apsua82) are 17.1 per cent of the 
population according to the 1979 survey, Georgians 43.9, Russians 16.4 and 
Armenians 15.1” (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 93).  By showing the data, 
Panjikidze and Miminoshvili intend to demonstrate the multiple privileges granted to 
 81	They	use	this	word	knowing	that	Abkhaz	did	not	like	that	particular	label	used	by	Gamsakhurdia			82	Apsua	also	was	used	by	Gamsakhurdia	to	alienate	Abkhaz	and	emphasize	their	otherness.		
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Abkhazians (see Slider, 1985), which are given to them on the “Georgian soil” for the 
price of “oppression and limitation” of Georgians (1990: 93).  Their intention is to 
fully depict and illustrate “who oppresses whom?”, which was the existential 
question of the time between two groups.   It is noteworthy that the authors use the 
word “oppress” in a sarcastic tone after each point: “Look, how we Georgians 
oppress the Abkhaz” (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 94).  This reference to 
statistics demonstrates that the authors assign their own categories to the aim as 
they create a hierarchy of things (ch.3).  They examine the factors of power that 
measure the problem in a particular way, which is offered by them.  In other words, 
Panjikidze and Miminoshvili list the paradigms that they consider significant in 
measuring Abkhaz representation.  As already mentioned in chapter 3, this is an 
example of an ideological and cultural context of speech acts that were prevalent at 
the time.     
 Another example of using the historic context as a tool was the Abkhaz claim 
that the government of Soviet Georgia was heading toward genocide of Abkhaz 
people, because they were following the footsteps of Stalin and Beria (Panjikidze and 
Miminoshvili, 1990: 103).  Stanislav Lakoba argues that Georgianization policies were 
an attempt of genocide against Abkhaz, which was conducted by Georgians when 
they purposefully destroyed historical and cultural monuments (1995: 101).  Both 
sides of the conflict used the Genocide word before and during the war as well as 
after the armed conflict.  Some Georgian politicians (e.g. Tamaz Nadareishvili) did 
argue that eviction of more than 200 000 ethnic Georgians was a genocide.  
Georgians do accuse the Abkhaz of destroying Georgian monuments in Abkhazia and 
consider that as an act of genocide too.  This very specific norm of international 
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humanitarian law was widely abused by everybody in the conflicts across the region.  
Genocide is a very powerful word in international humanitarian law, and it was useful 
for the politicians to exploit the norm.  One could suggest that the concept of 
genocide serves as a strategic weapon in the quest for independence as it mostly 
damages such aspirations, further complicating conflict resolution (Grodsky, 2012: 
2).     
 If one applies the method of framing (ch. 3) then one can see how the issue 
of language was put into the spotlight.  Abkhaz claim that they were forcefully 
exposed to the Georgian language whilst they wished to speak Russian.  The answer 
to the language issue is ironic for the Abkhaz, as Georgian authors explain that it was 
Georgian side who added the Abkhaz language to the Constitution of Abkhazian 
Autonomous Republic to protect the endangered language.  The Abkhaz accuse not 
only the Georgian government but the Church as well in forcing the Abkhaz diocese 
to attend Georgian liturgy rather than Russian (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 
107).  Georgian writers mock the Abkhaz in this section as they explain that the 
Russian liturgy means Clerical Slavic, which is difficult to understand even for native 
Russian speakers (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 108).  As Nodia stresses in one 
of his essays, Georgians defined their country as part of “high culture”, in other words 
the space where Georgian was the language of literacy and elite culture (1998: 16).  
It must be noted that the idea of “high culture” might have guided the authors when 
they mocked Abkhaz.     
 Panjikidze and Miminoshvili stress the aspirations of Abkhaz toward Russia 
and ironically regret the fact that the Abkhaz language is “unfortunately still part of 
the Iberian-Caucasian family” and could not join the Slavic group yet (1990: 127).  The 
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Georgian writers accuse the Abkhaz in being Russia-focused.  They argue that Russian 
colonial rulers had been pursuing policies of segregation aimed to destroy Georgia.  
It was their aim to assimilate Abkhaz with Russians and substituted Georgian 
language with Russian (1990: 129).  They strongly support the viewpoint that 
Georgians had always protected Abkhaz from Russification and that now it is branded 
as a ‘crime’ (1990: 160).  The word “crime” of Georgians was prevalent in the public 
discourse.  Many thought that Georgians were unfaithfully treated hosts of Abkhaz 
guests who abused Georgian hospitality and demanded independence.  This was the 
most vivid observation of those years, and in particular the idea of “guests” was 
popularised by Gamsakhurdia and his followers.  Highlighting this word made the 
Georgians feel as though they were victims of a conspiracy of the Abkhaz and 
Russians and was a good tool for the mobilization of public opinion against non-
Georgians overall. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, talking victimhood 
is an attempt to establish a new reality, and it helps the speech act to succeed (see 
Jeffery and Candea, 2006).    
 There is another example of the application of a justificatory strategy (see 
ch.3), when the authors of the essay underline the language and ask generally that, 
if the Abkhaz were powerful and independent, then why they did not have own 
alphabet and literature (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 129).  Georgians always 
boast of having an ancient alphabet and literary legacy dating back to the fifth 
century.  The authors are inquiring why the Abkhaz “could not” write a book or 
translate the gospel (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 129).  They also refer to the 
founder of the Abkhaz alphabet, who was “buried the day before yesterday” 
(probably they mean Baron von Uslar or Dimitri Gulia).  It is understandable that the 
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writers were furious about the allegations made in Abkhaz letters, yet the emphasis 
on language is symbolic since it accomplishes an achievable aim: it links political 
claims of ownership with the psychological demands for the affirmation of a value of 
a group (Horowitz, 1985: 222).  Needless to say, that the authors use language as an 
instrument of self-respect and dignity vis-à-vis the Abkhaz; because the Abkhaz 
language in not as old as Georgian.  Such an ironic attitude supports the reproduction 
of identities, i.e. the Georgian identity looks stronger and older than that of the 
Abkhaz.     
 The Georgian intelligentsia always thought that the Abkhaz (and to more 
extent the Ossetians) did not have enough intellectual resources to fight the 
historical or ideological warfare with Georgian scholars and historians.  But looking 
at both sides and arguments demonstrates that the hierarchical academic 
inheritance of the USSR was limiting both parties, and this is apparent in the 
discourse and language used in the arguments against each other.  The past, which 
was mostly written from a political point of view of few Communists and censured 
during seventy years of the Soviet rule, was becoming an instrument for the 
solidification of new nations, and this very fact demonstrates the weakness of both 
scholarly groups.  The escalation of the conflict and its political outcomes vividly 
demonstrates the failure of scholars and historians to prevent the “historical 
engineering” of the future and the change in the channels of communication 
(Mamardashvili interview).83  Mamardashvili openly criticized Georgian nationalism, 
and he was announced to be “a traitor of Georgia” (Shatirishvili, 2009: 397, see also 
 83	Mamardashvili,	M.	1990.	Interview.	Available	at:		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sa44jqap_s	[Last	Accessed:	3	August	2018]	
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Coppieters, 2002: 98).  Again, this is an example of a strategic application of ideology 
and cultural context, signified and emphasized for a particular purpose.  There was a 
mainstream thinking that the Abkhaz and Ossetians lacked resources and any 
challenger was branded as a “traitor”.  Reading the language of the argument one 
can see the “mode” of operationalization of the issue (ch.3).      
 The essay continues to address almost all historic issues including the 
confusion about Abkhaz identity.  Panjikidze and Miminoshvili name the Abkhaz 
identity issue as “extremely important” (1990: 168), but was it that important? 
“Historic Abkhaz and modern Apsua” they claimed were totally different people.  The 
origin of Abkhaz and their affiliation to the territory of Abkhazia was and remains a 
significant part of historic discourse.  Georgians and Abkhazians accused each other 
of incorrectly interpreting words and the names of places, churches and towns 
(Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 185).  The authors emphasize that autonomy was 
the highest possible privilege granted to the Abkhaz, and they had to be satisfied 
with that status (1990: 186).  Panjikidze and Miminoshvili note that the short 
independence of Abkhazia was a “mistake” that produced negative outcomes (1990: 
186).  They affirm their position on the same page that “Abkhazia was and will always 
remain part of Georgia” (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 186).   
 After enumerating these examples, they talk about the benefits and privileges 
Abkhaz gained in modern times (i.e. 1970s-80s), which made some “faint-hearted” 
(sic.) Georgians become Abkhaz (1990: 136).  Abkhazia, as a small nation, was 
granted some privileges and some ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia choose to be 
registered as Abkhaz in the passports.  Panjikidze and Miminoshvili refer to this fact 
several times and mention exemptions granted to Abkhaz from military service 
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during the Tsarist period adding that such policies caused the increase in the number 
of the Abkhaz population and that in fact there was no significant change (1990: 151). 
The adjective to describe those Georgians was offensive for both nations.  The 
authors implied that bad Georgians wished to become Abkhaz, somehow meaning 
that the Abkhaz were a second-class people.  Georgians who chose Abkhaz ethnicity 
were bad citizens.  Such an interpretation of people’s choices did not bring any 
positive trends to the complex political disputes between Georgia and Abkhazia, or 
to be more specific, between Tbilisi and Sokhumi.  These adjectives had accumulated 
into instruments of radicalization and mobilization against one another.  This is an 
example of the operationalization of ethnic belonging for a political end.     
 This piece is noteworthy as it depicts the operationalization of history in 
Abkhaz-Georgian discourse.  Featuring the argument about titles of the kings of 
Georgia and their relation to the origins of the Georgian or Abkhaz Kingdom 
demonstrate how history is put into a “mode” that “creates the truth” and appeals 
to emotions and instincts across communities (ch.3). Georgian historiography 
considers Abkhazia and Georgia to be the same and thus strongly disagrees (see 
Lortkipanidze, 1990) with the Abkhaz argument for independence.  Stuart Kaufman 
calls it a “bogus theory” that was proposed in Stalin’s time, when the ancient Abkhaz 
were considered Georgians and contemporary residents, the North Caucasians, 
arrived in the seventeenth century (2001: 92).  The most striking part of this discourse 
is the structure of the argument.  Both parties refer to medieval or modern historians 
but never question the validity of historic ‘facts’. Historiography is used as scientific 
evidence of territorial or state belonging.  The argument concerns events dating back 
to the eighth century, to the Abkhaz King Leon II and his legacy.  Georgian 
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historiography argues that Leon II consolidated the territory of what is Western 
Georgia today, whereas Abkhaz historians and the Letter of Likhny as well define the 
same facts differently.  They say that Leon II incorporated (or annexed) parts of 
Western Georgia into the Abkhaz Kingdom (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 117).  
The general history books always implied that the consolidation of power in Western 
Georgia was an arrangement between the ruling families of the Kartvelian (Kartli) 
kingdoms (see Kaufman, 2001: 92, Lortkipanidze, 1990: 64).  Leon II was probably a 
good negotiator and he gained the title of a King.  The title of the Georgian monarchs 
was “A king [the queen was also referred as king] of Abkhaz, Kartvels, Rans and 
Kakhs” (the names are not in alphabetical order, they are arranged from West to 
East).  The details of the distribution of power during Leon II and the title of monarchs 
are a very important part of the discussion.  There are few examples of other regal 
titles that are ordered according to the significance of a province or a territory.  
Accordingly, Georgian historians think and argue that Abkhazia and Georgia 
(Saqartvelo) are synonyms and the name differences could not be used as a 
justification of the claim for independence.  This is the regime of truth they wished 
to impose on society, which later on ended up in flames and alienated parts of the 
country.  Yet one has to remember that the language, and any language, underwent 
huge modernization and transformation over time.  It is a difficult work and 
painstaking research efforts that makes it possible to translate the words across 
centuries.  It is particularly challenging in the South Caucasus, which lacks archival 
material that dates back to the first millennium. 
 By challenging the authenticity of the history of “free” or “sovereign” 
Abkhazia, which they define as a “myth”(1990: 124), the writers engage in an act of 
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creating the truth by questioning the “proofs” and “myths” used by Abkhaz.  Yet, one 
has to remember that “proofs” in the Soviet historiography could be problematic as 
it was mentioned in the Chapter 4 the history of the USSR was totally redefined by 
Bolsheviks (see Geller and Nekrich).  Besides, there are two points worth of attention.  
First, the idea of sovereignty is very fluid.  Sovereignty in its Westphalian 
understanding did not apply to the kingdoms of the South Caucasus, as they did not 
participate in European power wars.  They were on the edge of the continent and 
had a customary approach to power distribution among the princedoms.  This 
indicates that both the Abkhaz and Georgians were misleading their audiences about 
sovereignty and independence in their consequent pledges.  They wished to 
legitimize their claims, which were based on not quite legitimate arguments.  
Another significant point is the definition of history for the parties.  When Panjikidze 
and Miminoshvili say that the history promoted by Abkhaz is a myth, they forget to 
suggest that perhaps Georgian history is the product of the same myth as well.  The 
Communist regime always exploited all available means for the propaganda of their 
ideas and values and history was one of their favourites.  The discourse in this case 
is an exemplary demonstration of misconceptions and the misinterpretation of the 
past.   
 The rest of the essay is a position of part of Georgian society about the status 
and history of Abkhazia and Georgia as well as the status of history in the present.  
This is a story of mutual accusations and the radical evaluation of the critical 
situation.  The crisis was foreseeable as the old regime was collapsing and new 
arrangements were necessary to adjust to a new world.  Yet the parties, as the 
discourse demonstrates, had chosen the past to be the guiding tool for building the 
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future.  The past was and still remains controversial because of the political interests 
of the Soviet leaders in the 1920s and 1930s.  This is possibly the reason for so many 
misconceptions about the conflict.  The past was instrumental for getting public 
mobilized and securitized, whilst it guided the arguments that were purely political 
and could had been solved through a constructive dialogue.  In an interview, former 
Prime Minister of Georgia Tengiz Sigua talks about the methods that the Moscow 
establishment designed to retain control over the collapsing union.  He argues that 
he saw a secret document that was commissioned to the Institute of Ethnography 
directed by Professor Bromley (see Chapter 4) and aimed at proposing consequent 
tools that the Kremlin could use to compartmentalize and rule the prospective 
former republics (Sigua, 2013).  He outlines two main paradigms that the Institute 
offered to the government: the first one was the so called “inter-fronts” — the 
groups embedded within big factories or institutes who were mostly representatives 
of ethnic minorities and who triggered discontent among the staff.  Sigua argues that 
the idea of “inter-fronts” was not effective in Georgia, however, the second proposal, 
to instrumentalise and weaponize the autonomous status against the central 
governments in the republics ,ended up to be more fruitful in case of Georgia (Sigua, 
2013).      
 Overall, the essay ends up being judgmental, claiming that almost all the 
Abkhaz arguments were absurd and that all arguments and assumptions of Georgian 
scholars represented the complete truth.  In the final part they ironically refer to the 
first Abkhazian book that was published only in 1912 and “was not culturally or 
intellectually distinguishable” (Panjikidze and Miminoshvili, 1990: 193).  Indeed, the 
Georgian language is old, as was the literature, but still such irony did not add 
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anything particular to the fame of the Georgian literary tradition.  Contrarily, it 
depicted Georgian writers as cynical intellectuals who drafted a long essay to indicate 
that Abkhaz literature was too young, and its history was incorrect.   
 There is ample evidence in the letter that the Georgian elite was not ready 
for a compromise regarding the new terms and conditions of the relationships, which 
in turn made the ethnic minorities (Abkhaz and Ossetians) alien to the new state that 
Georgia was aiming to build.  There was no sense of “belonging” (Shotter, 1993: 163), 
but a sense of being inadequate in relation to a larger community with an 
unconditional membership, i.e. the Georgians.  Needless to say that in any society 
there must be a “competing and conflicting” life with associated “language games”,84 
but it should not make any member an “intrusive alien” whose worth to the 
community is being constantly questioned (Shotter, 1993: 163).  To put it into 
context, one could be alienated by the lexicon which excludes a significant segment 
of the population.  By doing so, they halted the process of social relations (in the 
Aristotelian sense), because if peoples’ identities are a function and a result of their 
social relations, then they must maintain their identities, which is the ontological 
security of their social being, and everyone must morally respect and sustain 
identities around them in order for these identities to sustain social relations 
(Shotter, 1993: 164).  The hostile dominant narrative deprived parties of the chance 
to listen each other’s ideas and accommodate differences.  Almost all words selected 
by disputing parties signified a rift and discord that it had predetermined their 
 84	This	is	Wittgenstein’s	concept,	when	he	argues	that	people	react	to	certain	things	within	the	boundaries	of	their	language	(see	Wittgenstein	2009:	no.	60	and	130)		
311 
application to that particular conflict (Wittgenstein, 2009: no. 264).  The articulations 
were bearers of negative signifiers that shaped the dimension of the conflict.   
 The Abkhaz discourse was radicalised by the either-or choice between Russia 
and Georgia.  Somehow the initiators of the project thought that they had to make a 
drama out of the political issue.  The very idea of total radicalisation is striking as it 
was widespread.  The political actors did not have the time and, perhaps, resources 
to organize a long-term transformation or channel the differences through 
diversified avenues.  It was an unfortunate choice of the illiberal and oppressed 
individuals of the USSR.  Most of them got the opportunity to acquire power in a 
post-Soviet political quagmire and they succeeded in finding an audience and 
legitimising a plainly illegitimate discourse of hatred and enmity.   
 The Abkhaz saw the solution in appealing directly to Moscow to become a 
union republic.  They felt Georgia was unable to provide the level and quality of 
autonomy they wished to possess.  Both Slider and Hewitt note that the reforms 
undertaken after the 1978 demands by the Soviet administration in Tbilisi did not 
have sufficient impact (Hewitt, 1993, Slider, 1985).  One could argue that the Soviet 
system was experiencing pitfalls as it was unable to develop and catch up with 
modernity.  As it has been said, in the previous chapters (see Chernayev) the system 
was in crisis and Perestroika was an attempt to save it.  In other words, the inefficient 
system was unlikely to produce adequate outcomes for Abkhaz.  Despite being a 
superpower of the time, the USSR did not have the strength to preserve the 
essentials of its structure and was incapable of change in the wider selection of its 
aspects (Deutsch, 1966: 82).  To further elaborate, the state did not have a learning 
capacity that would allow it to reallocate or recommit a large part of resources to 
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new uses without destroying the organization as a whole (Deutsch, 1966: 82).  Yet, 
the change of the regime and the collapse of the USSR was a completely new 
opportunity for the two sides to negotiate a better relationship and accommodate 
Abkhaz needs.  However, the radical securitization of Abkhaz and their voices in 
Tbilisi had blocked the avenues of communication as they revoked only the negative 
institutional memory across the polities.        
 There are inaccuracies in arguments of the both sides, but history is power in 
the discourse and thus gains vast importance.  The word “historic” or “historically” 
dominated the discussion, and the parties tried to prove that what they know from 
the history is the truth.  As all over Europe there were small princedoms on the 
modern Georgian territory.  There were some alliances or separations.  During the 
pre-war discourse in the 1980s, the history of Abkhaz and Georgian relations was a 
very popular discussion topic.  Everybody knew at least something about the ‘truth’.  
The newspapers published various letters and historic essays about the sense of 
belonging of Abkhazia.  The same occurred in Abkhazia.  Instead of addressing actual 
political problems that faced the parties, history and ethnic identity became the item 
on the agenda.       
 The multiple articles and open letters in leading Georgian newspapers shaped 
the public discourse.  The Tbilisi society questioned the right of the Abkhaz to live in 
Georgia.  Radical chauvinism became popular as many renowned writers, artists and 
public figures supported right-wing ideas.  Georgia was depicted as a privileged 
nation and all other ethnicities had to accept the reality or leave.  The issue of 
Georgian nationalism was the most popular topic of discussion and those who spoke 
up against it were considered enemies of the nation or spies of the Kremlin.  Zviad 
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Gamsakhurdia’s political allies particularly supported this stance.  Radical voices 
overtook the moderate intellectuals and as a result the campaign expanded 
(Kaufman, 2001: 112).  As already mentioned, the Abkhaz as well as the Ossetians 
became “existentially different and alien” (Schmitt and Strong, 2007).  It was 
acceptable to demand loyalty toward the Georgian people and ask the “aliens” to 
subscribe to the terms and conditions offered by the Georgian nation.      
 There were dissenting voices among the Georgian intelligentsia; however, the 
nationalist leaders trumped them by mobilizing supporters.  In extreme 
circumstances. people tend to listen to radicals rather than moderates.  A philologist, 
Tengiz Buachidze, appealed to the nationalists and called for common sense.  He 
published an appeal in the Literaturuli Saqartvelo newspaper in December 1988, and 
he argued that the number of radicals was relatively small and civil society was 
bigger; however, the society expected the government to manage the crisis 
(Buachidze, 1988).  Referring to the partly submissive attitude of a society, he hails 
part of the intelligentsia who understand the risks of radical discourse that is 
dangerous for Georgia; he urges for negotiations and insists that Perestroika and 
Glasnost should be used positively for the future of the country (Buachidze, 1988).  
Yet compared to moderate voices the performatives uttered by nationalists were 
more powerful and had more profound and far-reaching appeal.  The ideology of the 
nationalists made people forget that their world was constructed and the ideology 
of nationalism seemed to be a natural world for them (Billig, 1995: 37).  In other 
words, the reference to fears and threats ended up being a more efficient instrument 
of mobilization than a call to rethink historic facts.  The regime of truth based on 
hostile assumptions was already set up by radical nationalists.    
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 Another Georgian scholar and historian, Nodar Lomouri, proposed to re-think 
the term “Abkhaz” and end the long debate about the historical and linguistic 
misconceptions related to the issue.  Writing for the Literaturuli Saqartvelo 
newspaper, he argues that the understanding of the language and terms should be 
amended as they largely refer to dubious sources.  By declining to engage in the 
debate, he emphasizes the banality of deliberation that was underway in Georgia 
about the history and and origin of the Abkhaz in particular (Lomouri).  Lomouri 
candidly argues that all the chroniclers and sources used to support the parties of the 
debate were very “political” writings, even those produced by Greek geographers 
and scholars, who used ethnonyms as political terms rather than in relations to 
ethnic groups. Hence it was challenging, if not impossible, to get a full picture of the 
ethnic belonging of old Kolkhida (Lomouri).  Lomouri admits that the answer to the 
dialectical question between Georgians and the Abkhaz, as to why the Georgian kings 
had “Abkhaz” in their title, is simply unknown because historians did not know the 
ethnic origin of the first Abkhaz nobleman who was at the same time founder of the 
united Georgian Kingdom [Bagrat III].   By dropping the ethnic variable, Lomouri 
offers to concentrate on political legacy of Abkhaz princes and look into the shared 
heritage of Georgians and Abkhaz (Lomouri, 1989).  He also explains that the 
ethnonyms in the past were used differently and their literal translation to modern 
times was an inaccuracy, if not a mistake (Lomouri, 1989).  Citing many 
inconsistencies and grey areas in the history, Lomouri argues that such a 
dogmatisation of the past damages the discourse and insists that further research 
has to be conducted before any of the arguments are confirmed (1989).  Yet 
Lomouri’s opinion was less vocal, because he represented the moderate part of the 
intelligentsia.  In turbulent times ,nationalism was a “psychological” phenomenon 
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and the public preferred to listen to radicals (Billig, 1995: 44).  As mentioned earlier 
in chapter 3, in crisis situations language has a formative power due to “extra-
ordinary” discourse, which dominates the events (see Bourdieu ch.3).  Suffice to say, 
that the discourse was extraordinary, which gave the advantage to radicals.    
 Consequently, the language games and superlative adjectives applied to the 
vastly unknown past became decisive denominators of the political crisis over the 
legal status of the units of the former USSR.  The debate, launched by historians and 
intellectuals, had implied an exercise of historic amnesia when ideologically 
convenient stories were accepted as facts, while discomforting parts of the story 
were overlooked and denied (Billig, 1995: 38).         
 
6.9. Between Sokhumi and Tbilisi 
Abkhaz voices 
A Russian-language newspaper published by the National Forum of Abkhazia 
released an article about the “truth” of the founding of the Abkhazian Autonomous 
Republic (AAR).  Titled as Pages of History, the newspaper demonstrates special 
status of history.  A column by the historian Badjgur Sagharia started with a reference 
to a telegram, addressed to comrades Lenin and Stalin on 26 March 1921.  The 
telegram revealed the uneasy relationship between Tbilisi and Sokhumi during the 
independence years, from 1918-1921.85  The Abkhazian side accused the Georgian 




Stalin for protection.  Ephrem Eshba, Nestor Lakoba and Nikoloz Akirtava86 proposed 
that Abkhazia should become part of the Russian Federation, or else be an 
independent unit of the Union.87  The same article provides a record of the phone 
conversation between comrades Eshba and Orjonikidze.  They discuss the possibility 
of the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia.  Eshba insisted that Abkhaz people do not 
want to be part of Georgia and that Orjonikidze has to acknowledge the fact.  The 
significant point in the conversation is the reference to the “centre”.88  The dialogue 
of two communists showed their dependence on the centre and total dominance of 
the central committee.  The publication is significant as it demonstrates the role and 
status of this historic narrative in Georgian-Abkhaz discourse of the 1980s.  Such 
references show the significance of the Bolshevik legacy and how the polities 
perceived change in the age of Perestroika.  Despite the wide acceptance of the need 
to transform the USSR, discourse was still focused on the ideas of the 1920s.       
 On 21 May 1921, the Revkom of Georgia decided to accept the Declaration of 
Independence of the Socialist Republic of Abkhazia.89  The forum of all the workers 
of Abkhazia had welcomed the declaration of the Revkom and voted for a resolution 
that contained the wording: “in order to avoid ethnic and national clashes between 
Georgians and Abkhaz the independence of Abkhazia was the right decision”. 90  
However, the decision was temporary as Stalin revised it (see Hewitt, 1993)91.  The 
author of the article blames Stalin for the union of Abkhazia and Georgia.  Badjgur 
Sagharia outlines Stalin’s policies toward Abkhazia and his contribution to failed 
 86	Abkhaz	leaders	in	1920s	87	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	88	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	89	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	90	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	91	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	
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independence.  Stalin was Georgian, hence making him the key actor in failing in 1921 
made Georgia an enemy.  In this case, Stalin as well as Orjonikidze could be viewed 
as performatives that remind Abkhaz people that their rights were curtailed 
(Kaufman, 2001: 88-89) by two Georgian men.    
 Sagharia cited the Union Treaty signed between Abkhazia and Georgia in 
December 1921. The treaty was based on military, political and economic needs and 
enshrined good but equal relations of the two entities.92  Later on, the idea of a single 
South Caucasian Federation damaged Abkhaz interests according to Sagharia,93 but 
the noteworthy point is a quotation from a resolution of 17 February 1922.  In this 
resolution, the Revkom (Revolutionary Committee) of Abkhazia hailed the bilateral 
treaty between Georgia and Abkhazia, emphasizing the importance of eliminating 
“political mavericks” (i.e. Mensheviks).  According to the document Mensheviks were 
accused of stirring up ethnic tensions.94   
 The Abkhaz authorities attempted and actively worked to obtain direct 
membership of the Federation, although they were allowed to join it only through a 
treaty agreement with Georgia.  The dilemma in the evaluation and analysis of the 
conflict and war for Abkhazia is the clash of truths that are different for all sides.  
When the argument about the status of Abkhazia was raised in the 1980s, the parties 
and political groups chose to use certain extracts from distorted information they 
possessed from heavily censored books or research papers.  Sagharia argues that 




chauvinism as its key legacy, which promoted an antagonistic attitude toward 
everything Georgian.95       
 Sagharia argues that the union treaty was the main document between 
Georgia and Abkhazia, and that Stalin later devised constitutional changes that 
downgraded Abkhazia’s status. 96   There is a pattern of Bolsheviks accusing 
Mensheviks and the Abkhaz polity accusing Bolsheviks, and Stalin in particular, of 
constitutional and legal arguments between the two entities (see Hewitt, 1993).  It 
ended up as a blame game that involved the past, institutions that were obsolete or 
no longer existed.  Neither of the parties showed the will to overcome the past and 
outline the framework for talks over the future. The row over the status and power 
distribution became the essential hindrance.  At the same time, the parties did not 
work to cooperate on a settlement; on the contrary, they escalated the conflict and 
brought the country to the brink of war.  
 Most voices were assessing one part of the story, either negatively or 
positively, but almost nobody was able to offer an alternative or to soften 
nationalistic sentiments.  It was in vogue to criticize Communists and cultivate 
national identity, though many had forgotten that that national identity, which was 
so harshly disputed, was the product of millennia of multicultural interactions.  In 
fact, Sagharia notes in the article that Georgia had somehow forgotten its own 
history of being a multinational and multi-ethnic country, that the “one and 
undivided” Georgia was a rather imperialistic vision of the world. 97   One must 
mention here Andrei Sakharov’s argument about Georgia being a “little empire”, 
 95	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2		96	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	97	Edinenie,	August	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	
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when he proposed a confederation, in which all the units of the USSR including the 
autonomous republics and okrugs or oblasts can enjoy the widest possible 
“sovereignty” with some restrictions in security, foreign relations, transport and etc. 
(Sakharov, 1989: 26).  He insisted that such “de-imperializing” (decolonisation) of the 
USSR was the only way to deal with “small empires” i.e. the republics of the Union 
(Sakharov, 1989: 27).  Whilst arguing for the case, he referred to Georgia as an 
example of a “small empire” which had three autonomous entities (1989: 27).  By 
proposing to start with Georgia (and its decolonization) and then continuing with the 
Russian Federation (Sakharov, 1989: 27) he prompted huge outrage in Georgia.  
Sakharov’s comments about Georgia had been interpreted as unfriendly, and added 
up to fear for the Georgian identity, as Sakharov noted as Russian empire once 
curtailed Georgia’s aspirations now Georgians were suppressing minorities in a 
similar way (Smith et al., 1998: 172).  Hence, Sagharia referring to the same 
terminology pronounced a performative that threatened Georgians.    
 A further example of the continued attempts to shape the discourse is a piece 
from the Edinenie, a Russian-language Abkhaz newspaper from July 1990, which 
published a letter by Zurab Achba, a deputy chairman of the National Forum of 
Abkhazia “Aidgilara”.  He criticized the statement of the Abkhazian branch of the 
National Front of Georgia in the newspaper Sabchota Abkhazeti (Soviet Abkhazia).98 
Achba agreed with the authors that Abkhazia faced a “conflict situation”, but noted 
that the situation could not change unless the “objective causes” of the problem 




(public) movements.99  One can see the antagonistic language, similar to voices from 
Tbilisi, talking about the conflict and disputes.  When one analyses the context and 
rhetoric of the conflict, one can see the accumulation of negative perceptions that 
dominated the political lexicon of the time.  Notably, the radical discourse about the 
future allocation of power between Tbilisi and Sokhumi was in fact obstructing 
constructive discussions that could lead to an agreement.  Perhaps the biggest 
challenge for the parties was their inability to delineate the existing dilemmas and 
listen to each other, instead of referring to historic myths.   
 Furthermore, the choice of topics makes speech acts radical and engages in 
building new truth.  Achba denied the claim that the Georgian language had been 
banned in Abkhazia and that people were punished for being Georgian (the report in 
Newsweek describes how such rumours spread in Tbilisi).  Using framing, one can 
notice keywords, e.g. “incorrect” or “provocateurs”, along which the discourse is 
constructed.   Achba considers “incorrect” to equate the Abkhaz people with a 
“bunch of provocateurs”; though he admits that Abkhazians were used to harsh 
treatment for more than 150 years including attempts to annihilate them, their 
language and make them extinct (see Hewitt, 1993).100  His point could be linked to 
the statement made by Giorgi Karkarashvili (a Georgian general), which was and 
continues to be one of the most hostile speech acts in Abkhaz-Georgian saga.       
 One can see the metrics that were used by the political actors to secure 
support for their truth.  The letter demonstrates the antagonism and enmity that was 
built up through words and actions of political actors of two separate nationalist 
 99	Edinenie,	July	1990,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	100	Edinenie,	July	1990,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	2	
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movements.  Achba places emphasis on the historic trauma of Mohajirs and 
addresses the tragedy of the Abkhaz people, who were consistently suppressed for 
more than 150 years.  He attempts to create the image of a martyr nation that has 
no choice but to fight.  In other words, Achba use the idea of victimhood as well.  
Apparently, such evaluations served as performatives that mobilized the Abkhaz 
against Georgians.  The language of the letter was preparing the public for the worst-
case scenario, as it described the “historic” destiny to be persecuted.  Subsequently, 
the nation that was denied its basic right to exist and self-determine has no other 
choice than to continue to fight for freedom.  Like the Georgian nationalists, the 
Abkhaz were seeking legitimacy as they prepared the nation for a “historic” shift.       
 The same newspaper (Edinenie) published a piece featuring relations 
between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1918-1921, entitled “The Struggle between the 
Mensheviks and the Abkhaz National Council”.  The very title of the piece is hostile 
and has a mobilising power, given the fact that Georgians are ‘others’, although 
‘Mensheviks’ is the term used in the headline.  Notably, this Abkhaz newspaper 
emphasizes that the Mensheviks had an important role in the development of 
political tensions between two entities.  The policies and methods used by the 
Mensheviks were and remain largely unacceptable for Abkhaz people and have a 
very negative institutional memory.101  One of the main reasons of mistrust is the 
first Menshevik constitution of 1921, which did not include status of Abkhazia, 
because of tensions between the administrations in Tbilisi and Sokhumi.    
 101	The	Mensheviks	had	very	tensed	relations	with	the	Abkhaz	political	elite.		The	Abkhaz	thought	that	the	Mensheviks	had	deceived	them	during	the	period	of	independent	Georgia.		When	promised	devolution	and	autonomy,	they	did	not	receive	the	actual	rights	(see	Avalishvili	1940).		
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 The Struggle between the Mensheviks and the Abkhaz National Council 
contains an extract from the memoirs of an Abkhaz public figure and writer, Semen 
Ashkhvatsava, who was murdered in 1937.  According to Ashkhvatsava, participants 
of a meeting of the Abkhaz National Council in 1918 addressed the reasons behind 
the political problems with the Menshevik government.  The latter (the Mensheviks) 
had dissolved the local council, which was seen as an attempt to seize power in 
Abkhazia.  However, delegates noted the fact that it was a coup orchestrated by “a 
group of persons”102 who wished to rule the country led by partisan interests. The 
document highlights the extremely hostile relations between Abkhaz leaders and 
Mensheviks in Tbilisi at the time.  It is worth noting that the extract uses the word 
“Mensheviks” rather than Georgians.  Perhaps this is an indication that the argument 
was not against the Georgian nation but a group of politicians who pursued own 
interests.  The Abkhaz accused the Mensheviks of being untrustworthy during 
negotiations.  Ashkhvatsava claimed that the Mensheviks always used force and 
terror as a last resort, being unable to implement other policies.    
 The headline of the article suggested that the struggle was against the 
Mensheviks, while “Abkhazia and Georgia” were only in small print.  A careful 
analysis of the material shows that the Abkhaz community was against the 
Menshevik policies, which they saw were repeated by nationalists in Tbilisi.  The 
extract shows that, in private conversations, Abkhaz leaders used the term 
“Mensheviks”, rather than “Georgians”.  They perceived Mensheviks as a group of 
power-hungry people who refused any dialogue or compromise with other groups or 
republics between 1918 and 1921.  During the 1980s the issue between Sokhumi and 
 102	Edinenie,	February	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	3	
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Tbilisi was again the Menshevik approach to the status of Abkhazia.  The news article 
shows the position of the Abkhaz community, which was against that old politics 
which saw events as a one-dimensional trajectory imposed from Tbilisi.  If the 
Georgian polity had been able to change its attitude and position regarding 
Abkhazia’s status, then they would have been open to a conversation with the 
Georgian state over the new status in the post-Soviet period.  Instead, nationalist 
parties, thanks to their rhetoric and popularity, ignored the voices from autonomous 
entities.   
 In fact, Shakril’s letter (see below) asks the question as to whether the 
freedom of one entity is possible by suppressing the choices of another.  It might be 
considered that the wrong interpretation of freedom and independence was another 
hindrance between communities.   
 As this research project aims to show how the communication channels were 
misused or abused, it must point out the official formulation that Vladislav 
Ardzinba103 presented to the Congress of the Soviet Deputies in May 1989.  It seems 
that many units of the Soviet Union could not agree on the meaning of Perestroika, 
or what was the expected impact of the process.  Ardzinba spoke about the faults in 
the Constitution, noting the hierarchy between the autonomous and union republics 
that led to “practical inequality”, in the legal sphere in particular (quoted in Glebov 




and Abkhazian dilemmas were the culmination of those ill-fated policies (in 1989: 
78).      
 Another contribution to this hostile discourse is a lawyer, Georgy Kolbaya, 
who consider the consequences of the conflict in several different prisms.104  The 
article addresses the historic motives of war and the aggression the Abkhaz felt from 
the Georgian “ruling elite”.  Despite being critical, Kolbaya carefully separates 
Georgia’s political elite and argues that it was their idea to make Georgia a mono-
ethnic country.  Notably, Kolbaya repeats several times that Abkhazia was a 
multinational republic and that the Georgian elite aimed to occupy Abkhazia.  
Kolbaya uses word “genocide” in the text as well.105 He claims that Georgians and 
Abkhaz have not shared a state for last 700 years and it was the Russian Empire that 
brought them into one space.106  He argues that in the period of the USSR, Abkhazia 
was forced to become part of Georgia thanks to teh policies of Stalin and Beria (see 
Nodia, 1997: 4).  At the same time, Georgian authorities conducted ethnic 
engineering in the republic.  Kolbaya argues that in the times of the Soviet rule, 
Abkhazia was exposed to terror and discrimination.   
 Kolbaya elaborates on the details of legal relations between Tbilisi and 
Sokhumi.  He reminded the public that Georgia had boycotted the referendum of 
March 1991 on the subject of the future of the USSR, whereas Abkhazia participated 
in the vote and voted for the Union.  In fact, Georgia held its own referendum and 
voted for independence from the USSR (31 March 1991).  On 23 July 1992, the 
Abkhaz supreme council adopted the 1925 Constitution, which implied that Abkhazia 
 104	Abkhazia,	January	1995,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	pp.14-15	105	Abkhazia,	January	1995,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	14	106	Georgian	historiography	prefers	to	ignore	this	fact	
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was an independent entity that had a treaty relationship with Georgia.  The Georgian 
supreme council voted for the Constitution of 1921, which did not incorporate 
Abkhazia as a legal unit at all.  Kolbaya thus argues that the Georgian political elite 
chose to exclude Abkhazia from its own legal system.  Kolbaya argues that the union 
with Georgia was a “tragic” episode of Abkhaz history that brought repressions and 
war against non-Georgian residents.  After the February Revolution in 1917, the 
Abkhaz formed the “Abkhaz People’s Council” and joined the North Caucasus 
Republic, hence when Georgia declared independence in 1917 Abkhazia was not part 
of Georgia (Cheterian, 2008: 69).  They insist that it was only Stalin’s and Beria’s 
policies that downgraded Abkhazia from a union republic to an autonomous entity 
within Georgia in 1931 (Cheterian, 2008: 71).  If one looks into the topic choice in the 
current discourse, one can notice the rhetoric about history and divisions.  The text 
excludes commonalities, but it emphasizes only the differences between the two 
groups.  Such a choice of topics helped the actors to build the truth they saw as 
appropriate.           
 Another exemplification of the tense discourse between Tbilisi and Sokhumi 
is an open letter to then chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia by Tamara Shakril.107 In this case it is noteworthy to look into the 
“mode” and “perspective” of the appeal as well as the context which she highlights.  
Shakril elaborates on the chauvinistic speeches and behaviour of Gamsakhurdia and 
accuses him of having “imperial ambitions” and “barbaric morality”.  She quotes his 




Gamsakhurdia threatened Ossetians: “I will bring an army of two thousand men and 
exterminate all Ossetians from the soil of Samachablo”.108  Thus, one can see how 
Gamsakhurdia’s words were interpreted as speech acts by the Abkhaz.  
Gamsakhurdia thought that he “represented unity against the forces of separatism” 
but in fact it was an example of “simplification of political space” (Jones, 2013: 57).  
Instead of addressing the complexity of political and social relations he brought the 
“us versus them” dichotomy that actually ruined the ecosystem of society and 
inflicted a long-term trauma on societies including ethnic Georgians.        
 Shakril’s open letter is a noteworthy proof of controversies within Georgian 
society, and at the same time it is an expression of anger and empathy.  The author 
condemned the policies and rhetoric of Gamsakhurdia and his inner circle, but 
simultaneously believed that there were “knights [people with dignity] in Georgia”. 
Further, Shakril noted that according to some of her acquaintances in Georgia who 
disagree with Gamsakhurdia, anti-Ossetian and anti-Abkhaz campaigns should be 
allocated more attention to solve the disagreements (see interview with an 
anonymous politician).  Despite the attempts to widen the deliberation and bring 
more participants to the argument in Tbilisi, it was too late to limit nationalists and 
argue with their chauvinistic ideas.     
 The first part of the letter is aggressive and contains offensive words toward 
Georgia as a nation, and especially against Gamsakhurdia.  She condemns Georgian 
imperialism and says they have Stalin’s genes and would like to conquer Russia and 
would not be against taking over the whole world.  At the same time, she accused 
Gamsakhurdia of authoritarianism and dictatorship.  Shakril denounced the tone 
 108	Edinenie,	February	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	3	
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used by Gamsakhurdia when he called on Ossetians and Abkhaz to be “satisfied by 
existing autonomous rights” or be prepared to lose them altogether.  Shakril argues 
that the autonomy of Soviet origin was a scam and a purely symbolic practice, and 
not suitable for the new reality.  There are several references to Charles De Gaulle, 
as Gamsakhurdia considered him to be an ideal politician and national leader.  Shakril 
attempted to demonstrate the differences between Gamsakhurdia’s vision and the 
Gaullist approach to Algerian independence.   
 Shakril accuses the Tbilisi authorities of being controlled by Gamsakhurdia.  
She claims that the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia behaved 
recklessly in Sukhumi and narrowly escaped casualties.  The author believes that the 
Georgian people deserve a better leader than Gamsakhurdia, whom she accused of 
“sacrilege”.  Apparently, she had spoken to Georgians who never shared the 
nationalism propagated by Gamsakhurdia.  She accuses him of coercing to suicide 
his own cousin from Gudauta (in Abkhazia), who, she argues, chose to die instead of 
being driven into violence.  She mentions that Gamsakhurdia tried to convince “our 
Georgians” to act against the Abkhaz.  “Our Georgians” were the Georgians who 
resided in Abkhazia and never shared the chauvinism and nationalism actively 
promoted by nationalist parties and their leaders in Tbilisi.  
 Shakril accuses Gamsakhurdia of organising the 9 April massacres.109  She 
insisted that it was his “provocation” that forced the government to call for Central 
(Moscow government) assistance.  The author expressed empathy toward the 
Georgian people but accused Gamsakhurdia of staging a “fake” funeral in Sokhumi.110  
 109	Notably,	many	experts	and	witnesses	of	the	event	back	in	1989	think	that	Gamsakhurdia	did	contribute	to	the	tragedy.			110	Edinenie,	February	1991,	Sokhumi,	Abkhaz	ASSR,	p.	3	
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She also blamed him for an attempt to stir up a civil war in Georgia, referring to her 
“Georgian friends” and conversations with them.   
 It is worth mentioning that Shakril argues that Abkhazia and Ossetia were not 
parts of Georgia, and it was just a mere accident that they were included in the 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.  She asks for a just consideration of the issue and 
argues that, if Georgia should be independent (she agrees with the point), then why 
should Abkhazia and Ossetia lack the opportunity of self-determination?  Shakril 
assumes that Georgians did not have to sign the agreement with the “Centre” (i.e. 
Moscow) but at the same time Georgia had to avoid suppressing the smaller nations.    
 By examining the context and the language of Shakril’s points, one can see 
how the war of words produced the speech acts that had both intended and 
unintended consequences.  Official statements addressed to South Ossetians were 
threatening the Abkhaz, and vice versa.  Almost every word and fact as well as 
historic context was operationalised to fit into hostile mode of discourse.       
There is another significant dispatch in Edinenie from February 1991: 
Democracy from a position of force.111  Employing harsh and critical language, the 
new local government was represented in a negative scope as a tool of domination 
from Tbilisi.  The article notes that the situation in Abkhazia was calm compared to 
that of in South Ossetia, though a prefecture does not help confidence-building.  The 
appointment of a prefect (a head of local administration)112 was defined as “illegal”.  
The Abkhaz were unhappy about a prefect appointed by the central government, and 




Georgia.  These three men were (and still remain) deeply associated with the 
suppression of the Abkhaz in the early twentieth century.  Hence, in this case, their 
association with the existing regime is a performative act that allocates special 
meaning to the bilateral relations.  The Abkhaz considered the Menshevik 
government of the short-lived Democratic Republic of Georgia to be the first 
upholder of their rights.  Stalin and Beria had followed their footsteps and as Abkhaz 
believe further deprived them of a right to exist as a small nation.  Jakob Lakoba 
names Gamsakhurdia as an heir of those ill-remembered policies.  Therefore, an 
administrative appointment was interpreted in a deeply political and historical 
context, accentuating the negative institutional memory of Abkhazia.  This 
appointment was securitized by the interpretation of speech acts and the historic 
context.  The particular direction given to every decision contributed to a soaring 
alienation between the Tbilisi government and the autonomous republic.  Divisive 
discourse fragmented communities who were struggling to overcome Soviet 
isolation and the Bolshevik perception of the world.  These communities were not 
ready to face the anarchical world order after living under a strictly hierarchical 
totalitarian regime.  At the same time, deeply fragmented and hostile discourse was 
beneficial politically. Emphasizing or inventing the connection of current decisions 
with a violent past was a powerful mobilization tool for the Abkhaz political actors 
on their way to post-Soviet power distribution.  Simultaneously, political parties in 
Tbilisi had a plausible agenda which enabled them to avoid questions about the 
political and economic future of a soon to be an independent state. 
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6.10. Georgia for Georgians/Georgia – “a martyr nation” 
As nationalism became a signpost of post-Soviet Georgia, the narrative against the 
Ossetians was heard by all minorities across the country (see English, 2008: 23).  It 
was a conflict that defined the framework of how the Georgian authorities intended 
to deal with minority autonomies during and after the collapse of the USSR.  It helped 
to build a stereotype that damaged Georgia and inter-ethnic relations in the country.  
By 1989 a Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia was torn between nationalists and the 
Communist Party leadership.   Two political forces crafted and shaped Georgia’s 
reality and future: their interactions, decisions, demands and declarations had far 
reaching ramifications for then republic of the USSR.  Contrary to Barry Posen’s 
argument that a security dilemma exists/existed in the South Caucasus (see Lit. Rev.), 
this chapter has outlined the nationalistic discourses and narratives that governed 
the attitude of emerging political elites toward minorities.  At a time of rising 
nationalism, the elites veered away from the wider intelligentsia and created an 
exclusive group that aimed to build an ethnicity-based state.113  Subsequently, the 
significance of local agents has to be recognized to understand the architecture of 
the conflict. Notwithstanding geopolitical challenges and security problems, political 
actors on the ground were the most active and important decision makers who 
predisposed the violent outcome of a legal misunderstanding.  In the beginning the 
South Ossetian issue was “a war of laws” (Cornell, 2002: 266) that was improperly 
 113	Gamsakhurdia	managed	to	create	a	group	of	loyal	followers.		They	constructed	a	discourse	that	marginalized	writers,	actors	and	filmmakers	who	refused	to	promote	Georgian	nationalism	(see	Kaufman	p.112).		This	video	recording	of	one	of	the	discussions	in	1989	demonstrates	Gamsakhurdia’s	stance	and	approach	to	‘enemies’	of	Georgian	independence	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7v6zHKQ3bc		
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managed by the Communist government in Tbilisi, yet later it became a roadmap of 
the policies that Georgian authorities in Tbilisi were proposing to non-Georgians.   
 Speech acts like 'Georgia for the Georgians’, 'Long live Georgian 
independence’, 'Let blood flow' and 'To terror we will reply with terror’ had done 
more damage than perhaps the entire Communist regime during its seventy-year 
rule.  Such slogans accentuated the destructive institutional memories and historic 
narratives that had created and incubated during the Communist regime.  In other 
words, the above-mentioned speech acts revived the fundamental paradigms that 
helped the Communist regime to impose control for more than seventy years.  They 
explain how a particular process produced a hostile outcome (see ch. 3) and 
securitized all non-Georgians.  They set the semantic rules of conflict and shaped the 
gestures and re-actions of participating actors (see ch. 3).  As already noted in the 
Chapter 3, discourse is a product of the social conditions of production as well as 
interpretation.  By referring to and analysing the texts and speeches of the period, 
one can see the connection between the texts and processes that are defined by 
social conditions, but at the same time clarify the situational context of the discourse 
(Fairclough, 2001: 21).  Norman Fairclough argues that discourse changes due to the 
changing relationships of power at the level of social institution or of the society 
(2001: 25).  This section outlines the speeches and texts that demonstrate the 
changes of balance of power across social institutions and the society as a whole as 
a result of political transformations in the USSR.  Introducing the details of texts show 
how the political agents assigned and interpreted content and demonstrated the 
tendency of amending the truth as it was convenient for their goal (see Balzacq ch.3).  
By uttering performatives using artefacts, historic narratives and emotions, they co-
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constructed the securitization process as they prompted audience to believe new 
truths about history and ethnicity.  Securitization through the discourse helped them 
to design a network of feeling, thoughts and assumptions that certain citizens of a 
republic were second-class and/or represented a threat to national interest and 
independence.  Such approach to the security amassed public support and 
dehumanized the “other” as it created a mental image of an enemy who was wishing 
to annihilate Georgian nation.  As this research seeks to assign explanatory power to 
the discourses of the time, the forgoing paragraphs offer extracts from the texts and 
speeches as well as ideas that prepared the soil for wars in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.                        
 Gamsakhurdia’s speech about the origin and the holy mission of the Georgian 
people was part of his identity politics and nationalist vision.  He designed an ideology 
based on mythology, Christianity and Georgian literature.  Gamsakhurdia developed 
the theory during the 1980s to mobilize the nation against Communism, using sacred 
texts and biblical episodes.  Gustave Le Bon’s theory about the psychological crowd 
applies to Georgia at that time (2001: 14).  Gamsakhurdia had a charismatic approach 
to politics.  His family background and political beliefs gained him supporters and 
many Georgians thought that Zviad (his first name was a brand) represented a knight 
with a mission to save Georgia.  In his extensive speech about the holy duty of the 
Georgian nation and language, Gamsakhurdia argued that at the time of the Second 
Coming, Georgians would have a special role and that the judgment was to be held 




Gamsakhurdia cites Niko Marr and Wilhelm von Humboldt to argue that Georgian, 
or, more precisely, proto-Georgian or Japhetic languages, are root languages and 
that every language originates from it by process of differentiation (see Smith et al., 
1998: 179). 115   Smith et al argue that, by mentioning the messianic mission, 
Gamsakhurdia created the myth for salvation of the language and therefore for the 
nation (1998: 179).  He was considered to be a great patriot of Georgia, and people 
followed him.  His vision of the Georgian language and nation as “humiliated and 
pushed into obscurity” helped his nationalistic discourse to flourish and gain more 
supporters (Smith et al., 1998: 182).  In the Soviet Union, Georgian history was 
distorted, and most Georgian citizens did not know much about the past of the 
country so Gamsakhurdia exploited his scholarly authority and was able to inflame 
nationalistic sentiments.  His Round Table propagated patriotism, freedom and 
democracy, but blended them together with virulent nationalism.  
 The narratives and discourses promoted by Gamsakhurdia and his supporters 
have immensely influenced the outcome of struggle between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali.  
In the above quoted speech, he openly talked about Georgians as the ancient nation 
and all other minorities “as guests” (1990).  Because of his popularity Ossetians 
feared for future.  Both parties argued that they were right in the dispute, both sides 
had citations from books of history about the entitlement to Samachablo or South 
Ossetia.  They were sure that their position was just and legal and the battles of 
legality and justice ended up in a military clash on the outskirts of Tskhinvali.   
 115	Gamsakhurdia’s	address,	Full	text,	http://saunje.ge/index.php?id=1470&lang=ka	[Last	Accessed:	29	July	2018]	
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 The Georgian leader (Gamsakhurdia) attempted to ignore the actual state of 
affairs, and one interview that he gave demonstrates well the attitude of the 
Georgian leadership toward the Ossetian issue: 
"There is no 'Ossetian side',"- he told Sobesednik - "The other side is Gorbachev, 
Nishanov [Chairman of the House of Nationalities in the USSR Supreme Soviet], and 
Moscow.  They are waging war on us with Soviet troops.  And in this battle, they are 
using gangs of Ossetian Communist extremists.  This is a punitive operation by 
Moscow conducted -- and I state this with full responsibility -- by Nishanov and 
Kryuchkov [KGB Chairman], using the helicopter and missile regiments deployed in 
Tskhinvali [South Ossetian capital].  We have set up a display at our MVD [Georgia's 
Interior Ministry] showing Soviet missiles confiscated from the extremists.  They are 
using them against our population, who are armed only with hunting rifles (1991: 
7)."  
This quote from his interview shows the attempt of securitization.  His speech acts 
are almost a declaration of war.  In his discourse, the Ossetians are “extremists”, i.e. 
a group who can be considered as an exception in Schmittian terms.    
 Gamsakhurdia downgraded the Ossetian party to “gangs” that were used by 
Gorbachev to fight Georgia.  The Georgian leader wished to demonstrate that there 
was no “Ossetian side” that was unhappy with Georgia’s policies, rather it was a 
staged conflict.  He described one South Osssetian leader, Torez Kulumbekov, as a 
“terrorist leader” (1991: 7).  In the same interview, Gamsakhurdia argued that 
Kulumbekov was secretly connected to the authorities in Moscow who were trying 
to save the USSR (7).  He also noted that the conflict accelerated anti-Ossetian 
sentiments in Tbilisi, which he tried to prevent (7).  Almost every word said to 
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Sobesednik was a powerful performative aimed at outlawing the Ossetian people and 
boosting mutual hatred between people.  If Kulumbekov was a “terrorist” then he 
represented the group that hailed terrorism, which was rather inaccurate depiction 
of the reality.  By using modifiers like “gang” and “terrorist”, and at the same time 
accusing Ossetians of being in an alliance with Russia and “waging war”, 
Gamsakhurdia performs speech acts that securitize the Ossetians and Russians 
simultaneously.  He constantly tries to create or signify existential threats in order to 
be able to break the rules (see Balzacq ch.3).  He created certain principles (see 
Tiechmann, 1997) that were used to measure the factors of power that ordered the 
hierarchy of things that were important (see ch.3).  In other words, he manufactured 
the consent of the public through creating a new regime of truth.        
 General Tsagolov proposed a Moscow backed plan that implied restoration 
of a status quo. He told the Sobesednik: “The Ossetians should return to their regional 
structures [South Ossetia has proclaimed itself a Soviet Republic within the USSR] 
and reaffirm that the region belongs within Georgia, while Georgia should invalidate 
the scrapping of [South Ossetia's] autonomy and lift the blockade” (1991: 7).  
However, Gamsakhurdia did not agree with the plan, as he thought granting “illegal” 
autonomy to Tskhinvali could not stop the bloodshed (7).  He referred to the illegal 
annexation of Georgia in 1921 by the Russian Red Army, and the consequent status 
of territories, in his view, was deemed to be unlawful.  Apparently, most of the 
nationalist groups did not have a clear understanding of the legal ambiguity that their 




“fight for independence”, and that other “details” were irrelevant.117  Yet labelling 
the plan as “illegal” raised more disputes.  In this case, defining the plan as “illegal” 
was a speech act that outlawed the possibility of negotiations.   
 Gamsakhurdia was outspoken about his admiration of the principles of the 
French Revolution, particularly the points that prioritised ethnicity and identity.  
During a meeting with foreign reporters he said: “Georgia's Ossetians are unwanted 
"guests" who should "go back" to North Ossetia” (Brooke, 1991).  The article cites his 
attitude to the legality of the autonomous status of South Ossetia, with 
Gamsakhurdia claiming that it was obtained by Ossetians as an appreciation for 
supporting the Bolsheviks in Georgia in 1920s (Brooke, 1991). 
 Georgia was intended for Georgians, and minorities were excluded from the 
future post-Soviet project of the nation-state.  In an interview to the Russian 
newspaper, Sobesednik, Gamsakhurdia explained that the allegations that he was 
campaigning for “Georgia for the Georgians” were "total lies". However, he 
elucidated, "Georgia, being in a catastrophic demographic predicament, cannot 
grant citizenship to all.  In any country foreigners, hostile to the state are denied 
citizenship." (1991: 7),  Gamsakhurdia’s narrative demonstrates that he was in favour 
of the selection and limitation of “foreigners”.  Note also his use of the modifier 
“hostile”, which specifically securitizes minorities.  Such views were destroying the 
multicultural legacy of Georgia, but Gamsakhurdia was able to gather enough 
supporters, and the choice was made in favour of nationalism.  As Thomas Goltz puts, 
it he did all the right things at the right time, including becoming a member of the 
Helsinki Human Rights Committee, and was an intellectual who translated European 
 117	A	private	talk	with	the	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	nationalists	in	Tbilisi,	July	2013	
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books (2009: 5).  Perhaps this secured him support along, with promoting the policy 
“Georgia First”, which pleased ethnic entrepreneurs but alienated everyone else in 
Georgia and abroad (Goltz, 2009: 6).  However, Stephen Jones observes that 
Gamsakhurdia’s period was more than just “nationalism”, as the leader believed in a 
“semi-mythological” and “racially pure” Georgia, which helped him to appeal to 
nostalgic Georgians who yearned for “the innocence of pre-Soviet times” (2013: 52).  
By enticing the “little man” who had missed out on privileges and idealistic youth, he 
reflected “Georgia’s crisis of modernity” (Jones, 2013: 52-53).  His language and its 
semantics appealed to those who lost out, saw a truncation of opportunities and had 
no access to power.  They felt bewilderment and perceived a Messianic figure in 
Gamsakhurdia.    
 Christina Teichmann points to attempts by Gamsakhurdia to control political 
conflicts linguistically (1997: 248), as she argues that a particular context defined the 
utterances of politicians (1997: 235).  In an analysis of Gamsakhurdia’s definition of 
democracy, she emphasizes his ability to achieve acceptance by using  a “triad of 
speech acts” which Tiechmann calls his “threats-demand-invoke” tactics (1997: 244).  
He always managed to present potential choices as if they were “objectively 
constrained” by external actors or forces (Tiechmann, 1997: 247).  He referred to the 
securitization of issues when facing disputes with the opposition, or when addressing 
inter-ethnic relations.  This was a case where ethnography became a tool based on 
wrong assumptions.  As Ernest Renan noted, ethnography was “an interesting 
science” but its political application was dangerous (1990).  The fluctuations in the 
scientific knowledge define the limits of states and some patriots need to be told that 
they were wrong (Renan, 1990).  Gamsakhurdia employed historic and ethnographic 
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materials to argue that the Georgian nation had a holy mission and deserved a special 
status.  Accordingly, the minorities had to comply with the norms and rules offered 
by the titular group.       
 On the other side of the barricade, his rhetoric and hyper-nationalism caused 
anti-Georgian sentiments.  The same newspaper report contains the story of a two 
and a half-year-old girl who wished to get a “machine gun” from her father to murder 
Georgians (Brooke, 1991).  Children who watched the suffering in Tskhinvali and 
heard the panicked conversations of their parents were frightened.  Through word 
of mouth and the media, the aggressive discourse was spreading fast, instilling 
prejudice against certain groups and ethnic minorities.  In Soviet Georgia, there were 
just two TV channels and the news service were censored by the government.  Hence, 
unlike Yugoslavia TV broadcast, it was less important for the distribution of 
information.  After Gamsakhurdia’s accession to power, the TV channel was 
completely controlled by a few MPs, and mostly broadcast from the bunker under 
the Parliament building in central Tbilisi.   Newspapers became “instruments of 
specific interests” and served “sectionalist propaganda” (Snyder, 2000: 125) — 
mostly nationalistic in nature. The preponderant narrative attacked the centuries-old 
links between communities that formed and shaped Georgia and Georgianess.  
Nationalists could not forge a compromise, on the contrary they continued to engage 
in a hostile discourse that did bring victory to nationalists, yet left more vanquished, 
as well as lost opportunities and decades of conflict and instability.           
 For a country and society suppressed under the Communist ideology for 
seventy years and experiencing epistemic violence, hyper-nationalism was a 
disastrous choice.  Gamsakhurdia’s rule was characterised by a plethora of 
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restrictions and bans.  His every speech and declaration were full of extremism and 
intolerance to “others”, i.e. non-ethnic Georgians, — or “guests”, as he liked to label 
them.  Some of his allies even used the adjective “ungrateful” as a prefix to the word 
“guest”.  In other words, non-Georgians were “ungrateful guests” without a place in 
an independent Georgia.  Georgia was transformed into a martyr nation, which 
suffered for the sake of the interests of “these ungrateful guests”.118   As the New 
York Times reported, Gamsakhurdia’s campaign, “Georgia for Georgians”, 
discouraged mixed marriages, “where its citizenship would be restricted to people 
who could prove residence prior to Russia's annexation of 1801, and where property 
rights would be limited to people who voted for national independence in a 
referendum in April” (Brooke, 1991).  Another aspect of the policy was the 
compulsory test of Georgian language and literature for admission to higher 
education, which became the law in August 1989 (Coppieters, 2002: 98).  The law 
revived memories of Stalin’s purges, as knowledge of Georgian was almost non-
existent in Abkhazia (Coppieters, 2002: 98).    
 Another of Gamsakhurdia’s addresses was on 26 May 1989 — his speech 
begins with ovations and his words are “Georgia’s sons and daughters, brothers and 
sisters, Georgians [Georgianno] Christ is Risen!”, and pronouncing that “God is with 
us”.  He refers to the past of Georgia and argues that the very existence of Georgia is 
the proof that God has been and will continue to be with “us” (the Georgians) 
(Geoika, 2009).  His mention of “holy blood” to support the destruction of the biggest 
empire of darkness is significant (Geoika, 2009).  He says that the blood of those who 
died on 9 April had joined those one hundred thousand Georgian martyrs and that 
 118	This	was	a	widespread	discourse	propagated	on	TV	and	by	the	word	of	mouth	
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those martyrs and their blood will help Georgia, and that being a martyr nation is the 
path allocated to the Georgian nation.  “A road to martyrdom, a road of Christ”, he 
insists.  His entire speech is aimed at depicting Georgia as a part of the sacral world, 
a nation belonging to heaven.  He ends by saying “Hail to independent, Christian 
Georgia!”, a sentence which in turn was aimed to alienate all non-Christian residents, 
including ethnic Georgians who were either Muslim or Catholic.     
 Gamsakhurdia uses a metaphor (See Balzacq Chapter 3), compares Georgia 
to Christ and creates a powerful image of sacred Georgia.  He also makes reference 
to “holy blood”, bringing a “rhetoric of blood” (Herzfield, 1997: 83).  According to 
Herzfield, blood has a long history in the Indo-European and Semitic cultures and has 
been a symbol of social inclusiveness (1997: 84).  As Ricoeur puts it, metaphor 
governs naming and it substitutes the missing or absent word (1976: 47-48).  By 
comparing Georgia to Christ, his intentional meaning prepares the public to accept 
bloodshed.  He substitutes the possibility of death with “a road of Christ” and “a road 
to martyrdom”.  It signifies that people had to get ready for fatal outcomes.  Another 
aspect that makes this metaphor important is the reference to a “common fate”, 
which implies enhancement of prominence and solidarity among the members of a 
group (Armstrong, 1982: 9).  Gamsakhurdia legitimizes the symbolic aspects that are 
more important than material ones in forging identity (1982: 9).  In other words, the 
Georgian nationalist leader uses several mobilizing symbols to define a special 
identity.  By referring to “holy blood”, he links human agency to symbols and to 
ancestors (Smith, 2015: 168).  Hence the idea of a “rhetoric of blood” serves as a 
mythomotoeur, which aims to link the present to past (see ch. 2).            
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 Gamsakhurdia and his supporters fractured the vulnerable fabric of Georgian 
society just as it was in search of a new post-Soviet identity.  By 1991, it was evident 
that the man who epitomized the anti-Soviet struggle for many in the 1980s was 
failing to govern Georgia.  He was heavily dependent on radical discourse, referring 
to enemies and to agents of Moscow.  He blocked access to the media for the 
opposition groups and imposed strict censorship (Forsyth, 2013: 681).           
 When a leader of a national movement, who later became a president, 
sanctions intolerance toward non-Georgians and makes it a cornerstone of the 
official policy, it produces a snowball effect.  Carroll Bogert reports about street 
meetings where people exchanged rumours regarding the situation in Abkhazia, 
telling one another that allegedly 70 Georgians were killed in Abkhazia, calling the 
situation intolerable (1989).  Gamsakhurdia labelled Abkhaz as “terrorists” and 
“agents of Moscow” who were instructed to slaughter local Georgians (Bogert, 
1989). Another controversial statement was made by then-commander of the 
Georgian forces in Abkhazia, Colonel (later to be made a general) Giorgi Karkarashvili, 
who, in a televised address, warned the Abkhaz that he was ready to sacrifice 100, 
000 Georgians to annihilate 97,000 Abkhaz (entire population), and he threatened 
that the Abkhaz people could be left without descendants (in Cheterian, 2008: 
195).119 This was perhaps one of the most powerful speech acts  of the time, and it 
worsened Abkhaz-Georgian relations.  One can make a claim that Karkarashvili’s 
threats epitomized the social conditions that produced that performative.  It 
demonstrated how power was shifting toward radicals.  However, despite this harsh 
 119	Karkarashvili,	G.	1992.	Address	to	Abkhaz,	Available	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzvtaZIMy98	[Accessed:	September	2016]	
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rhetoric, Georgians did not intend to massacre the Abkhaz and destroy the nation 
(Cheterian, 2008: 196).  Nodia attempts to explain Karkarashvili’s declaration and 
indicates that the statement implied that “it was silly” of the Abkhaz side to expose 
their youth to danger, as Georgia would never  give up Abkhazia and that in the end 
Karkarashvili was expressing his own views (Nodia, 1997: 10).  Cheterian interprets 
those words as warnings and not as threats, yet he notes that Abkhaz psychology 
was too traumatized by the memories of the nineteenth century to ignore them 
altogether (2008: 196).   
 
6.11. How does “We” become the “Other”? 
One must admit that the Georgian Communist Government along with nationalist 
parties in a matter of months made all the wrong decision, emphasized negative 
institutional and historic memory, and “aced” in alienating all non-ethnic Georgians.  
Their appeals were often based on exaggerations and self-interests but helped them 
to persuade public (Snyder, 2000: 53-54).  They acted either in concert or separately, 
yet they secured chaos and military clashes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
 As argued in chapter 3, crises in Georgia in the late 1980s were the products 
of the securitization of ethnicity, i.e. minor difference.  Empirical evidence presented 
in this chapter demonstrated how nationalist leaders constructed a discursive wall 
and fractured society, blocking channels of communication and negotiation. The 
descriptive sections provided evidence of the power of performative utterances that 
were used by leaders for the mobilization of support.  Spoken words transformed 
social reality and created mental images of enemies out of the neighbours. The 
sections offer a “snap-shot” of the dominant public narrative that inflamed emotions 
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and assembled all those artefacts, stereotypes and thoughts which were necessary 
to prove the critical vulnerability of a referent object (Balzacq, 2011b: 2).  The chapter 
shows how discursive politics worked as it created dilemmas out of security.  They 
helped to dehumanize the Abkhaz and Ossetians, and prepared the public to fight 
the war.  Referring back to Sartori’s conceptual framework, one can argue that the 
conflicts need to be approached with more-or-less measurements because during a 
tectonic political shift, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, one is unlikely to find 
one or even two either-or answers to the causations of the escalation and later 
interventions.  For this study it is central to show what security, history, and in this 
case Georgianess, meant and what they meant in terms of the political context 
assigned to them.       
 With regard to Abkhazia, Coppieters asserts that the government of Georgia 
was following an order to arrange the police operation in Sokhumi and it was legal.  
He offers an analysis of intentions that drove the Presidium to issue the order 
(Coppieters, 2003: 196). Coppetiers interprets the decision as follows: primarily the 
authorities thought that the disruption on the railway120 was a threat to the new 
government of Georgia; the government had to crush the supporters of the former 
president Gamsakhurdia (Coppieters, 2003: 196).  Simultaneously, the new 
government was unable to deal with the growing escalation of the conflict between 
Georgian and Abkhaz communities in Abkhazia as they started to arm [themselves?], 
and military presence in Abkhazia was a chance to decide the issue of Abkhazia “once 
and for all”; and the fourth point was the nationalistic stance demonstrated by the 
 120	The	official	reason	of	an	armed	operation	was	to	open	the	railway	between	Tbilisi	and	Moscow	which	was	blocked,	and	which	halted	trade	between	Georgia	and	Russia.			
344 
government of Gamsakhurdia, and, in light of his rhetoric, the new government did 
not wish to seem “less patriotic” (Coppieters, 2003: 196).  If Coppieters’s assumption 
is right, then it proves the argument that the discourse of “patriotism” was to blame 
for utterly incompetent decision.  In doing so, the government demonstrated that it 
brought in the divisive narrative and further expanded the space for verbal 
aggression.     
 According to the Georgians’ own interpretation of the events, they had the 
“right intention”, but the number of sources and evidence does not allow Coppieters 
to accept the justification of actions. Instead, he argues that there is no objective just 
cause and subjectively right intention (2003: 196).  Additionally, Coppieters questions 
the legitimacy of the Presidium of the State Council to wage war, as the Council was 
not elected but established by paramilitary leaders after an armed coup against 
Gamsakhurdia (Coppieters, 2003: 197).  Overall, the unelected Council had to deal 
with already tense relations and periodic skirmishes between Georgians and Abkhaz 
that were mostly triggered because of prevailing nationalist discourse.          
 It is important to remember that Georgians had always feared that Abkhazia 
would become a pressure point for the Moscow government in relation to 
independent Georgia (Carrère d'Encausse, 1993: 77).  Abkhazia was a prosperous 
republic with a higher rate of growth per capita income, and a disproportionate share 
of the budget, plus larger than average number of publications in its native language 
(Ozhiganov, 1997: 352).  That is the reason Georgians always thought that Russians 
would like to keep the province for themselves.  Perhaps that is why it was so 
traumatic to see the Abkhaz on the “Russian side” in the aftermath of the USSR 
collapse.   
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 Despite such fears, Georgians admitted and welcomed the hostile discourse 
against the Abkhaz.  Ozhiganov emphasizes and partially shares the viewpoint 
expressed by Svetlana Chervonnaya, regarding the role of press, media, ethnologists 
and political scientists who “aggravated interethnic tensions” and made Georgian 
nationalism a weapon with which to terrorize minorities (Ozhiganov, 1997: 352).  By 
advocating divisions, the intelligentsia assigned a “quality of aggression” to 
nationalism and underlined its negative aspects (Billig, 1995: 56).       
 
6.12. Summary 
By describing and analysing the discourses that had performed acts of securitization 
in Georgia in the 1980s, this chapter has presented the empirical evidence of 
performatives and addressed their consequences.  It responds to the causal 
mechanism that pertain to the question of the theory — who does securitization and 
what securitization does — the finding makes them mutually supportive, because 
due to these causal mechanisms one can see how those who possess certain interests 
securitize (or de-securitize) any given case (Wæver, 2011: 469). One can see how 
chains of actions unfolded and helped the creation of an exclusive society that was 
hostile toward non-Georgians or to the people who did not affiliate themselves to 
the idea of Georgianess offered by the national movement.   
 The outline of the narratives that objectified certain ethnic groups shows how 
the securitization was conducted, yet other real threats (e.g. an economic collapse) 
were not labelled as issues of immediate security (Wæver, 2011: 472).  The 
performatives emphasized in this chapter demonstrate how the national movement 
and members of intelligentsia directed public opinion, telling the public “what to 
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think” about the challenges of the time (Vultee, 2011: 80).  Maxims like 'Georgia for 
the Georgians’, 'Long live Georgian independence’, 'Let blood flow’, and 'To terror 
we will reply with terror’ consolidated most of the negative aspects of history and 
Soviet ethno-nationalism that had existed in the collective memory of the republic.  
Such words created a very dangerous “fusion of national security with national 
identity” (Vultee, 2011: 80).  People were told that they risked losing their identity 
and perhaps would be unable to live as themselves (Wæver in Vultee, 2011: 81).      
 The extracts from speeches and statements, as well as disenfranchising 
decisions show how the political entrepreneurs on all sides of the disputes “selected” 
securitizing stories and emotions that activated certain conditions (presumably 
threatening) and concealed other dimensions of the issue (Balzacq, 2005: 182).  
These trends enable one to say that security is a symbol “involved in the mediation 
of the symbolic aspect of security” and is an elucidation that emphasizes specific 
features of natural or social development thus influencing the public and their action 
(Balzacq, 2005: 183).    
 Anti-Ossetian and anti-Abkhaz sentiments were accepted because they were 
given “authorization” by the narratives of political actors or intelligentsia who were 
empowered to speak (Balzacq, 2011b: 8).  Because those people had a particular 
authority their words and evaluations of ethnic difference were regarded as 
important and became securitized.  The current findings unravel the process in which 
the securitizing actors in Tbilisi, Sokhumi and Tskhinvali as well as in Moscow induced 
the audience to accept their interpretation of the conflict.  Gamsakhurdia’s and 
Kostava’s nationalist stance paved the way to emergence of hostile sentiments 
toward Georgians across Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Stories were circulated that 
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were selected for the wider discourse about the post-Soviet status of the 
autonomous entities.  They were alienating and divisive, bringing almost all negative 
memories to the surface, and at the same time assuring the public that this was the 
democratic Georgia they wished to build.  Performatives including “exterminate”, 
“holy blood”, “terrorists” or “agents of Moscow” convinced people to other their 
compatriots.  In this case the context of securitization and power status of 
nationalists had additional leverage, as the audience thought that the national 
movement was delivering on the independence of Georgia.  Here the “linguistic 
competence” (Balzacq, 2011b: 25) was assigned to the leaders of the national 
movement as they had an unchecked authority to articulate and control the 
sequence of statements and performatives.  Thus, one can see how the “dispositional 
concept” of power, i.e. an ability to either directly or indirectly produce an effect on 
the public, secured full support in Georgia proper (Luke in Balzacq, 2011b: 26).  
Finally, one could argue that the discourse did make a difference, as was 
mentioned in chapter 1, and Adjara was not included in the securitizing discourse 
which could explain why religious difference there did not escalate into an armed 
confrontation (see Chapter 1).  Besides, there is an apt difference between the 
discourse of Georgian intellectuals in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth.  
When Adjara returned to Georgia, Ilia Chavchavadze wrote the following: “the Berlin 
treaty has done one tremendous good deed for us […]. Our brothers in blood, the 
nest of our heroes, the cradle of our civilization, our ancient Georgia, were united to 
us” (quoted in Pelkmans, 2006: 98).  Whereas the nationalists and their supporters 
in the twentieth century ‘othered’ Abkhaz and Ossetians branding them as 
‘newcomers’ and ‘guests’.        
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7. Chapter Seven  
Conclusions and Summary of Findings 
 
7.1. Introduction: What is at stake? 
 
Every research project is assessed on the merits of its contribution to the relevant 
sciences.  Hence this thesis adds voice to studies of the discursive dimensions of the 
conflicts and the impact of the main political narratives.  It examines cases in the 
South Caucasus (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  By examining discourses, the study explains the operationalization of 
historical and political narrative.   
 What did the words, the speech acts, denote in the context of securitization?  
How has the political discourse influenced the interpretation of ethnic differences 
and securitized them?  Following the footsteps of this analysis, one can see that 
political entrepreneurs inflicted hatred and resentment across the communities.  
Their words and speeches engendered divisions and differences which brought the 
countries to the brink.  These findings seek to bring to the surface the links between 
the discourse and the war, between the securitization of ethnic differences and the 
armed conflicts.  It does not offer any judgements about the validity of historic 
narratives that were used in the process of securitization, yet it outlines their 
significance in the escalation of events.  To refer to Foucault’s argument, discourse is 
not just a manifestation, but an object of desire; it not only translates struggles and 
systems of domination, but is a channel for which and by which there is a struggle — 
it is a power which can be captured and used (1981: 52-53).  Our aim here has been 
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to delve below the divisions and reassess the speech acts and performatives that led 
toward the inter-ethnic wars.   
 This section consolidates the findings and assumptions made across my 
study.  It refocuses on the question in the introduction to this thesis, as to whether 
ethnic difference was a driving force behind the armed escalation.  Referring back to 
Sartori’s concept of the more-or-less, one could conclude that narratives and 
discourses about history and symbols served as powerful instruments for the 
mobilization of public opinion.  They were not a single causation, yet the speech acts 
and performatives that dominated the public space had an enormous impact on the 
perception of conflicts on all sides of disputes.     
 
7.2.Findings 
Following from the account of the discontents across the South Caucasus, one can 
solidify the argument against nationalism.  When populists and demagogues who 
strive for influence dominate the public discourse and power, nationalism is a mere 
tool for achieving their goals.  The parties and protagonists could not withstand the 
primordialist trap that forced them to come to a singular conclusion without focusing 
on multilateral processes and interactions.  As my findings show, primordialism is not 
a rock-solid dictum, rather it was weaponized by fears, projections and interests 
which were depicted as maxims.  All accounts structured around the ethnic identity 
provide built-in assumptions that eventually ask who is right or wrong, making the 
question meaningless.  It is better to look for a smoking gun in the hands of every 
single actor and their performatives.  
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 After laying out the methodology, the thesis addresses Soviet ethno-
nationalism as it influenced the discourse of independence.  Yet at the same time, it 
depicts that references to the past were choices of individual actors, who mostly 
condemned the USSR and the Communist system.  The theory of securitization offers 
analytical dividends that allow us to broaden the research of the South Caucasus.  By 
combining social science theories and empirical data the study observes the language 
of controversies during the 1980s and early 1990s.  The empirical chapters explain 
the ideas that shaped the discourse of conflicts, showing how political protagonists 
modelled their speeches and public appeals.  These chapters provide the data to 
answer the research question and reveal the instruments of securitization.   
 If there is anything these findings generalize, it is how political discourse 
forms and shapes social reality and creates threats.  My findings show how calling 
out the common sources of hardships provide the tools to overcome them.  This 
project features the sentiments, dogmas and passions that divided society and points 
to short-sightedness that confounded visions of independence. 
 Words do possess performative power as they are the primary point of this 
research project.  They are the most important issues in the study of conflicts.  Words 
and utterances are forms of communication that reveal the very fabric of thoughts.  
When we launch a closer examination of the paradigms that organise the enmity 
then there is a hope of preventing the worst atrocities against humanity.  It can also 
equip us against demagoguery and zealotry, which is in itself a form of securitization 
of public discourse.  
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7.3. Main aspects of the study 
 
These case studies tell us a qualitatively different story about the political 
background of the wars.  It demonstrates how securitization was conducted and how 
the ethnic difference became a weapon of warfare.  This thesis has two original 
aspects: it applies the securitization theory to the non-democratic orders and 
demonstrates how the concept explains the perceptions of the post-Soviet political 
actors; and secondly it examines the South Caucasus through the social-
constructivist prism and argues that the actors mutually constituted the crisis around 
constitutional dilemmas and translated them into violent conflicts.   
By emphasizing the importance of referent objects, securitizing actors and the 
context that was employed to conduct securitization, can outline the correlation 
between conflicts and speech.  By distancing itself from a geopolitical view of the 
conflicts, this study revisited the adjectives and modifiers that predated the turmoil.  
These depict the lines of differentiation that epitomized otherness and the speech 
acts where history commanded the meaning of discourse.  The thesis shows how the 
communities fell victims to extremism and demagoguery. 
 The aim of this thesis was to apply securitization theory to the context and 
development of the three conflicts in the South Caucasus, and to explore the rules 
and practices that defined the dispute and how differences were produced and 
reproduced by the discourse.  It has encapsulated trends that were significant in the 
region during the 1980s and early 1990s.  First, it showed the discursive power of 
nationalist ideas to be overarching.  Secondly, one can observe the process of 
othering that engulfed the three republics of the USSR.       
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 As already mentioned, security serves political goals in “various contexts”, 
and scientists should examine as many cases as possible (see Vuori ch. 1).  
Securitization considers practices, artefacts, metaphors, policy tools, images and 
stereotypes that contextually mobilise the audience (ch. 3).  It is a theory that looks 
for power in communications between political actors and a community.  This theory 
seeks to find the imprint of power in daily relations as it studies the ways that are 
used to assign categories to political aims.  Securitization theory goes into the depth 
of the problem and helps to define blurred lines between acceptable and 
unacceptable conduct, between a friend and an enemy, and between us and them.  
It helps to study actors who preach and teach intolerance as they create 
vulnerabilities and then exploit them.    
 When assessing the conflicts, one must remember that the language has 
meaning as it creates symbolic content.  In other words, securitization is produced 
through communication when enunciators claim legitimacy.  By adhering to 
particular trends, political discourse creates the ‘law’ of existence of hostile political 
statements (ch. 3).  One can see how political actors defined and shaped the language 
and made exceptions acceptable.  Upon the examination it is striking what the 
domain of discourse was, how the social memory was affected and, in certain cases, 
censored or repressed, and how history was transmuted to fit the appropriate 
discourse and impose control on narrative.   
 By addressing the discourse as a “monument” these findings demonstrate 
how history and ethnic belonging became monuments that were worshipped.  These 
three cases emphasise the contexts that were accentuated in the South Caucasus 
and add value to the overall studies of securitization.  
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 This thesis thus demonstrated how speech acts and performatives do things 
by allocating ‘relevant’ context to the content and meaning of issues.  By examining 
speeches and decisions, one could see how the burden of interpretation of certain 
concepts or notions lies with individuals rather than structures like geopolitics.  As 
the empirical data proves, the politics of enmity is a sum of individual choices of those 
who are authorized to speak in the name of power or possess the power.  It also 
shows how the failure to communicate power fails the governments.  By embarking 
on speculations around the security of nation and importance of historic justice the 
political entrepreneurs securitized political language but failed to provide security.  
In other words, if one generalizes the findings, political actors refer to platitudes 
which then unleash the forces they are unable of control.  Therefore, securitization 
becomes a tool of destruction, resulting in more losers than victors.             
  There was an ethnic ‘wrapping’ for the crisis, but the real reason was the 
legal and political discontent between the centre and the periphery.  The defining 
trait of the conflicts was the politicized image of the dissent.  To be more specific, 
virulent nationalism was something manufactured and created by political actors 
who emphasized memories and narratives founded on hostility and negative 
experiences.  The analysis and materials elucidated in this project offer footage and 
other empirical data that demonstrate the radicalism of parties.  Indeed, every case 
of securitization is “a historical process” that takes place between preceding set of 
events and their subsequent impact on communication of the time, that help to 
reinforce repercussions of securitization (Balzacq, 2011b: 14).  In other words, the 
investigation of the cases shows what the “doing was” at the point of escalation (see 
Veine ch. 2).        
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 Contradictions over the status and legal jurisdiction of Abkhazia, Nagorno-
Karabakh or South Ossetia were mainly wars of adjectives.  New political actors 
wished to establish their own modifiers of autonomy and power distribution.  
Borrowing from Foucault, the explanation of the conflicts should not be researched 
from either strategic or primordial concepts, nor should it focus on the timeline of 
events, but it should instead be a descriptive analysis of the transformations that 
occurred throughout (Foucault, 1991b: 58).  Consequently, any description of the 
shifts in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods are best manifested in the discourses 
that shaped and reshaped the communities and republics of a former giant state.            
 As this analysis has demonstrated, nationalistic and historic narratives were 
eroded by the Soviet nationalities policies and then securitized by nationalists and 
freedom fighters.  By the end of the twentieth century there was a hybrid confluence 
of two ideologies that shaped the political order of post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia.  By combining the modified past offered by the Bolshevik leaders in the 
1920s, nationalists were unable to bring positive change.  Soviet historiography was 
exceptionally politicized, hence the involvement of history in the narratives of 
mobilization that determined the significance of the old ideology they wished to 
topple.  The Soviet doctrine became an ideological powerhouse of new political 
elites.  By opting to instrumentalize history as a unifying tool, the nationalists divided 
the very communities they meant to unite.         
 It is essential to address these conflicts as a single crisis, or three distinct 
shades of one complexity.  As previous chapters explain, the local actors in the Soviet 
republics were politicized and radicalized during the 1980s.  In the time of loud 
355 
declarations forbidden for decades, it was easy to bargain with truth or with the idea 
of whether it existed at all.  
 
7.4. Local narratives 
 
In light of the destruction of the Soviet Union and the subsequent challenges, the 
discourses and narratives about ethnical purity and a sacred mission of particular 
groups did not help disputes.  Rather, they strengthened in-group solidarity among 
those who were deemed to be out-groups.  
 It could be said that the local political narratives and discourses played the 
biggest role in escalation of the conflicts in the South Caucasus.  Those narratives 
created an ethnic limbo that dominated the peace talks and negotiations.  Their 
content implicitly forced communities and governments to choose a focal point and 
address every problem in the scope of ethnic belonging.  The nationalists’ words gave 
the power to ethnos.      
 The broad narrative of “Georgia for Georgians” was a demonstration of ultra-
nationalism that harmed Georgia as a state and Georgia as a society.  The first victim 
of nationalism promoted by Gamsakhurdia was the South Ossetian autonomy.  In the 
case of South Ossetia, Georgian nationalists triggered enmity artificially.    
 As Ozhiganov argues, the idea of “historic enmity” was instilled into the 
consciousness of the Georgian people by the nationalist leaders and their followers, 
who promoted the idea of Georgians as a “host nation” and all others as “guests” 
(1997: 343).  Olga Vasileva notes that the conflict in Abkhazia was triggered by the 
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belief of Georgians that they had a “historic past” which stipulated that Georgia 
would flourish as a free and united nation in the future, manifested in the maxim 
widely quoted by the nationalists that there was “a historic right of Georgians to 
Georgian lands”, and that “guests” should be accustomed to their “second-class” 
position in that new Georgia (in Ozhiganov, 1997: 343).     
 Intellectuals in Tbilisi were divided as they enhanced the importance of 
negative aspects of the bilateral relations.  Georgia was approaching a point of no 
return from escalation of disputes.  As mentioned earlier, there has to be a fertile soil 
for negative stories, people have to remember certain extracts of history, which then 
make them susceptible to moral pressure (see Deutsch) — and nationalistically 
imbued editorials served exactly that cause.   
 History has a direct link to the narratives and discourses that triggered the 
escalation.  It is not clear who was telling the truth or who was lying, but the end 
result was tragic.  As mentioned in the introduction, Vicken Cheterian blames a 
distorted interpretation of history and lack of a marketplace of ideas during the 
Soviet period (2008: 41-42).   
 As Brubaker defines it, nationalism is “a category of practice” and its 
understanding requires an exploration of practical issues related to nationalism and 
its production (see Brubaker, 2003).  It is clear how the texts chosen by the 
nationalists influenced the understanding of nation and nationalism in the post-
Soviet South Caucasus.  In Armenia a discourse came from Nagorno-Karabakh that 
emphasized the social and economic problems, but at the same time implicitly 
depicted Azerbaijanis as enemies and allies of Turkey or, as the findings show, they 
were defined as “Turks”.  Turkey, as mentioned earlier, represents an existential 
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threat to the Armenian state and the Armenian people.  Turkey, as the legal heir of 
the Ottoman Empire, is considered responsible for the 1915 genocide of Armenians.  
The nationalists and authors of various letters and appeals knew that by relating 
Azerbaijanis to Turks they were propagating enmity and hatred.  Azerbaijanis were 
equated with Turks, i.e. sub-humans, who did not deserve either rights or 
sovereignty.  The discourse about secession or the change of jurisdiction of Nagorno-
Karabakh is predominantly focused on ethnic identity, on the dichotomy of the “us 
and them” — Armenian and Turk — who claim to be Azeris and wish to exterminate 
Armenians (see Aivazian’s letter in Libaridian p.92).   
 Another culprit was the mass rally in Yerevan that also mobilized the public 
around an idea of Armenian identity that was under threat from Azerbaijanis.  
Armenia had to unite and protect its identity against its enemies.  Aivazian’s appeal 
enumerates the issues that were emphasized in the dispute concerning the legal 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but few of his points contained any juridical 
argumentation.    
 As Laitin and Suny note, ethnic hatreds were very insignificant; instead they 
place the emphasis on ‘nation-building’, ethnonationalism in the USSR and the 
rapidly dissolving Soviet Union (see Suny and Laitin, 1999).  Historic justice and 
nationalism were part of the nation-building plans of nationalist politicians.  In the 
case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the theme was apparent during the discussions between 
Gorbachev and the Armenian nationalists from the Karabakh Committee.  
Additionally, Kaputikian and Balayan wished to be seen as authorities capable of 
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talking with Moscow.121  The records show that Gorbachev insisted on stopping the 
escalation of differences.  Yet, the nationalists had another agenda; they had 
influence over the crowds in Yerevan who supported their ‘just’ demands.  Public 
debate was about ‘the sides’ that the Kremlin allegedly took during the dispute.  
From the beginning there was a dividing line: that the supreme government 
supported the ‘out-group’ — i.e. Azerbaijanis — and that Armenians were 
suppressed in the debate.  Such perceptions produced a snowball effect and helped 
to rally people around the idea of the reconstruction of historic Armenia that had to 
start from Nagorno-Karabakh.  Karabakh became a totem, word, and place that 
assured the legitimacy of the warmongers.     
 Sumgait was a result of local discourses that emanated from insecurity and 
disorientation as well as local political actors who opted for the manipulation of 
nationalistic sentiments.  As my findings show, the simple reference to Azerbaijani 
refugees triggered the tragedy in Sumgait.   
 The looming perspective of being second-class citizens of even an 
independent Georgia was not the most comfortable and beneficial prospect for non-
Georgians.  They felt threatened by the unwelcoming discourses of Georgians.  South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia had a status that was questioned firstly by nationalists, and 
later the Communist government of Georgian SSR adopted legislation that further 
questioned their position in the case of independence from Moscow.  Hence, the 
content of discourse, speech acts, and the language used was of great importance.  
 121	The	ability	to	communicate	with	Moscow	was	an	additional	advantage	for	the	popularity	and	ranking	of	politicians.		Despite	aspirations	to	freedom	and	sovereignty,	the	wider	public	still	paid	attention	to	such	details,	as	Moscow	and	the	Kremlin	were	seen	as	bridges	to	the	rest	of	the	world.						
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The polities deliberately selected epithets that served to deepen the rift between 
communities.   
 To sum up, the narratives and discourse created a world of ‘hosts’ and 
‘guests’, where guests were labelled as ungrateful.  The language used to organize 
the legal dispute over the status of two autonomies largely defined the escalation 
and securitization of ethnic belonging of Abkhaz and Ossetians.  In Armenia, 
Azerbaijanis were securitized as being Turks, who were enemies of Armenia, while in 
Azerbaijan, Armenians became enemies as they wished to occupy Azeri lands.  Local 
nationalists created a story built on threats, and, as Balzacq puts it there was an 
“assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts” were contextually mobilised 
in order to create the critical vulnerability of the referent object (2011b: 3).                   
 In the end, the leaders of the national movements used knowledge and a 
historical memory that was filtered twice: first by the Russian empire, and later by 
the Communist regime.  In other words, nationalists used ideas that were bred under 
the heavy influence of the epistemic filter of two oppressive regimes.        
 
7.5. Performance of security 
As mentioned elsewhere, the examination of language and application of the “ethnic 
shifters” help to reveal the context of the conflicts.  Speech acts and performatives 
that assigned significance to ethnicity also fitted history into the securitization 
narrative.  Thus, analysis of the way in which the discourse circulated, or how form 
and meaning were connected in particular circumstances, define this study (see ch. 
3).  Politicians used words that were actions themselves: their modifiers had 
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“performative” power.  Therefore, this study wishes to highlight the importance of 
political power that “draws boundaries and erects walls” (Searle ch. 3).  This research 
is a distinct interpretation of the controversies of personality, cultural difference, 
political affiliations and ethnic rights.  This is a study of a conflict as a discursive 
product.  Hence it offered an insight into the discursive roots of nationalist grievances 
that have been pertaining to the power discourse ever since.    
 This analysis is about the importance of the narrative chosen by those in 
power or those close to power.  One has to acknowledge the significance of their 
utterances that defined the modes of enmity in the South Caucasus rather than look 
into geopolitical rivalries.  Wittgenstein observes that “the results of philosophy are 
the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding 
has got by running up against the limits of language.  They — these bumps — make 
us see the value of that discovery” (2009: no: 119).  Those bumps that were 
“performed” by the nationalist leaders help one to uncover trajectories of 
mobilization.  One must admit that the discourse transformed the mode of thinking 
about identity and who the “others” were.  It influenced the conditions of 
communication.  Even today, the parties use the language that had governed their 
alienation thirty years ago and are unable to change the modifiers of the discontent.  
The “regime of truth” created by that discourse provides ground for and makes it 
possible to sustain a system that divides communities and supports “othering”.    
 
7.6. Symbols of otherness 
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One striking issue that resurfaces in this analysis regards peoples’ understanding of 
their identities and how Georgians imagined themselves vis-à-vis the Abkhaz or 
Ossetians and how Azerbaijanis and Armenians perceived each other.  What was 
their sense of belonging and what was contested?  In other words, the parties vied 
for a symbolic power that, instead of strengthening newly acquired sovereignty, 
fragmented and destroyed them.   
 The question has to be understood as to whether it was about people or 
symbols and why the symbols had a greater value than human lives.  As this thesis 
has argued the nationalist discourse amended the rules of communication, which in 
turn radicalized the positions held by parties.   
 In the approaches of Georgians and Armenians toward the ‘other’, one can 
notice the context of victimhood, which provides another powerful speech act that 
helps the enunciators to forge a new reality.  Georgians found existential enemies 
among the Abkhaz and Ossetians, whereas Armenians and Azerbaijanis erected 
dividing walls between two nations.  The polemics were about the distribution of 
redress in the post-Soviet political reality and the nationalist leaders turned it into 
the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy.  It is the political that becomes the most severe and 
extreme antagonism, and it gains momentum closer to the tipping point of re-
grouping activities (Schmitt and Strong, 2007: 29).  In other words, one can refer to 
Schmitt’s argument that the “political” creates enemies and increases tensions 
between the groups, because all political concepts, images and terminology have a 
polemical meaning as they focus on a specific situation and often disappear like 
ghosts when the problem fades (2007: 30).   
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 In a certain way, the nationalists hijacked words like nation, patriot, security 
and history because they changed the language of communication.  The entire 
nationalistic discourse was a type of “cheating” to borrow from Schmitt (2007: 54).  
They promoted a social order that did not accommodate minority communities.  In 
the end, they employed the very same methods of differentiation as the Communists 
had done when they used ethno-nationalism as the founding concept of statehood.   
 This thesis has demonstrated that the political toolbox used by the 
nationalists was hugely predisposed and influenced by the Soviet vision.  In essence, 
the attempt to build new states was founded on the values of a deteriorating regime 
that failed.      
 
7.7. Whose freedom and whose justice? 
Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian patriots all claimed to 
act in the name of historic justice and freedom of their consequent countries.     
Mostly ‘justice’ became a pathetic word that epitomised the banality of the patriots’ 
demands.  By referring to justice, it was easy to look “moral” but in the end it 
diminished the very value of justice.         
 By revealing the means used to achieve political goals, one is then better able 
to demonstrate their relevance to the future (Arendt, 1970: 4).  The means — 
narratives, symbols and discourses — ended up being important because of the 
content, yet almost futile for building inclusive states.  Bearing this in mind, one can 
see that the political goals of the nationalist movements could not pass the test of 
relevance.  Hence, this study shows how apparently ‘permanent’ problems were 
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constructed by political actors, and emphasizes the role of agency, rather than 
blaming structures for the crises in this region. 
 As history commanded the meaning of the discourse, symbols were 
weaponized against the people.  As one can see in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis, myths about the great past and symbols of ethnic belonging were allocated 
much greater importance than human life.  The political entrepreneurs engineered 
the regime of truth that enabled them to influence people to accept securitization of 
ethnic differences.   
 If one seeks the logos of war in the South Caucasus, then that word must be 
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